The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward - A New Approach

by James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton

On March 15, 2006, members from both parties in Congress supported the creation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group to review the situation on the ground and propose strategies for the way forward. For more than eight months, the Study Group met with military officers, regional experts, academics, journalists, and high-level government officials from America and abroad. Participants included George W. Bush and members of his cabinet; Bill Clinton; Jalal Talabani; Nouri Kamal al-Maliki; Generals John Abizaid, George Casey, and Anthony Zinni; Colin Powell; Thomas Friedman; George Packer; and many others. This official edition contains the Group's findings and proposals for improving security, strengthening the new government, rebuilding the economy and infrastructure, and maintaining stability in the region. It is a highly anticipated and essential step forward for Iraq, America, and the world.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, War, Middle East, Military Fiction, American History

160 pages, Paperback

First published December 6, 2006

About the author

James Addison Baker III (born April 28, 1930) is an American attorney and governmental official.

Baker served as the Chief of Staff in President Ronald Reagan's first administration and in the final year of the administration of President George H. W. Bush. Baker also served as Secretary of the Treasury from 1985–1988 in the second Reagan administration, and Secretary of State in the George H. W. Bush administration. He is also the honorary chair of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas.

Reviews

[Sully (sully.reads) · Rating 4 out of 5]

"To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."
-President George W. Bush, Discussing the beginning of operation Iraqi freedom

January 27,2013

Okay, so...The 2003 invasion of Iraq or the Iraq War. The Operation Iraqi Freedom in which a combined force of troops from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq and knocked down the regime of Saddam Hussein in 21 days of major combat operations.

After the incident, America still protects its interest in Iraq. How? WHY? No one can guarantee that any kind of action in Iraq will stop sectarian warfare, rapid increase of violence, or chaos.
There were lessons brought by this war dedicated to the leaders of the world and the United States (according to this article by Stephen Walt: Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War) I have to agree with the said article. A lot of lessons must be learned from Iraq - it's very unfortunate that some leaders in the Middle East seems to be ignoring these lessons as the war tendency level increases particularly in Iran (another middle eastern country).

January 29,2013

This Iraq Study Group Report is a little advance for me, but I did all research just to understand each concepts, terms and approaches and it really helped me a lot in getting along with this research.
For instance, the study group indicated the Shi'a and Sunni Muslims living in Iraq. How would they live together? The dominant view of contemporary political analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines; that is why it's hard to combine those denominations together. The answer is: National Reconciliation.

My favorite parts in this study are the U.S recommendations and the Economic view of the US in Iraq where it's divided into oil sectors, neighboring countries' relations, politics of oil and the international community.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

The 2006 co-chairs were James Baker and Lee Hamilton. Group members were Lawrence Eagleburger, Vernon Jordan, Edwin Meese, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon Panetta, William Perry, Charles Robb, and Alan Simpson. They came up with an excellent report. Unfortunately, these recommendations met up with reality, a horrible world.

More and more, I admire diplomats and want little to do with revolutionaries. Just check out the rude behavior of the Bernie or Bust "revolutionaries" over the last few days. It's much easier to destroy than it is to build up. Thus, we have the Iraq we have today.

President George W. Bush made two incredible blunders in this war, not to mention attacking in the first place. 1. He disbanded the Iraqi Army. Hundreds of thousands men sent home with guns and no job. How stupid can you get. Well try this. 2. De-Baathification. All members of the Baath party were fired. That includes just about all government officials at every level.

Now I could mention dozens of other blunders that would under normal circumstances be huge mistakes. But after the two above, what more needs to be said.

[Elisabeth Flynn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Like a lot of peopple I'd heard and read about this second-hand, but when I came across a copy at my local library branch I felt compelled to check it out and better understand the situation. It's the product of a highly experience, bipartisan group of former senators, diplomats and other foreign relations experts. It is surprisingly brief and succinct, and still extremely informative (although its recommendations were made in late 2006, and sadly few of them seem to have been made concrete). A depressing but illuminating read.

Among the jaw-dropping facts I learned:

1. At the time of its writing in late 2006 - three years into the war - the United States Embassy in Iraq (which is now the largest of its kind anywhere in the world) had in its employ 1000 people, of whom only 6 were fluent in Arabic.
I don't know how much, if at all, this has changed.

2. Congress appropriated $2 billion in 2006 for "countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraw against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to undertand the people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices."

