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With Napoleon in Russia
On the 23rd June 1812 Napoleon stated to General Armand de Caulaincourt, "In less than two months’ time Russia will be suing for peace."
But for once Napoleon's confidence was misplaced.
Instead of a mere two months the Russian campaign would go on to last over five months.
Yet, his army would not be overcome in pitched battle, instead it would be decimated by a vicious Russian winter.
Prior to the beginning of the war Armand de Caulaincourt served as French ambassador to St. Petersburg and records within his memoirs how he attempted to dissuade Napoleon from his invasion of this vast country.
His warnings were, however, not heeded and he went on to serve with Napoleon throughout the conflict as Grand Écuyer, or Master of the Horse, riding at his leader's side through many of the major battles such as Borodino.
Caulaincourt continued with Napoleon through his capture of Moscow and warned his commander against wintering in Russia, but again was not listened to, and so records the disintegration of the once magnificent French army.
With Napoleon in Russia is a remarkably intimate portrayal of the brilliant general as he suffered one of his greatest defeats.
General Armand de Caulaincourt left Russia with Napoleon in December 1812. After this campaign he continued with his critical support of Napoleon right through until the Battle of Waterloo. After which his name was placed upon a list of those proscribed for arrest and execution, but this stopped by the personal intervention of Tsar Alexander I. During his life he kept numerous records and memoirs, which were eventually compiled and translated by Jean Hanoteau in 1935. Caulaincourt passed away in 1827 and the translator of the work Hanoteau died in 1939.
B. H. Liddell Hart cited the work extensively when studying why Hitler's invasion of Russia failed in the twentieth century. Yet it was also a favored reference for many of those German commanders, for example General Günther von Kluge, who General Günther Blumentritt recounted: "I can still see von Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office, and standing there before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand. That went on day after day."
But for once Napoleon's confidence was misplaced.
Instead of a mere two months the Russian campaign would go on to last over five months.
Yet, his army would not be overcome in pitched battle, instead it would be decimated by a vicious Russian winter.
Prior to the beginning of the war Armand de Caulaincourt served as French ambassador to St. Petersburg and records within his memoirs how he attempted to dissuade Napoleon from his invasion of this vast country.
His warnings were, however, not heeded and he went on to serve with Napoleon throughout the conflict as Grand Écuyer, or Master of the Horse, riding at his leader's side through many of the major battles such as Borodino.
Caulaincourt continued with Napoleon through his capture of Moscow and warned his commander against wintering in Russia, but again was not listened to, and so records the disintegration of the once magnificent French army.
With Napoleon in Russia is a remarkably intimate portrayal of the brilliant general as he suffered one of his greatest defeats.
General Armand de Caulaincourt left Russia with Napoleon in December 1812. After this campaign he continued with his critical support of Napoleon right through until the Battle of Waterloo. After which his name was placed upon a list of those proscribed for arrest and execution, but this stopped by the personal intervention of Tsar Alexander I. During his life he kept numerous records and memoirs, which were eventually compiled and translated by Jean Hanoteau in 1935. Caulaincourt passed away in 1827 and the translator of the work Hanoteau died in 1939.
B. H. Liddell Hart cited the work extensively when studying why Hitler's invasion of Russia failed in the twentieth century. Yet it was also a favored reference for many of those German commanders, for example General Günther von Kluge, who General Günther Blumentritt recounted: "I can still see von Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office, and standing there before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand. That went on day after day."
317 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1935
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Armand de Caulaincourt
11 books2 followersGeneral Armand Augustin Louis, marquis de Caulaincourt
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
March 21, 2008
The memoirs of the ill-fated Russian campaign written by Napoleon's aide-de-camp and master of horse, are a rare and unique window into the workings of willpower as a catalyst of fate.
Dormant for over 100 years, Caulaincourt's diary lay unpublished and in the possession of his family until World War I, when the German army destroyed his state, and with it, the original manuscript. That was until 1934, when explorations amidst the rubble of his chateau, helped unearth a twisted metal safe that contained the damped, but unscathed diary of the great general. It was published immediately and became an overnight sensation between military circles at the time.
General Guderian comments while on the Eastern Front in 1941, how "Caulaincourt's account was lingering in everyone's head, and for the first time we thought of the possibility of failure..."
Fascinating to read the day to day musings and squabbles of Napoleon and his army; the battles of Borodino and Smolensk, the burning of Moscow and the fated retreat... A must read for all enthusiasts of the Napoleonic Era in particular, and Military History in general.
Dormant for over 100 years, Caulaincourt's diary lay unpublished and in the possession of his family until World War I, when the German army destroyed his state, and with it, the original manuscript. That was until 1934, when explorations amidst the rubble of his chateau, helped unearth a twisted metal safe that contained the damped, but unscathed diary of the great general. It was published immediately and became an overnight sensation between military circles at the time.
General Guderian comments while on the Eastern Front in 1941, how "Caulaincourt's account was lingering in everyone's head, and for the first time we thought of the possibility of failure..."
Fascinating to read the day to day musings and squabbles of Napoleon and his army; the battles of Borodino and Smolensk, the burning of Moscow and the fated retreat... A must read for all enthusiasts of the Napoleonic Era in particular, and Military History in general.
December 15, 2017
The major part of this book is fairly interesting as Caulaincourt (Master of the Horse), and self-proclaimed devotee of Napoleon describes the trauma and tragedy of the Russian campaign. His negative views of the campaign are obvious early on, which makes the reader wonder why he stuck around as the army moves farther and farther into Russia. A cynic might believe it's so he could say, "I told you so" as things go from bad to worse.
In fact, Caulaincourt continues to tell Napoleon and the reader why things have gone wrong. He even threatens to walk out at times, but is always persuaded to continue his service. Perhaps, he enjoys being at the left hand of a military genius or he likes having the second-hand power of his position. Whatever it is, he continues to describe the battles, the fires in Moscow, and the retreat back to France.
This works until December 5, 1812, when Napoleon takes the monumental step of returning to France on his own (with Caulaincourt at his side of course), leaving his men under the command of Marshal Murat, who also eventually manages to leave the army. From then until December 19, when they arrive in Paris, the book becomes a virtual non-stop rant by Napoleon about the things which have gone wrong, the nations which have betrayed him, the people who disappointed him, his glorious actions of the past, and his plans for the future, once he has successfully rallied the French people to him again. Frankly, it becomes rather boring. If it is all true, Caulaincourt earned his pay just for listening.
The book ends in Paris where we know Napoleon does rally his people for two more years of war and many more deaths. Towards the end of the book, Napoleon reflects on his legacy, "A nation, like history itself, rarely takes account of anything but success." Although he did not achieve ultimate success--to the relief of most of Europe--Napoleon's reign will not be forgotten for many reasons.
In fact, Caulaincourt continues to tell Napoleon and the reader why things have gone wrong. He even threatens to walk out at times, but is always persuaded to continue his service. Perhaps, he enjoys being at the left hand of a military genius or he likes having the second-hand power of his position. Whatever it is, he continues to describe the battles, the fires in Moscow, and the retreat back to France.
This works until December 5, 1812, when Napoleon takes the monumental step of returning to France on his own (with Caulaincourt at his side of course), leaving his men under the command of Marshal Murat, who also eventually manages to leave the army. From then until December 19, when they arrive in Paris, the book becomes a virtual non-stop rant by Napoleon about the things which have gone wrong, the nations which have betrayed him, the people who disappointed him, his glorious actions of the past, and his plans for the future, once he has successfully rallied the French people to him again. Frankly, it becomes rather boring. If it is all true, Caulaincourt earned his pay just for listening.
The book ends in Paris where we know Napoleon does rally his people for two more years of war and many more deaths. Towards the end of the book, Napoleon reflects on his legacy, "A nation, like history itself, rarely takes account of anything but success." Although he did not achieve ultimate success--to the relief of most of Europe--Napoleon's reign will not be forgotten for many reasons.
July 1, 2023
Very interesting read for anybody curious about the Napoleon Era just before and during the Russian campaign. Clearly illustrates how Napoleon’s willpower drives political and military action, shaping the European geopolitical landscape of the time. The memoirs of the Duke of Vicenza, the Emperor’s aide-de-camp and Master of the Horse, come from an unique position - 1) main adviser who is against the Russian invasion from the beginning and despite multiple put-downs from the Emperor, 2) takes part in the Russian military campaign and retreat, 3) spends ~2 weeks worth of tete-a-tete time with the Emperor on the way back to Paris.
The book also goes into interesting details about politics, Napoleon’s vision for Europe, and the continental system. Napoleon seems to have trusted the Duke. Although he always advised against the Russian campaign and opposed the Emperor’s position, he did it out of mere duty to France and the Emperor. Interestingly, he apparently relayed the Tsar’s intent of waging a war of attrition, letting the cold winter take its toll and avoiding full battle. Towards the end of the book, you can also see through the Duke’s eyes a different side of Emperor - the “man”. Sharing carriages and sleighs with him for ~2 weeks on the trip back to Paris, they talked about family life, about the Empress and their son.
Thankfully, these memoirs survived to this day and were first published in 1934, although thought to have been lost post World War I. The introduction of the book shares more context about the author and why the memoirs were published so late.
The book also goes into interesting details about politics, Napoleon’s vision for Europe, and the continental system. Napoleon seems to have trusted the Duke. Although he always advised against the Russian campaign and opposed the Emperor’s position, he did it out of mere duty to France and the Emperor. Interestingly, he apparently relayed the Tsar’s intent of waging a war of attrition, letting the cold winter take its toll and avoiding full battle. Towards the end of the book, you can also see through the Duke’s eyes a different side of Emperor - the “man”. Sharing carriages and sleighs with him for ~2 weeks on the trip back to Paris, they talked about family life, about the Empress and their son.
Thankfully, these memoirs survived to this day and were first published in 1934, although thought to have been lost post World War I. The introduction of the book shares more context about the author and why the memoirs were published so late.
July 5, 2017
Quite simply a fascinating, primary source account of Napoleonic efforts on the Russian Campaign. The Aide de Camp in question General Armand De Caulaincourt (Duke of Vicenza) walks the reader through the events as they occurred. He had kept meticulous notes along the time span of events. This account of the Russian Campaign is a wonderful accompaniment to Tolstoy’s “War and Peace.” I was slightly disappointed in “War and Peace” in that all through that book Tolstoy never once references The Treaty of Tilsit (1807). It is in effect this treaty breakdown that leads one today to learn of the events of Napoleon and La Grande Armée fighting the Russians, a capture of Moscow, a burning of Moscow by Cossacks, an attempt at a truce with the Tsar, and then a captivating retreat during the early winter months of 1812. For whatever may have been the fault of Napoleon; at least he gets into Russia by horse whereby 130 years later Corporal Hitler cannot by motor transport, air, and tank. As odd as this may be placed here in this review it is in fact the truth – both took off for Moscow during the month of June (different years) but Napoleon is entrenched in Moscow by near mid-September of 1812. The Treaty of Tilsit is referenced somewhere between 15 to 20 times during the course of the full read. It is a treaty that cannot be ignored for it is this that is the foundation of the War in Russia.
Chapter 8 in this book is in my opinion the most important of the events of Moscow. There are three elements to the events that the Duke of Vicenza wrote that led to the French retreat. The first, is the courage of the young officers. Though courage itself is not a detrimental characteristic during time of battle, siege, war and other such events it is noticeable to him that the courage in this case lacked foresight and “method” in employing the courage required. In this sense courage becomes a hollow and lonely attribute with little direction. The second issue was the onslaught of winter. De Caulaincourt writes that the Emperor had a strong belief in his French troops – though Cossacks were successfully employing in guerilla warfare (as would be later confirmed in the 1821 essay by Denis Davydov entitled “Essay Towards a Theory of Guerrilla Warfare”) where the goal was simply “ubit da duiti” (kill and escape). The Emperor (according to the Duke) was using his words of the time to mark “wishful thinking”. The third and fatal blow to La Grande Armée was as follows: On a personal level there are things I have learned about troops, grunts, Special Forces, and other military organizations over the course of my personal experience and life. On page 161 the General informs the reader that the greatest enemy to the French Forces in Moscow was the “lack of discipline”. This is explained after he has detailed the training efforts by officers upon newly inducted troops of the army. Herein lays a distinction between the French of 1812 retreating from Moscow and some 140+ years later the retreat at the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War by NATO Forces – predominantly X Corps which also included the1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal Marines and ROK Forces, and all the U.S. Army elements so assigned to X Corps . The Chosin Reservoir escape was one in which “morale” was not the enemy – the cold and North Koreans along with a greater foe in Peoples Republic of China Forces. Still, they were held at bay and checked all along the retreating lines of the time. General Ned Almond during the Korean War was the “idiot” and not General Douglas MacArthur.
The final 25% of this book is based on the conversations and tribulations as Napoleon is considered to have “abandoned” the French Forces on 5 December 1812; however, the Emperor had to return to France to ensure his political survival following the coup d'état by General Claude de Malet. In this reader’s point of view Napoleon did what he had to do and when the time was necessary. The conversations were quite telling while as Napoleon and his Aide de Campe; General Armand De Calaincourt, Duke of Vicenza travel through the snow to Paris. In part the conversations entail the successes and defeats vs. the Russians and the future. There is quite a telling conversation on page 305 of Napoleon’s view of America at this point with her own war of 1812. The perspective is of course for the future of the United States and though he was off just slightly on some predictions; many more were “spot on” and something that made this reader raise an eyebrow upon.
This book for me was a better read than “War and Peace” and more accurately (in my opinion) covers the War of 1812. I give this book 5 stars as I did “War and Peace” for the historical significance – this is a better book than is Tolstoy’s. (I may come back to this review and update it later.)
Chapter 8 in this book is in my opinion the most important of the events of Moscow. There are three elements to the events that the Duke of Vicenza wrote that led to the French retreat. The first, is the courage of the young officers. Though courage itself is not a detrimental characteristic during time of battle, siege, war and other such events it is noticeable to him that the courage in this case lacked foresight and “method” in employing the courage required. In this sense courage becomes a hollow and lonely attribute with little direction. The second issue was the onslaught of winter. De Caulaincourt writes that the Emperor had a strong belief in his French troops – though Cossacks were successfully employing in guerilla warfare (as would be later confirmed in the 1821 essay by Denis Davydov entitled “Essay Towards a Theory of Guerrilla Warfare”) where the goal was simply “ubit da duiti” (kill and escape). The Emperor (according to the Duke) was using his words of the time to mark “wishful thinking”. The third and fatal blow to La Grande Armée was as follows: On a personal level there are things I have learned about troops, grunts, Special Forces, and other military organizations over the course of my personal experience and life. On page 161 the General informs the reader that the greatest enemy to the French Forces in Moscow was the “lack of discipline”. This is explained after he has detailed the training efforts by officers upon newly inducted troops of the army. Herein lays a distinction between the French of 1812 retreating from Moscow and some 140+ years later the retreat at the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War by NATO Forces – predominantly X Corps which also included the1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal Marines and ROK Forces, and all the U.S. Army elements so assigned to X Corps . The Chosin Reservoir escape was one in which “morale” was not the enemy – the cold and North Koreans along with a greater foe in Peoples Republic of China Forces. Still, they were held at bay and checked all along the retreating lines of the time. General Ned Almond during the Korean War was the “idiot” and not General Douglas MacArthur.
The final 25% of this book is based on the conversations and tribulations as Napoleon is considered to have “abandoned” the French Forces on 5 December 1812; however, the Emperor had to return to France to ensure his political survival following the coup d'état by General Claude de Malet. In this reader’s point of view Napoleon did what he had to do and when the time was necessary. The conversations were quite telling while as Napoleon and his Aide de Campe; General Armand De Calaincourt, Duke of Vicenza travel through the snow to Paris. In part the conversations entail the successes and defeats vs. the Russians and the future. There is quite a telling conversation on page 305 of Napoleon’s view of America at this point with her own war of 1812. The perspective is of course for the future of the United States and though he was off just slightly on some predictions; many more were “spot on” and something that made this reader raise an eyebrow upon.
This book for me was a better read than “War and Peace” and more accurately (in my opinion) covers the War of 1812. I give this book 5 stars as I did “War and Peace” for the historical significance – this is a better book than is Tolstoy’s. (I may come back to this review and update it later.)
April 4, 2020
A chilling account of Grande Army's Russian campaign is also a first hand account of how Napoleon thought in those fateful days. If Duke of Vicenza is to be believed then i guess "Wiseness left the Emperor before fate also took a flight"
No doubt, a must read for anyone interested in Russia and her mass.
Napoleon, i guess, rightly concluded at Moscow when the fall, already in motion, was not so evident
"Du dustin qui fait tout, telle est la loi"
No doubt, a must read for anyone interested in Russia and her mass.
Napoleon, i guess, rightly concluded at Moscow when the fall, already in motion, was not so evident
"Du dustin qui fait tout, telle est la loi"
to-keep-reference
July 4, 2019Durante la noche del 20 de junio, el OKW difundió la palabra clave «Dortmund». En el diario de guerra se dice: «Por medio de ella se ordena definitivamente el comienzo de los ataques el día 22 de junio. La orden debe transmitirse a los distintos Grupos de Ejército». Hitler, alterado ante la proximidad del gran momento, se dispuso a trasladarse a su nuevo cuartel general cerca de Rastenburg, cuyo nombre en clave era la Wolfsschanze, o Guarida del Lobo. Seguía convencido de que el Ejército Rojo y todo el sistema soviético iban a venirse abajo. «Solo tenemos que pegar una patada a la puerta y todo el edificio podrido se hundirá», había dicho a sus altos mandos.
En privado los oficiales más serios destacados en las fronteras orientales abrigaban no pocas dudas. Algunos habían releído el relato del general Armand de Caulaincourt acerca de la marcha de Napoleón sobre Moscú y su terrible retirada. Los oficiales y los soldados más viejos que habían combatido en Rusia durante la Primera Guerra Mundial también se sentían incómodos.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial Pág.183
En privado los oficiales más serios destacados en las fronteras orientales abrigaban no pocas dudas. Algunos habían releído el relato del general Armand de Caulaincourt acerca de la marcha de Napoleón sobre Moscú y su terrible retirada. Los oficiales y los soldados más viejos que habían combatido en Rusia durante la Primera Guerra Mundial también se sentían incómodos.
La Segunda Guerra Mundial Pág.183
November 24, 2023
If you love Napoleonic history, this is awesome. Caulaincourt is Napoleon's aide de camp, diplomat to Russia and his stable master during the Russian campaign. He wrote many precious anecdotes here, his personal talks with the emperor, with other famous figures like Alexander I and Metternich, and his opinion. It feels weird to read about it, this is a book from someone who has spoken with Napoleon. Apparently Caulaincourt tried to talk away the emperor from invading Russia, and Napoleon in turn spent many hours trying to persuade Caulaincourt. This is an inside story of how Napoleon ruined one of the biggest invasions in military history and by extension his empire by one stroke of boldness and hubris.
June 5, 2024
Marginal. I guess some of the details would be more interesting if I knew more about the Napoleonic period in French history. Clearly, they suffered in Russia as the Germans repeated in World War 2. Both leaders, Napoleon and Hitler, were warned about the vastness of Russian territory and cold climate beforehand. Senseless loss of life and destruction.
November 3, 2015
This is essential reading for anyone who enjoyed the military history in War and Peace.
February 23, 2022
'like all curt and obstinate people, I remained on my own ground, maintaining only my own ideas...' Caulaincourt, p. 27
An excellent book by an interesting man. Caulaincourt's position - both in general, but in this instance also in particular (he shared the arduous and rapid journey in freezing conditions back to France with his Emperor) - enabled him to give us a unique view of Napoleon during the debacle of 1812.
Not published till well after everybody involved, including the author, was long dead, Caulaincourt appears to take great pride in really telling it all as he saw it. If we are to take him at his own estimate (as per the quote that titles this review), Caulaincourt was a man who spoke his mind, even to the famously and overpoweringly charismatic Napoleon.
That he could be critical and yet remain an admirer of Napoleon is frequently made clear. On the page following the personal character assessment I've used in the title of my review, Caulaincourt says 'the Emperor was carried away by his own illusion.' But elsewhere he says such things as 'he seemed to me sublime', or 'the Emperor was stronger than adversity.'
If you have more than just a passing interest in this era, I'd say this essential. Better still, it's a joy to read; not only is Caulaincourt's story inherently interesting, it's also well-written, which can't be said of all such memoirs. Even the tale of how the manuscript came down to posterity is fascinating!
An excellent book by an interesting man. Caulaincourt's position - both in general, but in this instance also in particular (he shared the arduous and rapid journey in freezing conditions back to France with his Emperor) - enabled him to give us a unique view of Napoleon during the debacle of 1812.
Not published till well after everybody involved, including the author, was long dead, Caulaincourt appears to take great pride in really telling it all as he saw it. If we are to take him at his own estimate (as per the quote that titles this review), Caulaincourt was a man who spoke his mind, even to the famously and overpoweringly charismatic Napoleon.
That he could be critical and yet remain an admirer of Napoleon is frequently made clear. On the page following the personal character assessment I've used in the title of my review, Caulaincourt says 'the Emperor was carried away by his own illusion.' But elsewhere he says such things as 'he seemed to me sublime', or 'the Emperor was stronger than adversity.'
If you have more than just a passing interest in this era, I'd say this essential. Better still, it's a joy to read; not only is Caulaincourt's story inherently interesting, it's also well-written, which can't be said of all such memoirs. Even the tale of how the manuscript came down to posterity is fascinating!
July 17, 2023
I found the book to be lacking and dull. Without knowing more about Mr. Caulaincourt's memory, I am very skeptical of his ability to remember such extensive conversations to the degree depicted in this book. He does say he would note each conversation shortly after its conclusion but I can't bring myself to fully accept their accuracy. Much of this mental feat was done while enduring an exceptionally cold winter and being sleep deprived for at least two weeks in the midst of a chaotic retreat.
Even accepting the accuracy of these conversations, I don't feel they contributed anything of note to the larger events going on at the time. If accurate, these talks depict Napoleon as being completely divorced from reality in terms of how disastrous his Russian campaign turned out to be as well as how ill-equipped France was to respond in terms of manpower and resources for 1813.
Lastly, while I expect there to be issues transliterating places and names from Russian (Cyrillic) to Roman alphabets, I've never seen so many unique spellings of people and places. For example, for years I've always seen the primary Russian field marshal's surname spelled as either Kutuzov or Kutusov. This title introduced one I've never encountered before, Kutusof. Such spellings took some getting used to.
Even accepting the accuracy of these conversations, I don't feel they contributed anything of note to the larger events going on at the time. If accurate, these talks depict Napoleon as being completely divorced from reality in terms of how disastrous his Russian campaign turned out to be as well as how ill-equipped France was to respond in terms of manpower and resources for 1813.
Lastly, while I expect there to be issues transliterating places and names from Russian (Cyrillic) to Roman alphabets, I've never seen so many unique spellings of people and places. For example, for years I've always seen the primary Russian field marshal's surname spelled as either Kutuzov or Kutusov. This title introduced one I've never encountered before, Kutusof. Such spellings took some getting used to.
February 15, 2020
I was really looking forward to reading this book. O give it four stars for the detailing the insider politics and decisions that led to Napoleon's decision to invade Russia, and for the detailing of the actual military campaign...both the invasion and withdrawal.
I did take off half a point for the overdone "notes" of everything said by Napoleon during their trip back to Paris, while freezing in a sled. I find it hard to believe that those notes are entirely correct, especially as the author admits he got very little sleep for 14 days, and was exhausted.
Besides that, this is an excellent first hand account of Napoleon's Russian folly.
I did take off half a point for the overdone "notes" of everything said by Napoleon during their trip back to Paris, while freezing in a sled. I find it hard to believe that those notes are entirely correct, especially as the author admits he got very little sleep for 14 days, and was exhausted.
Besides that, this is an excellent first hand account of Napoleon's Russian folly.
July 27, 2023
Not what I expected. I struggled reconciling Vossler's account of the horrors of the early retreat with his souvenir shopping in Poland only a short time later. I also was surprised at the lack of interest or commentary on the wider political situation happening at the time of his travels and the battles which raged. Presumably many of these would have involved his countrymen. The lack of even a mention of his servants name surprised me given the close relationship they must have had and his death in service.
It was an interesting read but perhaps needs to be read with more knowledge of the context and the author.
It was an interesting read but perhaps needs to be read with more knowledge of the context and the author.
January 25, 2023
I have read dozens of books on Napoleon, several on the Campaign of 1812 and a few others written by intimates of the Emperor. This was enlightening in providing a first person account of the events leading up to the invasion of Russia. What I found most interesting though was Part V: Flight. Here Napoleon and Caulaincourt are virtually alone in a sledge or carriage for a two week journey from Warsaw to Paris. The author’s retelling of their conversations I found to be compelling reading and gave me new insights into Napoleon as a man.
October 13, 2022
Interesting look into the mind of Napoleon. Too much dialogue and not enough reporting of events. The last 25% was a slog.
May 14, 2023
Fascinating insider view of Napoleon’s Russian campaign and Napoleon’s state of mind during it and the aftermath. Caulaincourt was Napoleon’s ‘Master of Horse‘ which basically meant he was his personal logistics officer responsible for all the travel and security arrangements. He was an intelligent man and also one who was not afraid to tell Napoleon what he really thought, and even better N. seemed to enjoy C.’s frankness and accept it (even if he rarely listened to him, with unfortunate results)
The description of of the advance, fighting at Borodino, the fire of Moscow, and French retreat was gripping and often terribly depressing. The needless destruction and loss of life (most notable, for me, was when Caulaincourt’s brother is killed at Borodino) was just appalling.
The narrative is divided into two sections, because midway through the retreat of the Grande Armee Napoleon leaves it to head for Paris as quickly as possible, taking basically only Caulaincourt as an escort. As they travel though Poland, Germany, and France C. records the conversations he has with N, and they provide a great insight into N’s thinking regarding his position, politics, the state of France, and the war.
I finished it with the sense that Napoleon didn’t deserve the absolute loyalty of such a fine man as Caulaincourt, but that he was able to inspire it (in C. as well as so many others) was certainly one of the most critical factors in his success.
The description of of the advance, fighting at Borodino, the fire of Moscow, and French retreat was gripping and often terribly depressing. The needless destruction and loss of life (most notable, for me, was when Caulaincourt’s brother is killed at Borodino) was just appalling.
The narrative is divided into two sections, because midway through the retreat of the Grande Armee Napoleon leaves it to head for Paris as quickly as possible, taking basically only Caulaincourt as an escort. As they travel though Poland, Germany, and France C. records the conversations he has with N, and they provide a great insight into N’s thinking regarding his position, politics, the state of France, and the war.
I finished it with the sense that Napoleon didn’t deserve the absolute loyalty of such a fine man as Caulaincourt, but that he was able to inspire it (in C. as well as so many others) was certainly one of the most critical factors in his success.
September 21, 2010
General Caulaincourt was at Napoleon's side throughout the magnificent assault and the disasterous winter retreat. When the horses froze to death he walked. As the once mighty French army moved, humiliated, through Poland and as they limped back into Paris, he was there. This is not a history book. It is military history as it should be writ; by an accute observor who, with minimum of gloss and spin, tells the reader how it really was.
Don't be put off by the archaic lanuage, the translation from the original French is good and after a few pages you get into the swing. He is both admiring and critical of Napoleon. In fact, for stdents of the Emperor this book provide valuable insights into what dove the man and his considerable ego. I found it hard to put down, but then I am fascinated by Napoleon and military campaigns.
Geoffrey Lambert - author of "The Morozov Inheritance"
Don't be put off by the archaic lanuage, the translation from the original French is good and after a few pages you get into the swing. He is both admiring and critical of Napoleon. In fact, for stdents of the Emperor this book provide valuable insights into what dove the man and his considerable ego. I found it hard to put down, but then I am fascinated by Napoleon and military campaigns.
Geoffrey Lambert - author of "The Morozov Inheritance"
January 31, 2024
This is one of those books that can't be praised enough. That can't even be read enough. I go back to it always with gratitude that it exists. Caulaincourt was such a decent man and Napoleon was so much the opposite in so many ways that it is hard to understand the devotion and loyalty paid to the emperor by his aide-de-camp. Calaincourt himself said that he didn't really understand it either. But this book gives us many illustrations of what it was like. One fascinating glimpse into their relationship was a time when Calaincourt doggedly tried to get the emperor to order new nails for the horseshoes of his cavalry forces while Napoleon was only interested in orating about the glory of France. Calaincourt's memoirs give us such glimpses. We are lucky that it exists.
November 11, 2013
Taas on kohta luettu läpi kirja jostakin merkittävästä historian tapahtumasta, mikä tarkoittaa taas kerran jotakin suurmiehen typerää sotaa, josta sadat tuhannet sotilaat ja siviilit saivat taas kerran kärsiä. Tässähän suomalaisia koskettaa eniten Tilsit ja Aleksanteri I, jotka taas palautuvat tällä lukijalla Niskasen suvun esi-isään Jussiin, joka joutui sotaan muutama vuosi ennen tämän kirjan tapahtumia mainitulla paikkakunnalla solmitun sopimuksen vuoksi. Jussin komppanian kapteeni oli muuten Carl Leon(h)ard Lode, kenet yksi Runebergin Jussi valitsi runonaiheekseen ("Ukko Lode") siihen kirjaan, joka kenties löytyy teistäkin aika monen isovanhemman asunnon tai kesämökin kirjahyllystä.
August 18, 2013
Written by Napoleon's "Master of Horse", this book details from a first-hand perspective Napoleon's decision to invade Russia, the disastrous decision to occupy Moscow and the resulting retreat and disintegration of the French Army. It includings N's personal musings on this life, his ambitions and his legacy. It is definitely not a complete history of the campaign and some parallel (or prior) reading is required. There are things I still don't understand but this book tells a gripping story.
July 5, 2014
An essential piece for anyone seeking to learn more on the Grande Armée and Napoleon's 1812 campaign into Russia. However, Caulaincourt distances himself from many of Bonaparte's crucial decisions that determined the outcome of Russia's "success".
July 13, 2012
Unto itself not something to read just for the heck of it. Invaluable resource/ partner Volume to War and Peace.
June 9, 2012
Read an an earlier edition (1935 ?)
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