Probably Problematic: Huemer’s Ontological Proof of Moral Realism

by Matthew Stewart

Michael Huemer has constructed what he believes to be an ontological proof of moral realism. Roughly speaking, he thinks that given that it’s possible moral realism is true, and thus possible we have objective moral reasons to do certain actions, then we do have objective moral reasons to do certain actions. This essay sets out to critique Huemer’s Argument. The first section discusses the relevant background theory in meta-ethics and reasons. The second section states Huemer’s argument and explains how it works. The third section highlights some problems for the Probabilistic Reasons Principle that Huemer bases his argument on, in particular the complications surrounding the interrelation of factors when determining the existence and strength of reasons. The fourth section explains why Huemer must deal with the interrelation of factors or face a reductio ad absurdum against his argument. The fifth section points out some of the counter-intuitive reasons that are generated from the premises of Huemer’s argument. Finally, section six delivers a verdict on Huemer’s argument.

39 pages, Unknown Binding

Published January 1, 2016

Reviews

[Millie Muroi]

Whenever I ask someone if I can read their thesis, I’m almost always met with scepticism or an, “it’s not that interesting”. Yet each time I find their latter statement in particular to be unfounded. Perhaps now I have an explanation as to why I read these dissertations despite humble protestations by their authors.

Huemer’s OPMR essentially argues this:

1. If the following conditions hold–
a. If S knew that P, this would provide a reason for S
to φ,
b. If S knew that –P, this would provide no reason
for S not to φ,
and
c. S has some reason to believe P - then S thereby has a reason to φ.

In pursuing this strand of reasoning:

1. If the following conditions hold:
a) If I knew that a certain thesis was interesting, this would provide a reason for me to read it.
b) If I knew that a certain thesis wasn’t interesting, this would provide no reason for me not to read it, and
c) I have some reason to believe that the given thesis is interesting
- then I thereby have a reason to read it

Sounds about right, huh?

Well, conveniently in this instance, yes. But let us take an example used at the forefront by Huemer himself: this one considers the case for torturing babies (a little confronting, I know!)

1. If we knew that torturing babies was objectively morally obligatory, this would provide a reason to torture babies.
2. Even if we knew torturing babies wasn’t objectively obligatory, this would provide no reason to avoid torturing babies.
3. We have some reason to believe torturing babies is objectively obligatory, because:
a. There is a possibility of moral realism being true and that torturing babies is morally obligatory.
b. Possibility entails non-zero probability.
c. Non-zero-probability is sufficient to give reason
to believe.
Therefore, we have a reason to torture babies.

Now it’s starting to sound a little shaky...Throughout the thesis, Stewart identifies a number of flaws in this, as well as several other cases, effectively necessitating further explanation on Huemer’s part. Chief amongst the arguments which propose the untenability of OPMR:

1. The Probabilistic Reasons Principle, notions that possibility entails non-zero probability and non-zero probability is sufficient to ground reason collectively, entail a set of reasons so implausible that there is no choice but to doubt them.
2. The applicability or the interrelation or factors to certain situations should be more explicitly stated.

Hence, the proposition that Huemer’s Ontological Proof of Moral Realism is “probably problematic” is elucidated. Aside from the clarity of Stewart’s arguments, his ability to counter his own arguments by impermanently adopting the standpoint likely to be occupied by Huemer (and then re-proving his point) is impressive. Then there’s the mathematical equations used to quantitatively support his case - which by some grace of Methods I was able to understand😓

Whilst it seems that Huemer’s OPMR cannot after all, plausibly justify my insatiable appetite for theses, thanks must needs be given to an ex-soccer coach for letting me in on some tertiary level philosophy: Matt, we probably don’t even need a debate👍🏼 - you’ve done most of the work needed to convince me to undertake a philosophy unit.