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The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era
Populism of the right and left has spread like wildfire throughout the world. The impulse reached its apogee in the United States with the election of Trump, but it was a force in Europe ever since the Great Recession sent the European economy into a prolonged tailspin. In the simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies economic and political elites and instead lionizes 'the people.' The people, populists of all stripes contend, need to retake power from the unaccountable elites who have left them powerless. And typically, populists' distrust of elites shades into a catchall distrust of trained experts because of their perceived distance from and contempt for 'the people.' Another signature element of populist movements is faith in a savior who can not only speak directly to the people, but also serve as a vessel for the plain people's hopes and dreams. Going back to the 1890s, a series of such saviors have come and gone in the US alone, from William Jennings
Bryan to Huey Long to--finally--Donald Trump.
In The Populist Temptation , the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and 'bought' politicians are responsible for the mess, populists' own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control--international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists--populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to shoring up and improving the welfare
state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America's patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump's victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.
Bryan to Huey Long to--finally--Donald Trump.
In The Populist Temptation , the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and 'bought' politicians are responsible for the mess, populists' own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control--international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists--populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to shoring up and improving the welfare
state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America's patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump's victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.
262 pages, Hardcover
Published June 4, 2018
58 people are currently reading
409 people want to read
About the author
Barry Eichengreen
107 books136 followersBarry Eichengreen* is the George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987. He is a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Massachusetts) and Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (London, England). In 1997-98 he was Senior Policy Advisor at the International Monetary Fund. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (class of 1997).
Professor Eichengreen is the convener of the Bellagio Group of academics and economic officials and chair of the Academic Advisory Committee of the Peterson Institute of International Economics. He has held Guggenheim and Fulbright Fellowships and has been a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto) and the Institute for Advanced Study (Berlin). He is a regular monthly columnist for Project Syndicate.
His most recent books are Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (January 2011)(shortlisted for the Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award in 2011), Emerging Giants: China and India in the World Economy, co-edited with Poonam Gupta and Ranjiv Kumar (2010), Labor in the Era of Globalization, co-edited with Clair Brown and Michael Reich (2009), Institutions for Regionalism: Enhancing Asia's Economic Cooperation and Integration, coedited with Jong-Wha Lee (2009), and Fostering Monetary & Financial Cooperation in East Asia, co-edited with Duck-Koo Chung (2009). Other books include Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Second Edition (2008), The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (updated paperback edition, 2008), Bond Markets in Latin America: On the Verge of a Big Bang?, co-edited with Eduardo Borensztein, Kevin Cowan, and Ugo Panizza (2008), and China, Asia, and the New World Economy, co-edited with Charles Wyplosz and Yung Chul Park (2008).
Professor Eichengreen was awarded the Economic History Association's Jonathan R.T. Hughes Prize for Excellence in Teaching in 2002 and the University of California at Berkeley Social Science Division's Distinguished Teaching Award in 2004. He is the recipient of a doctor honoris causa from the American University in Paris, and the 2010 recipient of the Schumpeter Prize from the International Schumpeter Society. He was named one of Foreign Policy Magazine 's 100 Leading Global Thinkers in 2011. He is Immediate Past President of the Economic History Association (2010-11 academic year).
* This is the biosketch available at his faculty page.
Professor Eichengreen is the convener of the Bellagio Group of academics and economic officials and chair of the Academic Advisory Committee of the Peterson Institute of International Economics. He has held Guggenheim and Fulbright Fellowships and has been a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto) and the Institute for Advanced Study (Berlin). He is a regular monthly columnist for Project Syndicate.
His most recent books are Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (January 2011)(shortlisted for the Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award in 2011), Emerging Giants: China and India in the World Economy, co-edited with Poonam Gupta and Ranjiv Kumar (2010), Labor in the Era of Globalization, co-edited with Clair Brown and Michael Reich (2009), Institutions for Regionalism: Enhancing Asia's Economic Cooperation and Integration, coedited with Jong-Wha Lee (2009), and Fostering Monetary & Financial Cooperation in East Asia, co-edited with Duck-Koo Chung (2009). Other books include Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Second Edition (2008), The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (updated paperback edition, 2008), Bond Markets in Latin America: On the Verge of a Big Bang?, co-edited with Eduardo Borensztein, Kevin Cowan, and Ugo Panizza (2008), and China, Asia, and the New World Economy, co-edited with Charles Wyplosz and Yung Chul Park (2008).
