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Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings
A comprehensive and authoritative anthology of Rousseau's major later political writings in up-to-date English translations. This volume includes the essay on Political Economy, The Social Contract, and the extensive, late Considerations on the Government of Poland, as well as the important draft on The Right of War and a selection of his letters on various aspects of his political thought. The Social Contract, Rousseau's most comprehensive political work - he called it a 'small treatise' - was condemned on publication by both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities in France as well as in Geneva, and warrants for its author's arrest were issued. Rousseau was forced to flee and it is during this period that he wrote some of his autobiographical works. This new edition features an expanded introduction, and an extensive editorial apparatus designed to assist students at every level access these seminal texts.
412 pages, Hardcover
First published August 28, 1997
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June 7, 2018This review discusses Rousseau's concepts of social contract and general will in his work The Social Contract. Quotations are from Rousseau, "The Social Contract" and Other Later Political Writings, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Although I read the G. D. H. Cole translation of The Social Contract in college, I have recently finished reading the Gourevitch translation, which appears to be more accurate than the Cole translation (though I don't know French and have not consulted the French original).
Rousseau organized The Social Contract into four books, each with brief chapters (similar to sections) beginning with chapter 1 in each book. The Gourevitch translation follows the paragraphing of the French original and affixes Arabic numerals to those paragraphs. Accordingly, citations herein are to the book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), and paragraph (Arabic numeral): "I.1.1" means book I, chapter 1, paragraph 1.
Rousseau states that "[the] clauses [of the social contract], rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community . . . ." (I.6.6) (Emphasis added.)
He adds in the next paragraph:
"Moreover, since the alienation is made without reservation, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything further to claim: For if individuals were left some rights, then, since there would be no common superior who might adjudicate between them and the public, each, being judge in his own case on some issue, would soon claim to be so on all, the state of nature would subsist and the association necessarily become tyrannical or empty." (I.6.7) (Emphasis added.)
As if he had not already made this point sufficiently clear, he restates it again as follows:
"If, then, one sets aside everything that is not of the essence of the social compact, one finds that it can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will ; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." (I.6.9) (Italics in the original, bold emphasis added.)
From these statements, we can conclude that the individual does not reserve any rights when entering into the Rousseauean social contract. In contrast to the principles of Locke, Jefferson, Madison, and American government generally, there are no "unalienable" individual rights as such for Rousseau. Every individual submits totally to the "general will," whatever that term may mean.
Moreover, "for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free . . . ."(I.8.7) (Emphasis added.) One may be excused if one is reminded of the propaganda recited in George Orwell's 1984.
Even for Thomas Hobbes, the Leviathan state could not arbitrarily assume the power of life or death over its individual subjects. Under Rousseau's social contract, however, "the Citizen is no longer judge of the danger the law wills him to risk, and when the Prince has said to him, it is expedient to the State that you die, he ought to die; since it is only on this condition that he has lived in security until then, and his life is no longer only a bounty of nature, but a conditional gift of the State." (II.5.2) (Emphasis added.) The architects of the terrors of the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Third Reich must have committed this passage to memory.
Rousseau praises the "wise Edicts" of John Calvin, the architect and leader of Geneva's seventeenth-century theocracy. (II.7.5n) Although Rousseau was elsewhere a connoisseur of pity, he does not pause to pity the heretics (defined as those who disagreed with any of the dogmas of Calvin's theology) whom Geneva executed at Calvin's maniacal instigation. (See Alan E. Johnson, The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience [Pittsburgh: Philosophia 2015], 326-31.)
Similarly, in total contrast to the explicit statements of the American founders, Rousseau claimed that no political society could be established without instilling a myth among the common people that it was founded by God or the gods. (II.7.9-12) Rousseau knew his Machiavelli, whom he cited with approval in this work.
But what exactly is the "general will"? How is it determined? Is it some mystical thing subject to manipulation by tyrants? Or does it have a concrete meaning?
Considering all of Rousseau's ethereal ambiguities, it is difficult to pin him down on this matter. Nevertheless, he seems to come down to earth a bit in Book IV. There, he announces that "[t]here is only one law which by its nature requires unanimous consent. That is the social pact: for the civil association is the most voluntary act in the world; every man being born free and master of himself, no one may on any pretext whatsoever subject him without his consent." (IV.2.5) Consent to the social contract is established by residence. Those who do not agree with the social contract must physically leave; the only exception is for those who cannot voluntarily leave. (IV.2.6)
"Except for this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always obligates all the rest; this is a consequence of the contract itself." (IV.2.7) "This presupposes, it is true, that all the characteristics of the general will are still in the majority: once they no longer are, then regardless of which side one takes there no longer is any freedom." (IV.2.9) Here, Rousseau again escapes into the ether. How is "general will" determined if not by popular vote—by majority vote after the political society is founded? And who gets to determine it? Rousseau does not answer these questions, because they are essentially unanswerable.
James Madison, most famously in Federalist No. 10, taught that
"a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions."
Although Madison did not mention Rousseau here, he may have been thinking of The Social Contract when he referred to "[t]heoretic politicians." Rousseau strongly supported direct democracy (what Madison called "pure democracy") and strongly opposed any form of representation. Following Montesquieu, he argued that democratic political societies should be small in order to permit direct citizen involvement in all political issues. Citizens should spend their time politicking rather than making money or other pursuits. (III.15)
Madison, in contrast, thought that representation helped temper the momentary and parochial passions of the multitude. In Federalist No. 10, he argued that a republic could and should extend over a large territory. A system of representation would help ensure that local majorities would not oppress local minorities. Among the local "factions" listed by Madison was religion. He was well aware of the persecution of religious minorities by local religious majorities; he had personally witnessed and combatted such persecution in Virginia. (Johnson, First American Founder, 264-79.) In total contrast to Madison, Rousseau wished to enable the politicization of religion. He supported political control of personal morality as well as an official civil religion. (IV.7-8) Rousseau never learned the lessons of separation of church and state and freedom of conscience so ably taught and instituted by Roger Williams in the preceding century. (Johnson, First American Founder, chaps. 2-8.)
Rousseau advanced a plethora of ideas, good and bad, that this essay has not had occasion to reach. The foregoing discussion should demonstrate, however, that his political principles are inconsistent with the founding principles of the United States and other democratic republics that recognize and honor individual rights.
Rousseau organized The Social Contract into four books, each with brief chapters (similar to sections) beginning with chapter 1 in each book. The Gourevitch translation follows the paragraphing of the French original and affixes Arabic numerals to those paragraphs. Accordingly, citations herein are to the book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), and paragraph (Arabic numeral): "I.1.1" means book I, chapter 1, paragraph 1.
Rousseau states that "[the] clauses [of the social contract], rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community . . . ." (I.6.6) (Emphasis added.)
He adds in the next paragraph:
"Moreover, since the alienation is made without reservation, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything further to claim: For if individuals were left some rights, then, since there would be no common superior who might adjudicate between them and the public, each, being judge in his own case on some issue, would soon claim to be so on all, the state of nature would subsist and the association necessarily become tyrannical or empty." (I.6.7) (Emphasis added.)
As if he had not already made this point sufficiently clear, he restates it again as follows:
"If, then, one sets aside everything that is not of the essence of the social compact, one finds that it can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will ; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." (I.6.9) (Italics in the original, bold emphasis added.)
From these statements, we can conclude that the individual does not reserve any rights when entering into the Rousseauean social contract. In contrast to the principles of Locke, Jefferson, Madison, and American government generally, there are no "unalienable" individual rights as such for Rousseau. Every individual submits totally to the "general will," whatever that term may mean.
Moreover, "for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free . . . ."(I.8.7) (Emphasis added.) One may be excused if one is reminded of the propaganda recited in George Orwell's 1984.
Even for Thomas Hobbes, the Leviathan state could not arbitrarily assume the power of life or death over its individual subjects. Under Rousseau's social contract, however, "the Citizen is no longer judge of the danger the law wills him to risk, and when the Prince has said to him, it is expedient to the State that you die, he ought to die; since it is only on this condition that he has lived in security until then, and his life is no longer only a bounty of nature, but a conditional gift of the State." (II.5.2) (Emphasis added.) The architects of the terrors of the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Third Reich must have committed this passage to memory.
Rousseau praises the "wise Edicts" of John Calvin, the architect and leader of Geneva's seventeenth-century theocracy. (II.7.5n) Although Rousseau was elsewhere a connoisseur of pity, he does not pause to pity the heretics (defined as those who disagreed with any of the dogmas of Calvin's theology) whom Geneva executed at Calvin's maniacal instigation. (See Alan E. Johnson, The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience [Pittsburgh: Philosophia 2015], 326-31.)
Similarly, in total contrast to the explicit statements of the American founders, Rousseau claimed that no political society could be established without instilling a myth among the common people that it was founded by God or the gods. (II.7.9-12) Rousseau knew his Machiavelli, whom he cited with approval in this work.
But what exactly is the "general will"? How is it determined? Is it some mystical thing subject to manipulation by tyrants? Or does it have a concrete meaning?
Considering all of Rousseau's ethereal ambiguities, it is difficult to pin him down on this matter. Nevertheless, he seems to come down to earth a bit in Book IV. There, he announces that "[t]here is only one law which by its nature requires unanimous consent. That is the social pact: for the civil association is the most voluntary act in the world; every man being born free and master of himself, no one may on any pretext whatsoever subject him without his consent." (IV.2.5) Consent to the social contract is established by residence. Those who do not agree with the social contract must physically leave; the only exception is for those who cannot voluntarily leave. (IV.2.6)
"Except for this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always obligates all the rest; this is a consequence of the contract itself." (IV.2.7) "This presupposes, it is true, that all the characteristics of the general will are still in the majority: once they no longer are, then regardless of which side one takes there no longer is any freedom." (IV.2.9) Here, Rousseau again escapes into the ether. How is "general will" determined if not by popular vote—by majority vote after the political society is founded? And who gets to determine it? Rousseau does not answer these questions, because they are essentially unanswerable.
James Madison, most famously in Federalist No. 10, taught that
"a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions."
Although Madison did not mention Rousseau here, he may have been thinking of The Social Contract when he referred to "[t]heoretic politicians." Rousseau strongly supported direct democracy (what Madison called "pure democracy") and strongly opposed any form of representation. Following Montesquieu, he argued that democratic political societies should be small in order to permit direct citizen involvement in all political issues. Citizens should spend their time politicking rather than making money or other pursuits. (III.15)
Madison, in contrast, thought that representation helped temper the momentary and parochial passions of the multitude. In Federalist No. 10, he argued that a republic could and should extend over a large territory. A system of representation would help ensure that local majorities would not oppress local minorities. Among the local "factions" listed by Madison was religion. He was well aware of the persecution of religious minorities by local religious majorities; he had personally witnessed and combatted such persecution in Virginia. (Johnson, First American Founder, 264-79.) In total contrast to Madison, Rousseau wished to enable the politicization of religion. He supported political control of personal morality as well as an official civil religion. (IV.7-8) Rousseau never learned the lessons of separation of church and state and freedom of conscience so ably taught and instituted by Roger Williams in the preceding century. (Johnson, First American Founder, chaps. 2-8.)
Rousseau advanced a plethora of ideas, good and bad, that this essay has not had occasion to reach. The foregoing discussion should demonstrate, however, that his political principles are inconsistent with the founding principles of the United States and other democratic republics that recognize and honor individual rights.
September 13, 2019
His discourse on political economy precedes Smith by almost two decades, and his approach is in stark contrast to the later development of the subject. Rousseau thought the domination of self-interest within political societies as a sign of corruption, so you can imagine that the conclusions he draws differ axiomatically from contemporary economic thought. Again, returning to the classical political philosophers, Rousseau is mostly writing from the foundation of Aristotle’s conception of the Oikos. This work presages many of the ideas which will be more fully covered in the social contract and Geneva manuscripts, including the general will and the core of politics being fundamentally moral in nature.
In the social contract, Rousseau picks up from where he left off in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality: People find themselves in a state and society which corrupts their spirit, founded on a slight of hand by land-owners to secure their property and exploit the poor. As he pointed out in many of his replies, we cannot return to the state of nature (not that it existed) so we have to make the best of modernity. In this context Rousseau attempts to create a foundation for political society which preserves all the natural rights of man in the state of nature, but achieved through convention; "to find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before”. This convention is the Social Contract, which institutes the sovereignty of the General Will. The General Will is the will of each individual directed towards the good of the community. For Rousseau, this will when properly adhered to can only do good and never harm: after all, "one always wants one’s good, but one does not always see it". In contrast to Hobbes' view of founding politics on the most base values of self-preservation and self-interest, Rousseau seeks to found politics on something more akin to Kant's Categorical Imperative: to find a government in which each action could be formulated as something all members of the polity could agree with. However, again like Kant, people do not always know what is correct. What Isiah Berlin called positive liberty, the ability to be "truly free" through pursing your "true desires", is necessary for the proper practice of freedom; as such, "whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that he will be forced to be free". This general will is contrasted with the particular will—roughly self-interest—which is a corrupting force that harms the community as a whole. This idea is quite similar to the classical conception of governmental forms. It is certainly interesting placing sovereignty not in an institution or government itself, but in a collective of individual wills.
These high demands on human willingness to work towards the good of all is something many people would view as either overly optimistic or full-blown utopian. But Rousseau thinks this view is only a result of people having live in an essentially corrupted society; "the bounds of the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think: it is our weakness, our vices, our prejudges that constrict them". Rousseau does not think that any polity, however virtuous or good the laws, can last in such a way forever. Eventually the particular and corporate wills will overtake the general will and people will devolve back to their vice and greed. Another problem that Rousseau faced was just how such a polity could begin to exist in the first place. Rousseau thought that people's nature was almost entirely a result of education and their habituation to society, which naturally leads to a paradox: for there to be good society, there must be good people, but for there to be good people, there must be a good society;"the effect should become the cause; that the social spirit, which should be the product of the institution, should preside over the institution itself, and that men should be, prior to the laws, what they ought to become by means of them". For this he gave the rather ephemeral answer of a virtuous "lawgiver" à la Lycurgus or Solon, who creates laws which teach men to be good. However, i think even Rousseau understood how inadequate such an answer is. The treatise trails off after this into specifics which aren't that important to his broader ideas.
Is he successful in his goal? not really, but it's a fascinating read and has been absurdly influential in future political thought.
In the social contract, Rousseau picks up from where he left off in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality: People find themselves in a state and society which corrupts their spirit, founded on a slight of hand by land-owners to secure their property and exploit the poor. As he pointed out in many of his replies, we cannot return to the state of nature (not that it existed) so we have to make the best of modernity. In this context Rousseau attempts to create a foundation for political society which preserves all the natural rights of man in the state of nature, but achieved through convention; "to find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before”. This convention is the Social Contract, which institutes the sovereignty of the General Will. The General Will is the will of each individual directed towards the good of the community. For Rousseau, this will when properly adhered to can only do good and never harm: after all, "one always wants one’s good, but one does not always see it". In contrast to Hobbes' view of founding politics on the most base values of self-preservation and self-interest, Rousseau seeks to found politics on something more akin to Kant's Categorical Imperative: to find a government in which each action could be formulated as something all members of the polity could agree with. However, again like Kant, people do not always know what is correct. What Isiah Berlin called positive liberty, the ability to be "truly free" through pursing your "true desires", is necessary for the proper practice of freedom; as such, "whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that he will be forced to be free". This general will is contrasted with the particular will—roughly self-interest—which is a corrupting force that harms the community as a whole. This idea is quite similar to the classical conception of governmental forms. It is certainly interesting placing sovereignty not in an institution or government itself, but in a collective of individual wills.
These high demands on human willingness to work towards the good of all is something many people would view as either overly optimistic or full-blown utopian. But Rousseau thinks this view is only a result of people having live in an essentially corrupted society; "the bounds of the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think: it is our weakness, our vices, our prejudges that constrict them". Rousseau does not think that any polity, however virtuous or good the laws, can last in such a way forever. Eventually the particular and corporate wills will overtake the general will and people will devolve back to their vice and greed. Another problem that Rousseau faced was just how such a polity could begin to exist in the first place. Rousseau thought that people's nature was almost entirely a result of education and their habituation to society, which naturally leads to a paradox: for there to be good society, there must be good people, but for there to be good people, there must be a good society;"the effect should become the cause; that the social spirit, which should be the product of the institution, should preside over the institution itself, and that men should be, prior to the laws, what they ought to become by means of them". For this he gave the rather ephemeral answer of a virtuous "lawgiver" à la Lycurgus or Solon, who creates laws which teach men to be good. However, i think even Rousseau understood how inadequate such an answer is. The treatise trails off after this into specifics which aren't that important to his broader ideas.
Is he successful in his goal? not really, but it's a fascinating read and has been absurdly influential in future political thought.
July 8, 2025
words can’t describe how much i love rousseau 😍😍 complete opposite of locke… made me wanna turn into a bee 🐝 gave me a new look on civil society in general
October 18, 2017
As an American, we have entered into a political state of turmoil that many find new and either exciting or debilitating. I am of the latter, to be blunt. However, I can't sit here and attest that this state of perpetual upset is new. For time out of mind, government (if the word existed at the time) has had its issues and falsities. Rousseau, writing his collaborative works during the mid-1700s, attests to this. His main concerns, as a philosopher, was to engage and spar with governmental regimes and oust what he would consider "chimeras" and lackluster ways of managing a people and a State.
Even today, this text has relevance. To be sure, much of it does not as the world has moved on and changed. His views on women, religion, and the idea of a Sovereign or King are slightly outdated. However, for having been written nearly 300 years ago, I have to admit, a lot can be learned from his thoughts.
He argues, quite adamantly, that we have to do away with this thought that freedom is automatic happiness and quantity. In fact, he would most likely be appalled by the amount of waste and commodities that exist today. He states that freedom is a word that should be universal and, quite unlikely, the same across the board. For example, a person should only own a set amount and after that amount is exceeded it would be highly taxed. And this would apply universally. This is the true idea of equality and freedom as there is no excess, but there is also no want for more. Philosophy at its finest, considering that our own inner desires and wants usually win out if they can be attained.
Something more manageable, however, was his beliefs on small governments being run by the people and that once a government became to large it would forget its compatriots and the little people that help to make it so. This happens quite often in today's world where the government seems to no longer be run by the people because the government is too large and in control of too many. He also makes a solid point that one small gathering of people, perhaps only in the thousands, do not need the same rules and regulations as another set of people many miles away. The land, the climate, what the soil produces, the beliefs, the nuances of those people are so very different they cannot possibly be governed by the same set of governors.
These are but a few examples in his multitudes of writing here encased in this text. It's worth the read, but with an open eye that he lived three centuries ago and had a very different outlook on the world. Despite this, the text has its merits, and it is no surprise his works helped to foster revolutions around the world and he was ousted from his own homeland as a heretic. Nobody likes a pot-stirrer and he had quite the ladle.
Even today, this text has relevance. To be sure, much of it does not as the world has moved on and changed. His views on women, religion, and the idea of a Sovereign or King are slightly outdated. However, for having been written nearly 300 years ago, I have to admit, a lot can be learned from his thoughts.
He argues, quite adamantly, that we have to do away with this thought that freedom is automatic happiness and quantity. In fact, he would most likely be appalled by the amount of waste and commodities that exist today. He states that freedom is a word that should be universal and, quite unlikely, the same across the board. For example, a person should only own a set amount and after that amount is exceeded it would be highly taxed. And this would apply universally. This is the true idea of equality and freedom as there is no excess, but there is also no want for more. Philosophy at its finest, considering that our own inner desires and wants usually win out if they can be attained.
Something more manageable, however, was his beliefs on small governments being run by the people and that once a government became to large it would forget its compatriots and the little people that help to make it so. This happens quite often in today's world where the government seems to no longer be run by the people because the government is too large and in control of too many. He also makes a solid point that one small gathering of people, perhaps only in the thousands, do not need the same rules and regulations as another set of people many miles away. The land, the climate, what the soil produces, the beliefs, the nuances of those people are so very different they cannot possibly be governed by the same set of governors.
These are but a few examples in his multitudes of writing here encased in this text. It's worth the read, but with an open eye that he lived three centuries ago and had a very different outlook on the world. Despite this, the text has its merits, and it is no surprise his works helped to foster revolutions around the world and he was ousted from his own homeland as a heretic. Nobody likes a pot-stirrer and he had quite the ladle.
June 22, 2012
An impressive collection of Rousseau's political writings from the Discourse on Political Economy through the Social Contract to the Considerations on the Government of Poland. The inclusion of the first and last named, along with the State of War and several important letters in which Rousseau defended and explicated his philosophy, make this volume, like its companion, indispensable to those interested in Rousseau's political thought. Gourevitch's translations are solid (one can quibble here or there with his choices, of course), and his editorial notes are excellent. All in all, this is one of the best titles in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series. That it has become routine for scholars to cite it shows that it has gone a long way toward becoming a standard edition of Rousseau's works in English translation.
May 1, 2021
I only read the intro and The Social Contract. I don't feel like reading all of it because I'm not trying to be a Rousseau expert or anything, it'd be boring, and so it feels kind of unreasonable to do.
I don't know why you'd give books like these any less than 5 stars because it's not like the person who put this book together is Rousseau himself. Unless you are some sort of serious scholar that disagrees with the works included or the translation, which I doubt, but kudos to you if you are.
Lots of interesting stuff in here. I particularly liked the discussion on Jesus. And the book basically completely reformed how I thought about freedom, people, and the state, and which one of the latter two ensure the first.
I don't know why you'd give books like these any less than 5 stars because it's not like the person who put this book together is Rousseau himself. Unless you are some sort of serious scholar that disagrees with the works included or the translation, which I doubt, but kudos to you if you are.
Lots of interesting stuff in here. I particularly liked the discussion on Jesus. And the book basically completely reformed how I thought about freedom, people, and the state, and which one of the latter two ensure the first.
November 17, 2011
Not as good as the first volume (I could have done without "Considerations on the Government of Poland", and "Discourse on Political Economy" is boring as fuck when compared to his earlier discourses), but it's still worth the read. This translation is better than most I've read, and the footnotes, and index are invaluable. Most will probably want to skip the Introduction, but it provides some needed context for The Social Contract. Wish that "Emile" was included so I wouldn't have to buy another book, but alas.
May 1, 2009
I have not actually read it yet, BUT I've read the Social Contract and the prior volume "The Early Political Writings" and it gets 5 stars for having a thorough and complete index. When writing papers indexes can help.
August 27, 2017
So all my life, people keep bringing up this "Social Contract" biz in political discussions, and they can't explain it. Like, three times this has happened, at least. They'll be like "I can't explain it to you, you need to educate yourself." Or if I press them to explain it, they'll give me something that sounds like nonsense, and also doesn't support their point. So I saw this book and said, hey. Why not?
Wow. This guy's a very clear writer. Just about every chapter, he explains thrillingly what he's going to do in the chapter, and by the end of the chapter he's done mostly none of it. I'm not sure if he forgot to go back and read the openers or what. But for the record, the Social Contract works something like this:
Everybody originally in a state of nature had rights based on whatever they could secure and protect with their own resources. There were no protections, but also no dependencies on others. Seems legit.
To get to the next state, where you could have private property that everybody agreed to respect and protect even if you couldn't protect it from them yourself, people had to renounce their natural right to take whatever they want (from each other), and acquired dependencies on each other. They surrendered their natural rights to the community as a whole: to the "general will." In turn, government arises from the general will, to order and administer the agreements of the general will ("laws"), and to deal with those who break them.
Actually, the way I've laid it out there seems pretty clear, but trust me, this Rousseau guy wasn't satisfied. He felt the idea requires all kinds of abstract existences and states of people giving up this or that philosophical aspect of themselves and getting it back improved, from the abstractions they create collectively. He was simply following the fashion of the times, I believe: political philosophy needed to be abstruse to be taken seriously. Then as now?
Completely unaddressed in any of this is the main question that springs to mind, whenever people bring up "Social Contract" without being able to explain it: What social contract?! In what sense is there a contract to which any of us now living have agreed, and by which any of us now living are bound? People fumble around claiming that enjoying the benefits of society, such as they are, obligates you to this and that as well. Well no, it doesn't.
Specific things like a driver's license, the obligations are spelled out, but the vast majority of society's benefits are offered to all members without contingencies attached. We're free to make use of them as we please without obligation, taking or leaving whatever comes our way. We're also aware of the existence of police! And laws, and penalties for breaking them.
There's no connection between the two. No connection is necessary. The benefits are not made available to you because of or contingent upon the fact that you have agreed to respect the laws. Society offers its benefits freely to all its members, en masse and a la carte, whether people have agreed to any obligation or not. Society offers its punishments the same way.
There is not, in any sense, a social contract. There never has been, and there's never been any society with a need for one. I might read Locke's or Hobbes's take on it, though, just to see if they add anything fun! I understand Rousseau was a latecomer to the game. He gives Hobbes a real shellacking at several points - which is telling. Not even the champions of Social Contract have agreed to any such thing.
Rousseau's right about one thing, though. Government does indeed arise from the general will.
Wow. This guy's a very clear writer. Just about every chapter, he explains thrillingly what he's going to do in the chapter, and by the end of the chapter he's done mostly none of it. I'm not sure if he forgot to go back and read the openers or what. But for the record, the Social Contract works something like this:
Everybody originally in a state of nature had rights based on whatever they could secure and protect with their own resources. There were no protections, but also no dependencies on others. Seems legit.
To get to the next state, where you could have private property that everybody agreed to respect and protect even if you couldn't protect it from them yourself, people had to renounce their natural right to take whatever they want (from each other), and acquired dependencies on each other. They surrendered their natural rights to the community as a whole: to the "general will." In turn, government arises from the general will, to order and administer the agreements of the general will ("laws"), and to deal with those who break them.
Actually, the way I've laid it out there seems pretty clear, but trust me, this Rousseau guy wasn't satisfied. He felt the idea requires all kinds of abstract existences and states of people giving up this or that philosophical aspect of themselves and getting it back improved, from the abstractions they create collectively. He was simply following the fashion of the times, I believe: political philosophy needed to be abstruse to be taken seriously. Then as now?
Completely unaddressed in any of this is the main question that springs to mind, whenever people bring up "Social Contract" without being able to explain it: What social contract?! In what sense is there a contract to which any of us now living have agreed, and by which any of us now living are bound? People fumble around claiming that enjoying the benefits of society, such as they are, obligates you to this and that as well. Well no, it doesn't.
Specific things like a driver's license, the obligations are spelled out, but the vast majority of society's benefits are offered to all members without contingencies attached. We're free to make use of them as we please without obligation, taking or leaving whatever comes our way. We're also aware of the existence of police! And laws, and penalties for breaking them.
There's no connection between the two. No connection is necessary. The benefits are not made available to you because of or contingent upon the fact that you have agreed to respect the laws. Society offers its benefits freely to all its members, en masse and a la carte, whether people have agreed to any obligation or not. Society offers its punishments the same way.
There is not, in any sense, a social contract. There never has been, and there's never been any society with a need for one. I might read Locke's or Hobbes's take on it, though, just to see if they add anything fun! I understand Rousseau was a latecomer to the game. He gives Hobbes a real shellacking at several points - which is telling. Not even the champions of Social Contract have agreed to any such thing.
Rousseau's right about one thing, though. Government does indeed arise from the general will.
May 8, 2024
man is born free and everywhere he is in chains ⛓️💥
intro from the essay i wrote for finals which was a very fun essay to write: In the Second Discourse, Rousseau depicts human life changing for the worse as mankind transitions from being in a state of nature to living in civil society by portraying civil society as a corrupting and tyrannical force. The Social Contract appears to argue for the opposite, that is, that Man has the potential to lead a better life in civil society. How can Rousseau simultaneously criticize and support the social contract?
read for SOSC 15200 Classics of Social and Political Thought, Winter 2024
intro from the essay i wrote for finals which was a very fun essay to write: In the Second Discourse, Rousseau depicts human life changing for the worse as mankind transitions from being in a state of nature to living in civil society by portraying civil society as a corrupting and tyrannical force. The Social Contract appears to argue for the opposite, that is, that Man has the potential to lead a better life in civil society. How can Rousseau simultaneously criticize and support the social contract?
read for SOSC 15200 Classics of Social and Political Thought, Winter 2024
May 5, 2021
3.5 stars
December 23, 2023
Favorite philosophical text thus far
November 27, 2024
Makes too much sense with his other works, I hate it. If you enjoy puzzles you’ll like Rousseau— good luck fitting all the pieces together. The kind of author you need to reread.
March 9, 2023
I have a few disagreement with Rousseau, but his over attachment to physiology and bodily health is what sets him a part as a thinker.
November 19, 2013
A really good edition.
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