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Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.
146 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1998
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299 people want to read
About the author
Jaegwon Kim
23 books54 followersJaegwon Kim (born 1934 in Daegu, Korea (now in South Korea)) is a Korean-born American philosopher currently working at Brown University. He is best known for his work on mental causation and the mind-body problem. Key themes in his work include: a rejection of Cartesian metaphysics, the limitations of strict psychophysical identity, supervenience, and the individuation of events. Kim's work on these and other contemporary metaphysical and epistemological issues is well-represented by the papers collected in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (1993).
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
Kim's philosophical work focuses on the areas of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
January 24, 2022
Very readable book. I'm not fully convinced by all of the arguments, but the book makes me avidly pursue those arguments.
The book involves various detailed discussions about mental causation, mind_body problem and the concept of reduction, generally. But I think the main line of the book is as follows:
Kim starts the book by asking the main question of his discussion: how physicalism could explain mental causation? Is it possible at all?
It seems very plausible and undeniable that mental causation is real. I decide to raise my hands and then I raise my hands. Thus, it should be presupposed in each solution to the mind_body problem. Kim, tries to formulates physicalism, and He distinguishes between two types of physicalism: non-reductive physicalism and reductive physicalism. Kim, then, in a long chapter (chapter 2) presents many arguments (almost all of them are based on supervenience thesis and the principle of physical causal closure) to show there is no way to reconcile between non-reductive physicalism and mental causation. Thus, Kim concludes that mental causation rules out non-reductive physicalism, and therefore the only view remains for us is reductive physicalism. But, is reduction of mental to physical is possible? Kim argues that the only plausible way to reduce mental to physical is functional analysis of mental (it's interesting to note that Kim not only deny functionalism [I think realizer functionalism] as a form of non-reductive physicalism, but also he thinks it's the only plausible form of reductive physicalism). But, does functionalization of mental in principle possible? It depends on possibility of functionalization of all mental phenomena: that is intentionality and qualia. Contrary to some philosophers such as John Searle and Hillary Putnam, Kim sees no difficulty in functional analysis of intentionality. He thinks the main difficulty is reduction of qualia. Kim thinks there is very good arguments against reducibility of qualia, such as possibility of inverted qualia.
So, Kim claims that mental causation leads us to decisively reject "middle of the road" positions like property dualism, anomalous monism and non-reductive physicalism. Also, he thinks substantive dualism seems out of menu (although he doesn't reject it). However, it seems he leaves unanswered the question of what should we do with phenomenal mental properties?
The book involves various detailed discussions about mental causation, mind_body problem and the concept of reduction, generally. But I think the main line of the book is as follows:
Kim starts the book by asking the main question of his discussion: how physicalism could explain mental causation? Is it possible at all?
It seems very plausible and undeniable that mental causation is real. I decide to raise my hands and then I raise my hands. Thus, it should be presupposed in each solution to the mind_body problem. Kim, tries to formulates physicalism, and He distinguishes between two types of physicalism: non-reductive physicalism and reductive physicalism. Kim, then, in a long chapter (chapter 2) presents many arguments (almost all of them are based on supervenience thesis and the principle of physical causal closure) to show there is no way to reconcile between non-reductive physicalism and mental causation. Thus, Kim concludes that mental causation rules out non-reductive physicalism, and therefore the only view remains for us is reductive physicalism. But, is reduction of mental to physical is possible? Kim argues that the only plausible way to reduce mental to physical is functional analysis of mental (it's interesting to note that Kim not only deny functionalism [I think realizer functionalism] as a form of non-reductive physicalism, but also he thinks it's the only plausible form of reductive physicalism). But, does functionalization of mental in principle possible? It depends on possibility of functionalization of all mental phenomena: that is intentionality and qualia. Contrary to some philosophers such as John Searle and Hillary Putnam, Kim sees no difficulty in functional analysis of intentionality. He thinks the main difficulty is reduction of qualia. Kim thinks there is very good arguments against reducibility of qualia, such as possibility of inverted qualia.
So, Kim claims that mental causation leads us to decisively reject "middle of the road" positions like property dualism, anomalous monism and non-reductive physicalism. Also, he thinks substantive dualism seems out of menu (although he doesn't reject it). However, it seems he leaves unanswered the question of what should we do with phenomenal mental properties?
February 11, 2012
This a fantastic introduction to metaphysics of mind, especially if you are like me and neglected to take much (or any) philosophy of mind in college. (I was more Kant/math/language/ethics.) However, it is not meant as an introduction; therefore, although it reads smoothly (as it was originally a talk), it does not dive too deep.
Ultimately the book is a unified argument against what I like to think of as a kind of "compatibilism" for the mental: the idea that we have token reduction of the mental to the physical while preserving the idea that, conceptually, we could not achieve type reduction. Kim finds this idea, made popular in reaction to basic type physicalism by Davidson (among others), both incoherent and ultimately far from the spirit of physicalism. If physicalism is going to successful, it will need to be type reductionist. Kim's conclusion comes off as cautiously stated: we should not only be conscious that perhaps not all of the mental could be reduced in this way (Kim seems convinced that qualia could not be so reduced) but also that perhaps these arguments could be just as much as a reductio of physicalism and as it is an argument in favor of it (by offer a cogent reduction strategy--- viz. Kim's brand of functionalism). That is, if we are more committed to nonreductionism than to physicalism, than according to Kim we won't be able to have it both ways. We will need to choose between a kind of (nonreductionist) dualism (e.g. epiphenomenalism) on one hand and (type) reductionist physicalism on the other.
Ultimately the book is a unified argument against what I like to think of as a kind of "compatibilism" for the mental: the idea that we have token reduction of the mental to the physical while preserving the idea that, conceptually, we could not achieve type reduction. Kim finds this idea, made popular in reaction to basic type physicalism by Davidson (among others), both incoherent and ultimately far from the spirit of physicalism. If physicalism is going to successful, it will need to be type reductionist. Kim's conclusion comes off as cautiously stated: we should not only be conscious that perhaps not all of the mental could be reduced in this way (Kim seems convinced that qualia could not be so reduced) but also that perhaps these arguments could be just as much as a reductio of physicalism and as it is an argument in favor of it (by offer a cogent reduction strategy--- viz. Kim's brand of functionalism). That is, if we are more committed to nonreductionism than to physicalism, than according to Kim we won't be able to have it both ways. We will need to choose between a kind of (nonreductionist) dualism (e.g. epiphenomenalism) on one hand and (type) reductionist physicalism on the other.
August 28, 2012
This book has inspired me to take an interest in the subject of philosophy of mind, specifically the problem of mental causation. After reading this book I have tried to read other books that clarifies or introduces the philosophical topic of philosophy of mind, but in retrospect I don't think anybody has done as well as Jaegwon Kim who knows how to make the subject stimulating and interesting.
April 20, 2020
Many of the arguments Kim is willing to reject (such as overdetermination) seem uncontroversial but interfere with author’s desire to explain the relationship between the mental and physical properties. However in chapter 3: it’s very remarkable how he is avoiding the stupefying charm of many so-called sufficient explanations (ex. conferfactuals). He draws from a realistic approach in order to explain in the most relevant way the causal relations of the mental with physical properties. And finally he is perhaps very much right to write that it is not worth talking about properties, but about concepts or things to characterize the causal relations. There are indeed only things causing things and their concepts, not properties causing things. This is the reason why his eliminativism doesn’t seem really ultimate, but rather skeptic about the availability of a good theory of the mental and physical interrelations, unless we are god-fearing Cartesians.
December 17, 2022
3.5 stars. Kim is a brilliant philosopher and writes with clarity and concision. These papers are no less well done. His criticism of non-reductive physicalist is sound, his presentation of supervenience is clear and seemingly comprehensive, and his challenge to all philosophers of his ilk (namely, physicalist) are well argued and founded. However, that is where the praise ends as we are simply on different sides entirely of the mind-body problem. Kim’s physicalist presuppositions are throughout the book and his functional representationalism for me is incompatible with reality. In the end we would just disagree (amicably!), so much of the book is not convincing. However, it truly is a must read for those interested in the current physicalist debates of philosophy of mind. Kim, regardless of our differences, is top class.
to-keep-reference
November 1, 2019La conciencia depende del cerebro.
La mente Pág.146
La mente Pág.146
November 18, 2015
Jaegwon Kim offers a weakened physicalist discussion of supervenience and the difficulties it presents for current alternatives to Mind-Body dualism. There is some technical language but it is kept at a minimum. Of primary importance is Kim’s remarkably lucid discussion of “supervenience.”
Supervenience tries to explain how mental properties and physical kinds, not tokens, are related. Mental properties supervene on physical properties: For any property M, if anything has M at time t, then there exists a physical base (subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and necessarily anything that has P at a time has M at that time (Kim 9). This means “every mental property has a physical base that guarantees its instantiation” (10). Thus, mental properties supervene on physical properties. The takeaway is that mental properties must always have a physical base. This is an improvement on older materialist models which said mental properties were physical properties.
Supervenience presents a number of problems for physicalism, however. What happens if mental property M causes another mental property M* to be instantiated? For example, my having the state “anger” causes me to have the mental state depression/fear/whatever. This means that, if supervenience holds, M* must also have a physical property P* as its physical base. Two problems immediately arise:
a. It appears that a mental property (M) is causing a physical base (P*) which then launches M*. Yet reductionists hold that all things have a physical cause. But this raises the problem:
b. So what causes M*? It seems we have multiple causes, overdetermination.
Kim restates the problem: if mental properties are physically irreducible and remain outside the physical domain, then, given that the physical domain is causally closed, how can they exercise causal powers (Kim 58)?
Conclusion
In terms of an introductory text, albeit a rigorous one, I highly recommend this book. Admittedly, Kim doesn’t solve the problem (cf. p. 58), nor does he pretend to. He introduces the reader to the relevant terminology and explains why certain moves available to physicalists cannot work.
Supervenience tries to explain how mental properties and physical kinds, not tokens, are related. Mental properties supervene on physical properties: For any property M, if anything has M at time t, then there exists a physical base (subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and necessarily anything that has P at a time has M at that time (Kim 9). This means “every mental property has a physical base that guarantees its instantiation” (10). Thus, mental properties supervene on physical properties. The takeaway is that mental properties must always have a physical base. This is an improvement on older materialist models which said mental properties were physical properties.
Supervenience presents a number of problems for physicalism, however. What happens if mental property M causes another mental property M* to be instantiated? For example, my having the state “anger” causes me to have the mental state depression/fear/whatever. This means that, if supervenience holds, M* must also have a physical property P* as its physical base. Two problems immediately arise:
a. It appears that a mental property (M) is causing a physical base (P*) which then launches M*. Yet reductionists hold that all things have a physical cause. But this raises the problem:
b. So what causes M*? It seems we have multiple causes, overdetermination.
Kim restates the problem: if mental properties are physically irreducible and remain outside the physical domain, then, given that the physical domain is causally closed, how can they exercise causal powers (Kim 58)?
Conclusion
In terms of an introductory text, albeit a rigorous one, I highly recommend this book. Admittedly, Kim doesn’t solve the problem (cf. p. 58), nor does he pretend to. He introduces the reader to the relevant terminology and explains why certain moves available to physicalists cannot work.
April 30, 2013
An in-depth, philosophically technical review of the mind-body problem. The latter chapters delve into modal logic and other less appealing modes of analysis for the general reader, but the early chapters and conclusion summarize the issue nicely. However, it remains somewhat difficult to distinguish Kim's perspective from more well-known theories such as Dan Dennett's except that he repeatedly denies eliminative materialism (although he retains a materialistic standpoint). This one will likely require a second reading, because Kim's differences from other philosophers of mind are extremely subtle ones.
July 25, 2010
Kim's trifecta of books on mental causation--this one, along with his books on physicalism and supervenience--constitute the definitive modern account of philosophy of mind. His arguments are clearly laid out, effectively argued, and, not easily brushed aside. Highly recommended.
April 6, 2008
Excellent, especially chapter 2.
Read
February 4, 2009<3
August 21, 2011
Kim shows (not says) 'causation' covers the "mental" and the "non-mental" as well as a pawn covers two pieces in chess.
April 12, 2013
Kim is a top-notch philosopher in philosophy of mind, and he deftly shows the ways physicalism cannot be had on the cheap.
August 22, 2015
Not an easy book to read and understand. However, the author's view has been well presented in very structured way.
October 24, 2016
No free lunches.
March 29, 2017
Challenging little book. Brilliant overview of the mind/body problem as it has been considered through the ages by philosophers on either side of the dualist/physicalist divide. Author Kim does a superb job of critiquing contemporary theorists of both stripes, leveling rigorous arguments in support here, opposition there. At the end of this highly thought provoking read, I feel much better equipped to grasp related future reads. But, alas, no closer to understanding the relationship between mind and brain, i.e., specifically, how each activates or instantiates the other. But Kim does offer some tantalizing thoughts on the matter. Great read!
Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews