Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion ― that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies , takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.
I picked up this book to try to gain a better understanding of a position that seemed blatantly, self-evidently false to me. That’s pretty much still my opinion, though it’s possible I’m interpreting the idea of illusionism as a slightly more radical claim than Frankish intends - but if so, I don’t understand how it differs from the more ‘conservative’ physicalist views he wishes to distinguish his view from. Regardless, these were thought-provoking papers. I really love the format of presenting a variety of responses to a target article - I wish this were more common.
Keith Frankish posits a radical and controversial theory of consciousness: Accept the anomalousness of the phenomena that arise from consciousness but reject the existence of qualia altogether. Phenomenal properties only seem to exist, qualia is only as real as the effect of a classic illusion.