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A Nation Like All Others: A Brief History of American Foreign Relations
Belief in the United States as a force for good in the world runs deep. Yet an honest consideration reveals a history marred by great crimes and ordinary errors, alongside many achievements and triumphs. In this comprehensive account of American foreign relations from the nation’s founding through the present day, the diplomatic historian Warren I. Cohen calls attention to the uses—and abuses—of U.S. international leadership and the noble as well as the exploitative ends that American power has wrought.
In A Nation Like All Others, Cohen offers a brisk, argumentative history that confronts the concept of American exceptionalism and decries the lack of moral imagination in American foreign policy. He begins with the foreign policy of colonial and postrevolutionary America, exploring interactions with European powers and Native Americans and the implications of slavery and westward expansion. He then traces the rise of American empire; the nation’s choices leading up to and in the wake of the First World War; and World War II and renewed military involvement in foreign affairs. Cohen provides a long history of the Cold War, from its roots under Truman through the Korean and Vietnam Wars to the transformation of the international system under Reagan and Gorbachev. Finally, he surveys America’s recent history in the Middle East, with particular attention to the mismanagement of the War on Terror and Abu Ghraib. Written with great depth of knowledge and moral clarity, A Nation Like All Others suggests that an unflinching look at the nation’s past is America’s best option to shape a better future.
In A Nation Like All Others, Cohen offers a brisk, argumentative history that confronts the concept of American exceptionalism and decries the lack of moral imagination in American foreign policy. He begins with the foreign policy of colonial and postrevolutionary America, exploring interactions with European powers and Native Americans and the implications of slavery and westward expansion. He then traces the rise of American empire; the nation’s choices leading up to and in the wake of the First World War; and World War II and renewed military involvement in foreign affairs. Cohen provides a long history of the Cold War, from its roots under Truman through the Korean and Vietnam Wars to the transformation of the international system under Reagan and Gorbachev. Finally, he surveys America’s recent history in the Middle East, with particular attention to the mismanagement of the War on Terror and Abu Ghraib. Written with great depth of knowledge and moral clarity, A Nation Like All Others suggests that an unflinching look at the nation’s past is America’s best option to shape a better future.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
322 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 6, 2018
2 people are currently reading
80 people want to read
About the author
Warren I. Cohen
27 books5 followersWarren I. Cohen was an American historian specializing in the diplomatic history of the United States. He is Distinguished University Professor, Emeritus, at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Cohen was president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1984.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
June 23, 2018
This is a very well-written and well-researched historical perspective on American foreign policy over the years. It gives a balanced analysis of blunders , malfeasances, and successes. I thoroughly enjoyed it as I didn’t really know much about these things. It helps sometimes to understand why other nations have resentments against us. A well-balanced history is a good area of knowledge in today’s often complex and confusing world.
My thanks to NetGalley for providing me with an arc in exchange for my honest review.
My thanks to NetGalley for providing me with an arc in exchange for my honest review.
August 8, 2018
Review title: In search of moral imagination
"Moral imagination", a term defined by David Bromwich and referenced here by Cohen, is "the power that compels us to grant the highest possible reality and the largest conceivable claim to a thought action or person that is not our own." (p. xii). Cohen has written this brief history of American foreign relations in search of that power, or as he writes later in referring to George Bush Senior's response to Tiananmen Square, in search of "policies [that] reflect its ideals as well as its interests." (p. 230)
First, setting the context of the book: it is truly brief, 300 pages with no footnotes or bibliography. Cohen refers readers in search of sources and additional reading to two longer histories (one of which he was an editor), each over 1,000 pages and thus less likely to be of interest for most general readers. He then proceeds in strict chronological order through American history touching the main points in a style like that of a professor speaking off the cuff or referring only occasionally to well-rehearsed notes for an undergraduate level survey course. And in fact Cohen is a professor emeritus and senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, so he may well have dictated or written his book just that way, in a few lecture-length writing sessions. Of course, without references to either primary sources or secondary sources with different viewpoints, just like college freshmen new to the course we are beholden to Cohen's take on American foreign relations. This is very much Cohen's history of American foreign relations.
Not that that is a bad thing. His take is pretty straight forward and nothing I read was shocking or unexpected. It is interesting that the history of American foreign relations up to 1900 can be told in just 50 pages, while the 20th century takes the next 200 pages and the few years of the 21st century the remaining 50. This balance reflects the relative isolationism first of the young country establishing its borders on the North American continent, then of the divided nation struggling against the bitter scourge of slavery, and finally of the reunited nation struggling with Reconstruction and deep economic recessions in the Gilded Age.
With Roosevelt and then Wilson, American policymakers began looking outward, even when, as Cohen says applies consistently throughout American history, Americans and their leaders will always turn inward to take care of issues at home first. But even after the defeat of Wilson's international agenda, Cohen documents America's continued deep overseas involvement as the strongest nation in the world in the aftermath of the first World War; the Depression, while not driving Americans completely inward, did result in bad foreign relations choices that helped drive to the second.
American foreign policy was driven in the second half of the 20th century by the Cold War. Cohen views the US/Russian relationship as a mutual push-pull, with each country adopting policies and taking actions to enhance their security, which was perceived by the other country as threatening (see p. 100-101). In perhaps his boldest statement, Cohen views the Korean War as the "momentous turning point in the Cold War" (p. 127), even though most baby boomers (like myself) coming of age after Korea point to Vietnam, the rise of China, or the fall of the Berlin Wall as more immediate. For the rest of the Cold War era and "the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the moral leadership of my country is a little harder to pinpoint and praise." (p. 298)
To an outsider, traditional diplomacy looks like a dishonest and dirty sport played by refined gentlemen. American exceptionalism turned that formula on its head: unrefined elected representatives of a classless society representing the highest of ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and other expressions of the American moral imagination, acting and taking with simple sincerity. Could a nation ever conduct diplomacy by those standards of its moral imagination? Likely not, so, like all other nations, it should be no surprise that the occasions of American moral action to match the imagination are much more rare than its negation. Could we hope for more, and should we expect more from our modern elected leaders? We must and we should. Cohen has documented all the good with all the bad, a standard by which we can measure our expectations.
"Moral imagination", a term defined by David Bromwich and referenced here by Cohen, is "the power that compels us to grant the highest possible reality and the largest conceivable claim to a thought action or person that is not our own." (p. xii). Cohen has written this brief history of American foreign relations in search of that power, or as he writes later in referring to George Bush Senior's response to Tiananmen Square, in search of "policies [that] reflect its ideals as well as its interests." (p. 230)
First, setting the context of the book: it is truly brief, 300 pages with no footnotes or bibliography. Cohen refers readers in search of sources and additional reading to two longer histories (one of which he was an editor), each over 1,000 pages and thus less likely to be of interest for most general readers. He then proceeds in strict chronological order through American history touching the main points in a style like that of a professor speaking off the cuff or referring only occasionally to well-rehearsed notes for an undergraduate level survey course. And in fact Cohen is a professor emeritus and senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, so he may well have dictated or written his book just that way, in a few lecture-length writing sessions. Of course, without references to either primary sources or secondary sources with different viewpoints, just like college freshmen new to the course we are beholden to Cohen's take on American foreign relations. This is very much Cohen's history of American foreign relations.
Not that that is a bad thing. His take is pretty straight forward and nothing I read was shocking or unexpected. It is interesting that the history of American foreign relations up to 1900 can be told in just 50 pages, while the 20th century takes the next 200 pages and the few years of the 21st century the remaining 50. This balance reflects the relative isolationism first of the young country establishing its borders on the North American continent, then of the divided nation struggling against the bitter scourge of slavery, and finally of the reunited nation struggling with Reconstruction and deep economic recessions in the Gilded Age.
With Roosevelt and then Wilson, American policymakers began looking outward, even when, as Cohen says applies consistently throughout American history, Americans and their leaders will always turn inward to take care of issues at home first. But even after the defeat of Wilson's international agenda, Cohen documents America's continued deep overseas involvement as the strongest nation in the world in the aftermath of the first World War; the Depression, while not driving Americans completely inward, did result in bad foreign relations choices that helped drive to the second.
American foreign policy was driven in the second half of the 20th century by the Cold War. Cohen views the US/Russian relationship as a mutual push-pull, with each country adopting policies and taking actions to enhance their security, which was perceived by the other country as threatening (see p. 100-101). In perhaps his boldest statement, Cohen views the Korean War as the "momentous turning point in the Cold War" (p. 127), even though most baby boomers (like myself) coming of age after Korea point to Vietnam, the rise of China, or the fall of the Berlin Wall as more immediate. For the rest of the Cold War era and "the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the moral leadership of my country is a little harder to pinpoint and praise." (p. 298)
To an outsider, traditional diplomacy looks like a dishonest and dirty sport played by refined gentlemen. American exceptionalism turned that formula on its head: unrefined elected representatives of a classless society representing the highest of ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and other expressions of the American moral imagination, acting and taking with simple sincerity. Could a nation ever conduct diplomacy by those standards of its moral imagination? Likely not, so, like all other nations, it should be no surprise that the occasions of American moral action to match the imagination are much more rare than its negation. Could we hope for more, and should we expect more from our modern elected leaders? We must and we should. Cohen has documented all the good with all the bad, a standard by which we can measure our expectations.
