Everyone is trying to figure out, in light of the ongoing economic crisis, just what it is that happened to the American economy over the last 30 to 40 years. We can give approximate dates as baselines for many of the trends that lead to the present crisis: in terms of economics, the late 70s and the early 1980s saw a profound mutation in the configuration of the global economy as the United States ceased to be the lone and outsized industrial economy of the postwar world; during the same period, the rise of Neoliberal economic thought and a renaiscent conservative movement provided an intellectual framework for understanding and facilitating that very transformation.
We are now at a point in time from which we can assess a number of these long-term trends with greater clarity than ever before. The slogan of the Occupy Wall Street movement -- "We are the 99%" -- is one early assessment of the period that seems to be coming to a close, emphasizing in a compelling way the dramatic income inequality that has been one conspicuous outcome. There are other measures, too, many of which are well known. American household incomes have remained, on average, flat (despite the shift from single- to dual-earners as women entered the workforce). Rates of social mobility have declined. Levels of household debt have risen, as have corporate savings. Manufacturing has declined in terms of numbers employed and overall revenues, while finance has swollen to be the largest single sector of the American economy, though it has fallen from its pre-crisis height.
Less well-known is a trend that Jacob Hacker suggests underlies and goes far towards tying together many of the others: the "great risk shift." The idea of risk is an actuarial concept, and it is one of the technical and philosophical foundations of programs of "social insurance", or the modern welfare state. The key idea behind social insurance, or insurance of any kind, is that risk is made manageable by spreading it as widely as possible among pools of exposed individuals. The larger the pool, the lower the risk. Where economic risk -- such as sudden loss of income, unexpected or chronic illness, indebtedness, or a shifting market for specialized skills -- was previously born chiefly by governments and private sector employers, the last 30 years have seen a shift of the risk burden from these bodies to individuals.
Hacker's central point is that this shift in risk has resulted in a raft of underreported trends that belie an overall increase in *insecurity*. Bankruptcies are much more common now than they were in 1960; a greater percentage of homes are foreclosed on (the book, published in 2006, does not refer to the subprime crisis), more people are in debt, and what Hacker calls income volatility is higher than before. This last measure is the book's most compelling. A person's chances of falling into poverty are greater now than they have been in over a generation. The opportunity to strike it rich does exist, but the risks that accompany failing to do so are also greater than before. Unemployment insurance, designed in the 1930's, is no longer adequate to the new world of changing technology, part-time work, and long-term unemployment. Medicare undermines itself by covering only the old and infirm (the most expensive insureds), leaving the private sector to cover the young or those who can afford the premiums. There is very little safety net for couples who have to withdraw from the workforce to start families; and the list goes on. Falling through any of the cracks in this patchwork system of social insurance is more and more likely for more and more people.
In short, the burdens of protecting individuals against blind swipes of fate - the obsolescence of a job skill, sickness of a family member - have been unloaded from larger entities more able to absorb the shocks and onto individuals, assigning to them the role of risk managers for their own financial security. This is a rejection of the very idea of insurance - or rather, in parallel with the evolution of the broader economy, its 'financiarization' - the idea of insurance being to distribute risk among a very large group of people so that the costs of ill fortune to any individual are not so great that that person is overwhelmed.
Hacker suggests that the anxiety generated by this assumption of greater risk is behind widespread pessimism about the American economy. It is the experiential, psychological side of the well-known graphs plotting the inequality of income or wealth. It is most likely also the source of the profound sympathy of so many with the Occupy Wall Street protest movement.