Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18

by Dennis E. Showalter

Drawing on more than a half-century of research and teaching, Dennis Showalter presents a fresh perspective on the German Army during World War I. Showalter surveys an army at the heart of a national identity, driven by--yet also defeated by--warfare in the modern age, that struggled to capitalize on its victories, and ultimately forgot the lessons of its defeat.

Exploring the internal dynamics of the German Army, detailing how the soldiers coped with the many new forms of warfare, Showalter shows how the army's institutions responded to and how Germany itself was changed by war. He goes on to detail the major campaigns on the Western and Eastern Fronts and the forgotten war fought in the Middle East and Africa, revealing operational strategy, the complexities of campaigns of movement versus static trench warfare, and the effects of changes in warfare.

Winnter of the 2016 Norman B. Tomlinson, Jr. Book Prize, in association with the World War One Historical Association.

Genres: History, World War I, Nonfiction, Military History, Military Fiction, Audiobook, War

368 pages, Paperback

First published November 22, 2016

About the author

A specialist in German military history, Dennis E. Showalter was professor emeritus of history at Colorado College. He was president of the American Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001 and an advising fellow of the Barsanti Military History Center at the University of North Texas.

Reviews

[Julian Douglass · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think this book was the last one that I bought that was purely a military history. I have always found them boring and way too detailed and technical for me to enjoy and always found myself falling asleep reading them. This one, almost 300 pages stretched into 6 chapters does not help especially with everything packed into this book. This is the official history of WWI as seen from the vantage point of the German Military, so having some background in the conflict is necessary. It’s a fun book to read if you are into the military aspect of the war and not the Economic, Political, or Social aspect of the war. Not my cup of tea, that is all.

[John Plowright · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dennis Showalter is one of the most respected of military historians writing today, so his new history of the German Army of the 1914-18 conflict, ‘Instrument of War’, has been eagerly anticipated.

It should not disappoint either the academic community or the general readers at whom it is also aimed, although the general readers Showalter has in mind are evidently the sort who already have a working knowledge of the Wars of German Unification.

In general, Showalter expresses himself with admirable clarity although he uses, not for the first time in his writings, the somewhat obscure Americanism “at seventh and last”, which evidently means “at the end of the day” or “in the final analysis”.

In general, his argument is tightly structured and prose purposive, although at one point, within the space of three pages, he manages to repeat the colourful fact that, in imitation of German cavalrymen, spiked helmets once used to appear on American West parade grounds.

Showalter persuasively postulates that as a fighting institution the German army “displayed less a genius for war than a gift for improvisation” given that it was overextended from the war’s inception. This qualifies but does not completely overturn the German army’s fearsome reputation for efficiency, however, insofar as this ability to take the initiative and respond imaginatively to adverse circumstances was something nurtured by training and compares very favourably with the comparable regimes of that of all of its major rivals at that time. Moreover, Showalter shows, by reference to storm troop tactics, that the injunction “to educate the soldier to think and act for himself” was something inculcated down to non-commissioned officer level.

Showalter nevertheless shows that ultimately the German army was not “stabbed in the back” but defeated on the battlefield. It was the tragedy of Weimar Germany and ultimately of all Europe that this fact was not made manifest at the time by means of some high-profile public humiliation of Germany’s generals.

The book contains some interesting photographs but no maps and a bibliography which only lightly genuflects in the direction of the prolific and reflective reading indicated by the main text and its footnotes.

This book is not flawless (what book is?) but its weaknesses are very minor when compared with its strengths, which should render it the definitive one-volume history of the German army in the Great War for a very long time to come.

[Diana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book received from NetGalley.

I really loved this book. While I have read some books on World War I and have studied it a little in college classes I really don't know much about the soldiers and their training of the era. I learned quite a bit from this book and will definitely be buying a copy for my own shelves

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Disclosure: I received a review copy of this book from NetGalley.

Institutional histories can be very dry and only of interest to specialists. Dennis Showalter, however, is at his best and most entertaining within the historical genre. Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 is intended for general readers, published by Osprey, and definitely gives newcomers a clear and complete—without being complicated—view of the Wilhelmine Army at war. Showalter is one of America’s leading military historians and one of the foremost authorities on the German Army in any language. Instrument of War is his bread and butter, written with a smooth hand which comes off like a good lecture: full of humor and insight.

Showalter begins by looking at the dramatic transformation of the Prussian Army and State after 1860. In short: 1848 left Prussia with a military which was primarily composed of the Landwehr—the militia—which represented liberal values. The professional force was essentially a small Praetorian Guard, a bastion of conservatism under direct control of the King. In 1860, Albrecht von Roon became Minister of War and forced funding increases through the Landtag (an actual reform bill failed) which allowed the size of the professional army to be increased and the power of the militia reduced. Combined with the planning abilities of Moltke the Elder, this rapidly transformed the Prussian Army from an international punchline into a force which was able to defeat the major powers in Europe: Austria and France. The Army, enlarged, conscripted, and with massive reserve contingents, subsequently became a microcosm of German society. A reader might question why social history is leeching into military history, but consider that a citizen army is composed of citizens and reflects the society it is drawn from.


The social component is also important in putting Wilhelm II into context. Fussy and eager to interfere in military matters, despite being generally ignorant in them, Showalter argues that Wilhelm was generally able to be sidestepped in matters which had an effect by the internal culture of the German military, which reflected the federal nature of the German state. The social component also is interested in filling a hole in scholarship which seeks to link German genocide in its colonies with genocide during WWII. Showalter points out that the colonial service was largely disconnected from continental military concerns, makes convincing argument for it, and therefore the actions of the German Army against civilians needs to be explained only within the context of the German Army’s experiences and perceptions and not as a point of continuity in genocidal actions.

As the German military enters WWI, the story is not one of brilliance but of adaptation. On the Western Front, the Germans inflicted three casualties on their enemies for every two they took. And much of that was under conditions of inferiority in technology and numbers. Showalter carefully details the adaptations the German military—strategic and tactical—engaged in to prolong its ability to fight the war. Very complex ideas are presented as plainly as possible, using everyday language: a skill which Showalter possess in excess.

The work does end abruptly. Showalter is only concerned about the war, and not the postwar. A conclusion could have been more fleshed out and survey how the institutional culture of the army affected the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. There was sufficient foreshadowing within the text to warrant the inclusion.

For general audiences, the book does keep citation to a minimum. It was occasionally frustrating to read something I wanted to know more on and finding no reference for it, or an expectation of an explanatory note being unfulfilled. There are some other issues with the work. Maps would be useful. Despite the work not focusing on operational details, there are still points where geographic locations are mentioned and it would be good to have maps to fix them in space and time.


Additionally, there are a couple weird quirks. What sticks in my mind is that Showalter mentions, at least twice, that the .50 BMG round was based on a German anti-tank rifle round. This is false. The round was based on the .30-06 round, and enlarged. After the war, the German round was used as inspiration for improving performance… but that’s not a genealogical link. I’m being petty in this, because negatives are that hard to find.

Instrument of War should be highly recommended for all audiences, not just general readers. It would act as an outstanding survey for a beginner. As a supplementary text for an undergraduate history course, the work is short enough but comprehensive enough. And specialists will enjoy reading Showalter’s prose.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dennis Showalter, easily the best of the American historians dealing in German military history, presents a highly analytical, profoundly well written, easy to read, if at times superficial, look at the Imperial German Army during the Great War.
Showalter's thesis, that the German Army, distanced from societal norms and having become a force unto itself, turned the distancing into an all out divorce from the State, and ensured its own defeat by operating only for its own needs. While this isn't exactly a novel thesis, it is not pedestrian and serves the reader well as few can elaborate so skillfully as Showalter.

This book is not a straight cut military history, it is also at times a social history, a political history, and an institutional history. Meaning that discussion on the operations and campaigns of the fighting itself takes a backseat to the evolution of the Army as it undergoes the forging process by crisis.

Put another way, the how is relegated to the backseat for the why.

This means that at times the narrative can be a tad slow, but these passages lay the groundwork for the essential points made later on.

The German Army in the Great War was a first rate instrument. No other Army was better trained, better equipped, better fed, or better led at the front end. The General Staff system was, theoretically at least, the best in the world, and the Teutonic levels of planning, on paper, seemed to ensure German victory in any eventuality.

However, the War itself exploded beyond anyone's rational judgement could possibly comprehend, and the once magnificent instrument of 1914, was even by 1915 showing cracks and strain before it was devoured in the bloodbaths of 1916 at Verdun and along the Somme. Even so, as Showalter demonstrates, the German Army in this war, as in the greater one a quarter century later, were the masters of improvisation, and doing more with far less than their adversaries.

No other Army was as lethal, either. Overall, thanks largely to the Germans, despite defeat, the Central Powers as a whole (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Ottoman Empire) killed three Allied soldiers for every two lost to themselves. And considering the staggering numbers involved in industrial warfare, a 50% better kill ratio is all but incomprehensible as such losses easily number close to a million if not more.

This was a consequence of an Army who in this war, as in the next one, had no equal in terms of tactics, and few in terms of operations. The actual business at the front end, even in times of retreat and defeat, was often sung to a German tune and the Angel of Death seemed all too often to speak with a Prussian accent.

But while tactical and even operational greatness can cover a multitude of sins, they alone are not sufficient works for salvation. The Germans never did, in either war, overcome their inability to think beyond the needs of a limited, localized war. Strategy, and especially grand strategy, were the weak links in their system. Logistically this weakness was brought to bear as the front loaded logistical system simply couldn't sustain the resources necessary that the more market driven societies of the British and French in the First, and the Americans in the Second, Wars were able to produce and maintain.

And despite their amazing skill at improvisation, making due with less (often far less), and producing tactically amazing junior and field level commanders, they simply couldn't overcome the strategic handicaps that some of their own methods brought about.

In terms of narrating the war itself, Showalter is a tad uneven.

His focus is almost exclusively on the Western Front, his discussion on the Eastern Front is almost as an afterthought. Showalter seemingly downplays the threat of the Czar's forces, even though he even points out that it was German fears of a Russian colossus that prompted German entry into what could have been just another Balkan spat. This heavy focus on the West tends to skew the perspective of the reader who loses entirely the importance of the resources of conquered Russian lands to the ideas of a wider Germanic eastern empire.

An idea that heavily influenced the next war, and became the guiding principle of the counter-revolutionaries in the National Socialists who took over the country, and subsumed the Army.

Despite those few complaints, this is a very good book, indeed an indispensable one on the German Army as an institutional construct during the Great War.

Highly recommended.

[Dropbear123 · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5/5 rounding down for Goodreads. Bought new.

I quite liked this. I found it accessible and easy to read, which is the authors intent as he says in the intro, and I think you don’t need that much prior knowledge of the First World War to enjoy this book. It packs a wide range of information into 320 or so pages (plus 30 for notes and sources). Covers topics ranging from the top of the German army, such as what the generals were thinking and their reasons for their decisions, as well as German society and industry (labour shortages, morale etc), through to the ordinary soldiers experiences and psychology. Has a good amount on the key equipment without bogging down into stale statistics or arcane minor differences between almost identical kinds of rifles or artillery.

The vast majority of the discussion of strategic, operational topics and direct experiences of German soldiers is focused on the Western Front. There is not that much on the Eastern Front unless it affected the Western Front, such as artillery reform that was first used on the Eastern Front or the transferral of poor quality troops from East to West for the 1918 Spring Offensive. So if you’re looking for German Army vs Russia then this book might not be for you. But there is a good section imo on the administration of the conquered parts of Eastern Europe (Ober Ost)

Overall I’d recommend it if you’re interested in the First World War or military history in general.

[William DuFour · Rating 2 out of 5]

An okay read but could have used a editor or proofreader in some areas.

[Ed Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

First the negatives. Showalter writes in an engaging but distractingly idiosyncratic style. He recycles a complement of quirky idioms, occasionally digresses into foggy explanations of major phenomena, and tinges the discussion of too many subjects with excessive wryness (as the book jacket rightly advertises). This last habit leaves an impression that the Army gradually disintegrated like a Rube Goldberg device rattled apart by its own flailing exertions. To demonstrate that the device was actually smashed by external forces, Showalter should have contrasted the German with the Allied armies to a greater extent, provided more detail on the effectiveness of the blockade, and expounded upon the Army's dogged defense and scorched-earth retreat in the face of overwhelming Allied artillery superiority during the war-ending Hundred Days offensive. Glossing over major battles can be understood in the context of this survey, but adumbration of entire phases of the war, such as the Hundred Days, creates unfortunate distortions.

I find Showalter's concluding remark, that the ingrown and self-referential nature of the Army proved its own downfall, to be only partly convincing, especially in light of his documentation that technological, logistical, and tactical (i.e., "low-level") proficiency was absolutely necessary for the realization of operational and strategic goals, in a way that probably has never existed before or since. The more convincing side of his conclusion arises from his analysis of the Army's shortcomings in senior leadership and its primacy within German society, to the detriment of geopolitical realism. But, again, these problems were not necessarily unique to Germany, nor was it likely that the Allies would have settled for a negotiated peace at any point in the war, for any concession. Showalter's arguments seem to better support a conclusion that beside a few blunders, such as First Ypres, the Army did a remarkable job of fumbling in the direction of victory but ran out of time and resources after a total war mentality had set in on both sides. I think that certain truly bad decisions, such as the vortex of Verdun and the wholehearted commitment to the final U-boat campaign, played a larger role than suggested. And it should also have been noted that France's Pyrrhic victory and Russia's utter collapse were arguably enormous advantages for Germany in its continuing quest for "a place in the sun."

Now the positives. This book is eminently readable, with a relatively unstructured format that works surprisingly well. Showalter does not get bogged down in minutiae of campaigns or production figures or the configuration of the Hindenburg Line, but instead stays focused on his subject, the Army as an entity. He convincingly demonstrates that the Army's cohesion and effectiveness can be traced to its competence at lower levels, flexibility in response to challenges, and integration into the national cultural fabric. The small technical edge over the Allies, especially in terms of prewar artillery production and developments in aircraft, is emphasized. Ludendorff is rightly portrayed as a good general who championed next-generation tactics but was laboring in the face of daunting challenges.

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent and bursting with diverse insights providing a multi-facetted understanding of the institution and its development.

[Joseph Spuckler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 by Dennis Showalter is a history of World War I based on the German participation. Showalter is a retired Professor of History, past President of the Society for Military History and Joint Editor of War in History specializing in comparative military history. He has written or edited two dozen books and a hundred fifty articles.

World War I was the war that could have been prevented, it, however, set the stage for the 20th century. It was the stubbornness of Austria-Hungary and their demands that brought on the violence. From all accounts, the Kaiser thought Serbia had met Austria-Hungary's demands and planned on vacation. Franz Josef took the assassination of his despised nephew as the will of God and saw it as a way of accomplishing what he couldn’t. Unfortunately, his ministers saw things differently and moved to war. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Germany joined its ally. Russia came to the aid of its Slav allies. Germany moved against France, who was bound to aid Russia by treaty. Germany’s move through Belgium brought England to war. Much has been blamed on the entangling alliances as the cause for the war but one must remember too that the NATO alliance (and the Warsaw Pact for that matter) helped keep the peace in the Cold War. WWI was more the fault of faulty leaders than alliances meant to balance power.

World War I was history caught between pages. The advances in technology changed the world. The expansion of railroads meant that mobilization and transportation of troops and equipment could move at previously unattainable speeds. The machine gun was capable of killing on a scale never seen before. The internal combustion engine started to play a role in the military but was still too undependable to be counted on. Horses still played a major role in transportation at this time. That meant pulling animals from the farms which still used and needed them. It also meant feeding the animals. 84,000 horses used by the German’s required almost two million tons of feed a day; this came out of food that would be used by soldiers and civilians. Armies did not adapt to new technologies on the offensive. Killing charging masses of enemy troops is where the machine gun excelled. Advancing armies refused to learn their lesson.

The German army, like most powers, relied on reserve units. It differed in that their reserve units were trained and expected to hold their own in combat. Most nations reserves went to the rear and were used as fillers. The Russian army was in the worst position of the major powers. It’s rail system needed developing and the rally points for mobilization were spread across the vast country. Germany, on the other hand, exercised a near flawless mobilization and continued to be a successful force until it was not only beaten but out-soldiered at Vimy. No one expected a long war and no one was prepared to fight a drawn out war. The German army was statistically successful in creating three casualties for every two it suffered, but allied army size stood against the Germans in a war of attrition. A well-written history of Germany in World War I.

[Steven Lee · Rating 3 out of 5]

As the title of this book indicates, it is about the German Army during the First World War. While some of the strategic thinking and bigger picture filters down into the story, it is much more focused on the machinery of war and the men who served within it. Battles, logistics, and morale is more the material of this book than anything else.

The book largely takes a chronological focus, examining the German Army from before the outbreak to the war until the bitter end. Dennis Showalter studies the German Army in a variety of dimensions: how was it organized, how were men trained, how was it deployed, how did it fight, who led it? etc. It is a depth of focus I haven't really explored in this topic, or any topic. The closest parallel that comes to mind is the Guns of August with its intense focus on the leadership across Europe in the critical days leading up to the start of fighting.

The author provides some insight into the state of the German Army as the war progressed. For example, it is often said that the Schlieffen Plan failed because Moltke pulled forces away from the right wing at the critical moment. Showalter presents a very different picture. The German Army in the early weeks of the war was badly overstretched and struggling to continue such a harried pace. Interestingly, Showalter does a great job in humanizing the German Army from faceless machines into a very human institution that was taxed beyond its capability.

I believe that significant blame for the failures of the war are levelled at the leadership and leadership culture. The Germans had a number of ineffective leaders who led them into and during the war. Even when more capable men came along they did not have clear goals and targets and spent German, French, and British soldiers' lives with unclear objectives.

This book definitely offered a new perspective on the First World War and German Army for me, and would likely be appealing to those who enjoy WWI history or military history.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a history of World War I from the perspective of the German military establishment. The author, historian Dennis Showalter, offers a chronological narrative and in-depth analysis of the German Army from 1914 to 1918. The book doesn’t concentrate on detailed accounts of the various campaigns and battles. Instead, it looks at the changing organization, doctrine, technology, and command relationships of the Army through the war years. It provides useful background on the “who, what, and why” for other war histories. Showalter does an especially great job peeling back the layers on the German command methodology. The use of “mission command” by the German Army, alongside its many myths, is explained in relation to the army’s tension between defensive and offensive warfare. In this telling, the growing importance of material warfare on the WWI battlefield collided with the maneuver warfare favored by the mission command doctrine. A great book for anyone interested in learning more about adaptation by a large military at war. Recommended for those wishing to better understand how Germany fought in World War I.

[Chris Breese · Rating 2 out of 5]

I picked this up as a keen student of history and was interested in the German perspective of WW1, having just read Haig. What could be a great informative read is spoilt by the very poor structure and overly complicated use of language.
The book follows the progress of the war from a German perspective but gets muddled up constantly and jumps about one minute talking about the emerging German storm tactics then mixing in high command political issues and throwing in a bit about logistics and manpower shortages.
All of this is doubly confused by Showalter’s apparent determination to use the biggest/longest/most arcane words –almost it seems simply to show off his obvious wide ranging vocabulary. Unfortunately what this does is break up what little structure and cohesion there is. It does nothing to help communicate his research to the reader. His use of German to title their various tactics without any clarification again confuses.
A shame as the subject matter is very interesting but in this form it sadly misses.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An accessible one-volume history of the German army during the war, with a strong focus on how its strategy and tactics evolved, and its successes and failures. Showalter also describes the army’s impact on German society and politics during the period.

Most of the focus seems to be on the army officer corps, and Showalter describes its impact on the army’s tactics, operations, and weaponry. The treatment of policy and strategy is also there, if not as prominent. Showalter is fairly critical of Ludendorff, and argues that many of his failures can be traced to the army’s culture. He also does a good job describing the experience and mindset of the German soldier, the role of military service in their lives, and the initiative they were expected to show.

Some more maps would have helped, though, and there’s a bit more on the western front than the eastern. Still, a solid, insightful work, and fairly comprehensive for its size.

[Edgar Raines · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dennis Showalter wore his learning lightly. He had command of a vast literature in both German and English and used that knowledge to construct this brilliantly written institutional history of the German Army in World War I. The prose is sparkling, often ironic, and shows how a secondary institution at the beginning of the conflict had all but displaced the primary institution by the last year of the war. Showalter has mastered political, economic, social, and technological history to show how the German Army had become virtually the dominant institution in Germany in 1918 until its leaders finally perceived that they had lost the war, and then it wasn't. I highly recommend this book for both general readers and specialists. This is a model of how first-rate institutional history should be written, but often isn't.

[Shake n' Vac]

This book suffered, through no fault of its own, due to the fact that illness prevented me from reading it other than in small bites. I actually found it a very good read, while I was awake :-). Yes, it helps if you have a grounding in the Great War timeline, however, one suspects that if you pick up a book on the German Army during that conflict then you would already have some knowledge of that timeline.

The book takes the reader through from the formation of the army (1871 unification etc) through to final defeat in 1918. I felt that the sections covering the early days down to 1916 were excellent, but perhaps then it feels a little rushed. All in all, I learned a lot from this work - especially the conclusion in that the German field army was defeated rather than being stabbed in the back by the home front/politicians while fighting a rear-guard action. Worth a read.

[Rick Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

I haven't read much on World War I and I found this a fascinating examination of the war from the aspect of the German Army. I've done a lot of reading and studying on WWII and this book provided additional insight into the German mindset. I've read Showalter's book Hitler's Panzers and enjoyed it. Consequently I wasn't disappointed with this one. I do wish that some maps had been included in the book. As a student of military history I like to orient myself to a map and consequently I had to resort to the Internet more than one time to accomplish that. The only other complaint I have is Showalter's selection of words that I have not found commonly used in everyday life or in other books. However, with that being said, it did force me into using the dictionary which isn't a bad thing.

[Mike Glaser · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating and very readable. Any book is a joy which can provide a new way at looking at a subject that has been covered extensively over a long period of time. Good lessons learned and insights on a war that has too often been reduced to a caricature. Would be 4 1/2 stars if Goodreads allowed the half star.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting study of the German Army of World War I. What Mr. Showalter presents is in many ways a very different creature than what readers of Anglo-French histories of the war are familiar with.

[Christer Dørmænen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellently and smartly written as well as easy to digest, a must for anyone with a interest in the WW1 period.

[John Somers · Rating 4 out of 5]

16/20.

[Johnny · Rating 3 out of 5]

My exact type of book but tbh, I think most of this info is widely available online especially YouTube. Still an entertaining enough read.

[Stuart Cole · Rating 2 out of 5]

Whilst a fair overview of the German Imperial Army in the Great War, ultimately Showalter's book was disappointing. It seemed to have been completed in a rush, and the author was not particularly well-served by his editors. He is prone to repetition (particularly of the phrase 'seventh and last'), and occasionally displays and awkward style. It would also have been useful if more detail on individual campaigns (e.g. Somme, Kaiser Battle, etc.) could have been related to the analysis of the balance-sheet of German success and failure.

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good overview of the imperial german army in ww1, far too short in my opinion considering the scope. some fronts such as the african and eastern front were relatively ignored in comparison to the western front.