Professor Eichengreen was awarded the Economic History Association's Jonathan R.T. Hughes Prize for Excellence in Teaching in 2002 and the University of California at Berkeley Social Science Division's Distinguished Teaching Award in 2004. He is the recipient of a doctor honoris causa from the American University in Paris, and the 2010 recipient of the Schumpeter Prize from the International Schumpeter Society. He was named one of Foreign Policy Magazine 's 100 Leading Global Thinkers in 2011. He is Immediate Past President of the Economic History Association (2010-11 academic year).
* This is the biosketch available at his faculty page.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
May 12, 2019
The Populist Temptation is a thoroughly researched, clearly reasoned, evidence based analysis of the role of economic grievance/insecurity in creating environments vulnerable to populism. Eichengreen’s claim is clear, and the comparative case studies of the US and Europe are effectively traced across history to illustrate this. For my purposes, there was a bit too much present focus, but this is a valuable perspective which will have application in my programme.
April 23, 2019
This book discusses the interrelationship between the economic causes underlying populist resentment and loss, or fear of loss, of status and identity in both the United States and England. When governments do little to satisfactorily address substantial economic or social problems, it is not surprising that aggrieved citizens will turn to those who promise that they will respond to the will of the people.
Dr. Eichengreen deftly points out how the economic policies of the US and Great Britain since the 1970s have actually contributed to stagnant wage growth for the majority even as income disparity widened markedly and the march of global trade virtually extinguished many occupations through competing markets and cheaper labor costs elsewhere. While globalization has helped many in the workforces of less wealthy countries, the result for much of the First World has been that only a minority of the well educated has managed to prosper while most other segments of the labor force have seen jobs vanish, benefits shrink, and wages stagnate. The consequent devastation has been most sharply felt in small towns, rural areas, and sections of the country where once dominant occupations – such as commercial fishing in England’s Northeast and once dominant manufacturing plants in the American Rust Belt – disappear.
Both Trump and Brexit must be seen in this larger context which was the result of decades-long policies that only favored the wealthiest portion of the citizenry but also actively sought to weaken unions, strengthen the already-dominant bargaining position of business owners over workers, and pit both laborers, cities, and regions against each other in competing for a decreasing number of well-paid jobs.
It is also undeniable that recent waves of immigration have contributed to the politics of resentment. The perception that immigrants have taken jobs that otherwise would have gone to citizens, coupled with the unfamiliarity of their languages, customs, and religious beliefs, contributed to the feeling among the economic and culturally marginalized that “we are losing our country and our way of life.”
It is an irony of history that the perfect storm of a huge surge of immigrants – a result, in many cases of flawed Western policies in the Mideast (including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, and the devastating civil way in Syria) – coincided with the period of widening economic inequality made even more obvious by the great recession of 2008.
All of this created fertile ground for a populist resurgence in the United States and throughout Europe.
Dr. Eichengreen defines populism as “a political movement with anti-elite, authoritarian, and nativist tendencies… populist movements of the Left…emphasize the anti-elite element [while those] of the Right…emphasize hostility toward foreigners and minorities.”
Populists appeal to dissatisfied citizens by dividing society into “the elites and the people,” emphasizing that mainstream politics is really an “elite conspiracy” that works against the will and the interests of “the people.” Populism retains a strong link to some of the romantic ideas of previous centuries, especially in its conviction – clearly welcomed by discontented citizens – that “the people” possess “a basic common sense, passed down through collective traditions, religion, and community” that can be drawn upon to correct the mistaken policies of the elite.
The rhetoric of populism always defines “the people” over and against “the other.” This latter category not only includes the governing elite, but also immigrants and racial and religious minorities. And, since the elites control the levers of representative government, populists preach the importance of direct democracy. The referendum, thus, is a vital tool of “the people” as it expresses their common sense solution to problems.
