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Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia
Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent is the first book to fully explore the expansive and ill-understood role that Russia's ancient Christian faith has played in the fall of Soviet Communism and in the rise of Russian nationalism today. John and Carol Garrard tell the story of how the Orthodox Church's moral weight helped defeat the 1991 coup against Gorbachev launched by Communist Party hardliners. The Soviet Union disintegrated, leaving Russians searching for a usable past. The Garrards reveal how Patriarch Aleksy II--a former KGB officer and the man behind the church's successful defeat of the coup--is reconstituting a new national idea in the church's own image.
In the new Russia, the former KGB who run the country--Vladimir Putin among them--proclaim the cross, not the hammer and sickle. Meanwhile, a majority of Russians now embrace the Orthodox faith with unprecedented fervor. The Garrards trace how Aleksy orchestrated this transformation, positioning his church to inherit power once held by the Communist Party and to become the dominant ethos of the military and government. They show how the revived church under Aleksy prevented mass violence during the post-Soviet turmoil, and how Aleksy astutely linked the church with the army and melded Russian patriotism and faith.
Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent argues that the West must come to grips with this complex and contradictory resurgence of the Orthodox faith, because it is the hidden force behind Russia's domestic and foreign policies today.
In the new Russia, the former KGB who run the country--Vladimir Putin among them--proclaim the cross, not the hammer and sickle. Meanwhile, a majority of Russians now embrace the Orthodox faith with unprecedented fervor. The Garrards trace how Aleksy orchestrated this transformation, positioning his church to inherit power once held by the Communist Party and to become the dominant ethos of the military and government. They show how the revived church under Aleksy prevented mass violence during the post-Soviet turmoil, and how Aleksy astutely linked the church with the army and melded Russian patriotism and faith.
Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent argues that the West must come to grips with this complex and contradictory resurgence of the Orthodox faith, because it is the hidden force behind Russia's domestic and foreign policies today.
344 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2008
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August 4, 2011Gerrard and Gerrard (hereafter GG) attempt to locate the place of the Russian Orthodox Church in modern Russia in contrast to the Soviet Union’s officially atheistic policy. Such a question is of supreme importance. From an American standpoint, this issue needs to be faced, for the answers given to these questions will likely determine American foreign policy in the Slavic world.
Right-wing Cold Warriors see the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a vehicle of state propaganda and perhaps an impediment to the creation of a global market force led by Westerners (e.g., the philosophy of neo-conservatism). Left-wing Westerns are likely dismayed that the ROC took such a key role in downing state socialism in Russia. Also, they oppose the ROC’s strict (sometimes violent) opposition to sodomy.
Both left- and right-wing forces in the West, then, are allied against Russia. This is evident in that all media outlets on both sides of the aisle (e.g., Fox and CNN) are anti-Russian (or anti-Putin, more specifically). At the end of the preface, GG makes a very startling (from an academic Western) and wise pronouncement: whatever Russia’s future may be, it will not be Western andcannot ever be (xiv). This is probably the wisest and most intelligent remark made by an academician about Russia–it also cuts against the grain of both neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism).
Prologue
GG gives a brief but very well-written account of the nature and history of the ROC. One is surprised at how accurate and almost sympathetic their reading of Orthodoxy is. The authors give considerable detail to the nature of Orthodox liturgy and more particularly, the place of “liturgical time.” This is important for the next Chapter.
They argue that Alexey II is rebuilding Russia along the lines of cleansing, history, and sobornost–all explicitly Orthodox categories but also subverting the Soviet trinity of ideology, party, and narodnost.
Throughout the book GG shows a remarkable ability to fairly capture the essence of a very different viewpoint. Sadly, this does not last.
The Gerrards, writing either as nominal liberal Protestants and secularists, previously surprised me by defying all liberal and neo-conservative academic standards when dealing with Russia. They rightly identified Russia as a medieval civilization that will never be Western, despite the aims of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
Even more surprising was their painstakingly accurate (and fairly sympathetic) description of Russian Orthodoxy and liturgy. This is enough to get one fired and blacklisted from the academy. The Gerrards are to be commended.
Then the Gerrards utterly ruin the book with an irrelevant section on how evil the Serbs are. Now I know CNN is funding this book (actually, Princeton is but my point is the same). They claim the Serbs did bad things, but so did the Muslims and Croats. But who’s to blame? The Serbs.
Actually, that section on the Serbs is not irrelevant. It plays into the Regime’s mindset nicely. The Gerrards’ early chapters on the beauty of Orthodoxy should not mislead you. The Regime (Beltway Alliance, London, Tel Aviv, etc) is not anti-religion. It is pro-religious expression as long as that religious expression does not challenge the Regime. The Serbs (and Russian nationalists) know that religious questions cannot be “isolated” from other questions, and for that they are hated. This is because GG are jaded postmodernists. Religion is good, especially if ran as a critique of modernity, but it should never be exalted as a metanarrative. This is the ideology of the Gerrards, whether they admit it or not.
Are they Hungtindonians?
In this chapter the Gerrards give a detailed, yet succinct enough summary of Russian Church history, particularly in its opposition to “The West.” Other scholarly reviewers criticized the Gerrards for adopting a “Huntingdonian” view of East-West differences. Perhaps Huntingdon’s thesis is overdrawn, but I don’t see how anyone who reads any random issue of The Wall Street Journal or watches Fox News can avoid the conclusion that the West is opposed to Russia. The Gerrards are simply stating the obvious.
That’s not to say the Gerrards do a good job on summarizing Russian ecclesial and political history in this chapter. They do not. In fact, many of their summaries and conclusions are painful. Like the rest of the book when it errs, they get the general idea correct, but botch the details. A few examples:
They say that Orthodoxy opposes papal infallibility because Orthodoxy traces their lineage through St Andrew “the first called apostle,” and not through Peter. Now, any decent church history textbook can explain the difference between papal primacy and papal infallibility. Orthodox affirm the former (at least until 1054) as a way of honoring the Roman bishop because of his good leadership and the number of martyrs at Rome. Affirming the former, however, is not the same thing as justifying the latter (a basic logical distinction that Roman Catholics fail to see). As to the argument of “Andrew the First-Called,” I suppose some out of the way Russian clerics hold that view, but I’ve never seen a serious Orthodox scholar advance such a view.
The Gerrards downplay the role of the Filioque in order to bolster their own (unique) thesis that it was the issue of Apostolic Succession, and not the Filioque, that determines the difference between Orthodoxy and Rome. The Gerrards are to be commended, however, for noting the connections between papal supremacy and the desire to convert Russia by the sword.
Interestingly, Alexey II, the star of the book so far, is not prominent in this chapter. They do mention the fact Aleksy used his political skill to thwart many of John Paul II’s aims against Russia. Surprisingly for academics, the Gerrards do not criticize the Russian Church for thwarting the goals of Protestants to proselytize Russia. This is a hard point for Westerners to understand. Even the most backwoods conservative right-wing American, who loves Jesus and hates secularism, is a pure secularist when it comes to proselytizing Russia. And by pure secularist, I mean someone who has thoroughly absorbed the values of the Enlightenment. Americans simply cannot understand why Russia opposes “Christian” missionaries to her country.
Russians, and Orthodox, affirm that their view is “the truth.” While maybe a mean statement, most conservative religious communities do the same thing as well. If you say you are the truth, you are likewise making a value-judgment against those who are not the truth. This is not bigotry. This is logic. Everyone does it. This is a rejection of the Enlightenment view that says to some religious communities, “No, you are not welcome here.”
From the perspective of Russia’s 1,000 year history and memory, precisely what do they owe the Protestants, especially the more chaotic baptist elements who themselves are splinters from splinter groups? Also, and this usually isn’t mentioned in low-church circles, many of these proselytizers are “NGOs” whose tracts may contain bible verses on one side, but democratic propaganda on the other side.
A Faith-Based Army
Christ told his followers to be gentle as doves but wise as serpents. Alexey II’s wisdom–indeed cunning–is evident in this chapter. After the Soviet Union’s debacle in Afghanistan, coupled with the fall of the USSR and the ignomious outing of the Red Army from Eastern Europe (forcing to leave behind value military hardware), the Red Army suffered a severe morale crisis. At times, 60% of conscripts failed to report for duty, and many that did suffered severe hazing rituals.
