One of the first modern historians to integrate economic realities into the study of American foreign policy, William Appleman Williams has been a diplomatic historian of major influence since the first publication of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy . In this pioneering book, "the man who has really put the counter-tradition together in its modern form" ( Saturday Review ) examines the profound contradictions between America's ideals and its uses of its vast power, from the Open Door Notes of 1898 to the Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam War.
I wish I could say I read this with the thoroughness of a baboon picking fleas off its paramour. With about half my normal focus, I could tell there was lots of good stuff in here. One of the main themes is that American foreign policy, from 1898 beginning with the Open Door Notes to about 1958 when the book was published, has always been heavily influenced by corporations and their need for markets. America's surplus products were a huge driver of policy, since Americans could only consume so much. As the summary of my edition states, the Open Door policy, "designed to assure continued expansion of the domestic economy by making secure markets abroad, has been pursued...in different versions up to the present time [1958]. Yet this policy has failed. It has failed to prevent economic depressions at home, and it has failed to keep the peace abroad." Anyone who has paid attention to our imperial adventures of late (Iraq comes to mind) will notice the parallels. It seems that our recent wars have benefited military purveyors and contractors and firms like Halliburton and Blackwater, while hurting everyone else.
There's a lot more going on in the book, at great depth and detail. I feel like I would need further background in the foreign policy of this whole era (1898-1958) in order to really grasp it.
The fact that this book has become a classic is hardly debatable. Williams’ examination of American foreign policy is now in its fourth printing with this 50th anniversary edition. The book takes a detailed look at “The Open Door Policy” which evolved out The Open Door Notes of the late 19th century. It shows that, for better or worse, American Capitalism had to find and constantly expand into foreign markets in order for there to be freedom and prosperity at home. Williams argues that not only American leaders but the general population internalized this belief so deeply that it was considered the very basis of morality in the world. Any other way of looking at society was believed to be simply wrong, and in fact, evil. Williams undoubtedly knew that this way of looking at Capitalism, and the world at large, coincided directly with the predictions of Marx concerning Capitalism’s globalization. The Policy of the Open Door can be used to explain the objectives of every foreign military excursion we have undertaken since the end of the 1800’s. It continues to this day in our oil-hungry drive for control of the nations in the Middle East and South Asia. It creates real and imagined enemies that have accounted for the build up of America’s military might over the years. Overall I found this examination of American foreign policy to be quite satisfactory and rational in explaining the successes and failures of American actions over the years. Where I would criticize Williams is in his characterization of America’s leaders having a truly benevolent anti-colonial attitude towards the lesser nations in which America invested and set up “trade”. Williams argued repeatedly, and the commentators in the 50th anniversary edition did as well, that the government really believed they were benefiting mankind as a whole by not only exporting America’s goods, but American values, and that the only "Tragedy" was the failure of these policies. I think it a bit uncritical to state this unequivocally. To argue that American leaders (both government and civilian) did NOT know that they were exploiting nations and purposely directing the trade to benefit Americans regardless of the effect on foreigners is quite bold. I believe that the greed of Americans and the drive that is inherent in Capitalistic countries meant that these leaders knew EXACTLY what they were doing, and that they had little true regard for the welfare of nations. Our failure to see that there is more than one way for societies to organize themselves is certainly a problem of ignorance in American culture, and Williams is right to argue that blaming America’s leaders becomes a scapegoat. Americans need to change themselves first and realize the error of their ways…that it will cause destruction at home and abroad…before we will see any change in leadership and our destructive policies. However, the American empire is really not that different than others in history. The drive for power becomes all consuming, and ultimately leads to disregard for humanity…unless that humanity happens to be at the top of the American food chain.
The greatest (?) American historian goes on a diatribe--only the tenured can get away with this kind of frankness. In its place and time, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy was bracing for its vision of history as leading inexorably, stupidly, to global thermonuclear war. And Wm. A. Williams was p-i-s-s-e-d! The best kind of history: a useful one. Read it.
This is a classic study in US foreign policy that I found both interesting and frustrating. A few caveats: this is more of a long essay than a traditional scholarly text. There are very few footnotes, and Williams interjects repeatedly with his own opinion. This book is best understood as a broad interpretive scheme of the driving force behind US foreign policy from the 1890s to the 1950s.
The big argument here is that in the 1890s American business and political leaders started to freak out about the end of the frontier in a Frederick Jackson Turner sense. They were less worried about excess population than about America's economic frontiers, ie the markets and resources it would have access to. This concern, combined with America's growing industrial and military power, prompted the United States to adopt an open-door policy in numerous parts of the world, most famously China. Williams keenly calls this the "imperialism of anti-colonialism," in that the United States wanted to open up colonial economic reserves and allow open trade, but it did so in a way that often abrogated the sovereignty of states like China or many Latin American countries. Williams strings together an impressive number of quotations of American presidents and other leaders saying that without overseas expansion for American surplus production, there would be huge political and social upheaval at home. Williams leaves this.a bit vague, but I think he meant that employment numbers would have to fall, creating more poverty and unrest.
Williams then links the Open Door policy to the origins of the Cold War by arguing that what had started as a conscious policy had evolved into an ideological faith by the 1940s. Openness was the American creed, and it could not tolerate Stalin's desire to carve out an exclusive economic and security zone in Eastern Europe or maybe even all of Germany. Williams narrates the early Cold War in a way that mostly blames the US for demanding full freedom of action in places like Greece and Iran but then freaked out about Soviet attempts to consolidate control in its zone. What I think he misses is that Stalin's actions violated Yalta and other wartime agreements about the sovereignty of Eastern European states.
Obviously, if you know your Cold War historiography, you know that the original debate between revisionists like Williams and more anti-Soviet scholars like Schlensinger Jr. has largely been superseded by a more balanced approach from historian like Gaddis and ZUbok that incorporates a wider range of primary sources. THere's a strong tendency in Williams to fold a wide and complex set of actors and events into his soft Marxist interpretation, subsuming politics, ideology, and strategy under the rubric of economics. I don't think you can just treat openness as a manifestation of US business interests and the desire to offload manufactured goods to sustain capitalism and high employment at home. Wilson and others are part of a long line of liberal thinkers who believe that economic openness, freedom of navigation, and deeper links between societies will soften international tensions and create a more peaceful world. Williams' treatment of Wilson's thinking is cursory and inaccurate. I don't mind if people criticize Wilson or US foreign policy in general, but they need to see the whole picture. While Williams makes an important contribution in his key idea about the Open Door foreign policy, he drastically oversimplifies these other factors.
Lastly, this book is not particularly well written. Williams tends to argue through lists, as in "3 factors drove the United States to..." There are at least 3 of these formulations in each chapter, and it gets really old. I think this way of writing speaks to the problem I was highlighting earlier about this book's ramming of complexity into one schema. So I don't really recommend it unless you are comping in Cold War historiography.. It is more balanced and fair-minded than many of the leftist screeds that followed in its path, but there's so much good scholarship on the Cold War out there to dig into.
not sure why i’ve never logged this before—i’ve used it as a source at least four times in my time in undergrad, and by now have read the whole thing at least twice.
it’s a classic for a reason, and williams doesn’t hold back. i wasn’t sure how to rate this, because williams’ writing isn’t super fun and he has a tendency to make sweeping generalizations. that said, it’s a seminal work of historiography and by now i know it like the back of my hand.
Reading The Tragedy of American Diplomacy in 2002—just months after 9/11, during a moment when the world was beginning to re-question America’s global role—was more than timely; it was chillingly prescient. William Appleman Williams, a pioneer of revisionist historiography, lays bare the contradictions of U.S. foreign policy with unsettling clarity.
Far from the self-congratulatory myth of spreading freedom and democracy, Williams argues that the U.S. consistently used “open door” rhetoric to justify economic expansion and semi-imperial global reach. Unlike the old colonial powers, America didn’t plant flags—it planted markets. What it lacked in formal empire, it made up for in financial dominance.
So where’s the tragedy? It lies in America’s moral self-image: a nation convinced it was liberating the world, even as it sowed instability, resistance, and war. Korea, Vietnam, Latin America, the Middle East—the patterns are as relentless as they are tragic. It’s a kind of geopolitical hamartia, born not of malevolence but of hubris.
When I read this in 2002, as U.S. troops rolled into Afghanistan and war clouds gathered over Iraq, Williams’ voice felt almost prophetic. The book raised a simple, piercing question: Is there a dissonance between America’s ideals and its actions?
Critics have pointed out its Marxist leanings and occasional moral absolutism. But even with these, the book remains essential. In a post-globalization world, amid new Cold Wars and fresh “missions,” it still whispers a warning: Idealism without introspection can be history’s cruelest irony.
“Our economic frontiers are no longer coextensive with our territorial frontiers.”
"The “tragedy” evolved out of the ultimate contradiction between the idea and the reality that the Open Door Policy disguised, and which left American policy-makers imprisoned within a rigid framework of their own assumptions."
William Appleman Williams' "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy" is part diplomatic history, part wistful look at a series of missed opportunities. In it, the United States plays the role of unwitting antagonist as its commitment to the "Open Door" leaves it incapable of understanding the ramifications of the pursuit of such a policy. From its seemingly benign application in China as a response to Japanese inroads into the region, the Open Door, far from being forgotten, became the guiding light of American foreign policy for generations. That this happened at all, Williams argues, is due in part to the connection made between domestic prosperity and access to foreign markets by followers of Turner's Frontier thesis. Following the Panic of 1890, American elites came to believe that the secret to America's wealth and dominance lay in its constantly expanding frontier to the West. With this frontier all filled up, many argued that "continued expansion in the form of overseas economic (and even territorial) empire provided the best, if not the only, way to sustain their freedom and prosperity." This new policy can be seen in America's successful prosecution of the Spanish American War which left her with several new colonial properties and unrestricted influence in those states not under direct control. Ultimately, the American Empire came to be different than the British, taking the form of an "informal empire" under which subject states were nominally free but had their freedom of action severely limited. Any state to cross the United States could expect, at best, a cessation of loans, and at worst an armed invasion as seen in Nicaragua where Coolidge deployed the Marines for six years. Had Williams known about the activities of the CIA, it is no doubt he would have included them in his empire framework. The policies of the informal empire were supported by all presidents from McKinley to LBJ, with only slight variations within. Woodrow Wilson, the Calvinist Idealist, saw it as the American duty to make the world "safe for democracy," that is, for democracy along the lines of the Anglo-Saxon variety and the American-style capitalism that came along with it. Wilson believed that American economic woes came from insufficient buyers on the export market, and sought to extend loans to foreign countries so that they could buy American products. Banks were to provide these loans, although in the end, "tax monies collected from individual citizens came to be used to provide private corporations with loans and other subsidies for overseas expansion, to create the power to protect those activities, and even to create reserve funds with which to make cash guarantees against losses." In essence, the American taxpayer foot the bill while the banks and corporations took in the majority of the profits of these ventures. Wilson also opposed foreign revolution as inimical to his view of a stable community of nations in the mold of American democracy. Hoover, a long-derided figure for his failure to resolve the Great Depression, comes off vindicated in this work, being presented by Williams as being possessed of a shrewd understanding of American and global political economy. Hoover hastened to shift American foreign policy away from military intervention, stating that “A large part of the world,” he warned the country at large (as well as businessmen), “has come to believe that they were in the presence of the birth of a new imperial power intent upon dominating the destinies and freedoms of other people.” He was not wrong in this assessment. Instead, he argued that "In stimulating our exports, we should be mainly interested in development work abroad such as roads and utilities which increase the standards of living of people and thus increase the demand for goods from every nation, for we gain in prosperity by a prosperous world, not by displacing others.” Hoover fought to "keep the door open" in territories gradually coming under the influence of the Axis, but was unable to end the Great Depression. Williams argues that WWII can also be viewed as in line with the Open Door Policy, citing a statement from FDR's Secretary of State Hull in which he claims that "Yes, war did come, despite the trade agreements. But it is a fact that war did not break out between the United States and any country with which we had been able to negotiate a trade agreement. It is also a fact that, with very few exceptions, the countries with which we signed trade agreements joined together in resisting the Axis. The political line-up followed the economic line-up." In his assessment of FDR, Williams echoes many of his other detractors in arguing that it was the war, rather than the New Deal, that brought America out of the depression and that the New Deal, far from being radical, was in fact a consensus aimed at preserving corporate capitalism. He states "it is most aptly defined and described as a movement to provide for the emergency relief, the short-run rehabilitation, and the long-term rationalization of the existing corporate society. Its objective was to define and institutionalize the roles, functions, and responsibilities of three important segments of any industrial society—capital, labor, and the government—and to do so according to the principles of capitalism." The Good Neighbor Policy was but a variation on the Open Door, now combined with FDR's sense of "noblesse oblige" and a desire to integrate Latin America more closely with the American market. Following the death of FDR, the Open Door was firmly calcified at the heart of American foreign policy and often taken for granted by policymakers. That that happened is in part due to the preponderance of American strength at the end of the war. Truman felt that because he was in control of the Bomb, there was no need to seriously negotiate with the Soviets and compromise with them over reparations, preferring instead push off the issue and assume that whatever was promised, the Americans could force their way into Eastern European markets at a later date. Stalin's seizure of Eastern Europe was not a surprise but was in fact an offer made by the Americans, an offer refused by Molotov for a week before relenting in the face of American intransigence. In this work, Williams displays a keen understanding of American history and of the American identity. He constantly notes how these elites did not believe they were acting in a malicious manner, but they were ultimately blind to the negative effects stemming from their seemingly benign policies.
A fun read. America wants money and always has: free trade and pursuit of markets have been the consistent theme of American policy since the later 19th century, says Williams. And this pursuit has resulted in outcomes contrary to America's preferences. For example, we pushed so far to have an important presence in many countries, that we enabled radicals to make those countries communist. It makes sense and I'm sure there is some truth in it. But the book is far too simplistic. This country can't maintain consistency with any one president, let alone something this grand over a century.
An important contrarian view of American foreign policy. Thesis: American economic security has driven American foreign policy since the Spanish American War. American economic success and internal social stability depends upon economic expansion beyond American borders and throughout world, and Open Door Policy, Good Neighbor Policy, and other "innocently named policies" belie their intent. Should be read alongside a more traditional American foreign policy book for best understanding.
A classic that lives up to the expectations. A student came to me last semester and wanted to create an independent study on the history American Foreign Policy and diplomacy. While it has never been my main interest. This book had been on my radar for a long time.
Revisionist is putting it lightly. Williams attempts to smash mid century conceptions of American history, diplomacy, and the Cold War. Taking a somewhat obscure set of documents penned by John Hay in 1899-1900, Williams sets out a case against American Empire, that his critics have never been able to fully answer. He gets lots wrong, and while I'm more or less sympathetic to several of his mistakes, there is a hard core of truth that runs through his argument based on the documents and it is just mesmerizing when he strikes it.
I'll need to revisit this one, but for or against, it is a worthwhile one to wrestle with.
A radical analysis of American foreign policy from the 1890s to the 1960s. Argues that the open door policy was often inadequate or counter-productive. The need for constant economic expansion, to get rid of America's export surplus, was antagonistic to the rhetoric of democracy and self-determination employed by politicians. The strategy of containment being one example of that, which from its inception was known to be a policy of inevitable military conflict. The revolutions of the world that were crushed or interfered with by America resulted in resentment and deteriorating conditions in those countries. The goal of improving conditions in other countries through replication of the American model typically failed. It led to high levels of inequality in those countries, especially since the U.S. mainly prioritized building relationships that might have the potential to be economically beneficial. It should also be noted that economic benefit was taken as equivalent to national benefit in the minds of most politicians. In the end, he argues an open door for revolution is a moral imperative. True self-determination for all is necessary, especially now in the world of 2018, and it can only be achieved by building social and political infrastructures that will unapologetically articulate what a radically new society could or should be.
Excellent. My edition is the revised 1968 extended essay with a nice historiographical essay at the end written in 1985. Love a bit of historiography; something I wish I had grasped aged 21 when it made up 15% of my BA mark. Anyway. It's easy to pick apart Williams' analysis on the basis of over-egging economic factors to the detriment of other issues: totally correct. But this is an exemplary a piece of brave, original historical inquiry that named and challenged some gigantic sacred cows at a time when it was genuinely dangerous to do so. He writes really well too, thoroughly enjoyable.
What a horrible book. There are no footnotes and vague sweeping generalizations. Only popular because the New Left, in its fetishistic hatred of America, latched onto this. The main trouble though is that Williams took what was probably true about the Cold War and shoe-horned it onto the Progressive Era and New Deal. Of course the New Left is best at attacking liberal movements of the past and undermining the ideals of effective liberalism.
With visits to the historical markers labelled the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and the Open Door Policy, Professor Williams marshals an expert reappraisal of American foreign policy, notably misguided at times, from the 1890s to the 1960s. He believes that a continuous frontier philosophy, used as justification to expand markets and to distract from domestic social ailments, is foundational to understand our behaviors. He further notes that our most important policy frameworks are frequently, if not always, the output of a small cadre of elite leaders, and seldom, if ever, the result of broad public debate. The tragedy follows from a failure to recognize that America is one nation among many rather than a nation naturally ordained to lead the world to greater prosperity through the propagation of its superior economic, political, and religious beliefs, more broadly, its self-important exceptionalism. The unfortunate results speak for themselves. He writes: “It is only by abandoning the clichés that we can even define the tragedy. When we have done that, we will no longer be merely acquiescing in the deadly inertia of the past.” In other words, we can, and should, do better. The journey begins with an appreciation for our history.
Much of Professor Williams’ substantial work met with my agreement, with two exceptions. First, around the mid-1970s, America began its sustained run of trade deficits, imports exceeding exports, which has become increasingly pronounced through time. Professor Williams wrote of a need to secure international markets for American surplus products, whether industrial or agricultural. The concept of America as a materialistic consumer nation was unforeseen when this book was first published in 1959. Times have indeed changed. In recent decades, we have shifted from a focus on securing markets for our goods to a focus on securing our access to imports – although the current administration sure seems confused about what our international priorities are, or if there even are any priorities. Second, Professor Williams believes that a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union following the Second World War would have produced greater global harmony in company with greater economic rewards. Considering what we now know, I believe a strong case exists that America should have been even tougher with Stalin. I think it has been shown – if not in words, then through deeds – that the world has a sufficient number of bad actors to permit the remark that global statecraft is best performed through associated strength, which hopefully will prove of sufficient deterrence never to be tested.
There is one other theme worth further comment: corruption. Many writers, including Professor Williams, defer to standard political or economic models to structure their commentary. Maybe corruption – where consideration is owed to the individual rather than to the state – is a condition that deserves significantly more discussion in the subject of international relations, especially since it appears to be currently in vogue among many world leaders.
The book that launched a revolution, in thinking first, then on the streets. THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY became the Bible of the Sixties New Left radicals in their critique of American foreign policy and the roots of the Vietnam War. Tom Hayden cited William Appleman Wiliams as a pivotal influence. The Williams thesis is radical for being simple. Ever since the U.S. Civil War both Democrats and Republicans in the White House and Congress have pursued the same foreign policy, with disastrous results for America and the world. U.S. diplomacy is built on the twin pillars of opening doors for American business abroad and securing first the Western Hemisphere then the rest of the globe from any threat from competitors. The differences between the two parties, globalists and America Firsters, idealists and realists, are tactical, not strategic. Take the two world wars. During World War I isolationists like William Jennings Bryan and Henry Cabot Lodge were NOT opposed to the extension of U.S. power abroad. They either favored U.S. intervention in the Americas (Bryan) or a pivot towards Asia (Lodge). Wilson was no hesitant pacifist edged on by war mongers such as Theodore Roosevelt. He too aimed to open Western Europe, China and Japan to U.S. economic domination. Williams sees World War II as an extension of superpower rivalry for control of Asia and Europe, and his thoughts on the origins of the Pacific War, a war in which the U.S. was not blameless, would later be taken up by Noam Chomsky in blaming the Vietnam War on "The New Mandarins" in Washington, Kennedy, McNamara, and their academic apologists. THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY is a hot stew of thought still sizzling today.
Basically it confirmed what I've heard and thought about American foreign policy with lots of historical details I simply wasn't aware of. Some of the things I sort of knew but now really KNOW: 1. The tragedy: "The tragedy of American diplomacy is not that it is evil, but that it denies and subverts American ideas and ideals." Perhaps we can just call it hypocritical. 2. Lots of hyperbole was used to get us to hate our enemy. In 1947 Senator Vandenberg expressly told President Truman that it was necessary to "scare the hell out of the American people" to win support for his foreign policy. 3. America was unreasonable in dealing with other nations due partly to the hubris which developing the atomic bomb first engendered. In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson warned of "having this weapon ostentatiously on our hips," referring to the atomic bomb.
This is arguably the most influential book in the field of diplomatic history and introduced the idea that economic and ideological motivations drove American foreign policy over the long duree. Williams argues that the United States was always looking toward the frontier and when that closed on mainland North America that it continued to look primarily for external markets as a place to sell surpluses in order to keep the domestic economy humming. While he was incorrect in his predictions of a nuclear war happening if the US did not change course, many of the themes he presents will resonate with readers familiar with the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Scholars such as Michael Hunt and Walter Hixson have greatly expanded upon the ideas presented in Tragedy in more sophisticated ways. This is a book that any student of diplomatic history should read.
genuinely too good, and I mean this quite literally, because I was so enthralled at how uniquely pithy and sharp the writing is in a way that so very few history books are that I genuinely forgot to form my own opinion and just found myself agreeing with whatever was said.
I read some chapters much more thoroughly than others (uni assignments wait for no girl), but I really felt that this text struck a perfect balance between being swift and erudite and interesting and still maintaining the rigour and research necessary for this work to firmly hold its own as an academic resource, rather than a popular history book.
HOWEVER still wasn’t enough to distract me from the fact that the author’s name is william williams like… why? is he okay? should someone have called child services?
Conservative analysis of US foreign policy from Cleveland to Ike that actually ends up being radical. "Conservative" in the sense that blame is laid at the feet of Democratic Presidents; Republican Presidents are portrayed as more virtuous. "Radical" in that it is a contemporary view of Soviet and Bandung interests that actually considered these actors to be rational and acting in response to their (not inaccurate) perceptions of US behavior and the neocolonial Open Door marriage of business and ideology that drove it.
This is a very interesting and is simply a summation of history of America’s open door policy - from its initial self-serving beginning and the tragedy of leaders in upholding these policy with goals of controlling and manipulating trades markets To understand what’s happening today, we need to under what happened in the past. As the author puts it.. ‘.. it’s vital at this point to differentiate between the motives, the specific results and the overall consequences of American policy” It’s. A good read and must have the interest or else it could sometimes be quite monotonous...
I wish Williams cited more sources but alas. Hoover comes out looking great, which makes it all the weirder that his name is used to promote the Hoover Neocolonial Project over at Stanford
The foundational traditional Marxist interpretation of American foreign affairs
Williams looks at the history of the Open Door Policy, which was the US's idea to have an economic empire without colonialism. He looks at how the policy developed starting about 1890 and had some success (for the US) early on but how the idea was not critically re-assessed and was partially to blame for diplomatic blinders that created the Cold War and the Vietnam War. And how the policy did not benefit other countries as the proponents said it would. The first edition of the book was published in 1961 and updated in 1968. There is an afterward written during the Iraq war by another historian.
A classic look into America and how big business exploited overseas resources. A wonderful and well-documented book with ample sources to check. If you ever wondered how America became so involved with the powers of big business, this book helps pinpoint the beginnings of such relationship. The American oversea endeavors are fully encouraged by the Open Door policy of the late 19th century. A must read for avid historians.
Tediously dull at times, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy" remains a worthwhile read for its damning portrayal of American imperialism in the early twentieth century and its powerful moral message. Williams does not hate the United States. He believes strongly in America; he wants it to live up to its ideals and stop interfering in foreign markets and elections while claiming to support freedom. That's a message politicians in both major parties have yet to learn.
Thought provoking. Clearly shows strong linkage between American business interests and foreign policy. Debunks notion that Americans were idealistic, more practical. Not very good history though. I mean evidence seemed to be arrayed to prove a point. For example, no effort was made to explain ideas or event, which did not fit his narrative. For example he constantly stressed that America constantly pushed the open door, but never even mentioned Smoot-Hawley.