Populism is also, Eichengreen argues, a “political style.” Its spokespersons portray themselves as “no-nonsense” leaders who speak the language of the people, even if that occasionally means being politically incorrect. Forcefulness is “conveyed by the assertive dismissal of inconvenient facts and a menacing undercurrent of violence.” Populists also look for alternative channels of communicating with the people in order to circumvent mainstream media sympathetic to the elites. Populists are direct in their speech, over-simplistic with regard to goals, dismissive of expert opinions, and resistant to constraints. All of this can be seen in the tweets and rally language used by Trump and in the propaganda of the “Leave” side ahead of the Brexit referendum.
As a consequence of this political style, populism is inherently impatient – if not outright dismissive – of the process of listening to various opinions or respecting the point of view of those who disagree. Populists are naturally inclined toward autocratic, even authoritarian, rule. Once in office, they work to weaken any and all constraints upon their power, deliberately delegitimizing other branches of government that could in any way hinder their will. All dissident voices, therefore, must be illegitimate and can be ignored. A virulent nationalism comes to mark their belief system and, with it, a tendency towards violence against those who would resist them. And, since the people who follow them have already come to believe that only “their leader” speaks the truth and understands their deepest needs, their followers willingly fall in line.
While populism does not necessarily lead to fascism, it is a necessary precursor for it.
It is remarkable how few people appear to recognize the extreme danger posed by this moment. In England, for example, despite mounting evidence that Brexit will cause immense economic, social and political upheavals for all of Great Britain, the Conservatives refuse to submit the “leave/remain” issue to the people again and, instead, insist that the break must occur.
In the US, the current hoopla of tribalism incited by immigration, cultural wars, and raging partisanship for now are giving Trump’s populist base the thrills and “victories” they desire. But the downward momentum boosted by the huge tax cuts that overwhelmingly favor the rich – and also drain the Treasury of even more resources – will inevitably mean renewed attacks by the Right on the two significant programs that benefit most Americans – Social Security and Medicare.
It is fascinating that poll after poll demonstrates that there is remarkable agreement even in today’s divided America over what “the people” think the priorities should be: better and more high paying jobs, available – and affordable – health care for all, expanded Social Security, and a sound Medicare. But, thanks to the complete control exercised by the wealthy and the politicians they have effectively purchased, these hopes are nowhere on the politicians’ radar screens.
What happens when the populists realize they have been betrayed? To whom do they then turn?
Dr. Eichengreen deftly points out how the economic policies of the US and Great Britain since the 1970s have actually contributed to stagnant wage growth for the majority even as income disparity widened markedly and the march of global trade virtually extinguished many occupations through competing markets and cheaper labor costs elsewhere. While globalization has helped many in the workforces of less wealthy countries, the result for much of the First World has been that only a minority of the well educated has managed to prosper while most other segments of the labor force have seen jobs vanish, benefits shrink, and wages stagnate. The consequent devastation has been most sharply felt in small towns, rural areas, and sections of the country where once dominant occupations – such as commercial fishing in England’s Northeast and once dominant manufacturing plants in the American Rust Belt – disappear.
Both Trump and Brexit must be seen in this larger context which was the result of decades-long policies that only favored the wealthiest portion of the citizenry but also actively sought to weaken unions, strengthen the already-dominant bargaining position of business owners over workers, and pit both laborers, cities, and regions against each other in competing for a decreasing number of well-paid jobs.
It is also undeniable that recent waves of immigration have contributed to the politics of resentment. The perception that immigrants have taken jobs that otherwise would have gone to citizens, coupled with the unfamiliarity of their languages, customs, and religious beliefs, contributed to the feeling among the economic and culturally marginalized that “we are losing our country and our way of life.”
It is an irony of history that the perfect storm of a huge surge of immigrants – a result, in many cases of flawed Western policies in the Mideast (including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, and the devastating civil way in Syria) – coincided with the period of widening economic inequality made even more obvious by the great recession of 2008.
All of this created fertile ground for a populist resurgence in the United States and throughout Europe.
Dr. Eichengreen defines populism as “a political movement with anti-elite, authoritarian, and nativist tendencies… populist movements of the Left…emphasize the anti-elite element [while those] of the Right…emphasize hostility toward foreigners and minorities.”
Populists appeal to dissatisfied citizens by dividing society into “the elites and the people,” emphasizing that mainstream politics is really an “elite conspiracy” that works against the will and the interests of “the people.” Populism retains a strong link to some of the romantic ideas of previous centuries, especially in its conviction – clearly welcomed by discontented citizens – that “the people” possess “a basic common sense, passed down through collective traditions, religion, and community” that can be drawn upon to correct the mistaken policies of the elite.
The rhetoric of populism always defines “the people” over and against “the other.” This latter category not only includes the governing elite, but also immigrants and racial and religious minorities. And, since the elites control the levers of representative government, populists preach the importance of direct democracy. The referendum, thus, is a vital tool of “the people” as it expresses their common sense solution to problems.
Populism is also, Eichengreen argues, a “political style.” Its spokespersons portray themselves as “no-nonsense” leaders who speak the language of the people, even if that occasionally means being politically incorrect. Forcefulness is “conveyed by the assertive dismissal of inconvenient facts and a menacing undercurrent of violence.” Populists also look for alternative channels of communicating with the people in order to circumvent mainstream media sympathetic to the elites. Populists are direct in their speech, over-simplistic with regard to goals, dismissive of expert opinions, and resistant to constraints. All of this can be seen in the tweets and rally language used by Trump and in the propaganda of the “Leave” side ahead of the Brexit referendum.
As a consequence of this political style, populism is inherently impatient – if not outright dismissive – of the process of listening to various opinions or respecting the point of view of those who disagree. Populists are naturally inclined toward autocratic, even authoritarian, rule. Once in office, they work to weaken any and all constraints upon their power, deliberately delegitimizing other branches of government that could in any way hinder their will. All dissident voices, therefore, must be illegitimate and can be ignored. A virulent nationalism comes to mark their belief system and, with it, a tendency towards violence against those who would resist them. And, since the people who follow them have already come to believe that only “their leader” speaks the truth and understands their deepest needs, their followers willingly fall in line.
While populism does not necessarily lead to fascism, it is a necessary precursor for it.
It is remarkable how few people appear to recognize the extreme danger posed by this moment. In England, for example, despite mounting evidence that Brexit will cause immense economic, social and political upheavals for all of Great Britain, the Conservatives refuse to submit the “leave/remain” issue to the people again and, instead, insist that the break must occur.
In the US, the current hoopla of tribalism incited by immigration, cultural wars, and raging partisanship for now are giving Trump’s populist base the thrills and “victories” they desire. But the downward momentum boosted by the huge tax cuts that overwhelmingly favor the rich – and also drain the Treasury of even more resources – will inevitably mean renewed attacks by the Right on the two significant programs that benefit most Americans – Social Security and Medicare.
It is fascinating that poll after poll demonstrates that there is remarkable agreement even in today’s divided America over what “the people” think the priorities should be: better and more high paying jobs, available – and affordable – health care for all, expanded Social Security, and a sound Medicare. But, thanks to the complete control exercised by the wealthy and the politicians they have effectively purchased, these hopes are nowhere on the politicians’ radar screens.
What happens when the populists realize they have been betrayed? To whom do they then turn?
July 29, 2018
This is an in-depth, well-researched explanation, and history, of populism -- a phenomenon now in fullness in the Trump era, but one, the author shows us, has a long and recurring history in the West. He traces it, country, by country, notably in the U.S., where economics -- shifts in technology, agriculture and industry, and the resulting shocks -- would intertwine with politics to energize populist movements of left and right, be they the Know-Nothing and Progressive/Populist parties of the 19th Century, or such varied figures as Huey Long, FDR, Father Coughlin and Joe McCarthy in the 20th. We see the same pattern in England, from the days of the Corn Laws, the Chartists, the Luddites, the Poor Laws and the rise of the Labour Party. We see it in Germany, where Bismarck would try to head off Social-Democratic agitation, and address the problems of an industrializing society, with social welfare schemes of his urging.