Alexey’s dream was to have chapels on military bases, but this was a hard sale in the 1990s. However, many mothers of soldiers were complaining that their sons were suffering from the hazing rituals (many in fact died as a result of hazing). The military command said if the soldier had a problem, he should go to his superior officer. The mothers countered that this was pointless if the superior officer was the one beating the soldier! The mothers also staged a street protest in front of Western media, calling the situation to a crisis-point.
The generals were faced with a dilemma: if they kept up the hazing, they would become an international spectacle of brutality. If they gave in to the mothers’ demands, they would be a laughingstock. In steps Alexey II. He (publicly) told both sides he would mediate. He asked the generals if Orthodox clerics could have chapels on bases; this would allow soldiers to come to their priests if they have problems. The priests then appeal to the commanding officers. This way the issue stays within the military. In short, he offered the military a way out. He told the mothers that their sons would have a support network and different lines of appeal. The mothers agreed.
Other moves Alexey made: while turning Russia largely back to Orthodoxy, Alexey very wisely refrained from wanting a state religion. He also acknowledged the cultural presence of Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism in Russia. Alexey also worked very hard at calming a lot of Islamic tensions in southern Russia.
This was a very good chapter showing how brilliantly Alexey played the chaos of the 1990s, steering Russia back to order.
Sadly, the authors deliberately ruin the chapter. They bring up how stupid and evil they think the Tsars were. They ridicule Nicholas II’s attempt at command in WWI, accusing him of losing millions of soldiers against the Japanese and Central Powers. A few words:
First, this is irrelevant to the chapter and quite likely a scholarly faux pas.
For all of his faults, Nicholas II–and his army–completely destroyed the Austrian empire (wasting Austria’s entire army several times), forcing German generals to pull key divisions from France back to the Eastern Front. (Unfortunately, this probably saved France and England from the ass-whooping they so richly deserved.)
At the end of 1905, while it appeared that Japan had thoroughly defeated Russia, what is not mentioned in history books is that Japan was begging America to intervene and call for peace. Why? Japan–and Russia–knew that legions of Tsarist troops were en route from Europe across Siberia. It simply took a long time by train. Japan’s resources were exhausted. Had the war been continued with the rest of the Tsarist troops, Russia would have likely owned all of northern China and northern Japan.
These unscholarly rants no longer bother me. I realize the authors are jaded postmodernists and this is part of their worldview.
Conclusion:
Despite all the horrible side-problems with the book, it is a good and welcome study. It summarizes (and sometimes makes known previously secret material) a lot of difficult and often conflicting information. Given that the authors are Lutheran and secularist, they are able to approach the “Sergist” controversy with some objectivity.
Unfortunately, the authors’ jaded postmodernism ruins much of the book. Good scholarship, especially on the university level, is supposed to avoid value-judgments and emotionally-explosive language as much as possible. Scholars are to be those individuals who are serene and can transcend the current debate (of course, anyone in academia knows this is a laughing joke). The Gerrards, unfortunately, seem to want to violate those canons. When I was in grad school, I received low marks on some papers that had finer style than this!
It’s not worth the $29 at amazon. However, if found cheaper one should get it. Their strength is in post-soviet history. One needs to supplement this study with other studies, though, since the authors are woefully inadequate on pre-Revolutionary Russia.
Right-wing Cold Warriors see the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a vehicle of state propaganda and perhaps an impediment to the creation of a global market force led by Westerners (e.g., the philosophy of neo-conservatism). Left-wing Westerns are likely dismayed that the ROC took such a key role in downing state socialism in Russia. Also, they oppose the ROC’s strict (sometimes violent) opposition to sodomy.
Both left- and right-wing forces in the West, then, are allied against Russia. This is evident in that all media outlets on both sides of the aisle (e.g., Fox and CNN) are anti-Russian (or anti-Putin, more specifically). At the end of the preface, GG makes a very startling (from an academic Western) and wise pronouncement: whatever Russia’s future may be, it will not be Western andcannot ever be (xiv). This is probably the wisest and most intelligent remark made by an academician about Russia–it also cuts against the grain of both neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism).
Prologue
GG gives a brief but very well-written account of the nature and history of the ROC. One is surprised at how accurate and almost sympathetic their reading of Orthodoxy is. The authors give considerable detail to the nature of Orthodox liturgy and more particularly, the place of “liturgical time.” This is important for the next Chapter.
They argue that Alexey II is rebuilding Russia along the lines of cleansing, history, and sobornost–all explicitly Orthodox categories but also subverting the Soviet trinity of ideology, party, and narodnost.
Throughout the book GG shows a remarkable ability to fairly capture the essence of a very different viewpoint. Sadly, this does not last.
The Gerrards, writing either as nominal liberal Protestants and secularists, previously surprised me by defying all liberal and neo-conservative academic standards when dealing with Russia. They rightly identified Russia as a medieval civilization that will never be Western, despite the aims of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
Even more surprising was their painstakingly accurate (and fairly sympathetic) description of Russian Orthodoxy and liturgy. This is enough to get one fired and blacklisted from the academy. The Gerrards are to be commended.
Then the Gerrards utterly ruin the book with an irrelevant section on how evil the Serbs are. Now I know CNN is funding this book (actually, Princeton is but my point is the same). They claim the Serbs did bad things, but so did the Muslims and Croats. But who’s to blame? The Serbs.
Actually, that section on the Serbs is not irrelevant. It plays into the Regime’s mindset nicely. The Gerrards’ early chapters on the beauty of Orthodoxy should not mislead you. The Regime (Beltway Alliance, London, Tel Aviv, etc) is not anti-religion. It is pro-religious expression as long as that religious expression does not challenge the Regime. The Serbs (and Russian nationalists) know that religious questions cannot be “isolated” from other questions, and for that they are hated. This is because GG are jaded postmodernists. Religion is good, especially if ran as a critique of modernity, but it should never be exalted as a metanarrative. This is the ideology of the Gerrards, whether they admit it or not.
Are they Hungtindonians?
In this chapter the Gerrards give a detailed, yet succinct enough summary of Russian Church history, particularly in its opposition to “The West.” Other scholarly reviewers criticized the Gerrards for adopting a “Huntingdonian” view of East-West differences. Perhaps Huntingdon’s thesis is overdrawn, but I don’t see how anyone who reads any random issue of The Wall Street Journal or watches Fox News can avoid the conclusion that the West is opposed to Russia. The Gerrards are simply stating the obvious.
That’s not to say the Gerrards do a good job on summarizing Russian ecclesial and political history in this chapter. They do not. In fact, many of their summaries and conclusions are painful. Like the rest of the book when it errs, they get the general idea correct, but botch the details. A few examples:
They say that Orthodoxy opposes papal infallibility because Orthodoxy traces their lineage through St Andrew “the first called apostle,” and not through Peter. Now, any decent church history textbook can explain the difference between papal primacy and papal infallibility. Orthodox affirm the former (at least until 1054) as a way of honoring the Roman bishop because of his good leadership and the number of martyrs at Rome. Affirming the former, however, is not the same thing as justifying the latter (a basic logical distinction that Roman Catholics fail to see). As to the argument of “Andrew the First-Called,” I suppose some out of the way Russian clerics hold that view, but I’ve never seen a serious Orthodox scholar advance such a view.
The Gerrards downplay the role of the Filioque in order to bolster their own (unique) thesis that it was the issue of Apostolic Succession, and not the Filioque, that determines the difference between Orthodoxy and Rome. The Gerrards are to be commended, however, for noting the connections between papal supremacy and the desire to convert Russia by the sword.
Interestingly, Alexey II, the star of the book so far, is not prominent in this chapter. They do mention the fact Aleksy used his political skill to thwart many of John Paul II’s aims against Russia. Surprisingly for academics, the Gerrards do not criticize the Russian Church for thwarting the goals of Protestants to proselytize Russia. This is a hard point for Westerners to understand. Even the most backwoods conservative right-wing American, who loves Jesus and hates secularism, is a pure secularist when it comes to proselytizing Russia. And by pure secularist, I mean someone who has thoroughly absorbed the values of the Enlightenment. Americans simply cannot understand why Russia opposes “Christian” missionaries to her country.
Russians, and Orthodox, affirm that their view is “the truth.” While maybe a mean statement, most conservative religious communities do the same thing as well. If you say you are the truth, you are likewise making a value-judgment against those who are not the truth. This is not bigotry. This is logic. Everyone does it. This is a rejection of the Enlightenment view that says to some religious communities, “No, you are not welcome here.”
From the perspective of Russia’s 1,000 year history and memory, precisely what do they owe the Protestants, especially the more chaotic baptist elements who themselves are splinters from splinter groups? Also, and this usually isn’t mentioned in low-church circles, many of these proselytizers are “NGOs” whose tracts may contain bible verses on one side, but democratic propaganda on the other side.
A Faith-Based Army
Christ told his followers to be gentle as doves but wise as serpents. Alexey II’s wisdom–indeed cunning–is evident in this chapter. After the Soviet Union’s debacle in Afghanistan, coupled with the fall of the USSR and the ignomious outing of the Red Army from Eastern Europe (forcing to leave behind value military hardware), the Red Army suffered a severe morale crisis. At times, 60% of conscripts failed to report for duty, and many that did suffered severe hazing rituals.
Alexey’s dream was to have chapels on military bases, but this was a hard sale in the 1990s. However, many mothers of soldiers were complaining that their sons were suffering from the hazing rituals (many in fact died as a result of hazing). The military command said if the soldier had a problem, he should go to his superior officer. The mothers countered that this was pointless if the superior officer was the one beating the soldier! The mothers also staged a street protest in front of Western media, calling the situation to a crisis-point.
The generals were faced with a dilemma: if they kept up the hazing, they would become an international spectacle of brutality. If they gave in to the mothers’ demands, they would be a laughingstock. In steps Alexey II. He (publicly) told both sides he would mediate. He asked the generals if Orthodox clerics could have chapels on bases; this would allow soldiers to come to their priests if they have problems. The priests then appeal to the commanding officers. This way the issue stays within the military. In short, he offered the military a way out. He told the mothers that their sons would have a support network and different lines of appeal. The mothers agreed.
Other moves Alexey made: while turning Russia largely back to Orthodoxy, Alexey very wisely refrained from wanting a state religion. He also acknowledged the cultural presence of Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism in Russia. Alexey also worked very hard at calming a lot of Islamic tensions in southern Russia.
This was a very good chapter showing how brilliantly Alexey played the chaos of the 1990s, steering Russia back to order.
Sadly, the authors deliberately ruin the chapter. They bring up how stupid and evil they think the Tsars were. They ridicule Nicholas II’s attempt at command in WWI, accusing him of losing millions of soldiers against the Japanese and Central Powers. A few words:
First, this is irrelevant to the chapter and quite likely a scholarly faux pas.
For all of his faults, Nicholas II–and his army–completely destroyed the Austrian empire (wasting Austria’s entire army several times), forcing German generals to pull key divisions from France back to the Eastern Front. (Unfortunately, this probably saved France and England from the ass-whooping they so richly deserved.)
At the end of 1905, while it appeared that Japan had thoroughly defeated Russia, what is not mentioned in history books is that Japan was begging America to intervene and call for peace. Why? Japan–and Russia–knew that legions of Tsarist troops were en route from Europe across Siberia. It simply took a long time by train. Japan’s resources were exhausted. Had the war been continued with the rest of the Tsarist troops, Russia would have likely owned all of northern China and northern Japan.
These unscholarly rants no longer bother me. I realize the authors are jaded postmodernists and this is part of their worldview.
Conclusion:
Despite all the horrible side-problems with the book, it is a good and welcome study. It summarizes (and sometimes makes known previously secret material) a lot of difficult and often conflicting information. Given that the authors are Lutheran and secularist, they are able to approach the “Sergist” controversy with some objectivity.
