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Liberty Before Liberalism
This extended essay by one of the world's leading historians seeks, in its first part, to excavate and vindicate the neo-Roman theory of free citizens and free states as it developed in early modern Britain. This analysis leads to a powerful defense of the nature, purposes and goals of intellectual history and the history of ideas. In this concise yet powerful account, derived from his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor at Cambridge, Quentin Skinner provides one of the most substantial statements yet made about the importance, relevance and excitement of this form of historical enquiry.
156 pages, Paperback
First published January 13, 1998
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About the author
Quentin Skinner
94 books131 followersEducated at Caius College, Cambridge, where he was elected to a Fellowship upon obtaining a double-starred first in History, Quentin Skinner accepted, however, a teaching Fellowship at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he taught until 2008, except for four years in the 1970s spent at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. In 1978 he was appointed to the chair of Political Science at Cambridge University, and subsequently regarded as one of the two principal members (along with J.G.A. Pocock) of the influential 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought, best known for its attention to the 'languages' of political thought.
Skinner's primary interest in the 1970s and 1980s was the modern idea of the state, which resulted in two of his most highly regarded works, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance and The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume II: The Age of Reformation.
Skinner's primary interest in the 1970s and 1980s was the modern idea of the state, which resulted in two of his most highly regarded works, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance and The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume II: The Age of Reformation.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
February 27, 2014
Brief but very interesting explanation of the difference between the "neo-roman" concept of liberty as espoused by 17th Century thinkers like John Milton and the classical liberal concept of liberty as espoused by 18th Century thinkers like William Paley. Essentially, the difference lies in their respective definitions of "negative liberty." Neo-roman thinkers perceive inequality and dependence as threats to liberty. Classical liberals only see liberty as being threatened by coercive interference. The entire book serves to critique presuppositions in Isaiah Berlin's seminal book Two Concepts of Liberty. There much on which to ruminate in this brief book. Highly recommended.
November 22, 2018
Towards the end of this lecture, Skinner compares great works from the canon of political, philosophical and historical enquiry with Purcell's operas and Paradise Lost. The argument he is countering is that we should only study the past in order to deepen our understanding of the present. Sometimes, Skinner argues, it is enough simply to enjoy them for what they are and for what they tell us of the age from which they sprang. "But no one supposes these latter works of art to be any less valuable for being unable to tell us how to conduct our lives in the face of the new millennium."
I like the beauty of this argument and this book may be read simply for the pleasure of reading a well-argued case. Further, it may be read as an important landmark in our assessment of where we stand as a liberal democracy. Our Constitution has its roots in two traditions of liberal thought. One stemming largely from Locke and Bentham and one, earlier and arguably more significant born in ancient Rome but flourishing in seventeenth-century England. Not merely an intellectual movement but the driving force behind resistance to the monarchy, the Civil War and the founding of Parliamentary democracy in 1688/9 - 1701 - 1707. (Oh, and the driving philosophy behind the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence. Two ideologies with a deal of shading in the Venn diagram but equally a deal of antagonism (as is often the case with things more alike than unlike.)
We chose to follow Liberalism through Locke, Bentham, Mill, Mill and on. But we haven't lost what Skinner always refers to as "Neo Romanism". If you read this, read it in conjunction with "Our Republican Constitution" Adam Tomkins and/or Philip Pettit's Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.
Oh, and it's a good idea not to confuse Republicanism with the party of George W and Trump.
I like the beauty of this argument and this book may be read simply for the pleasure of reading a well-argued case. Further, it may be read as an important landmark in our assessment of where we stand as a liberal democracy. Our Constitution has its roots in two traditions of liberal thought. One stemming largely from Locke and Bentham and one, earlier and arguably more significant born in ancient Rome but flourishing in seventeenth-century England. Not merely an intellectual movement but the driving force behind resistance to the monarchy, the Civil War and the founding of Parliamentary democracy in 1688/9 - 1701 - 1707. (Oh, and the driving philosophy behind the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence. Two ideologies with a deal of shading in the Venn diagram but equally a deal of antagonism (as is often the case with things more alike than unlike.)
We chose to follow Liberalism through Locke, Bentham, Mill, Mill and on. But we haven't lost what Skinner always refers to as "Neo Romanism". If you read this, read it in conjunction with "Our Republican Constitution" Adam Tomkins and/or Philip Pettit's Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.
Oh, and it's a good idea not to confuse Republicanism with the party of George W and Trump.