It's a detailed history, and maintains -- and illustrates -- the parallels between economic inequality and political unrest through the 20th Century and to the present. We get a sense, especially in the United States, that economic and social progress will leave people behind, and that social nets are often fallible, and give rise to resentment, and then to messiahs on the right and left, be they George Wallace, or Ronald Reagan, or Bernie Sanders, or Donald Trump in the United States, or the latter-day Mussolinis elsewhere. We see populist pressures on established social-democrat or Christian-democratic establishments in the UK, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Brazil. Even now, after the book's publication, the election of Imran Khan in Pakistan and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico show that the trend is continuing. It's affirmation that the populist phenomenon didn't begin with Trump and won't end with him.
This book is worthwhile for anyone trying to understand the origins, ongoing dynamics, economics and implications of populism. It will be useful as a university text, certainly, but equally so for anyone wanting the larger picture, to see beyond the day-to-day news. It's a lot of trees in a very big forest, and it's currently on fire. Highly recommend.
It's a detailed history, and maintains -- and illustrates -- the parallels between economic inequality and political unrest through the 20th Century and to the present. We get a sense, especially in the United States, that economic and social progress will leave people behind, and that social nets are often fallible, and give rise to resentment, and then to messiahs on the right and left, be they George Wallace, or Ronald Reagan, or Bernie Sanders, or Donald Trump in the United States, or the latter-day Mussolinis elsewhere. We see populist pressures on established social-democrat or Christian-democratic establishments in the UK, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Brazil. Even now, after the book's publication, the election of Imran Khan in Pakistan and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico show that the trend is continuing. It's affirmation that the populist phenomenon didn't begin with Trump and won't end with him.
This book is worthwhile for anyone trying to understand the origins, ongoing dynamics, economics and implications of populism. It will be useful as a university text, certainly, but equally so for anyone wanting the larger picture, to see beyond the day-to-day news. It's a lot of trees in a very big forest, and it's currently on fire. Highly recommend.
June 20, 2019
Maybe I should read the book again, as other very thorough and sensible reviews are very positive (I read them too), and I was rather disappointed. I don't know what to think of 'his' definition of populism. I looks convincing at first sight, but upon inspection it seems incomplete or even inappropriate - to me it seems a bit more complicated. I actually don't know if a better definition exists... I learned a lot on historical level, but really don't know what to do about his analysis of the facts. I don't know what I was expecting, but the book left me with more questions than answers. Still a very respectable and well researched book.
December 18, 2020
Barry Eichengreen is a governmental bureaucrat who has specialized in climbing the academic ladder and that is his only specialization. Hence, for him the same act is called politics if it is done by one of the gangs he approves and populism if it is done by a gang he wants forbidden by law. The text itself is the tantrums of a 6 year old embedded in bureaucratic language.
April 26, 2019
Informative and non-ideological analysis of the inflammatory surge of new populisms. Any perspective grounded in an analogy of times past with the present will likely be a good guide for the future, though this piece was lacking in critical analysis and detail.
January 31, 2025
Interesting look at populism from an economic perspective
September 27, 2021
This book, is timely, but rather poor; historical analysis is barely done, and little insight is provided, into, the process which resulted in the Trump administration (on the surface).
January 24, 2024
I have been working on this book for a while but ended up stopping and starting. Eichengreen is a very distinguished economist/historian who does a fine job on showing how politics and economics mixed in large crises. I had hoped that this book would shed some light on the nature of populism in recent western nations - in particular in Britain with Brexit and in the US since the election of 2016.
I was disappointed, although it is a fine book. The book is a history of how the governments of US and European states have engaged their economic policy to mitigate the effects of economic crises and downturns that promote widespread feelings of loss and insecurity in large sections of the population, all in an effort to promote political stability and the orderly emergence from crisis. As such this is interesting and an accomplishment that shows clearly how governments have not only managed their economic policies but how managed how those policies are perceived by and affect the broad population that they target. I was hoping to learn more about the less well understood dynamics that produce sensitivities in the electorate that show up under the auspices of MAGA, the Tea Party, or other labels that show a disconnect from more routine politics. I was hoping to learn more about the conditions that promoted the prospects of would be populist demagogues.
Eichengreen’s book is squarely target at MAGA and Brexit phenomena but he has relatively little to add over regularly repeated commentaries. Governments facing large blocs that are out of touch with normal politics and feeling like they have lost should taken actions to have these groups see a bigger stake in politics as usual - or something like that. Over time, the allure seems to go away historically, but it is not clear if the current situation fits that pattern or is different and more dubious.
I will have to process this further.
I was disappointed, although it is a fine book. The book is a history of how the governments of US and European states have engaged their economic policy to mitigate the effects of economic crises and downturns that promote widespread feelings of loss and insecurity in large sections of the population, all in an effort to promote political stability and the orderly emergence from crisis. As such this is interesting and an accomplishment that shows clearly how governments have not only managed their economic policies but how managed how those policies are perceived by and affect the broad population that they target. I was hoping to learn more about the less well understood dynamics that produce sensitivities in the electorate that show up under the auspices of MAGA, the Tea Party, or other labels that show a disconnect from more routine politics. I was hoping to learn more about the conditions that promoted the prospects of would be populist demagogues.
Eichengreen’s book is squarely target at MAGA and Brexit phenomena but he has relatively little to add over regularly repeated commentaries. Governments facing large blocs that are out of touch with normal politics and feeling like they have lost should taken actions to have these groups see a bigger stake in politics as usual - or something like that. Over time, the allure seems to go away historically, but it is not clear if the current situation fits that pattern or is different and more dubious.
I will have to process this further.
October 28, 2024
It's a great and compact political economy study of populism with a historical and international perspective, combining narrative and data analysis with economic theories. Eichengreen traces the history of populism back to the Luddite workers who smashed the swing machines during the Industrial Revolution.
In summary, any overall positive economic shock (making governments slow to respond) with uneven economic impacts creating losers and winners can trigger populist tendencies. echnological biased progress, international trade, and immigration—all similar scenarios—can provoke populism. In today's America, these factors are all intertwined.
The author believes that escalating racial divisions and the political culture tradition of distrust towards big government have limited the mainstream parties' ability to respond constructively, painting a rather pessimistic picture of America's ability to handle the populist wave.
In summary, any overall positive economic shock (making governments slow to respond) with uneven economic impacts creating losers and winners can trigger populist tendencies. echnological biased progress, international trade, and immigration—all similar scenarios—can provoke populism. In today's America, these factors are all intertwined.
The author believes that escalating racial divisions and the political culture tradition of distrust towards big government have limited the mainstream parties' ability to respond constructively, painting a rather pessimistic picture of America's ability to handle the populist wave.
October 28, 2023
Great read that provides a good framework of how economics, technological change, shifting trade patterns, people’s fears and political opportunists can drive populism.
Professor Eichengreen provides a nice overview of critical 20th and 21st century periods of populist ebbs and flows and how history was impacted.
The last third of the book presents the current European and United States landscape of populist trends. Sadly it left me thinking the Age of Enlightenment is headed for a close unless the electorates think through how easily populism will lead to authoritarianism and ultimately a lack of their personal freedoms.
Professor Eichengreen provides a nice overview of critical 20th and 21st century periods of populist ebbs and flows and how history was impacted.
The last third of the book presents the current European and United States landscape of populist trends. Sadly it left me thinking the Age of Enlightenment is headed for a close unless the electorates think through how easily populism will lead to authoritarianism and ultimately a lack of their personal freedoms.
June 23, 2025
Great guide to the history of populism through the eyes of an economic historian. Much of the discourse around populism strays away from the economic reasons, Eichengreen does not. The comparisons between countries and across periods of history are very strong. And his solution to populism - strengthening the social safety net - makes intuitive sense and fits with the historical evidence he focuses on. My one criticism is that he writes very little about the 2008 financial crisis. He alludes to the current period of Trumpian populism often, but it's my understanding that the financial crisis (and subsequent bailout) was a huge reason Trump gained such a following.
June 27, 2025
While the historical and social aspects of the discussion is very valuable, I'm very disappointed with the book given the high marks by others. As a economist, the author seemed oblivious to the elephant in the room that neoliberalism (aka market fundamentalism) or at least skittered around the issue. I know it's very difficult to make profound changes, but the book seemed to have a fatalistic feel.
January 16, 2020
Good explanation of the rise of populism in today's governments from an economic perspective.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews