As 2014 drew to a close James Meek reviewed four recently published books about the most recent of Britain’s engagements in Afghanistan, entitling his essay in the London Review of Books, ‘Worse than a Defeat’. The last of British forces withdrew from Helmand two months earlier after 8 years of fighting in that province. Fighting who? The Taliban?
NCOs in 3 PARA were not embarrassed to tell Meek, in Helmand as a journalist in 2006, that the people attacking them were local Helmandis. By the time of his visit the British mission was one of self-protection. Meek devotes more than a third of his long article to the thesis of Mike Martin, expounded in his book 'An Intimate War', that the British forces were engaged in a counter-insurgency while their Helmandi opponents had a very different understanding of the same conflict. Martin had been in and out of Helmand, in and out of uniform, as a British officer and then a ‘cultural adviser’ and latterly as a scholar for his study of the conflict. He was a Pashto speaker and his work put him in touch with numerous Helmandi players. The study was generated by his own personal observations which were at odds, as he put it, with the ‘insurgency narrative’ and was commissioned by the UK’s Ministry of Defence. However because it was too critical the MOD sought to block publication. Martin says he was forced to resign and publish.
The book is redolent of its academic predecessor, his PhD thesis. His sources were almost all Helmandi actors in the conflict whom he interviewed, and he references everything. Appendices cover 110 pages. With a plethora of characters and the highly complex political situation in Helmand this is not a casual or easy read. It is a serious book born of solid research and personal experience. And it’s convincing in its argument that over 35 years Helmandi individuals, clans and tribes were in conflict with each other and manipulated outside players, be they Russian, American, British, Pakistani or the Taliban leadership in Quetta. These outsiders never understood the conflict the way the Helmandis did, the latter referring to it as ‘pshe-pshe’ which Martin translates as ‘civil war’. They happily exploited the outsiders ‘lack of detailed knowledge of Helmandi politics’ and this made the conflict worse as the Helmandis were able to leverage external resources to their own ends.
Martin notes that his perspective ‘presents an idiosyncratic viewpoint’ but he supports this with strong evidence. He emphasizes the complexity of the political terrain juxtaposed against a more simplistic framework to which the NATO forces adhered. Pushtun society is founded on a balance of power between tribe, state and mosque which is forever in flux. There is an ongoing process of ‘fission and fusion’ – cousin fights cousin, tribe fights tribe and both unite against the outsider. The British have been hated in Helmand since the last century when the locals beat them at Maiwand. British forces followed an official narrative supporting the ‘government’ against the ‘taliban’ and treated aberrations that didn’t fit the framework as just that, aberrations. But for Martin these were central to the conflict, they were the dynamic that needed to be understood. In the words of one UK official, ‘we had to support the governor … because he was the governor’. Going along with the official narrative was psychologically necessary and Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, a formerUK ambassador to Afghanistan, admitted ‘I allowed myself to be self-deceived’. Had the NATO forces in Helmand had a true understanding of what was going on then they might have thought of leaving. The British found themselves in conflict with large sections of the local population who were resisting them as an outside power, and although foreign jihadis joined the locals, including those directed by the Taliban leadership in Quetta, it was really locals they were fighting.
One of the strangest features of the conflict was the Helmandi belief that the British were supporting and fighting on the side of the Taliban. Work that one out! A rumour. Another aberration. This was Helmand. Martin sees his book as a start to a wider understanding of what is going on in Afghanistan. His study begins in 1978 but not much has changed in the country since Lord Roberts was there 135 years ago. Of course the words of Lord Roberts have been quoted as apposite today, before and after the current conflict: ‘We must not be afraid of Afghanistan and would profit by letting it be the master of its own fate. Maybe it is not the most attractive solution for us, but I feel that I am right in asserting that the less they are able to see us, the less they are likely to hate us… we will have a much greater chance of getting the Afghans on our side if we abstain from any interference in their internal affairs whatsoever’.
When the British forces went into Helmand the Minister of Defence, John Reid, said ‘UK forces might not have to fire a single shot’. Now they’ve left, rather more than ‘a single shot’ later. Looking over press reports about that final exit in October 2014 the Taliban are still the enemy and the word ‘defeat’ is not in evidence. David Cameron announced ‘mission accomplished’ and the Afghan National Army have now taken over. I doubt Meek’s article resonated strongly with the general public. Although Martin’s book has been endorsed by some notable individuals, he may have to wait before his thesis is trumpeted as the best researched assessment of the conflict. I used to think that history would tell but I’m more circumspect now. If the other works reviewed by Meek are a guide though, Martin’s book should become generally recognized for what it is, a brave and successful challenge to the accepted narrative.