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Rebels All!: Rebels All! A Short History of the Conservative Mind in Postwar America
Outstanding Academic Title of 2008
Do you ever wonder why conservative pundits drop the word “faggot” or talk about killing and then Christianizing Muslims abroad? Do you wonder why the right’s spokespeople seem so confrontational, rude, and over-the-top recently? Does it seem strange that conservative books have such apocalyptic titles? Do you marvel at why conservative writers trumpeted the “rebel” qualities of George W. Bush just a few years back? There is no doubt that the style of the political right today is tough, brash, and by many accounts, not very conservative sounding. After all, isn’t conservatism supposed to be about maintaining standards, upholding civility, and frowning upon rebellion? Historian Kevin Mattson explains the apparent contradictions of the party in this fresh examination of the postwar conservative mind. Examining a big cast of characters that includes William F. Buckley, Whittaker Chambers, Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, Kevin Phillips, David Brooks, and others, Mattson shows how right-wing intellectuals have always, but in different ways, played to the populist and rowdy tendencies in America’s political culture. He boldly compares the conservative intellectual movement to the radical utopians among the New Left of the 1960s and he explains how conservatism has ingested central features of American culture, including a distrust of sophistication and intellectualism and a love of popular culture, sensation, shock, and celebrity. Both a work of history and political criticism, Rebels All! shows how the conservative mind made itself appealing, but also points to its endemic problems. Mattson’s conclusion outlines how a recast liberalism should respond to the conservative ascendancy that has marked our politics for the last thirty years.
Do you ever wonder why conservative pundits drop the word “faggot” or talk about killing and then Christianizing Muslims abroad? Do you wonder why the right’s spokespeople seem so confrontational, rude, and over-the-top recently? Does it seem strange that conservative books have such apocalyptic titles? Do you marvel at why conservative writers trumpeted the “rebel” qualities of George W. Bush just a few years back? There is no doubt that the style of the political right today is tough, brash, and by many accounts, not very conservative sounding. After all, isn’t conservatism supposed to be about maintaining standards, upholding civility, and frowning upon rebellion? Historian Kevin Mattson explains the apparent contradictions of the party in this fresh examination of the postwar conservative mind. Examining a big cast of characters that includes William F. Buckley, Whittaker Chambers, Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, Kevin Phillips, David Brooks, and others, Mattson shows how right-wing intellectuals have always, but in different ways, played to the populist and rowdy tendencies in America’s political culture. He boldly compares the conservative intellectual movement to the radical utopians among the New Left of the 1960s and he explains how conservatism has ingested central features of American culture, including a distrust of sophistication and intellectualism and a love of popular culture, sensation, shock, and celebrity. Both a work of history and political criticism, Rebels All! shows how the conservative mind made itself appealing, but also points to its endemic problems. Mattson’s conclusion outlines how a recast liberalism should respond to the conservative ascendancy that has marked our politics for the last thirty years.
192 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2008
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About the author
Kevin Mattson
27 books14 followersDr. Kevin Mattson is a historian, critic, and author whose work focuses on the intersection of ideas and politics in the twentieth century. Currently, he is Professor of Contemporary History at Ohio University, where he teaches about U.S. cultural and intellectual history and popular culture.
Mattson's work has appeared in the American Prospect, the Nation, the New York Times Book Review, Salon, and the Guardian. He has also appeared on NPR, Fox News, C-SPAN, and the Colbert Report.
Mattson's work has appeared in the American Prospect, the Nation, the New York Times Book Review, Salon, and the Guardian. He has also appeared on NPR, Fox News, C-SPAN, and the Colbert Report.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 25, 2017
This was an okay book. The summary for it was way too misleading- it sounded more explosive and polarizing than it actually was (which I guess demonstrates the problem the authors were talking about). The history parts were interesting- as interesting as bigotry can get- but nothing too new outside the "dr*in the sw*mp" mentality or anti establishment stuff. I think tying more stuff to the 2000s besides a few anecdotes (like Ann Coulter or a few profiles on George W. Bush) would wrap the argument up better.
September 17, 2025
This book highlights influential conservative ideologies, speakers, and writers in the US beginning after World War II through the George W. Bush administration. It provides a helpful backdrop for understanding the politics and thinking of conservatives today. The target audience of this book is people already familiar with the names and ideas of conservative spokesmen from this time period and even earlier. I would not suggest it as an introductory book on this topic.
The section that resonated most with me was the conservative mindset around science. Here are some quotes that capture the essence of this discussion.
“If conservatives have traditionally questioned academia for its liberal machinations, their dislike of modern science has become no less pronounced (p121).” “But it was the call to teach ‘intelligent design’ in public schools that became the most important movement critical of science and constitutive of post-modern conservatism. Here, conservative intellectuals did not just criticize science’s power; they offered a view to explain the world (p123).” “Exponents of ID have … successfully ‘transformed the debate into an issue of academic freedom rather than a confrontation between biology and religion’ (p124).” “Most proponents of the [ID] theory are not working in laboratories gathering counter-evidence to Darwin’s findings. They are, instead, writing for a wider public and mobilizing action at the state and local level (p125).”
“Shock and sensationalism help sell conservative books, even if such values seem in conflict with conservative values (p128).” “Postmodernity frames numerous culture wars fought by the postwar conservative mind and has helped create something resembling a ragtag establishment – an establishment that glorifies rebellion, loudmouth rantings, a debunking of professional authority, and a relativist view of truth (p129).” “As postmodern conservative intellectuals have waged their wars, they have helped create a culture in which the fine art of discerning truth from falsehood seems unnecessary. … A culture that is disrespectful of professional competence and holds intelligence in contempt, pilloried as elitism and snobbery (p131).”
I see the current conservative rejection of medical experts and promotion of medical freedom in the anti-vaccine movement paralleling and building on the ID movement’s rejection of evidence-based science to promote academic freedom in its height of popularity. This seems to be a natural progression of the anti-intellectualism and anti-academia that is so entrenched in conservative spaces.
The section that resonated most with me was the conservative mindset around science. Here are some quotes that capture the essence of this discussion.
“If conservatives have traditionally questioned academia for its liberal machinations, their dislike of modern science has become no less pronounced (p121).” “But it was the call to teach ‘intelligent design’ in public schools that became the most important movement critical of science and constitutive of post-modern conservatism. Here, conservative intellectuals did not just criticize science’s power; they offered a view to explain the world (p123).” “Exponents of ID have … successfully ‘transformed the debate into an issue of academic freedom rather than a confrontation between biology and religion’ (p124).” “Most proponents of the [ID] theory are not working in laboratories gathering counter-evidence to Darwin’s findings. They are, instead, writing for a wider public and mobilizing action at the state and local level (p125).”
“Shock and sensationalism help sell conservative books, even if such values seem in conflict with conservative values (p128).” “Postmodernity frames numerous culture wars fought by the postwar conservative mind and has helped create something resembling a ragtag establishment – an establishment that glorifies rebellion, loudmouth rantings, a debunking of professional authority, and a relativist view of truth (p129).” “As postmodern conservative intellectuals have waged their wars, they have helped create a culture in which the fine art of discerning truth from falsehood seems unnecessary. … A culture that is disrespectful of professional competence and holds intelligence in contempt, pilloried as elitism and snobbery (p131).”
I see the current conservative rejection of medical experts and promotion of medical freedom in the anti-vaccine movement paralleling and building on the ID movement’s rejection of evidence-based science to promote academic freedom in its height of popularity. This seems to be a natural progression of the anti-intellectualism and anti-academia that is so entrenched in conservative spaces.
February 14, 2010
Mattson sets out to explain how it is the ideas of the right have “moved to the forefront of American identity,” by creating a roadmap of sorts of conservative ideas—and just as importantly, the style in which those ideas are communicated—beginning with the punchline that the right—not the left—is the principle inheritor of the spirit of the 60's rebellion.
I have to say, this is pretty convincing stuff,. That spokespeople for today's right (Coulter, Limbaugh, Palin, etc.) have taken pages from the 60s rebellion (disregard for authority, backlash against rationalism, distrust of government, the media, etc.) becomes surprisingly obvious. Another premise of Mattson's book is perhaps less obvious: that the rebellious style of today's conservatism dates back to intellectuals like William F. Buckley. People like Coulter have just intensified this style, in keeping up with changing popular culture. Mattson argues that Buckley was a key figure for stylizing the conservative as the rebel, instead of as a the defender of the status quo.
Mattson identifies 3 core ideas to American conservatism: free-market capitalism, traditional religion, and aggressive foreign policy. While these three ideas can be traced throughout the history of the conservative mind, the style of conservatism has undergone important changes. Not having read a lot on the subject of the history of the conservative mind, I don't know how novel or controversial Mattson's history is. But he essentially outlines the history thus:
(1.) the “old” right (intellectual and rebellious, a la Buckley, 1950s)
(2.) neoconservatism (intellectual and anti-populist, 1960s-1970s)
(3.) postmodern conservatism (anti-intellectual, populist, rebellious, a la Palin)
And so, from this history, we see that the rebel image is what prevails for American conservatism. The rebel needs something against which to always rebel, and for the conservative rebel, it is simply liberalism. The conservative rebelled against liberalism as a cover for communism in the 50's; liberalism as apologetic for student radicalism in the 60s; liberalism as feminism, environmentalism, animal rights, political correctness in the 90's; and liberalism as “sissiness,” lattes, elitism, abortion, etc. beyond. The conservative rebel claims to be for the people, on the outside, fighting against the liberal establishment (Media, Hollywood, University, etc.)
In today's era of what Mattson calls “postmodern conservatism,” the style is defined in the terms of culture war. Conservative pundits are brash, in-your-face, and do not seek to simply defeat liberalism, but to demonize it. This style of conservatism is against dialogue; it prefers shouting matches and overwhelming one's opponent. One need to go no further than “Hardball” and hysteric talk radio to see this.
What characterizes this rebelliousness as postmodern is its extremism. This sort of conservatism is absolutist faith, but relativist interpretation. In other words, though it has faith in capitalism, Christianity, and militarism, it has carried on the 60's Left rejection of over-reliance on modernist Englightenment values of rationality and objectivity. Post-modern conservatism draws from religion instead of a universal claim such as human rights. After 9/11, it was “Christian America” against “militant Islam” (104). Another way Mattson describes this is “tactical relativism,” in which any tactics are used, even if they contradict the alleged principles.
“Rebels All” was written shortly before the 2008 presidential election, but we can clearly carry over Mattson's thesis to understand the backlash against Obama's election, with the advent of the Tea Party, Palin's book (called “Going Rogue”!) and the attack against healthcare reform. Consider the disruption of the town hall meetings, the invention of death panels, likening Obama to Hitler, and Senator Joe Wilson's interrupting Obama's address to Congress to heckle him, calling him a “liar!” Unlike liberal anti-war protesters under Bush, these “rebels” are hailed by the pundits as “patriotic!”
As a liberal himself, Mattson ends the book by turning to the pressing and fascinating question of liberalism's response. I recently read an article in In These Times (“It's the Message, Stupid,” Nov. 2009) in which the author was arguing that conservatives were winning the healthcare debate and other debates because they have mastered communication. Conservatives locked onto simple, emotional messaging, and repeated it over and over again. Liberals, on the other hand, were too reliant on patiently and rationally laying out factual arguments. The author was recommending that liberals mimic the Republicans, using more consistently emotional messaging, essentially a sort of “counterpopulism,” something against which Mattson argues.
Mattson's problem with populism, regardless of where it falls on the political spectrum, is that it mindlessly celebrates people as they are, without asking much of them. Mattson decries liberals' attempts to evade conservatives' culture wars by their focus on “economic populism.” While he argues the economic issue is central to liberalism, he also insists that “liberals should explain the virtues necessary for a healthy polity—precisely those virtues the conservative mind negates....Therefore, liberalism's virtues include publicmindedness, rationality, humility, and autonomy...Respecting the religious pluralism of modern life, liberalism encourages citizens to argue in terms understood by all, including secularists and members of different faiths. There must be a public language—grounded in rationality—that frames debate in a liberal society” (139-140). Sounds nice, doesn't it! Ironically, Mattson's liberalism becomes the party of order against the conservatism's party of rebelliousness!
I have to say, this is pretty convincing stuff,. That spokespeople for today's right (Coulter, Limbaugh, Palin, etc.) have taken pages from the 60s rebellion (disregard for authority, backlash against rationalism, distrust of government, the media, etc.) becomes surprisingly obvious. Another premise of Mattson's book is perhaps less obvious: that the rebellious style of today's conservatism dates back to intellectuals like William F. Buckley. People like Coulter have just intensified this style, in keeping up with changing popular culture. Mattson argues that Buckley was a key figure for stylizing the conservative as the rebel, instead of as a the defender of the status quo.
Mattson identifies 3 core ideas to American conservatism: free-market capitalism, traditional religion, and aggressive foreign policy. While these three ideas can be traced throughout the history of the conservative mind, the style of conservatism has undergone important changes. Not having read a lot on the subject of the history of the conservative mind, I don't know how novel or controversial Mattson's history is. But he essentially outlines the history thus:
(1.) the “old” right (intellectual and rebellious, a la Buckley, 1950s)
(2.) neoconservatism (intellectual and anti-populist, 1960s-1970s)
(3.) postmodern conservatism (anti-intellectual, populist, rebellious, a la Palin)
And so, from this history, we see that the rebel image is what prevails for American conservatism. The rebel needs something against which to always rebel, and for the conservative rebel, it is simply liberalism. The conservative rebelled against liberalism as a cover for communism in the 50's; liberalism as apologetic for student radicalism in the 60s; liberalism as feminism, environmentalism, animal rights, political correctness in the 90's; and liberalism as “sissiness,” lattes, elitism, abortion, etc. beyond. The conservative rebel claims to be for the people, on the outside, fighting against the liberal establishment (Media, Hollywood, University, etc.)
In today's era of what Mattson calls “postmodern conservatism,” the style is defined in the terms of culture war. Conservative pundits are brash, in-your-face, and do not seek to simply defeat liberalism, but to demonize it. This style of conservatism is against dialogue; it prefers shouting matches and overwhelming one's opponent. One need to go no further than “Hardball” and hysteric talk radio to see this.
What characterizes this rebelliousness as postmodern is its extremism. This sort of conservatism is absolutist faith, but relativist interpretation. In other words, though it has faith in capitalism, Christianity, and militarism, it has carried on the 60's Left rejection of over-reliance on modernist Englightenment values of rationality and objectivity. Post-modern conservatism draws from religion instead of a universal claim such as human rights. After 9/11, it was “Christian America” against “militant Islam” (104). Another way Mattson describes this is “tactical relativism,” in which any tactics are used, even if they contradict the alleged principles.
“Rebels All” was written shortly before the 2008 presidential election, but we can clearly carry over Mattson's thesis to understand the backlash against Obama's election, with the advent of the Tea Party, Palin's book (called “Going Rogue”!) and the attack against healthcare reform. Consider the disruption of the town hall meetings, the invention of death panels, likening Obama to Hitler, and Senator Joe Wilson's interrupting Obama's address to Congress to heckle him, calling him a “liar!” Unlike liberal anti-war protesters under Bush, these “rebels” are hailed by the pundits as “patriotic!”
As a liberal himself, Mattson ends the book by turning to the pressing and fascinating question of liberalism's response. I recently read an article in In These Times (“It's the Message, Stupid,” Nov. 2009) in which the author was arguing that conservatives were winning the healthcare debate and other debates because they have mastered communication. Conservatives locked onto simple, emotional messaging, and repeated it over and over again. Liberals, on the other hand, were too reliant on patiently and rationally laying out factual arguments. The author was recommending that liberals mimic the Republicans, using more consistently emotional messaging, essentially a sort of “counterpopulism,” something against which Mattson argues.
Mattson's problem with populism, regardless of where it falls on the political spectrum, is that it mindlessly celebrates people as they are, without asking much of them. Mattson decries liberals' attempts to evade conservatives' culture wars by their focus on “economic populism.” While he argues the economic issue is central to liberalism, he also insists that “liberals should explain the virtues necessary for a healthy polity—precisely those virtues the conservative mind negates....Therefore, liberalism's virtues include publicmindedness, rationality, humility, and autonomy...Respecting the religious pluralism of modern life, liberalism encourages citizens to argue in terms understood by all, including secularists and members of different faiths. There must be a public language—grounded in rationality—that frames debate in a liberal society” (139-140). Sounds nice, doesn't it! Ironically, Mattson's liberalism becomes the party of order against the conservatism's party of rebelliousness!
November 12, 2008
This short history of the postwar conservative mind focuses more on the style of presentation of postwar conservative ideas than on their substance. It's weak as a history of conservative ideas and values, which Mattson defines as a commitment to religion/traditional values, free market capitalism, and an aggressive, expansionist military policy. For the most part ideas are just name checked and assigned to certain individuals. There's no in-depth analysis of conservative political philosophy. But he's very good on the mode of presentation of conservative ideas, and he does a good job of establishing continuity between contemporary blowhards like Ann Coulter and Rush Limbaugh, and earlier figures like William F Buckley.
One of the more provocative, if not entirely novel, claims in the book is the idea that it's contemporary conservatives, far more than liberals, who are the inheritors of the extremist, confrontational, Manichean politics of the 60's. This is perhaps most true of the "postmodern conservatives" that are ruling America today, but Mattson argues that this means of advancing conservative ideas actually begins with Buckley. Buckley, in "God and Man at Yale" and "McCarthy and His Enemies," and on Firing Line in its early years, presents himself as an outsider, an aristocratic populist, a tough-ass rebel speaking truth to the liberal power elite. He was perfectly comfortable using tactics of shock and outrage to get his message across, and he was perfectly willing to use pop and mass culture to do so.
The McCain campaign, which in ideology and tactics is arguably the culmination of the ideology/tactics of the George W Bush era, suggests that for the average Republican-leaning voter, and for members of the base and fellow travelers, an inchoate resentment of and disdain for a succession of invented caricatures of elitist liberals IS the SUBSTANCE of their politics. Its certainly true that the Republican party's ascendancy since the early 80's was not achieved by pushing innovative policy proposals designed to make government more efficient and effective. Its been built on weakening or dismantling existing structures (regulatory structures, various components of the welfare state) and rhetorically undermining the very legitimacy of government by casting government as the problem rather than the solution, whatever the problem may be. Yes, there have been cross-currents--conservative support for government enforcement of "traditional" morality, increased defense spending, support of government intervention to aid business, most recently in the massive bailout of the nation's financial giants--but the main thrust of conservative rhetoric and policy has been to argue for the dismantling of the regulatory/welfare state constructed during the New Deal and thereafter. Call me a cynic, but it seems like most positive policy ideas put forth by conservatives are just stalking horses for privatization, first steps in relieving government of any role or responsibility whatsoever for whatever the problem at hand is. As someone remarked recently, George Bush's 2004 proposal for "fixing" social security was designed to take both the social and the security out of the program.
One aspect of the marketing of conservatism that's long driven me crazy, and that Mattson doesn't really address, is that conservative ideas and policy proposals often aren't very conservative, at least not in any literal meaning of the term. I know that words are ultimately empty signifiers, and that they take on the content that's been pumped into them by history, but much of American politics takes place on the level of surface rhetoric, and Republicans get a lot of political mileage out of labeling radical policies as conservative.
Here's the thing: to the extent that conservatives are free market fundamentalists, they are the radicals. Conservatives, in a very important sense, are not very conservative. To the extent that they believe in the unfettered free market, they believe in structuring society in such a way as to promote the maximum amount of insecurity and social and economic upheaval. The market, after all, is totally unsentimental when it comes to existing ideas and values. As Marx famously said, capitalism is a revolutionary force causing all that is solid to melt into air. So, with the exception of traditional religion, its often conservatives who are promoting the more radical policies. They are not simply radicals in terms of style.
I guess you tie it all together this way: 1) conservatives promote a more disruptive and transformative economic policy--they seek to reduce, as much as possible, curbs on market activity 2) conservatives promote a more disruptive and transformative foreign policy--they want to remake the world in America's image by promoting democracy and free markets, and they are wiling to use military force to do so 3) at the same time, they want to preserve order at home, but they are allergic to government intervention, so, rhetorically at least, they promote socially conservative values as a way of managing the socially volatile effects of their economic policies.
One of the more provocative, if not entirely novel, claims in the book is the idea that it's contemporary conservatives, far more than liberals, who are the inheritors of the extremist, confrontational, Manichean politics of the 60's. This is perhaps most true of the "postmodern conservatives" that are ruling America today, but Mattson argues that this means of advancing conservative ideas actually begins with Buckley. Buckley, in "God and Man at Yale" and "McCarthy and His Enemies," and on Firing Line in its early years, presents himself as an outsider, an aristocratic populist, a tough-ass rebel speaking truth to the liberal power elite. He was perfectly comfortable using tactics of shock and outrage to get his message across, and he was perfectly willing to use pop and mass culture to do so.
The McCain campaign, which in ideology and tactics is arguably the culmination of the ideology/tactics of the George W Bush era, suggests that for the average Republican-leaning voter, and for members of the base and fellow travelers, an inchoate resentment of and disdain for a succession of invented caricatures of elitist liberals IS the SUBSTANCE of their politics. Its certainly true that the Republican party's ascendancy since the early 80's was not achieved by pushing innovative policy proposals designed to make government more efficient and effective. Its been built on weakening or dismantling existing structures (regulatory structures, various components of the welfare state) and rhetorically undermining the very legitimacy of government by casting government as the problem rather than the solution, whatever the problem may be. Yes, there have been cross-currents--conservative support for government enforcement of "traditional" morality, increased defense spending, support of government intervention to aid business, most recently in the massive bailout of the nation's financial giants--but the main thrust of conservative rhetoric and policy has been to argue for the dismantling of the regulatory/welfare state constructed during the New Deal and thereafter. Call me a cynic, but it seems like most positive policy ideas put forth by conservatives are just stalking horses for privatization, first steps in relieving government of any role or responsibility whatsoever for whatever the problem at hand is. As someone remarked recently, George Bush's 2004 proposal for "fixing" social security was designed to take both the social and the security out of the program.
One aspect of the marketing of conservatism that's long driven me crazy, and that Mattson doesn't really address, is that conservative ideas and policy proposals often aren't very conservative, at least not in any literal meaning of the term. I know that words are ultimately empty signifiers, and that they take on the content that's been pumped into them by history, but much of American politics takes place on the level of surface rhetoric, and Republicans get a lot of political mileage out of labeling radical policies as conservative.
Here's the thing: to the extent that conservatives are free market fundamentalists, they are the radicals. Conservatives, in a very important sense, are not very conservative. To the extent that they believe in the unfettered free market, they believe in structuring society in such a way as to promote the maximum amount of insecurity and social and economic upheaval. The market, after all, is totally unsentimental when it comes to existing ideas and values. As Marx famously said, capitalism is a revolutionary force causing all that is solid to melt into air. So, with the exception of traditional religion, its often conservatives who are promoting the more radical policies. They are not simply radicals in terms of style.
I guess you tie it all together this way: 1) conservatives promote a more disruptive and transformative economic policy--they seek to reduce, as much as possible, curbs on market activity 2) conservatives promote a more disruptive and transformative foreign policy--they want to remake the world in America's image by promoting democracy and free markets, and they are wiling to use military force to do so 3) at the same time, they want to preserve order at home, but they are allergic to government intervention, so, rhetorically at least, they promote socially conservative values as a way of managing the socially volatile effects of their economic policies.
Read
July 26, 2011I came to this book with memories of the wretched attempt at a history of Conservatism by the Brit philosopher, Ted Honderich. All that just to get in a little Tony Blair bashing? Could Mattson have written this Ideas In Action volume just to explain second rate morons like Sean Hannity and Ann Coulter?
Thankfully not.
But there is a simplicity and tidiness in Mattson'sreasoning that, I think, betrays his theme: the fact of a rebellious, anti-intellectual, yet utopian cast to post-war American conservativism. The failures of liberalism and the excesses of the New Left are important in explaining and islolating important discontinuities in that period's conservativism. And how can any treatment fail to mention Pat Buchanan and George Will? The former pugnacious enough but no utopian and the latter a reasonable public intellectual. Perhaps exceptions prove the rule?
If not convincing in his stronger claims, Mattson does point out some interesting features of postwar conservativism: the continuing need for exes - ex-Communists, ex-liberals, ex-New Leftists - to provide energy and the incorporation of postmodern sensibilities.
Mattson posits a common attitude or posture in postwar American conservativism: I find it neither common nor up to the task of explaining the importance of that strain.
Overall, this book is well written and interesting in its parts.
Thankfully not.
But there is a simplicity and tidiness in Mattson'sreasoning that, I think, betrays his theme: the fact of a rebellious, anti-intellectual, yet utopian cast to post-war American conservativism. The failures of liberalism and the excesses of the New Left are important in explaining and islolating important discontinuities in that period's conservativism. And how can any treatment fail to mention Pat Buchanan and George Will? The former pugnacious enough but no utopian and the latter a reasonable public intellectual. Perhaps exceptions prove the rule?
If not convincing in his stronger claims, Mattson does point out some interesting features of postwar conservativism: the continuing need for exes - ex-Communists, ex-liberals, ex-New Leftists - to provide energy and the incorporation of postmodern sensibilities.
Mattson posits a common attitude or posture in postwar American conservativism: I find it neither common nor up to the task of explaining the importance of that strain.
Overall, this book is well written and interesting in its parts.
Read
July 30, 2019Mattson may have set himself an impossible task in attempting a "history of the conservative mind in postwar America" in such a short space. The book's early sections are superficial, with such key figures as Barry Goldwater receiving only cursory attention. (It seems odd that Mattson doesn't cite either Gore Vidal's "Barry Goldwater: A Chat" or Norman Mailer's review of LBJ's campaign book MY HOPE FOR AMERICA, in which Mailer discussed the differences between what "a real conservative" might believe and Goldwater's fatally flawed version of this ideology.) Mattson also mistakenly accuses Dwight Macdonald of admiring William F. Buckley. Reading the sequence of articles about Buckley and NATIONAL REVIEW included in Macdonald's MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONIST disproves this, but Mattson apparently didn't read it, instead relying on a single quotation from Macdonald taken out of context. REBELS ALL becomes much stronger when Mattson turns to the neoconservative thinkers of the 1970s. Mattson may have a special knack for writing about this era: his book about Carter's so-called "malaise" speech of 1979 is better than this one. (His more recent book about Nixon's 1952 "Checkers" speech is a disappointment.)
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