Unfortunately, the authors’ jaded postmodernism ruins much of the book. Good scholarship, especially on the university level, is supposed to avoid value-judgments and emotionally-explosive language as much as possible. Scholars are to be those individuals who are serene and can transcend the current debate (of course, anyone in academia knows this is a laughing joke). The Gerrards, unfortunately, seem to want to violate those canons. When I was in grad school, I received low marks on some papers that had finer style than this!
It’s not worth the $29 at amazon. However, if found cheaper one should get it. Their strength is in post-soviet history. One needs to supplement this study with other studies, though, since the authors are woefully inadequate on pre-Revolutionary Russia.
April 1, 2025
A very good book about how Orthodoxy supplanted Communism after the collapse of the USSR. The book explores Patriarch Alexei’s role specifically and delves into a number of topics, including the Russian Orthodox Church’s relations with the West, the military, and the government. The author does a great job of demonstrating how historical paradigms influenced the ROC’s decisions and why they proved effective.
June 20, 2023
Overall, a decent study in the modern (and to a slightly lesser degree Soviet era) Russian Orthodox Church (ROC.) It does somewhat slavishly fawn over Aleksy II, the Patriarch of the ROC- still, there's a good overview. I did take one star off for the fawning and the time leaps (the organization was thematic rather than chronological, and I think the latter would have been more appropriate.)
April 5, 2010
Exclusively focused on Patriarch Aleksy II, the book fails to provide a in-depth description of how the Russian Orthodox Church, as a religious institution, has functioned in the past two decades. Indeed, it looks more like a biography of the Patriarch than a survey of the ROC. This inevitably brings about the impression that there was only one person matters in ROC's hierarchy, which amounts to a grave misinterpretation of what the Church had achieved in the post-Soviet period. Except the relationship between the Church and the Russian Armed Forces, the book does not give us any information about how the ROC interacted with the Russian society. For instance, the authors do not mention the important fact that only 2% of Orthodox believers had integrated themselves into church life (воцерковленные) until the epilogue. (Which means respect for the Church Russian people demonstrated in the past two decades was very secular, i.e., it had its root in Russia's root as an Orthodox country.)
Although the book is plunged by these deficiencies, the fact that information and statistics may not be available makes them understandable. It is also helpful to view the ROC from an outsider's perspective. I used to think Patriarch Aleksy was nothing but a buffoon, but the book told me, by a host of examples of how he revived the Church and stood up against antisemitism, this was not the case.
Although the book is plunged by these deficiencies, the fact that information and statistics may not be available makes them understandable. It is also helpful to view the ROC from an outsider's perspective. I used to think Patriarch Aleksy was nothing but a buffoon, but the book told me, by a host of examples of how he revived the Church and stood up against antisemitism, this was not the case.
June 4, 2014
The widely anthologized work of political scientist Kathy Rousselet on secularization and Russian Orthodoxy in modern Russia is more reliable and helpful to understanding the topic. She is a recognized expert in the field. Oddly, she is not cited in the Bibliography, an unconscionable omission.
In contrast to her scholarly work, this book is titillating and sensationalistic. It makes so many mistakes in its understanding of Orthodoxy that it raises questions about the other "facts" presented. Further, its assertion that "The USSR's fatal mistake was to deny Russian patriotism and subsume it under the rubric of Soviet internationalism. The end result was that the once-despised… RO church became the reliquary of pride in being Russian" is questionable.
Skip this and check out Kathy Rousselet's work.
In contrast to her scholarly work, this book is titillating and sensationalistic. It makes so many mistakes in its understanding of Orthodoxy that it raises questions about the other "facts" presented. Further, its assertion that "The USSR's fatal mistake was to deny Russian patriotism and subsume it under the rubric of Soviet internationalism. The end result was that the once-despised… RO church became the reliquary of pride in being Russian" is questionable.
Skip this and check out Kathy Rousselet's work.
August 7, 2010
Well-written, engaging history of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Communist period and its triumph following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book also functions as a biography of the current Orthodox Patriarch, who comes across quite well despite his earlier dalliance with the KGB. Although an astute politician, he comes across as a man who is able to navigate post-Communist Russian politics so as to establish Orthodoxy's place in the world, and he has been aggressive in leading the contemporary church away from overly xenophobic interpretations of the faith.
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