Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War

by Robert S. Litwak

President Clinton and other U.S. officials have warned that "rogue states" pose a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. But what exactly is a rogue state? Does the concept foster a sound approach to foreign policy, or is it, in the end, no more than a counterproductive political epithet? Robert Litwak traces the origins and development of rogue state policy and then assesses its efficacy through detailed case studies of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He shows that the policy is politically selective, inhibits the ability of U.S. policymakers to adapt to changed conditions, and has been rejected by the United States' major allies. Litwak concludes that by lumping and demonizing a disparate group of countries, the rogue state approach obscures understanding and distorts policymaking. In place of a generic and constricting strategy, he argues for the development of "differentiated" strategies of containment, tailored to the particular circumstances within individual states.

312 pages, Paperback

First published February 14, 2000

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

First to review! Written in the late 1990's, this is a useful book about the rogue state idea as a guiding concept for American foreign policy. Litwak argues that the US adopted a foreign policy centered around rogue states in the 1990's. The US defined a rogue state mainly by its external behavior: threatening regions of vital interest of the US, acting aggressively towards neighbors, supporting terrorism, and building WMD. According to Litwak, this designation led the US to pursue overly simple and undifferentiated strategies towards diverse problem-states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. His most insightful point is that rogue state is really a term for mobilizing political support and concern, not a useful concept for describing the world or organizing policy. It leads to inconsistency the application of containment strategies, such as the fact that the US called Cuba a rogue state but didn't apply that label to Syria. Moreover, it leads to problems with allies who don't recognize the term rogue state nor have the same view of the problem as the US. Overall, Litwak's point is that the rogue state concept removes the flexibility that the US needs to deal with the general category of smallish regional powers with anti-status quo agendas, links to terrorism, and WMD.

Litwak covers US policy towards Iran, Iraq, and NK in 3 very thorough case studies. He describes the evolution of US policy towards each state and discuss how the US might develop more specific policies for each. For example, the US pursued a harsh containment strategy against Iraq that ultimately sought to topple the regime while, because of NK's nuclear capability, took a more carrot and stick approach to that regime. The rogue state label, however, makes it hard for the US to have the flexibility needed to carry out this policy. Any tactical concessions to NK, for example, opened Clinton up to massive criticism from the right because the rogue state concept makes it seem like the US should never back down to these dangerous and evil regimes.

My main critique of this book is that Litwak really likes to draw hard lines between policies and concepts rather than dealing in ambiguity and shades of emphasis. For example, he really emphasizes that the rogue state concept focuses on external behavior, but it is undeniable that the internal character of these regimes motivated the American response to them, especially among those who advocated for harsher policies. He also leaves out the possibility that US policy at times could just be confused and drifting rather than fitting into a category. Still, this is a good book for anyone interested in the history of containment and/or USFP in the 1990's.