March 16, 2018
The title of Warren Cohen's new survey of American foreign policy also serves as the thesis statement of this book: despite all our claims to exceptionalism, American foreign policy has traditionally been just as flawed, pragmatic, and tumultuous of most other nations. Our foreign policy has at times been aggressively expansionist, going so far as to seize land from Mexico and other countries. At other times, we have subordinated exceptionalism to perceived security needs, as during the Cold War. Throughout our history, domestic interest groups have played a huge role in dictating the direction and tone of our relationships with other nations.
Cohen's book serves as a highly readable single-volume history of American foreign policy since 1776. Given the amount of history, it's no small feat that the book manages to hit upon the most important foreign policy issues during each era without feeling superficial. Somehow, despite the breadth of the book, the book doesn't sacrifice depth. I consider myself a student of international relations, but I learned quite a bit from this book. For example, I did not realize that Secretary of State William Seward had seriously proposed declaring war on a European power in order to unify the US and forestall civil war!
That said, there is a recency bias in that he spends more time on more recent foreign policy issues than those in the distant past. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s received far more attention than the trade sanctions that led to the War of 1812, when our nation's sovereignty was at stake. Also, I noticed a few noteworthy omissions; Cohen does not address JFK's role in resolving the Sino-Indian War of 1962, or the human rights campaigns to push for change in South Africa or Myanmar (Burma).
I also wish Cohen had provided a clearer rubric for understanding how to evaluate a president's foreign policy. Cohen occasionally interrupts the historical narrative to provide an assessment of a particular decision (he considers Carter inept, surprisingly favorable towards the Kellogg–Briand Pact). However, presidents make hundreds of decisions. Should we evaluate presidents based on their decision-making process or policy outcomes? How should we weigh security and moral concerns when the two come into conflict?
Ultimately, no president gets a perfect score from Cohen, and perhaps that the best lesson to take from this book. Cohen's book helps demythologize our past. Foreign policy is difficult and involves compromises. More often than not, the presidents in this book come across as constrained by domestic politics or incomplete information about foreign actors. There never was a golden age of foreign policy wise men. But perhaps by learning from our history we can do better in the future.
Cohen's book serves as a highly readable single-volume history of American foreign policy since 1776. Given the amount of history, it's no small feat that the book manages to hit upon the most important foreign policy issues during each era without feeling superficial. Somehow, despite the breadth of the book, the book doesn't sacrifice depth. I consider myself a student of international relations, but I learned quite a bit from this book. For example, I did not realize that Secretary of State William Seward had seriously proposed declaring war on a European power in order to unify the US and forestall civil war!
That said, there is a recency bias in that he spends more time on more recent foreign policy issues than those in the distant past. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s received far more attention than the trade sanctions that led to the War of 1812, when our nation's sovereignty was at stake. Also, I noticed a few noteworthy omissions; Cohen does not address JFK's role in resolving the Sino-Indian War of 1962, or the human rights campaigns to push for change in South Africa or Myanmar (Burma).
I also wish Cohen had provided a clearer rubric for understanding how to evaluate a president's foreign policy. Cohen occasionally interrupts the historical narrative to provide an assessment of a particular decision (he considers Carter inept, surprisingly favorable towards the Kellogg–Briand Pact). However, presidents make hundreds of decisions. Should we evaluate presidents based on their decision-making process or policy outcomes? How should we weigh security and moral concerns when the two come into conflict?
Ultimately, no president gets a perfect score from Cohen, and perhaps that the best lesson to take from this book. Cohen's book helps demythologize our past. Foreign policy is difficult and involves compromises. More often than not, the presidents in this book come across as constrained by domestic politics or incomplete information about foreign actors. There never was a golden age of foreign policy wise men. But perhaps by learning from our history we can do better in the future.
June 25, 2024
Непоганий короткий опис величезної історії зовнішньої політики США. Мандруючи поміж доктрин Монро чи Трумена, ми можемо багато чого зрозуміти стосовно нашої сучасної історії, зокрема стосовно зовнішньої допомоги Україні. Історія циклічна, сподіваюся, уроки вивчені. І події наших днів будуть прикладом тріумфу демократії, про які так мріяли батьки-засновники, тим більше, що доктрина Монро уже далеко в історії.
April 19, 2019
Cohen's overview is indeed very brief, but nevertheless insightful. He pulls no punches, but is balanced in his evaluation of the successes and failures (practical and moral) of American foreign relations.
November 19, 2018
Goes through American foreign policy from the very beginning up to now. Lots of interesting and informative information and presented well. Very much worth reading.
December 26, 2025
Good overview and analysis of US foreign policy but it lacks any bibliography or footnotes
June 8, 2018
An excellent review of American foreign policy throughout it's history. The author shows that our past foreign policy has always been a mix of good decisions and bad ones. That all president's have struggled to 'do the right thing", but have at times made some bad moves. One would hope that our people now in charge of these matters would take the time to read this book, and learn and apply it's lessons. To do so would benefit America. To ignore the lessons of yesterday might lead to history repeating itself in a negative way.
March 16, 2018
The title of Warren Cohen's new survey of American foreign policy also serves as the thesis statement of this book: despite all our claims to exceptionalism, American foreign policy has traditionally been just as flawed, pragmatic, and tumultuous of most other nations. Our foreign policy has at times been aggressively expansionist, going so far as to seize land from Mexico and other countries. At other times, we have subordinated exceptionalism to perceived security needs, as during the Cold War. Throughout our history, domestic interest groups have played a huge role in dictating the direction and tone of our relationships with other nations.
Cohen's book serves as a highly readable single-volume history of American foreign policy since 1776. Given the amount of history, it's no small feat that the book manages to hit upon the most important foreign policy issues during each era without feeling superficial. Somehow, despite the breadth of the book, the book doesn't sacrifice depth. I consider myself a student of international relations, but I learned quite a bit from this book. For example, I did not realize that Secretary of State William Seward had seriously proposed declaring war on a European power in order to unify the US and forestall civil war!
That said, there is a recency bias in that he spends more time on more recent foreign policy issues than those in the distant past. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s received far more attention than the trade sanctions that led to the War of 1812, when our nation's sovereignty was at stake. Also, I noticed a few noteworthy omissions; Cohen does not address JFK's role in resolving the Sino-Indian War of 1962, or the human rights campaigns to push for change in South Africa or Myanmar (Burma).
I also wish Cohen had provided a clearer rubric for understanding how to evaluate a president's foreign policy. Cohen occasionally interrupts the historical narrative to provide an assessment of a particular decision (he considers Carter inept, surprisingly favorable towards the Kellogg–Briand Pact). However, presidents make hundreds of decisions. Should we evaluate presidents based on their decision-making process or policy outcomes? How should we weigh security and moral concerns when the two come into conflict?
Ultimately, no president gets a perfect score from Cohen, and perhaps that the best lesson to take from this book. Cohen's book helps demythologize our past. Foreign policy is difficult and involves compromises. More often than not, the presidents in this book come across as constrained by domestic politics or incomplete information about foreign actors. There never was a golden age of foreign policy wise men. But perhaps by learning from our history we can do better in the future.
Cohen's book serves as a highly readable single-volume history of American foreign policy since 1776. Given the amount of history, it's no small feat that the book manages to hit upon the most important foreign policy issues during each era without feeling superficial. Somehow, despite the breadth of the book, the book doesn't sacrifice depth. I consider myself a student of international relations, but I learned quite a bit from this book. For example, I did not realize that Secretary of State William Seward had seriously proposed declaring war on a European power in order to unify the US and forestall civil war!
That said, there is a recency bias in that he spends more time on more recent foreign policy issues than those in the distant past. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s received far more attention than the trade sanctions that led to the War of 1812, when our nation's sovereignty was at stake. Also, I noticed a few noteworthy omissions; Cohen does not address JFK's role in resolving the Sino-Indian War of 1962, or the human rights campaigns to push for change in South Africa or Myanmar (Burma).
I also wish Cohen had provided a clearer rubric for understanding how to evaluate a president's foreign policy. Cohen occasionally interrupts the historical narrative to provide an assessment of a particular decision (he considers Carter inept, surprisingly favorable towards the Kellogg–Briand Pact). However, presidents make hundreds of decisions. Should we evaluate presidents based on their decision-making process or policy outcomes? How should we weigh security and moral concerns when the two come into conflict?
Ultimately, no president gets a perfect score from Cohen, and perhaps that the best lesson to take from this book. Cohen's book helps demythologize our past. Foreign policy is difficult and involves compromises. More often than not, the presidents in this book come across as constrained by domestic politics or incomplete information about foreign actors. There never was a golden age of foreign policy wise men. But perhaps by learning from our history we can do better in the future.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews