This is a concise and very readable history of council housing in England from 1890 to late 2017. Because it is concise, it raises issues that could easily generate extensive debate and leaves these for others to resolve. That is not a fault in the book. It is just something to appreciate.
The UK has been in the grip of a neoliberal ideology since 1979, determined to invoke market forces as the only acceptable remedy for social ills, and industriously experimenting with one after another irrational – and often plain vindictive - initiative designed to create the longed for, magical free market conditions. In the case of housing policy, the later part of this history identifies the reasons why these initiatives are destined to fail, where they have not failed already. The early part of the history reminds us that they have for the most part been tried before and failed before.
The fact is that the three post World War II decades in Britain were exceptional. Previously, Britain was second to none in its obsession with liberal, free market ideology and over time its various governments did in fact make all sorts of unsuccessful efforts to address aspects of the chronic housing needs of its population without undue deviation from the tenets of liberalism. For Britain’s housing, it was not just housing markets that failed – it was also a full range of central and local government housing initiatives that failed, until council housing emerged as the one remedy that was effective in achieving the objectives set by government. The first may date from the 1890s and many were built between the two world wars, but it was in the thirty years from 1945 that council housing had its greatest impact, within the wider context of economic planning.
For all its attention to earlier and subsequent history, the real importance of this book is to investigate whether the council housing built in this era was a failure, as alleged by those dismantling the investment, or if it was instead a success, contrary to media and party political presentations. The neoliberal agenda since 1979 is based on the contention that it was a failure and this agenda was not abandoned under New Labour. This book analyses and refutes the main allegations made against council housing, without neglecting its failings, and in doing so is obliged to confront head on the misinformation and misrepresentation on which the neoliberal attacks have been constructed. Like all so called revisionist history, it is obliged to undertake this task in the teeth of a well established and popular narrative that is very difficult to shake off. We think we know what went wrong with council housing because we have been exposed to such a relentless misinformation campaign. It is not acceptable to recycle such ill informed contemporary accounts as though the passage of time and endless repetition transformed them into history. The myths were insufficiently challenged at the time and this book sets out to challenge them firmly now.
It is important to revisit all this history because otherwise we will be unable to appreciate how important government intervention and planning in general, and council housing in particular, must remain to any future housing policy. The challenge of securing for the people decent, affordable housing is not, never has been and never will be fulfilled by the market. Government intervention has been successful in the past and can be so again.
But of course, it is no secret that the neoliberal agenda does not envisage decent or affordable housing for the majority. The cynical and vindictive nature of many recent government decisions is exposed in this volume.
in its early years it housed a relatively affluent working class, those in steady employment who could be reliably expected to pay its comparatively high rents. In this sense, councils were like any other landlord: they wanted ‘respectable’ tenants for their housing and a guarantee that its capital costs would be paid off and running expenses met...council housing is not, in any meaningful sense, ‘subsidised’. Construction loans are repaid and, in most cases, the homes themselves become an asset, not only to those who live in them but a financial – and income-generating – asset to the local authority. [p231]
The true story of ‘Broken Britain’ is not failed council estates but an economy that failed their residents. [p48]
In their groundbreaking book, Family and Kinship in East London, Peter Willmott and Michael Young went on to lament what the residents, mostly from London’s old East End, had lost: ‘Instead of the sociable squash of people and houses, workshops and lorries, there are the drawn-out roads and spacious open ground of the usual low-density estate.’ To many that might seem an improvement but Willmott and Young mourned, in particular, the loss of the old matriarchal kinship networks which had, they contended, previously sustained community life. They seem blind to the bleak uniformity of the old terraces and have been criticised since for a much romanticised view of that supposedly ‘sociable squash’ and a selective use of evidence to support it. Still, it was an influential early sally against the legion of planners whose drawing board plans were held by critics to have decimated the working-class communities they had set out to rescue. [p72]
It was an undeniably suburban Arcadia, of course; indeed, that was its raison d’être. As such, it has probably fulfilled the hopes of its builders who believed simply that decent living conditions would support lives lived decently, but it taunts those who wanted this new world to be something more radical, something more ostensibly ‘modern’ and urban. As Matthew Hollow has pointed out, Britain’s early post-war planning has been criticised both for its naïve utopianism and its too timid pragmatism. The apparent contradiction can be resolved, he suggests, if we stop treating ‘utopianism and pragmatism as two mutually exclusive concepts’. There was clearly a genuine idealism and ambition on the part of planners and politicians but it was, unavoidably and properly, shaped by the material constraints and cultural realities of its day. It was, in the end, a grounded and very British utopianism. [p73]
...the reflex to blame the design of modernist council estates seems simplistic – and too convenient to those politicians seeking not only a scapegoat to blame for social disorder but an opportunity for a little real estate redevelopment. [p248]
A strategy that emphasised private sector and housing association involvement was one that encouraged redevelopment – new houses built for sale and shared ownership which would reward investors – rather than refurbishment of existing properties. Comprehensive improvement schemes had worked elsewhere and ‘selective redevelopment might have been justified by social and environmental objectives’, but leveraged capital demanded its profit. [p185]
The reality of residualisation was powerful enough; the social problems of many council estates – not most, and where significant caused by a minority of residents – were real enough (though sometimes exaggerated by the media). But the causal chain was vital. Right-wing politicians blamed council estates – their form, their management, their population – for the problems they suffered. This was an analysis rooted in and reflecting their opposition to all forms of state intervention (except those, we might add cynically, such as MIRAS, which helped the middle class). It was also one that conveniently shifted responsibility from the structural causes of poverty and inequality – which it had been thought in the past the duty of the state or government to address – to supposedly failing neighbourhoods. Academics have a posh term for this: ‘locality managerialism’ – an operating assumption that ‘problems of dilapidation and deprivation have predominantly spatial causes and can be tackled through area-based programmes’. [p196]
All this was an approach broadly shared by New Labour. Council estates remained a problem, inherently flawed, requiring systemic reform. An explicit and strengthened ‘social exclusion’ agenda would focus on rescuing its marginalised communities in order to integrate them into the new, highly competitive globalised economy. The focus on environmental and managerial reforms would continue, but a lot of council housing and a great many council estates would be significantly improved [p197]
The fault lies not necessarily, or not always, in intent but rather in a public investment strategy tied to the demands and interests of private capital and in a poverty reduction programme which in practice is as focused on removing the poor as it is in reducing their poverty, and in an approach premised on the belief that council estates themselves are part of the problem rather than an essential element of any genuinely inclusive solution... Here the New Labour government, for all its genuinely progressive politics and more radical policy ambition, shared in essence the presumptions of its Conservative predecessors. [p206]
Currently, the government pays around £9.3 billion a year in Housing Benefit to private landlords supporting some 1.5 million households, almost half of whom are in work. If all these people were renting socially, we’d be saving £1.5 billion on benefits payments ... [p240]
Council housing’s record has been much maligned. The form and nature of council housing has been unfairly blamed for problems entrenched in our unequal society and exacerbated by the politics which reflect it. [p260]
Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat deputy prime minister in the coalition, recalls a leadership meeting at which he proposed building more social housing: One of them [David Cameron or George Osborne] – I honestly can’t remember whom – looked genuinely nonplussed and said, ‘I don’t understand why you keep going on about the need for more social housing – it just creates Labour voters.’ They genuinely saw housing as a Petri dish for voters. It was unbelievable. [p239]