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Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming
Becoming someone is a learning process; and what we learn is the new values around which, if we succeed, our lives will come to turn. Agents transform themselves in the process of, for example, becoming parents, embarking on careers, or acquiring a passion for music or politics. How can such activity be rational, if the reason for engaging in the relevant pursuit is only available to the person one will become? How is it psychologically possible to feel the attraction of a form of concern that is not yet one's own? How can the work done to arrive at the finish line be ascribed to one who doesn't (really) know what one is doing, or why one is doing it? In Aspiration , Agnes Callard asserts that these questions belong to the theory of aspiration. Aspirants are motivated by proleptic reasons, acknowledged defective versions of the reasons they expect to eventually grasp. The psychology of such a transformation is marked by intrinsic conflict between their old point of view on
value and the one they are trying to acquire. They cannot adjudicate this conflict by deliberating or choosing or deciding-rather, they resolve it by working to see the world in a new way. This work has a teleological by modeling oneself on the person he or she is trying to be, the aspirant brings that person into being. Because it is open to us to engage in an activity of self-creation, we are responsible for having become the kinds of people we are.
value and the one they are trying to acquire. They cannot adjudicate this conflict by deliberating or choosing or deciding-rather, they resolve it by working to see the world in a new way. This work has a teleological by modeling oneself on the person he or she is trying to be, the aspirant brings that person into being. Because it is open to us to engage in an activity of self-creation, we are responsible for having become the kinds of people we are.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2018
170 people are currently reading
2829 people want to read
About the author
Agnes Callard
6 books131 followersAgnes Callard is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. Her primary areas of specialization are ancient philosophy and ethics. She is also noted for her popular writings and work on public philosophy.
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August 24, 2020
Callard does a good job defending the theory of aspiration she has created to explore how we as individuals become new and better persons. As Callard argues, the phenomenon of personal growth is clearly experienced in human life, so there must be an explanation for how it occurs. Philosophers have wrestled with this practical question for centuries, with much of the recent literature that Callard draws from either making too little of the subject or making self-creation impossible. For instance, if you hold certain values now, it is because you believe those values to be the best values to hold; how, then, are you logically supposed to then strive for something better?
The theory of aspiration goes a long way to solving many of the philosophical dilemmas heretofore explored. Even if it didn't, on a practical level, it offers a useful reflection on how our work to better ourselves might be approached in our life. For that, I much appreciate it.
Still, I'm not entirely convinced that the theory holds its weight. Callard acknowledges that she is only positing a beginning and hopes that she and others will work out the details of the theory later. Her humility throughout the book is rather refreshing. My issue, though, stems around the above question: if we currently hold values we believe to be the best, how are we supposed to strive for anything else if all else now seems to us inferior? While Callard speaks to this, I'm not sure she ever actually gets around the question. Her main idea is that the rational action of aspiration occurs proleptically--in other words, in reverse. We don't fully know toward what or why we aspire until we have finished the work of aspiration in a certain area. We can then look backward and reflect on our striving to say, "Oh! This is what I've been after all along!" But, again, why would anyone do anything differently in their lives if they didn't already question whether their values are indeed the best?
Sometimes Callard mentions that teachers and mentors are only part of the equation yet it seems to me that these external agents are the only possible agents to initiate aspiration/striving, especially if aspiration can only truly occur in a proleptic sense. If we can only come to question our current values because of external agents, or at least admire a new set of values (love of classical music, for instance, which is an example used a lot. Coming to value classical music usually doesn't force us to question our current musical values but merely to aspire to a new set), then how can we categorize aspiration as becoming with agency? If external agents are the only cause for breaks with our old selves, then our agency is limited to receiving those external causes. I'm certain Callard would like to avoid that conclusion but I'm not sure she has.
The theory of aspiration goes a long way to solving many of the philosophical dilemmas heretofore explored. Even if it didn't, on a practical level, it offers a useful reflection on how our work to better ourselves might be approached in our life. For that, I much appreciate it.
Still, I'm not entirely convinced that the theory holds its weight. Callard acknowledges that she is only positing a beginning and hopes that she and others will work out the details of the theory later. Her humility throughout the book is rather refreshing. My issue, though, stems around the above question: if we currently hold values we believe to be the best, how are we supposed to strive for anything else if all else now seems to us inferior? While Callard speaks to this, I'm not sure she ever actually gets around the question. Her main idea is that the rational action of aspiration occurs proleptically--in other words, in reverse. We don't fully know toward what or why we aspire until we have finished the work of aspiration in a certain area. We can then look backward and reflect on our striving to say, "Oh! This is what I've been after all along!" But, again, why would anyone do anything differently in their lives if they didn't already question whether their values are indeed the best?
Sometimes Callard mentions that teachers and mentors are only part of the equation yet it seems to me that these external agents are the only possible agents to initiate aspiration/striving, especially if aspiration can only truly occur in a proleptic sense. If we can only come to question our current values because of external agents, or at least admire a new set of values (love of classical music, for instance, which is an example used a lot. Coming to value classical music usually doesn't force us to question our current musical values but merely to aspire to a new set), then how can we categorize aspiration as becoming with agency? If external agents are the only cause for breaks with our old selves, then our agency is limited to receiving those external causes. I'm certain Callard would like to avoid that conclusion but I'm not sure she has.
abandoned
April 15, 2021I like reading short articles (and tweets) from Callard, so I was eager to try out her book. It’s about an intriguing topic, a philosophical investigation looking at a person’s desires to change. But after I got 90 or so pages in I realized it’s a little too advanced for me, and while I think the topic is interesting, it turns out that it wasn’t quite interesting enough for me to struggle with.
July 12, 2023
aspiration is the primary mode in which i live
February 11, 2021
I was deeply excited by Callard's analysis of this category of human endeavor--aspiration. To me, she makes a breakthrough or a 'breaking up' of the constant pressure to reject the fact that some aspects of human life are, at bottom, undefinable. The field has tended to force a tight definition of rationality on how humans do things -- that makes me think of the way too much ketchup on your hamburger bun, just leaks out and makes a mess, doesn't work. Aspiration -- the choice a person sometimes makes -- to better themselves in some way despite obstacles and pressures -- is both rational and mysterious.
Callard peels away the layers, always circling the question of why is it, how is it, that a person will, seemingly out of very little context, decide to push past their limits into something about which they know nothing. I had this happen to me at 47 when I was knocked sideways by the traditional harp and Irish music, I mean seriously blown away, and embarked on a journey I'm still on to learn to play the instrument, to learn about Irish music, to learn how to play with other people playing the music -- believe me there is no limit to the challenges involved.
Aspiration is a subset or side-set or whatever of that kind of inquiry into the hows and whys of the choices we make (including omitting to make choices) whether it is to learn Italian or have a baby. As she puts it in more complex form: 'it is the process of rational value-acquisition' which in ordinary English can be summarized as 'learning to become a better person' (e.g. by learning to recognize what is of value and moving toward it.) Callard's primary focus has been Greek philosophy, which, I guess one could say is centered around ethics and identity, ideas of the individual and choice (e.g. good and evil), that were then beginning to emerge. (We think so entirely inside the outcome of their thinking, we can't imagine how anyone lived before these ideas became so commonplace as to be unconscious.)
The book begins with a look at Alcibiades, a student of Socrates, both drawn to his ideas and repulsed by them as they conflict with his comfortable status quo. Alcibiades, handsome and arrogant, is only drawn 'to become better than he is' when directly in the presence of his mentor. Away from his mentor, he slides into his usual habits. The mystery, of course, is why, once we become even the smallest bit aware of a 'better' choice, we are sometimes drawn to move toward a greater understanding of that 'value' -- a value of which we don't, at present, have more than a smidgeon of understanding. Maybe no understanding, only a recognition that there is 'something' pulling at us. This lies at the heart of Callard's inquiry.
Many of the ideas Callard presents were momentous to me -- for example, extrinsic versus intrinsic conflicts and akrasia. An extrinsic conflict would, at its simplest be -- do you want vanilla or chocolate ice cream tonight? You may feel conflicted, but you know that the choice you make is not important to who you are, ditto what car to buy, or even what college to attend. An intrinsic conflict is when you are faced with a choice that can impact the course of your life: to marry, to go to college at all, to have a child, to conquer an addiction you have come to see is killing you. But intrinsic conflict can be smaller, say, if you aspire to learn to love music and are taking a class and a friend says, let's go to this cool movie, and you have tickets to Brahms . . . not some ordinary concert, but something once in a lifetime . . . One choice may not matter, but it may, as it was for Alcibiades, indicate that you may continue to undermine your own aspiration. Akrasia, or 'weakness of will' is the next concept she examines. That is a tendency on the part of people who know better, to make the poorer choice. Callard looks at this differently from other philosophers, that the poorer choice (which once might have been the only choice for this person) still has a strong hold over that person's thinking, exerting its own rationality (sure I'm on a diet, but I can have this cookie because it is so tasty). Eating something that tastes good is not irrational! Not for an aspirant who, as yet, has no real idea of the rewards of a successful diet. That makes sense to me. Less harsh, less judgmental, and less limited.
Here and there Callard has to directly address the ideas of predecessors and colleagues and for several pages things get pretty hard to wade through, but she always emerges into clarity.
Callard, in her conclusion, takes on something down-to-earth and different from anything I have ever encountered in a book of philosophy, something only a woman philosopher could bring to the field. She takes on the intrinsic conflict that a woman who has decided to become a mother who discovers she is infertile must face. There is a shift in young(ish) adults that happens (or doesn't) when the decision to become a parent is made. Women and couples (men who are entirely on their own do not decide to become fathers, by the way, a gay couple, yes, sometimes.) Once you aspire to become a mother, however, you are vulnerable in a new and profound way. Callard writes: "Aspirants often open themselves up to a distinctive experience of losing everything without seeming to have lost anything at all. . . Aspirants have, to various degrees and in various ways, put down roots in a possible world." Soon after that Callard makes the point about why it is profoundly cruel to say to someone who has to face infertility (or miscarriage) "Oh, but you can just adopt, can't you?" The potential for profound grief at the loss of an aspiration is, in fact, a distinctive property of it, and that gives aspiration a body, a reality, as well as a mysterious connection to our most inner selves, that say, ambition entirely lacks. Proof, if you will.
In a fascinating section on moral responsibility, Callard offers the possibility of viewing evil -- viewed through the lens of aspiratio-- may be primarily the outcome of the choice of omission of value acquisition, and therefore of aspiration in any form.
I feel this book has applications for helping people clarify and distinguish their aspirations (coming from within) from the stuff they have to do to live, from making poor choices, or no choices. Aspiration is what gets us out of bed in the morning, makes life worth living, and thus make the relative weight and value of decisions clearer-and intensely rational (while remaining mysterious!) *****
Callard peels away the layers, always circling the question of why is it, how is it, that a person will, seemingly out of very little context, decide to push past their limits into something about which they know nothing. I had this happen to me at 47 when I was knocked sideways by the traditional harp and Irish music, I mean seriously blown away, and embarked on a journey I'm still on to learn to play the instrument, to learn about Irish music, to learn how to play with other people playing the music -- believe me there is no limit to the challenges involved.
Aspiration is a subset or side-set or whatever of that kind of inquiry into the hows and whys of the choices we make (including omitting to make choices) whether it is to learn Italian or have a baby. As she puts it in more complex form: 'it is the process of rational value-acquisition' which in ordinary English can be summarized as 'learning to become a better person' (e.g. by learning to recognize what is of value and moving toward it.) Callard's primary focus has been Greek philosophy, which, I guess one could say is centered around ethics and identity, ideas of the individual and choice (e.g. good and evil), that were then beginning to emerge. (We think so entirely inside the outcome of their thinking, we can't imagine how anyone lived before these ideas became so commonplace as to be unconscious.)
The book begins with a look at Alcibiades, a student of Socrates, both drawn to his ideas and repulsed by them as they conflict with his comfortable status quo. Alcibiades, handsome and arrogant, is only drawn 'to become better than he is' when directly in the presence of his mentor. Away from his mentor, he slides into his usual habits. The mystery, of course, is why, once we become even the smallest bit aware of a 'better' choice, we are sometimes drawn to move toward a greater understanding of that 'value' -- a value of which we don't, at present, have more than a smidgeon of understanding. Maybe no understanding, only a recognition that there is 'something' pulling at us. This lies at the heart of Callard's inquiry.
Many of the ideas Callard presents were momentous to me -- for example, extrinsic versus intrinsic conflicts and akrasia. An extrinsic conflict would, at its simplest be -- do you want vanilla or chocolate ice cream tonight? You may feel conflicted, but you know that the choice you make is not important to who you are, ditto what car to buy, or even what college to attend. An intrinsic conflict is when you are faced with a choice that can impact the course of your life: to marry, to go to college at all, to have a child, to conquer an addiction you have come to see is killing you. But intrinsic conflict can be smaller, say, if you aspire to learn to love music and are taking a class and a friend says, let's go to this cool movie, and you have tickets to Brahms . . . not some ordinary concert, but something once in a lifetime . . . One choice may not matter, but it may, as it was for Alcibiades, indicate that you may continue to undermine your own aspiration. Akrasia, or 'weakness of will' is the next concept she examines. That is a tendency on the part of people who know better, to make the poorer choice. Callard looks at this differently from other philosophers, that the poorer choice (which once might have been the only choice for this person) still has a strong hold over that person's thinking, exerting its own rationality (sure I'm on a diet, but I can have this cookie because it is so tasty). Eating something that tastes good is not irrational! Not for an aspirant who, as yet, has no real idea of the rewards of a successful diet. That makes sense to me. Less harsh, less judgmental, and less limited.
Here and there Callard has to directly address the ideas of predecessors and colleagues and for several pages things get pretty hard to wade through, but she always emerges into clarity.
Callard, in her conclusion, takes on something down-to-earth and different from anything I have ever encountered in a book of philosophy, something only a woman philosopher could bring to the field. She takes on the intrinsic conflict that a woman who has decided to become a mother who discovers she is infertile must face. There is a shift in young(ish) adults that happens (or doesn't) when the decision to become a parent is made. Women and couples (men who are entirely on their own do not decide to become fathers, by the way, a gay couple, yes, sometimes.) Once you aspire to become a mother, however, you are vulnerable in a new and profound way. Callard writes: "Aspirants often open themselves up to a distinctive experience of losing everything without seeming to have lost anything at all. . . Aspirants have, to various degrees and in various ways, put down roots in a possible world." Soon after that Callard makes the point about why it is profoundly cruel to say to someone who has to face infertility (or miscarriage) "Oh, but you can just adopt, can't you?" The potential for profound grief at the loss of an aspiration is, in fact, a distinctive property of it, and that gives aspiration a body, a reality, as well as a mysterious connection to our most inner selves, that say, ambition entirely lacks. Proof, if you will.
In a fascinating section on moral responsibility, Callard offers the possibility of viewing evil -- viewed through the lens of aspiratio-- may be primarily the outcome of the choice of omission of value acquisition, and therefore of aspiration in any form.
I feel this book has applications for helping people clarify and distinguish their aspirations (coming from within) from the stuff they have to do to live, from making poor choices, or no choices. Aspiration is what gets us out of bed in the morning, makes life worth living, and thus make the relative weight and value of decisions clearer-and intensely rational (while remaining mysterious!) *****
Want to read
February 4, 2019Recommended By - https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...
September 12, 2021
This is a book of philosophy that, I would guess, mostly students of academia or academics will read, which is a shame.
There were large parts of this book where the author is defending her thesis of Aspiration. For the non-academic reader, this is fun when you are getting to learn about relevant "decision philosophy". For example, how the ideas of 'opting for one choice or another' or 'assuming a person has all the knowledge to make a rational decision', fail to help us understand transformational experiences. There are some sections that are quite heavy on details and frankly hard to follow. I suppose it is up to the reader to decide how seriously you want to chew on the validity of 'Aspiration'-- so you can skim or google as you wish.
What I enjoyed was first and foremost was the author gave a vocabulary to something which I have experienced but not been able to put words to. The concept of Aspiration is an insightful way to map how a person is on a path to somewhere they don't understand yet, and therefore are unable to describe how or why they are where they are. In a world of books about rational decision-making and a high-pressure culture that synonymizes success with 'open doors', a contemporary read which not only emphasizes but endorses uncertainty, and ethics, is refreshing.
I also enjoyed the humility of the framework and book (the author doesn't claim to have all the answers, nor does any 'Aspirer'). Also nice was how it ended, that we can use the Aspiration framework to improve our sense of empathy.
This is a great read for anyone who is interested in the philosophy of agency and how we make decisions, as well as a helpful practical framework for anyone struggling to understand themselves as they begin to embark (or have already embarked, who knows) on a self-transforming decision or path.
There were large parts of this book where the author is defending her thesis of Aspiration. For the non-academic reader, this is fun when you are getting to learn about relevant "decision philosophy". For example, how the ideas of 'opting for one choice or another' or 'assuming a person has all the knowledge to make a rational decision', fail to help us understand transformational experiences. There are some sections that are quite heavy on details and frankly hard to follow. I suppose it is up to the reader to decide how seriously you want to chew on the validity of 'Aspiration'-- so you can skim or google as you wish.
What I enjoyed was first and foremost was the author gave a vocabulary to something which I have experienced but not been able to put words to. The concept of Aspiration is an insightful way to map how a person is on a path to somewhere they don't understand yet, and therefore are unable to describe how or why they are where they are. In a world of books about rational decision-making and a high-pressure culture that synonymizes success with 'open doors', a contemporary read which not only emphasizes but endorses uncertainty, and ethics, is refreshing.
I also enjoyed the humility of the framework and book (the author doesn't claim to have all the answers, nor does any 'Aspirer'). Also nice was how it ended, that we can use the Aspiration framework to improve our sense of empathy.
This is a great read for anyone who is interested in the philosophy of agency and how we make decisions, as well as a helpful practical framework for anyone struggling to understand themselves as they begin to embark (or have already embarked, who knows) on a self-transforming decision or path.
Want to read
July 10, 2019From New Yorker article on decision making (https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.newy...) via Tiffany Choong.
Read
November 17, 2021DNF'ed circa 100 pages. Reads like a dissertation. I'm not sure if the philosophy of action is for me, either -- partly because nondual contemplative insights call its whole selfhood and motivation framework into question, and partly because it's just dull and weird.
October 19, 2024
Agnes Callard's argument for an aspirational form of rational agency is incredibly well-argued even if I ultimately cannot agree with her conclusions. She makes what I take to be a very novel observation about some of our actions and the reasons we use to justify them and down the rabbit hole she goes with this. And even though this is a philosophy book (and is dense and difficult to follow sometimes in virtue of this fact), there are plenty of places where I could not put the book down because I wanted to see where she was going with her argument.
June 26, 2020
Fantastic. Accessible, meaty, deeply philosophical. More thoughts coming...
Read
April 5, 2020Nothing new about this, existentialists had been asking people to be responsible for oneself, as it precedes existence.
September 5, 2021
An antidote to existentialist views.
Deeply moving and having brought me to tears many times.
Deeply moving and having brought me to tears many times.
September 4, 2023
This is a book about people trying to get better, and in fact to instill themselves specifically with better values; and it's by Agnes Callard, who I'm pre-inclined to like based on her excellent interview with Ezra Klein and some shorter articles I've read. Thus, this was a positive book to read; it's packed with real, hypothetical and/or literary figures all trying to make themselves better. ("Many persons strive for high ideals / and everywhere life is full of heroism".)
That said, it's also a dense read. It is, after all, a Srs Philosophy Book by a Real Philosopher. It doesn't take long to accept and grasp the idea that someone who is struggling to make herself better may not fully grasp what she's aiming at yet, and might to some extent be borrowing values from her own future self (the one who, say, has internalized being a mother and now values her baby.) This is interesting and useful. Also useful, much later in the book, is the discussion about how culpable people really should be considered for the content of their own characters; and the distinctive ways in which we might be kinder if we reframe some of the people who talk to us as aspirants. But the lay reader probably doesn't need the intervening defenses of the idea of aspiration -- long, long sections on why this or that model doesn't properly cover the idea, why the idea is new. These sections, being about philosophers I probably don't like as much, and referring to frameworks I'm less familiar with, got both difficult and draggy. (A sentence I had to read many times: "If this is correct, the shift from self to value fails to avoid reference to teleology." The "this" is complicated, and why are we avoiding teleology again? Right, teleology, the explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise. I guess... uh... we just don't do that here.)
Half the fun of reading a philosophy book is looking up the words, though: not just teleology, but tolos, enkratic (and enkrateia), diachronic, compossible, conative, pro tanto reasoning. Delicious. There is also the other irony: perhaps I aspire to be someone who likes reading philosophy books even more than I do today, and this book was (therefore) practice, and my four stars comes in part from a value system I only myself partially hold. There is truth in that.
Here are some quotes I liked a lot, that are human and seem to ring true:
Last, for a couple of quibbles. One weakness I saw was in the section on intrinsic conflict, which Callard really struggles with: "Experiencing these two desires seems to require that she be two valuers at once." And... yes? The modeling of a human consciousness as two (or more) agents each with their own agendas is far from new -- I read The Society of Mind in the early 90s -- and yet there is much, in this book, that clings to a single-agent model of the human mind. This probably made Callard's job a lot harder. The notion of the self-with-the-future-value as a fledgling, immature internal agent might have eased her way a bit.
I also don't agree with "The person who ends up with bad values never aspired his way there." Unfortunately, people learn what we might call "the wrong lessons" all the time; people in religious cults aspire to never question, a person who has been cheated might aspire to never love again or trust again, etc. I think this happens often and that, again, Callard's job is harder due to the asymmetry she tries to put on aspiration. I would therefore expect this part of the model to relax over time.
That said, it's also a dense read. It is, after all, a Srs Philosophy Book by a Real Philosopher. It doesn't take long to accept and grasp the idea that someone who is struggling to make herself better may not fully grasp what she's aiming at yet, and might to some extent be borrowing values from her own future self (the one who, say, has internalized being a mother and now values her baby.) This is interesting and useful. Also useful, much later in the book, is the discussion about how culpable people really should be considered for the content of their own characters; and the distinctive ways in which we might be kinder if we reframe some of the people who talk to us as aspirants. But the lay reader probably doesn't need the intervening defenses of the idea of aspiration -- long, long sections on why this or that model doesn't properly cover the idea, why the idea is new. These sections, being about philosophers I probably don't like as much, and referring to frameworks I'm less familiar with, got both difficult and draggy. (A sentence I had to read many times: "If this is correct, the shift from self to value fails to avoid reference to teleology." The "this" is complicated, and why are we avoiding teleology again? Right, teleology, the explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise. I guess... uh... we just don't do that here.)
Half the fun of reading a philosophy book is looking up the words, though: not just teleology, but tolos, enkratic (and enkrateia), diachronic, compossible, conative, pro tanto reasoning. Delicious. There is also the other irony: perhaps I aspire to be someone who likes reading philosophy books even more than I do today, and this book was (therefore) practice, and my four stars comes in part from a value system I only myself partially hold. There is truth in that.
Here are some quotes I liked a lot, that are human and seem to ring true:
In order to value something, we must engage with it in a way that takes time, effort and practice. Given our finite life spans and limited resources, we cannot devote ourselves to valuing all of the things we see as valuable.
It is important not to confuse a state of distress with a state of inquiry, though both dispose someone to stand still and not do anything.
The learning of a value takes time, and sometimes a decision needs to be made now.
...because ambition [getting better at something one already values] both consumes much of an agent's efforts and does not expand his value horizons, it carries with it the danger of trapping him in what may be an impoverished appreciation of value. (Shades of "explore vs exploit", in the realm of values, from Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions!)
There is a distinctive kind of sadness appropriate to losing something you were only starting to try to get to know. (Ah, that one boy from summer camp.)
Last, for a couple of quibbles. One weakness I saw was in the section on intrinsic conflict, which Callard really struggles with: "Experiencing these two desires seems to require that she be two valuers at once." And... yes? The modeling of a human consciousness as two (or more) agents each with their own agendas is far from new -- I read The Society of Mind in the early 90s -- and yet there is much, in this book, that clings to a single-agent model of the human mind. This probably made Callard's job a lot harder. The notion of the self-with-the-future-value as a fledgling, immature internal agent might have eased her way a bit.
I also don't agree with "The person who ends up with bad values never aspired his way there." Unfortunately, people learn what we might call "the wrong lessons" all the time; people in religious cults aspire to never question, a person who has been cheated might aspire to never love again or trust again, etc. I think this happens often and that, again, Callard's job is harder due to the asymmetry she tries to put on aspiration. I would therefore expect this part of the model to relax over time.
June 12, 2024
What kind of book is this?
This is an expository work.
Rational & Why I read this book
I have a Substack called Fractal Productivity and wanted to deepen my knowledge of "aspiration" before writing an essay series on vertical life sculpting
The unity of the book — what is the book about as a whole?
This book is a philosophical account of why aspiration (defined as "large-scale transformative pursuits" and "a gradual process of value change") should be seen as a form of "practically rational agency". Put simply: the book shows how and why people who aspire actively shape their future selves throughintentional efforts. Aspiration, according to the author, should be seen as something rational rather than irrational or arational, as it currently seems to be perceived by philosophers.
The book's structure
The book spans a long introduction and 6 chapters across 277 pages. It is further divided into three parts, each of which houses two chapters. These parts are "practical rationality", "moral psychology" and "moral responsibility". I completed a reading of the whole book but analytically focused most on part 1.
One particular lesson
One particularly interesting concept Callard posits is "proleptic reasons." This is a new "species" of reason that allows us to explain why something as vague and distant and not fully present in the aspirant's mind could considered "rational." Proleptic reasons capture the fact (?) that one can act rationally even when one doesn't know fully one's reason for doing something or if one knows one's reasons for doing it isn't exactly the right one. A proleptic reason for doing something is a reason where an agent acts on a rudimentary, anticipatory, and indirect "grasp" of something. The person's knowledge and development areprovisional. Callard argues that aspirations are based on agents' proleptic reasons.
Judgement & Recommendations - Who should read this?
I'm neither a philosopher nor an academic, and English is not my mother tongue. This book would still be hard to read even if all of this were the case. A big part was the overly awkward writing style! I certainly also lack the knowledge of philosophy and perfect English skills. Granted, the reading went much smoother on the second pass (done immediately after the first). After summarizing the book (at least part 1), I now feel that I have a somewhat firm grasp of what Callard is trying to say. And I have to say, it immediately impacted my way of viewing aspirations and values. Still, I can't rate this book higher than a 7/10 on my personal rating scale, which means this is a "Good read, despite minor weaknesses; generally recommended". The ideas are powerful, but the packaging feels off to non-philosophers and non-academics without English as a mother tongue.
Positive points
- As far as I can tell, Callard makes compelling arguments. At this point, I cannot refute any of her points.
- Callard's ideas are high caliber, and she has given this topic much thought.
- Callard is humble, and the book is more of a defense than a series of claims.
Negative points
- Callard's writing style is really hard to digest. I understood less than 70% of it on the first pass, maybe less.
- the book could have been carved down significantly without losing power.
Misc. comments and other remarks
I don't recommend this book unless you are motivated to understand the philosophy of aspiration. Luckily, I was highly motivated to understand the book (see rationale above), but it took me almost two months to complete it because the writing style led me to procrastinate.
Find my other book reviews at: https://www.dennisnehrenheim.com/read
This is an expository work.
Rational & Why I read this book
I have a Substack called Fractal Productivity and wanted to deepen my knowledge of "aspiration" before writing an essay series on vertical life sculpting
The unity of the book — what is the book about as a whole?
This book is a philosophical account of why aspiration (defined as "large-scale transformative pursuits" and "a gradual process of value change") should be seen as a form of "practically rational agency". Put simply: the book shows how and why people who aspire actively shape their future selves throughintentional efforts. Aspiration, according to the author, should be seen as something rational rather than irrational or arational, as it currently seems to be perceived by philosophers.
The book's structure
The book spans a long introduction and 6 chapters across 277 pages. It is further divided into three parts, each of which houses two chapters. These parts are "practical rationality", "moral psychology" and "moral responsibility". I completed a reading of the whole book but analytically focused most on part 1.
One particular lesson
One particularly interesting concept Callard posits is "proleptic reasons." This is a new "species" of reason that allows us to explain why something as vague and distant and not fully present in the aspirant's mind could considered "rational." Proleptic reasons capture the fact (?) that one can act rationally even when one doesn't know fully one's reason for doing something or if one knows one's reasons for doing it isn't exactly the right one. A proleptic reason for doing something is a reason where an agent acts on a rudimentary, anticipatory, and indirect "grasp" of something. The person's knowledge and development areprovisional. Callard argues that aspirations are based on agents' proleptic reasons.
Judgement & Recommendations - Who should read this?
I'm neither a philosopher nor an academic, and English is not my mother tongue. This book would still be hard to read even if all of this were the case. A big part was the overly awkward writing style! I certainly also lack the knowledge of philosophy and perfect English skills. Granted, the reading went much smoother on the second pass (done immediately after the first). After summarizing the book (at least part 1), I now feel that I have a somewhat firm grasp of what Callard is trying to say. And I have to say, it immediately impacted my way of viewing aspirations and values. Still, I can't rate this book higher than a 7/10 on my personal rating scale, which means this is a "Good read, despite minor weaknesses; generally recommended". The ideas are powerful, but the packaging feels off to non-philosophers and non-academics without English as a mother tongue.
Positive points
- As far as I can tell, Callard makes compelling arguments. At this point, I cannot refute any of her points.
- Callard's ideas are high caliber, and she has given this topic much thought.
- Callard is humble, and the book is more of a defense than a series of claims.
Negative points
- Callard's writing style is really hard to digest. I understood less than 70% of it on the first pass, maybe less.
- the book could have been carved down significantly without losing power.
Misc. comments and other remarks
I don't recommend this book unless you are motivated to understand the philosophy of aspiration. Luckily, I was highly motivated to understand the book (see rationale above), but it took me almost two months to complete it because the writing style led me to procrastinate.
Find my other book reviews at: https://www.dennisnehrenheim.com/read
July 15, 2024
As is the case when aspiring to become something new, often in writing the devil is in the details. The book started out strong when it came to tracing a general account of what aspiration is and then kind of fell off in the second half when it came to actually defending the position against alternatives.
The book opened well, I enjoyed an articulation of the state of aspiration where the end goal isn't understood. Often as a young person I can feel I want to acquire a new value or change in a direction, but can't fully grasp the nature of what I want or where I'm going. It's nice there's an account somewhere of this feeling. That's about all my positives for this book.
I think my issue is maybe I'm just too continental for a work like this. It's very bound by rational choice theory which is all fine and good, but I feel provides a very inadequate account of desire which is a crucial element of aspiration. For example, Callard frequently draws on the image of someone trying to get into classical music as an illustration of how one can aspire to be a way without understanding the full value of that state before getting there.
However, this account feels incomplete without evaluating the structural factors that construct our identities and tastes. The closest she comes is in a discussion of mentorship and then in a refutation of dialectical identity construction. However, in the case of the latter, she merely changes her definition of what aspiration even is to arbitrarily exclude dialectical identity construction.
I think my point here, more broadly, is that our desires and therefore our aspirations are often tied to much more subconscious and personal processes than rational choice theory can really account for. Callard's account of Akrasia is particularly telling here. She argues herself into circles trying to explain the value structure of akrasia when an integration of the subject into wider structural influences would provide a much more parsimonious account of akratic failings.
The most offensive part is about two pages from the end of the book where Callard openly admits to telling her friend who suffered a miscarriage that it's self centred to want biological children. Having read Callard's opinion pieces I'm not surprised by this behaviour, but I think the proof is in the pudding that there is more to being a good person (and friend) than being the perfect moral actor within a rational choice model.
The book opened well, I enjoyed an articulation of the state of aspiration where the end goal isn't understood. Often as a young person I can feel I want to acquire a new value or change in a direction, but can't fully grasp the nature of what I want or where I'm going. It's nice there's an account somewhere of this feeling. That's about all my positives for this book.
I think my issue is maybe I'm just too continental for a work like this. It's very bound by rational choice theory which is all fine and good, but I feel provides a very inadequate account of desire which is a crucial element of aspiration. For example, Callard frequently draws on the image of someone trying to get into classical music as an illustration of how one can aspire to be a way without understanding the full value of that state before getting there.
However, this account feels incomplete without evaluating the structural factors that construct our identities and tastes. The closest she comes is in a discussion of mentorship and then in a refutation of dialectical identity construction. However, in the case of the latter, she merely changes her definition of what aspiration even is to arbitrarily exclude dialectical identity construction.
I think my point here, more broadly, is that our desires and therefore our aspirations are often tied to much more subconscious and personal processes than rational choice theory can really account for. Callard's account of Akrasia is particularly telling here. She argues herself into circles trying to explain the value structure of akrasia when an integration of the subject into wider structural influences would provide a much more parsimonious account of akratic failings.
The most offensive part is about two pages from the end of the book where Callard openly admits to telling her friend who suffered a miscarriage that it's self centred to want biological children. Having read Callard's opinion pieces I'm not surprised by this behaviour, but I think the proof is in the pudding that there is more to being a good person (and friend) than being the perfect moral actor within a rational choice model.
February 11, 2024
I wish I had read this book while in college, as I think it would have had a clarifying influence on my career decisions. First, the ambition versus aspiration distinction would have been useful. I think I was ambitious (rather than aspirational) and reasoning from a contemporary valuational condition that was excessively reliant on status-seeking. Second, understanding the tenuous value grasp that characterizes aspiration could have made me at least slightly more comfortable with the paralyzing uncertainty of that period.
I struggled with the more philosophical content of the book, but that's a product of my own limitations. I have a few more observations and questions.
I found the call for special compassion towards aspirants compelling. I hope I can show (and receive) such compassion.
Why is acting on a set of preferences (be they values or desires) you don't currently have hard for decision theory? This sounds to me like a job for Epstein-Zin preferences.
The activity of aspiration consists in learning and not deciding, which perhaps highlights why decision theory struggles to accommodate aspiration.
Why can we not simply consider aspiration a special, proleptic case of acting on a second-order preference? Specifically, aspiration is the process of transforming a second-order preference into a first-order preference. I think this leaves us open to the question of the source of the second-order preference and a corresponding infinite regress. I guess I never understood why infinite regress is a problem, which I suspect comes from a background in math (however tenuous) rather than philosophy.
I struggled with the more philosophical content of the book, but that's a product of my own limitations. I have a few more observations and questions.
I found the call for special compassion towards aspirants compelling. I hope I can show (and receive) such compassion.
Why is acting on a set of preferences (be they values or desires) you don't currently have hard for decision theory? This sounds to me like a job for Epstein-Zin preferences.
The activity of aspiration consists in learning and not deciding, which perhaps highlights why decision theory struggles to accommodate aspiration.
Why can we not simply consider aspiration a special, proleptic case of acting on a second-order preference? Specifically, aspiration is the process of transforming a second-order preference into a first-order preference. I think this leaves us open to the question of the source of the second-order preference and a corresponding infinite regress. I guess I never understood why infinite regress is a problem, which I suspect comes from a background in math (however tenuous) rather than philosophy.
March 18, 2024
Philosophy is often times tedious to read but this book has some amazing insights that I am so glad to have come across.
the substantive fact that what they value is not valuable.
How do you come to value something? What role do you play in it or is it all a product of your times and circumstance?
I’m competing in order to become excellent rather than to show that I already am.
Achieving your goals is called ambition. But do we realize that these goals are the product of our values. Developing these values is in essence, aspiration.
On the aspirational model it can be true that you are at work on yourself, though there is, as yet, no real you; your wants are themselves a work in progress.
Developing values is much more nuanced that achieving goals. You have to be guided by an incomplete grasp on the value till you have worked enough to appreciate it fully.
The thought of being better than the people around me is a powerful motivator for making something of myself when I don’t know exactly what it is I want to make of myself.
Who said vanity didn't serve any purpose?
that where you belong depends not on how you look but how you think.
Unless you are in a beauty pageant. Sorry.
the substantive fact that what they value is not valuable.
How do you come to value something? What role do you play in it or is it all a product of your times and circumstance?
I’m competing in order to become excellent rather than to show that I already am.
Achieving your goals is called ambition. But do we realize that these goals are the product of our values. Developing these values is in essence, aspiration.
On the aspirational model it can be true that you are at work on yourself, though there is, as yet, no real you; your wants are themselves a work in progress.
Developing values is much more nuanced that achieving goals. You have to be guided by an incomplete grasp on the value till you have worked enough to appreciate it fully.
The thought of being better than the people around me is a powerful motivator for making something of myself when I don’t know exactly what it is I want to make of myself.
Who said vanity didn't serve any purpose?
that where you belong depends not on how you look but how you think.
Unless you are in a beauty pageant. Sorry.
September 5, 2022
A rare five star rating of a book I couldn't finish! So this is actually a full-blown philosophy book, which I didn't realize when I purchased it. I thought it would be one of those "for the layman" type books. I kept it on my "currently reading" list for a little over a year, and I actually read and took notes through about 2/3 of the book. The ideas resonated with me, while at the same time I could barely grasp them.
I decided to sell it (in a frenzy of shelf-clearing) today, knowing that I would never fully comprehend it nor would I attempt to re-read it; it would just sit on my shelf as a testament to my unrealistic reading aspirations (haha). I found these post-it notes within:
Core question/puzzle of values being seen as something that happens to us, rather than something that we do. But then how can we be responsible for the kinds of people we are?
Akrasia = "weakness of will;" how it is possible for a person to act against her better judgement (she lacks a full grasp of her values.)
I decided to sell it (in a frenzy of shelf-clearing) today, knowing that I would never fully comprehend it nor would I attempt to re-read it; it would just sit on my shelf as a testament to my unrealistic reading aspirations (haha). I found these post-it notes within:
Core question/puzzle of values being seen as something that happens to us, rather than something that we do. But then how can we be responsible for the kinds of people we are?
Akrasia = "weakness of will;" how it is possible for a person to act against her better judgement (she lacks a full grasp of her values.)
September 25, 2022
Similar to and partially in response to Paul'sTransformative Experience, in Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming Callard defines, defends, and explores a model for understanding how we work to fully acquire values which we do not yet fully grasp, how we aspire to be someone we are not, yet. She considers aspiration in terms of three subsets of ethics: practical rationality, moral psychology, and moral responsibility. Lots of academic philosophizing here, but it was worth slogging through that to get to her understanding of aspiration as an important way that some humans change for the better.
July 5, 2020
This book has helped me iron out some of the wrinkles I've run into as I've reflected on my experiences of becoming, trying to become, failing to become, and grieving the loss of ever being able to become.
I have read very little in the way of philosophy, so this comment may be naive, but I wonder if the theory of aspiration might be supported by a tolerance/acceptance of an un-integrated self, one in which a person experiences an internal, multi-voice dialogue without trying to determine a "winner." In other words, what if a person holds multiple conflicting values simultaneously and acts in accordance with some of those values while also acting contrary to other values without dismissing those values altogether in order to integrate the self towards decision?
I have read very little in the way of philosophy, so this comment may be naive, but I wonder if the theory of aspiration might be supported by a tolerance/acceptance of an un-integrated self, one in which a person experiences an internal, multi-voice dialogue without trying to determine a "winner." In other words, what if a person holds multiple conflicting values simultaneously and acts in accordance with some of those values while also acting contrary to other values without dismissing those values altogether in order to integrate the self towards decision?
July 3, 2021
This book makes an interesting case for Aspiration as a means of self-creation through the acquisition of new values. Dealing with the question of how we come to become someone new, Callard points to us as reasoning towards a new value and our actions becoming rational in light of those future values (e.g. the would-be music lover making themselves listen to music makes little sense except in light of the future end-point, the individual as the music lover).
September 13, 2022
I’m having my students read this book in a seminar this fall, so I read through it over the past week or so. I was super impressed. Not often I read a philosophy book that approximates a page turner, and especially where I feel like the author is genuinely in touch with what it’s like to live a human life. But this one was those books. I’ll be thinking about the ideas here for a long time to come.
Read
November 15, 2024I found this fascinating. Probably more detail than I needed, more academic, but to this day I love this idea that we aspire ourselves into the becoming of something better, which is different from having it as a seed within or some form of regimented stepping stone progress. Imagination and accompaniment are important.
May 28, 2019
Heavy read
January 1, 2021
Heavy going for someone not familiar with philosophy, but gave me a different perspective for understanding other humans, and myself.
January 14, 2024
Really dense (parts hard to understand)— some sections were super interesting. I’ve read some of Callard’s shorter stuff (loved it).
January 28, 2025
conceptually interesting but got bored after first few chapters
October 15, 2025
Interesting ideas but a little too much in the direction of dry/abstract philosophy
April 7, 2023
Somehow in this work Callard manages to make the deeply intriguing topics of becoming and aspiration boring and academic. But before I get into what's wrong with the work, I'd like to highlight a few things that Callard does well.
Callard is a clear, readable writer who is able to make particular technical concepts approachable. Furthermore, the project of trying come up with an account of the rationality of aspiration is certainly a worthy one. Unfortunately, her defense is not successful in any sense from my reading.
Firstly, Callard commits the all too common academic philosopher's sin of fixating on intramural debates within philosophy departments, rather than the hard questions that the issue raises. For example, a good chunk of the book is spent making a fairly obvious point that current decision theory, and calculative accounts of rationality cannot make sense of the phenomenon of aspiration as something rational. I don't disagree with Callard, at all, on this point, but the point could be made in 5 pages and instead it spans multiple chapters.
Secondly, Callard's discussions of aspiration are rife with terrible examples that reveal an almost self-parodying snobbery. For example, her discussions of aspiring to appreciate western art music are almost comical in what she presents as the height of classical music appreciation. My reaction, may reflect that I am a musician and have thought about the nature of what it is to appreciate music as an artform a little too much.
Lastly, her account of aspiration is an example of the worst kind of moralizing in academic philosophy. Her claim that someone who desires to become something bad or evil and pursue this path, isn't an example of aspiration is asserted rather than argued. Furthermore, by making this assertion it lowers the stakes of the phenomenon of becoming by sanitizing it and making aspiration directly map onto positive ethical development. The biggest question for any kind of ethical account of becoming and development is how we ensure we're pursuing something valuable before we fully understand it; Callard sidesteps this question and does not explore how fraught this process can be.
Callard is a clear, readable writer who is able to make particular technical concepts approachable. Furthermore, the project of trying come up with an account of the rationality of aspiration is certainly a worthy one. Unfortunately, her defense is not successful in any sense from my reading.
Firstly, Callard commits the all too common academic philosopher's sin of fixating on intramural debates within philosophy departments, rather than the hard questions that the issue raises. For example, a good chunk of the book is spent making a fairly obvious point that current decision theory, and calculative accounts of rationality cannot make sense of the phenomenon of aspiration as something rational. I don't disagree with Callard, at all, on this point, but the point could be made in 5 pages and instead it spans multiple chapters.
Secondly, Callard's discussions of aspiration are rife with terrible examples that reveal an almost self-parodying snobbery. For example, her discussions of aspiring to appreciate western art music are almost comical in what she presents as the height of classical music appreciation. My reaction, may reflect that I am a musician and have thought about the nature of what it is to appreciate music as an artform a little too much.
Lastly, her account of aspiration is an example of the worst kind of moralizing in academic philosophy. Her claim that someone who desires to become something bad or evil and pursue this path, isn't an example of aspiration is asserted rather than argued. Furthermore, by making this assertion it lowers the stakes of the phenomenon of becoming by sanitizing it and making aspiration directly map onto positive ethical development. The biggest question for any kind of ethical account of becoming and development is how we ensure we're pursuing something valuable before we fully understand it; Callard sidesteps this question and does not explore how fraught this process can be.
March 1, 2020
Some rational thought behind the magic that makes a wonderful, creative life.
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