September 14, 2021
There once existed a view of liberty that preceded liberal ‘negative liberty’. Quentin Skinner excavates this lost ‘liberty’ from its burial at the hand of liberalism.
The neo-romans conceived of liberty as a matter of establishing a free state or a republic. Citizens would only be free if authority was bound by laws and could not rule arbitrarily. Being free meant that your freedom was not dependent on the goodwill of the state. Moreover, these laws had to be accepted by popular consent. In this sense, citizens were only free if they were all equally subject to a set of laws – if the ability of the powerful to infringe on others’ liberty was itself infringed upon. Skinner’s extended essay, in digging up a lost form of a collectivist conception of liberty, reminded me in part of Benjamin Constant’s similar lecture on the liberties of the ancients compared to those of the moderns.
The neo-roman view contrasts the liberal view that freedom is merely the ability to act without impediment. For liberals, subjects living under a monarchy could theoretically be as free as citizens under a popular government as long as their autocrat decided to not infringe on their liberty.
At the end of his extended essay, Skinner makes the case that intellectual historians should not just use political texts to derive lessons for contemporary politics but should place these into the context of the debates of when they were written and the responses they provoked. Skinner also points out the arbitrariness of treating political texts as answering perennial political questions. For instance, historians often too readily accept the ‘negative liberty’ view as the eternal conception of freedom without understanding the contexts that those arguments were made in.
A thought-provoking piece of intellectual history.
The neo-romans conceived of liberty as a matter of establishing a free state or a republic. Citizens would only be free if authority was bound by laws and could not rule arbitrarily. Being free meant that your freedom was not dependent on the goodwill of the state. Moreover, these laws had to be accepted by popular consent. In this sense, citizens were only free if they were all equally subject to a set of laws – if the ability of the powerful to infringe on others’ liberty was itself infringed upon. Skinner’s extended essay, in digging up a lost form of a collectivist conception of liberty, reminded me in part of Benjamin Constant’s similar lecture on the liberties of the ancients compared to those of the moderns.
The neo-roman view contrasts the liberal view that freedom is merely the ability to act without impediment. For liberals, subjects living under a monarchy could theoretically be as free as citizens under a popular government as long as their autocrat decided to not infringe on their liberty.
At the end of his extended essay, Skinner makes the case that intellectual historians should not just use political texts to derive lessons for contemporary politics but should place these into the context of the debates of when they were written and the responses they provoked. Skinner also points out the arbitrariness of treating political texts as answering perennial political questions. For instance, historians often too readily accept the ‘negative liberty’ view as the eternal conception of freedom without understanding the contexts that those arguments were made in.
A thought-provoking piece of intellectual history.
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November 16, 2020As deft an analysis as you'd expect from Skinner - he both articulates with ease the broader lineage of debates around liberty, and intervenes effectively on a more fine-grained level in the conceptual disputes around this ever-illusive term. Situating the 'Neo-Roman' formulation of liberty in the pre-Restoration interregnum, Skinner's aim to recover a geneaology of liberty which might thoroughly contest the near-hegemonic liberal conception, is fairly appealing, even if schematic. That we can strive for more than mere non-interference and move toward a more productive theorising of non-domination is a foundation for neo-Republican thought, and Skinner's text offers an instructive introduction to its theorising.
The final section pushes beyond this specific theme, with Skinner guiding us through a fairly standard summary of the contextualist method and its forebearers, and outlining his (somewhat over-cautious) hopes for the intellectual historian. His vision of intellectual history, openly compared to some obvious parallels in Nietzsche (and in footnote form, Foucault), is standard fare, but nonetheless particularly well-expressed here. Hard to disagree that we should rebuke the 'depressingly philistine view of historical enquiry' that sees only 'scholarly antiquarianism' in recovering these subterranean debates, and that the intellectual historian should agitate so as to 'reappraise some of our current assumptions' and aid us in throwing off our inherited theoretical baggage, but perhaps we can be more bold, too. (Who might constitute this 'we' is of course a central question!)
I keenly await CUP's forthcoming Rethinking Liberty After Liberalism to see how contemporary theorists are tackling this short but acclaimed lecture-text, and I'd recommend Skinner's recent long-interview with Johnny Lyons too!
The final section pushes beyond this specific theme, with Skinner guiding us through a fairly standard summary of the contextualist method and its forebearers, and outlining his (somewhat over-cautious) hopes for the intellectual historian. His vision of intellectual history, openly compared to some obvious parallels in Nietzsche (and in footnote form, Foucault), is standard fare, but nonetheless particularly well-expressed here. Hard to disagree that we should rebuke the 'depressingly philistine view of historical enquiry' that sees only 'scholarly antiquarianism' in recovering these subterranean debates, and that the intellectual historian should agitate so as to 'reappraise some of our current assumptions' and aid us in throwing off our inherited theoretical baggage, but perhaps we can be more bold, too. (Who might constitute this 'we' is of course a central question!)
I keenly await CUP's forthcoming Rethinking Liberty After Liberalism to see how contemporary theorists are tackling this short but acclaimed lecture-text, and I'd recommend Skinner's recent long-interview with Johnny Lyons too!
January 2, 2020
Crucial text in both the contemporary political philosophical tradition of neo-republicanism and intellectual history. The text tries to show us both the relevance of the republican philosophical tradition and the praxis of the intellectual historian.
June 11, 2017
This is not a book about which you can sum up its main arguments or points other than by diminishing them in the process. It is a short, densely-packed, clearly written book, which should a must-read to anyone interested in politics and to anyone interested in how did we become what we are today as a society driven by so-called liberalism. I have read it over and over to make sure I understood it.
The title says it all: even before liberalism was formulated, from Hobbes to Bentham to Berlin, other, deeper, more thoughtful thinkers, who lived through the English Civil War, had formulated a theory of what liberty is. And liberty is not non-interference. Liberty is to live in a free state, which means that one is never threatened in his capacity to act according to his free will. Liberty is not the absence of constraints, because a free state constraints those who live under his rule. But it does so only to protect everyone's liberty from the arbitrary whims and power of others. To achieve this form of state, everyone interested in it should have the sovereignty to make and to alter its laws at will. This is why these authors were true republicans in the sense that they understood that only in a state where the state belongs to all, is this res publica, liberty is real and preserved.
This, I fear, inapt abstract (I warned you) is not only enlightening in itself but it is even more so when the eclipse of this powerful theory is considered. Hobbes with the vindication of absolutism, Locke to a lesser extent with his contractualism (only necessary to found the state, not to renew it), but also the utilitarianism of Bentham which gave birth to modern liberalism as defended by Berlin have all but annihilated the neo-roman republican theory, as Skinner calls it.
In excavating it, Skinner reminds us that there was once another liberty, a liberty that was a refutation of liberalism 'avant la lettre' and that if it existed once, it can still be a choice today. And in so doing, Skinner not only manages to add to our corpus of knowledge of intellectual history, but he also delivers a powerful lesson in the methods and purposes of the history of ideas. Wonderful.
(The only criticism I would have would be that Skinner, as all historians from the Cambridge "school", totally neglects and doesn't seem to know that these questions were debated in France too, and for instance there is no reference to Benjamin Constant's theory of the liberty of the Ancients v. the liberty of the Modern. But, that's for other books to come...)
The title says it all: even before liberalism was formulated, from Hobbes to Bentham to Berlin, other, deeper, more thoughtful thinkers, who lived through the English Civil War, had formulated a theory of what liberty is. And liberty is not non-interference. Liberty is to live in a free state, which means that one is never threatened in his capacity to act according to his free will. Liberty is not the absence of constraints, because a free state constraints those who live under his rule. But it does so only to protect everyone's liberty from the arbitrary whims and power of others. To achieve this form of state, everyone interested in it should have the sovereignty to make and to alter its laws at will. This is why these authors were true republicans in the sense that they understood that only in a state where the state belongs to all, is this res publica, liberty is real and preserved.
This, I fear, inapt abstract (I warned you) is not only enlightening in itself but it is even more so when the eclipse of this powerful theory is considered. Hobbes with the vindication of absolutism, Locke to a lesser extent with his contractualism (only necessary to found the state, not to renew it), but also the utilitarianism of Bentham which gave birth to modern liberalism as defended by Berlin have all but annihilated the neo-roman republican theory, as Skinner calls it.
In excavating it, Skinner reminds us that there was once another liberty, a liberty that was a refutation of liberalism 'avant la lettre' and that if it existed once, it can still be a choice today. And in so doing, Skinner not only manages to add to our corpus of knowledge of intellectual history, but he also delivers a powerful lesson in the methods and purposes of the history of ideas. Wonderful.
(The only criticism I would have would be that Skinner, as all historians from the Cambridge "school", totally neglects and doesn't seem to know that these questions were debated in France too, and for instance there is no reference to Benjamin Constant's theory of the liberty of the Ancients v. the liberty of the Modern. But, that's for other books to come...)
October 15, 2010
I'm not entirely sure that Skinner's conception of liberty as non-domination (to use Pettit's phrase) is really that distinct from equality, but nonetheless I think that emphasizing that freedom is more than the absence of state coercion is a vital service. Popular government requires more of us.
December 9, 2020
O objetivo da obra de Skinner é apresentar a teoria neorromana que, na modernidade, foi substituída pela teoria liberal utilitarista. Nas discussões acerca da monarquia na Inglaterra do século XVII, surgiu a teoria neorromana, defendida por Milton, Harrigton, Sidney, Nedham, enfatizando a liberdade civil em sentido político. Seu postulado era de que o Estado deveria agir positivamente para evitar que os indivíduos caíssem na dependência da boa vontade de um terceiro e deveria evitar a arbitrariedade de seus agentes. Essa teoria foi contestada por monarquistas, como Hobbes e Filmer, prevalecendo, no século XVIII, o utilitarismo liberal. Skinner busca resgatar a teoria neorromana e sustenta que o papel do historiador do pensamento é agir como um arqueólogo ao trazer à superfície textos clássicos que possibilitem repensar a teoria política.
June 14, 2022
Νομίζω ότι είναι πιο ενδιαφέρον ως ένα παράδειγμα του τι είναι η ιστορία των ιδεών και πως γράφεται παρά ως μια ανάλυση των ιδεολογικών παρατάξεων που περιγράφει. Επίσης είναι αξιοσημείωτο πως η χαρακτηριστική ιδιότητα των Αγγλόφωνων διανοούμενων (σε αντίθεση π.χ. με τους Γάλλους) να γράφουν με εύκολα κατανοητό τρόπο ακόμη και για τα πιο σύνθετα ζητήματα φαίνεται να έχει χαθεί με αυτή την μετάφραση.
August 17, 2019
A short text that I read in conjunction with Philip Pettit's work. A useful antidote to the prevailing discourse on classical liberalism, a toy of the enlightened and omitting the type of community and culture required to nurture and preserve freedoms. We live in a type of political system that does not.
January 23, 2021
Not a 'wow' book but a good entry into the history of political thought that gave me a good insight into a variety of 17th-century texts I'm unlikely to read (or read again). Brief and unpretentious, and not overly keen on chucking in loads of concepts that aren't relevent.
June 21, 2021
Siglos antes de que ese aglutinado de mercenarios, fundamentalistas y retardados, que se hacen llamar liberales y libertarios, se tomara las páginas de opinión en miles de diarios de todo el mundo, se escribió sobre la importancia libertad de manera muy elocuente y profunda.
May 17, 2017
A great essay on different understandings of the concept of freedom. Inspires to study humanities deeper.
October 29, 2017
A erudição de Skinner é impressionante. Os exemplos da cidade de Lucca e de Flauto Redivivus valem a leitura!
May 5, 2020
Excellent review of freedom before and after liberalism. Allows us to understand the difference between the pre-modern and modern concepts of liberty in a historical conext.
December 4, 2020
فرصت کوتاهی در تاریخ بریتانیا برای بازپرداختن به سنت نئورومنی آزادی دست داد و نویسنده در مقام مورخ و تحلیلگر تاریخ سعی میکند بگوید چرا آن فرصت از دست رفت و لیبرالیسم ظهور کرد.
August 6, 2021
Truly eye-opening. A great introduction to the field of intellectual history.
March 8, 2007
Good stuff. Short, thorough, and it makes an interesting point about the way most people use liberty today. Basically, people in the 17th century thought of it in two ways: non-domination/non-dependence, and non-interference. The former is republican, the latter liberal (although not necessarily in the way that we use those terms in contemporary politics). Taking for granted that liberty means only non-interference has skewed the way that we interpret political freedom. He uses this to critique Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty", which is also good...
July 17, 2016
Really good introduction to the history of Republican thought. Definitely makes a strong case that (a) many notable 16th-to-18th-century political commentators had a distinct understanding of freedom/liberty that does *not* match up with our contemporary notions (which basically come from Berlin, by way of Constant possibly), and (b) we can resuscitate this "neo-roman" notion of freedom/liberty to gain a refreshing new perspective on modern political issues [for this, see Pettit, "Republicanism"!]
May 12, 2009
Skinner examines the rise and fall of of what he refers to as the "neo-Roman" theory of liberty in the 17th century.
April 18, 2024
Good and short intro to republican ideas of liberty
Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews