Battleground Berlin is the definitive, insider’s account of the espionage warfare in Berlin between CIA and KGB from 1945 to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Two intelligence veterans―major players on opposite sides of the Cold War―have joined in an unprecedented collaboration to tell the story. Basing their narrative on personal recollections, interviews with other CIA and KGB officers, and documents never before made public, the authors provide a vast number of new details of CIA’s infiltration of the new East German intelligence service; the construction, operation, and uncovering of the Berlin tunnel; and many other initiatives and countermoves dealing with the series of crises that racked Berlin and jeopardized an uneasy world peace during this period.
Battleground Berlin illuminates some of the most compelling mysteries of the Cold War,
· what really happened the night the Soviets "discovered" the Berlin Tunnel;
· who ordered the building of the Berlin Wall―and why did the West seem so ill prepared;
· how did infighting among Soviet leaders affect decisionmaking during the most critical moments of the Berlin crisis;
· how did power struggles between KGB and its protégé, the dreaded East German security service, shape the political landscape of East Germany and heighten tension in West Berlin;
· how much did the famous defector Otto John reveal to KGB―and why is he still unable to clear his name;
· and much more.
The book, an operational and organizational history of the world’s two most important secret service organizations during a critical time, unveils the vital connection between intelligence gathering and political decisionmaking at the highest levels. Full of intrigue and suspense, it is a story not to be forgotten.
Interesting book on the Cold War through the lens of the Berlin — intelligence, the American airlift, the Berlin War, and secret cable. Written by a former U.S. intelligence agent and a KGB agent, along with a journalist of the Cold War, in the late 1990’s, the book provides a unique perspective. Spies, counter spies, elected officials and dictators often misread the tea leaves provided by the other side. It reminds us that as much as we know, we make mistakes from the dog of war, even a Cold War.
The most fascinating portion of the book was when the agents spoke about the purpose of the wall, what each side was projecting at the time, and the owner yielded from the spy operation.
Immediately after WWII, the Kremlin was ahead of the spy game. But they never did learn what motivated the United States - or Germany. Stalin was plugged in fully.
As with other books on this period that I read, there was frustration and intense tension between the Soviets and Germans on control. The Russians were not operating in a vacuum for Czech, Poles and others were struggling with similar owner grabs.
Besides, the Russians w re angry at Germany and placed draconian reparations on the Germans and went further in raping and attacking Germans.
The Berlin question continued to evolve around many questions. When the US introduced currency, it caused real problems including who was going to pay the railroad workers who toiled for both sides of the line. The Soviets becomes concerned when the Western Allies spoke of Germany becoming more militaristic to provide safety against their neighbor. Things got more complicated with the invasion of South Korea. The Soviets did not understand NATO’s expansion to include Germany. According to the authors, Stalin also played unification wrong, causing delays that lasted long after the dictator.
The authors did a unique job in explaining the conditions that caused the wall to be built. Soviet’s influence, East Berlin’s concern with losing their citizens at an alarming rate, and Western Allie’s’ worry about the influx of refugees all contributed. Total refugees from East Berlin for the second half of 1952 jumped to 78,831 from 57,234 in the first six months. The first three months of 1953, 84,034 East Germans ran their repressive country. Considering Kennedy’s later famous speech, it was surprising to hear the indifference of the White House until West Berlin citizens took to the streets. Other books better chronicle the terror caused by the police state. This book detailed the Hugh number of internal police whose sole job was to watch their neighbors.
The decision to build a wall was made on August 6, 1961. The border was first secured and closed. Within a week, a barb wired fence was installed. The authors point out the actual wall was not built until after some time passed after announcing the blockade and there was no reaction from the West. The authors also focused on the secrecy of the decision and the fact that the American intelligence didn’t pick up on the building of the wall until it was being formed since the Germans kept it so secure.
The wall and reaction place our country on a path to prepare for war. During October, military exercises were used. The wall was a victory for Khrushchev. It kept his portion of Germany under communist control. Yet still 30-40 people escaped with many gunned down by their fellow citizen.
As the authors summed up: the wall changed everything. The intelligence operation was starved for informants and even had to downsize. The wall caused showdowns, including a famous one at Checkpoint Charlie. West Berliners showed their protest that Christmas by placing Christmas trees on their side of the despised wall instead of celebrating with friends and family still being held captive.
The resistance from Germans caught in a repressive government was amazing. The reporters spoke about workers fighting increase in production figures. The authors reported that the workers wrote a letter of protest to the prime minister, demanding results the next day. Within days, the leaders were calling in all Berlin workers to engage in a general strike. The authorities claimed West Berlin activists played a role in the strike. Soviet troops moved in. Martial law was imposed. Reports showed that the East Germans and Soviets were flat footed. The CIA agent wanted to give weapons but was limited to sympathy.
It was also interesting to read how leadership change in Moscow affected Berlin. The authors spoke about how Khrushchev gave his “secret speech” against Stalin after his death. The KGB agents wrote about the reaction in different countries. Then Khrushchev again showed his independence by not using military power to force Poland to accept new leadership while using power in Hungry to force Soviet will. I learned that west Germans were the ones who protested the most. It took an effort for them now to break through the Brandenburg Gate into their sister portion of their country.
The authors brought to life that East German authorities had long planned to take control of the western half of their capital. Starting in 1957, the communist was making plans to reunify the city. The harassment and control increased by the Soviets, including train inspections. Documents from WWII were used against West German public officials, linking them to Nazi activities.
The book had a number of interesting stories of spy games including a detailed story of Otto John, the Recap operation, and the Goleniewski affair (the Lt. Col. who had access to documents of Polish and Soviet security officers and turned them over to the United States). The story of Frau K. couple whose wife was a maid for Gen. Karl Linke and his wife was fascinating. The maid turned on her employer because they were so horrible to her, especially the wife. They even forced the maid to strip once and searched her, thinking she was stealing documents. She wasn’t. But she did later. It’s written in a way of a good, short spy story. Her work disclosed the fragile relationship between the KGB and GRU. The Americans resettled her to the West to thank her and protect her.
The book has a number of appendixes that provided additional stories and information about the spy, net work, and the Cold War. It is unfortunate. The authors did not find a way to include the stories as part of the book. I am glad I read the appendixes, and even the notes That were included as footnotes throughout the book. The most interesting three points, raising the appendix was how Soviet spies who went to London, were shocked at the quality of life in the West. This was at a time when London was still repairing your bum, damaged city and citizens were on rations. It probably explains why so many Russian agents defected to the west when they had a taste of the quality-of-life democracy provides. Another interesting point is that the horrible treatment of Soviet armies right after the Nazis lost, was probably one of the reasons why so many Germans fought against Soviet control. As reported and so many other books, Soviet military took out the rightful anger and draconian, unjust way was rape and pillage against Germans. The authors explained that this awoken so many Germans, who otherwise would have just try to move on with your lives.
Finally, appendix five reviews the product of the Berlin tunnel. A shocking number of 443,000 conversations were fully transcribed from voice reels. The majority of these, 368,000 were Soviets in conversation. Many of these conversations revealed the confusion of power between the Soviets in east German officials. Others dealt with the cooperation under the Warsaw pact. Instill others dealt with the development of an improved nuclear power of the Soviet air army in east Germany.
Proving that I am truly a nerd, some of the footnotes were also interesting. In addition to the numbers, I previously cited refugees from east Germany, the footnotes also mentioned that the east German government had a State Security Force, even larger than a Nazi Gestapo. The Nazis had one internal intelligence agent for every 10,000 citizens. By the time to two Germany’s perform together the east German government had employed one citizen to watch over the other 200 E. German citizens.
The wall continued to divide a city and neighborhoods until Gorbachev took control and had a much different approach. On October 18, 1989, communist leader Erich Honecker was deposed and within a year - on October 3, 1990 - the unification long promised occurred.
The book does raise so many relevant questions for today. What fog of today’s Cold War is allowing sides to make decisions they wouldn’t except through misinterpretation. I don’t expect to read that collaborative book soon.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
This one is hard to review. Do I judge it on it on what I wanted it to be or what the book is? For what it is, it is probably a 5 star book. For what I wanted it to be, which is a wholly unfair way of judging the book, it is only 3 stars. I wanted a bit more spy vs spy with some analysis; there's some of that here. However, to be fair to the book, it is what it wants to be: a definitive, detailed, document-rich, primary sources review of the Cold War in Berlin. I read this for a class; I would perhaps not have finished it otherwise. That said, it is perfect as a text book, for a secondary source for the Cold War in Germany, and for anyone looking at specific bits of the 1950s and early 1960s. It is just a little dry.
For what it is, it is perfect. That does not mean that it will necessarily be fun to read. I'm glad I read it; I'm glad to move on to something else.