Both of these get at the heart of our problem - or at least, one of them. That fully seven years after the September 11th attackes, the U.S. remains ill-equiped to deal with the root causes of terrorism, to adequately analyze, communicate and contend with the human population in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorism is real, and must be opposed by all means at our disposal, but it should be clear by now that we will never win this 'war' with tanks and bombs alone. It is also clear that no significant change to our approach will come under the current administration (for further evidence, see the recent resignation of Admiral William Fallon, former head of Central Command in the Middle East - which flies in the face of Study Group Recommendiation #46: "The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council." So much for that). All the more critical that we restore rational leadership to the White House and the Pentagon this November. For the sake of the Iraqis as well as ourselves, we just have to hope it's not too late.

[Will Byrnes · Rating 3 out of 5]

This brief book-form report offers 79 recommendations for how to move forwards toward a better tomorrow in Iraq. It is notable that it makes almost no attempt to look at the errors and misjudgments of the past, let alone the lies and deliberate obfuscations. It makes me think of a theoretical scenario in which a person had been charged with murder, a commission had been set up to look at the event in question, and the commission reported only on how to keep the accused from murdering again, with no mention of the first killing. I was surprised to learn that a considerable problem in Iraq is violence by the criminal element. I liked one line in particular. It was that if New Jersey were occupied by a foreign power, Tony Soprano would be an insurgent leader. There were few surprises in the report, at least to the reader who attends to the news. It calls for engaging with Syria and Iran and makes a point of citing the Israeli-Palestinian problem as a serious source of regional difficulty. Note is also taken that as bad as things are with the volume of daily attacks, many incidents are left out of the tally.

p 95 – A roadside bomb or rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For example, one day in July 2006, there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 act of violence. I also learned that there is significant tension even within the Shia militias. Incidents are cited in which the Badr militia came to blows with the Mahdi Army.

[Jonathan McLeod · Rating 4 out of 5]

The handling of the War in Iraq may always be a topic of controversy among Americans. Individual viewpoints are often affected by factors such as experience, politics, patriotism, and emotions.

If you are facilitating a discussion about the Iraq War, you may find The Iraq Study Group Report a helpful resource.

Congress appointed the Iraq Study Group (ISG) on March 15, 2006. The ISG was a ten-person bipartisan panel tasked with evaluating the state of the war in Iraq as of December 6, 2006 and then provide policy recommendations.

The ISG Report is a fairly easy read. It describes the many complex issues that the US, our allies and the Iraqis were facing. Admittedly, there were no perfect fixes, but the ISG did attempt to outline and weigh the risks of implementation vs. the failure to implement their recommendations.

If you are working with students, I suggest supplementing your discussions with regional maps. Also, the use of concept maps would be very helpful to link people, places, and objectives.

[Rich · Rating 2 out of 5]

By the time this report came out, its goals were already out of reach. Its ridiculous that the opinions of people like Sandra Day O'Connor and Vernon Jordan Jr. were being solicited by the President of the U.S. about Iraq. I'm sure they've really committed themselves to the study of the inner-workings of organizations like the Mahdi Army and the Islamic Army in Iraq. Even if the brain behind the report was James Baker alone, its still nearly irrelevant; Dick Cheney and his appointees set the war on a course for failure long before the report was written. I remember seeing Baker on C-SPAN saying that the report wasn't going to point fingers. What he meant was that he had no intention of bringing up that the war was contrary to the interests of both the U.S. and Iraq to begin with.

[Fahed Al Kerdi · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is focusing on the Pre-Arab spring era (2003 - 2006). The board of authors are trying to draw a clear image about the sitution back then, no doubts there was no changes from back then until now, except the increasing numbers of armed Shia'a militias and the seat change between Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
A good book. Very clear information, and very summarized. The assessment of the current situation in Iraq in postwar era and its encapsulated messages with blood and chaos, is emphasizing the fact of failure caused by the stupid politics from both west and east.
After you finish reading the book, you ought to know, undoubtedly, the list of parties which are responsible of the mess in Iraq and the Middle East

[Alan Chen · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have this annoying part of my mind that nags me, saying that I should pay attention to the Big Issues, one of which is/was the Iraq War. The Iraq Study Group Report, delivered in Fall 2006, was a big thing when it came out. Like so many others, I downloaded the report online, and like so many others, the report sat on my desktop unread for months (in my defense, I was trying to get my college courses under control). Later, I was at Borders (oh, the memories!) when I saw this in print. Deciding that I would finally take a stand, I bought the book. That was June of 2007.

Now, in August 2012, more than 5 years later, I have finally finished this 100+ page book cover-to-cover. The magnitude of my failure is, of course, obvious as shown by the events that have occurred since the report was issued: the Iraq troop surge, the Sunni Awakening, the reversal of the slide towards civil war, the relative peace, the 2008 presidential election, and the US troop withdrawal from Iraq (in December 2011!).

Nevertheless, I didn't give up on this project. Considering that I never really paid much attention to the war after the invasion was over, I owed it to myself to see how the war was going. I knew it was bad, but not THAT bad. This book is an endless series of depressing insights. It's the type of thing that makes you cynical about everything.

Before I get into what I learned, I'd like to take space to compliment how this report was put together. The Report itself stands out from so many other multi-megabyte papers in that it is short and very readable - in this sense, it does what the 9/11 Commission Report graphic novel did for the bulky (700+ pages) report itself. Assessment and analysis, which takes a bird's-eye view instead of crowding the page with charts and lists, takes up the equivalent of 40 pages in a paperback novel, and there are a few maps that help orient the reader (which was very useful when the Report started pointing out which regions were the most dangerous). Additionally, the ISG's members and the people they interviewed is a basically a Who's Who of everyone's who's been involved with US foreign policy over the past 50 years.

This is what I gleaned from the Report:

* Surging troop levels, or even staying the course, was probably the 2nd worst choice (other than immediate total withdrawal). The Report recommended a slow drawdown and projected that all combat troops could be out by Q1 2008!
* Domestically, no one involved liked the status quo, but no one was willing to work towards a solution that wouldn't end in chaos and bloodshed. Sectarian conflict between Shiites and Kurds was the main driver of the conflict, but every party watched each other with suspicion and no one was willing to back down. Shiites, handed the reins of power, turned their power to abuse of Sunnis, with officials running their agencies not to provide service, but to consolidate power and abuse Sunnis. Additionally, Shiite associated groups (security services, militias, government agencies) often abused their power to target, persecute or kill Sunnis. Sunnis, bereft of power for the first time in decades, were caught in a paradox of whether to cooperate for a government controlled by their abusive rivals or work to destroy the government through violence (and occasionally cooperate with al-Qaeda to do so!), even though doing so would remove the protection that the US provided from Shiites. Sunni insurgents often attacked anyone supporting the government, with Shiite militias retaliating against them in an endless cycle of blood. Kurds, though having one of the more peaceful regions, were caught between wanting a sovereign state (the popular choice) and the realization that such a state would be surrounded by enemies. Furthermore, too many government functions only serviced their sectarian interests, with half the Iraqi army only wanting to serve in their sectarian areas! Finally, dividing Iraq into 3 sectarian regions, an idea that was floated around for awhile, was OK with Shiites and Kurds but a nonstarter for Sunnis because much of the country had intermingled ethnic groups, and the proposed Sunni region had no oil reserves. Instead the Sunnis favored a united Iraq (under Sunni control).
* Internationally, none of the parties involved in the Iraq liked the status quo, but no one pro-actively worked towards a better solution except for maybe the Americans (in a halting way). The report repeatedly calls out the Iraqis for lacking "will and capability" to turn things around/make things better/face the hard issues. Iran and Syria both worked to undermine efforts to make things better, while the rest of the Gulf States mostly stood by doing nothing. Maddeningly, almost no party wanted the inevitable result of their action: the collapse of the Iraqi nation. Such an event would create a massive humanitarian catastrophe, a tidal wave of refugees streaming in all directions, and had the chance of igniting a broader Shiite-Sunni war that could engulf the entire region! It is thus ironic that the only parties that wanted the end results of their actions were the US and al-Qaeda!
* "Political, economic, and military": a phrase that gets used a lot when talking about how the US supports Iraq (and what the US should remove if the Iraqi government didn't work towards goals).
* De-Baathification was an interesting idea in theory, but implemented horribly like the demobilization of the Iraqi army. While it was probably necessary to purge the country of Hussein's cronies, the program cut off everyone with ties to the Baath party from working or contributing to Iraq's future. This excluded many of the people who knew how things worked, and the technical experts that ran Iraq's ministries.
* US intelligence gathering and language/cultural experts are predictably terrible.

With retrospect, I can now compare what could have happened with what did happen. The Report called for a slow withdrawal, with a troop surge probably not being useful except for securing a localized area unless the sectarian violence stopped. After the ISG Report was issued, the conservative American Enterprises Initiative issued its own report advocating for a surge. As we now know, the top US military leadership was replaced, General Petraeus went in, and violence went down. This is not to say that the report's recommendations were wrong. The troops involved in the surge mostly went to Baghdad (a localized area). The sectarian violence didn't stop, but it was reduced when the US decided to pay former Sunni insurgents to patrol their own neighborhoods (the Sunni Awakening), thus calling to mind the sectarian violence problem and a amnesty proposal for Sunni fighters. So the Report was right, though not directly.

As usual, I have a few complaints about this book.
1: The assessment/analysis section section is much shorter than I would have liked. Most of my value from this book derived from that section, which served as a briefing and summary to 8 years of scattered and disparate news reports. Everything you needed to know about the Iraq War in 2006 is in here. To that end, the ISG report is a good primer to anyone who wants to look back at this point in history.
2: The recommendation section is where the book falls apart. Not because the recommendations were good or bad (I'm really qualified to assess that), but because the recommendations break up the flow of the report. I know this isn't a novel, but the recommendation section is where the Report stops reading like a briefing or guide and more like a ... report. Additionally, the scope of the recommendations (covering not just Iraqi issues, but broader regional problems like Iran's nuclear program or the Israel-Palestine conflict) and their depth (the last 4th of the recommendations can be summarized as "send experts from US agencies to aid their Iraqi counterparts) will turn off any casual reader not well versed with the nitty gritty of "making the trains run on time."
3. The Executive Summary is a straight copy-and-paste of the other sections. A lazy waste of space, but useful if someone were reading this in a hurry.

Rating: 4 stars (I like it, but I don't love it). Please read this report (whether online or in print), and pay attention to the big picture. Don't just listen to what the politicians say - they're elected officials whose power depends on their popularity. The one people who really know what they're talking about are the people who have the time and interest to study these issues. The war may be over, but the issues still remain. The Report is a no-holds barred review on war policy, and it details how close we came to losing it all.

[George · Rating 3 out of 5]

Yeah, yeah, I know what year it is, but whatever, leave me alone. Anyway, this report that I should've read a long time ago was still interesting and informative. We can learn a lot when we take the time to study our failures. Overwhelmingly, though, I thought throughout of that great opening scene of Ronin starring Robert DeNiro... and his quote: "Lady, I never walk into a place I don't know how to walk out of.”

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Exceptional work. Unfortunately it was not implemented as recommended, probably through no fault of any one organization, but a failing of the whole concept. Hard to bring so many international parties into agreement on such a difficult task.

[Paula · Rating 5 out of 5]

I RE-read this study in 2020 after having lived through its many reviews in 2006. Its findings have proven timeless. It should be required reading for statecraft practitioners and scholars.

[Jesse H. Cockerham · Rating 5 out of 5]

great study on the Iraq situation time to move on to a new book

[Malvalm]

Una lectura interesante. Me pareció impecable el aspecto puramente formal (cómo se presenta y estructura la información).

[Peter G · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoughtful investigation of a troubled war. Unfortunate that it did not seem to have an impact in the long term.

[Mallory Mac · Rating 3 out of 5]

Finally gave this a read after it sat on my shelf for years. Was interesting to review so many years after-the-fact.

[Phillip · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this years ago, and my reading of it now is colored by my experience as a quite junior Army officer serving in Mosul, Iraq in 2005 -- that being said, I think this is an interesting read, even if some of it may seemed dated. This report provides a snapshot of the challenges facing Iraq and the United States in the mid 2000s, and how we could use our domestic, international, civil, and military agencies to help improve Iraq. As I read this now in an age of ISIS/ISIL, certainly one can see the failures to follow some of the recommendations. Also, I'm struck by how U.S.-based the suggestions are -- to be fair, we "owned" the country (along with Coalition Forces), so certainly there was a lot of U.S. responsibility. But I was struck by how many American concepts we were recommending to foist on the Iraq - whether in training their Army, police, justice system, etc. Certainly how we train and operate in those fields may be entirely different than how Middle East/Iraq would operate. I felt that this is a continuing disconnect -- it's a different people with a different culture. An "in'sh'allah" culture doesn't always mesh with the American system of training. Nevertheless - if you see this as a snapshot of the time, it provides an insight in all the players and agencies, and things to think about in conflicts to come.

[Nathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's worth noting that when George W. Bush narrowly won the Presidency in 2000, he said he was going to lead from the center and that his administration would be one of bipartisan approaches to the problems of government. 6 years later and two wars later, when the Iraq study group was formed, Bush's attempts at bipartisanship had long since faded into distant memory. Obviously, the group's report was long on ideas and short on reception; it was mostly ignored by the Powers That Be. The report, however, is an important piece of work that offers hope in that it shows just how willing some people are, of both political stripes, to try and work together toward a workable solution. It may not offer hope until after 2008, but at least we know bipartisan approaches and pragmatic solutions really are possible. That this report probably should have been written six months before the invasion ever started is officially a moot point; the invasion started with no plan or strategy, and all that's left now is figuring out how to deal with it. The study group, which consisted of Republicans and Democrats, came to the almost unamimous conclusion that we are waging a futile war with futile tactics. Co-chaired by James A. Baker, former official from Bush Sr.'s administration, and Lee H. Hamilton, the bipartisan group interviewed key players and former players in our foreign policy including George W. Bush and members of his cabinet, former President Bill Clinton, Iraqi politicians, Generals John Abizaid, George Casey and Anthony Zinni, Colin Powell, theorist Thomas Friedman and dozens of experts. From this well of knowledge the group drew its conclusions. Proceeds of the book go toward The National Military Family Association, which provides financial assistance to military families.

NC

[liz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think you should go out and buy this right now. Seriously.

Now I do my best to keep up with the news, I listen to NPR in the mornings, I read the newspapers most of the day while I'm at work. And still, I'm not always positive what the difference is between the Shia and the Sunnis (I know, I know), what which millitias stand for, etc. Not only does this have all of that, is thorough, and readable, but it also says what's plausible for getting Iraq to be a functioning country. It's worth the price for the maps at the back alone.

The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.

The only negative is reading about what *should* be possible...but probably won't happen.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil.

I could quote about a million and one other important things.

Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their own future... The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

An important read for all who are concerned by the events going on in Iraq. The groups recommendations to the president and Congress seem well balanced and much needed. Some of their recommendations, if implemented, could also lead to better relations between te U.S. and the entire region of Southwest Asia. I also found two surprising things in the report. First, although the report does lay out specifiic benchmarks for success in Iraq, it never seems to say that withdrawal of troops should be contingent upon the completion of these benchmarks. And Second, although they say that increased troop levels would not be a good idea, at one point in the book they say they are not adverse to the idea of a troop surge that could provide relief for the Iraqi's to get things in order. It's just a pity that while Pres. Bush seems okay using more military force, he seems to be too gung-ho to use the olive brnach as well as the arrows in his foreign policy.

[Dave Clark · Rating 5 out of 5]

It was a worthy attempt at solving the crisis in Iraq; moreover, it was written in a bi-partisan fashion that presented the most viable solution for salvaging the fiasco in Iraq. Either side of the political spectrum can find plenty of faults with the recommendations put forth by the Iraq Study Group. Nevertheless, their recommendations address the critical issues in a manner that would be politically possible within the framework of the realty of political bickering in the U.S., the intense factionalism in Iraq, and the volatile Middle East as a whole. Unfortunately, the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations are largely being ignored by the Administration, especially the diplomatic recommendations. The Administration is apparently too deeply entrenched in its current policies to make the large sweeping changes that are recommended by the Iraq Study Group.

[Crystal · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty clear and transparent! Still, pity for nothing more than wishful thinking. These 79 recommendations for helping these people recover from tyranny and knowing the ages old rivals will not, yet hoping they will, agree to build from the ground up, a stable government and within the impatient constraints of a stop watch - what a stupid, sad waste of good intentions.
Put together well. Brief, point to point outline. Would be a great read for any history or political science class.
Fascinating to look up the Iraqi leaders and reps of 2004-2008 and see they have since been exiled, resigned, suffered assassination attempts... Also fascinating that warnings noted in this little read have and are reality for Iraq and the world.

[Nicholas Whyte]

http://nhw.livejournal.com/817463.html[return][return]For a main text of less than a hundred pages, aimed exclusively at policy-makers concerned with the question of What Next?, it is not bad - especially the recommendations on better US diplomacy in the region, ie Iran and Syria, and the Israel/Palestine dispute. Shame that doesn't appear to be happening.[return][return]I missed, though, any serious analysis of how the greatest military machine the world has ever known, run by the most powerful democratic state in history, had managed to get itself in this fix in the first place. So it feels very incomplete.

[nadeem · Rating 4 out of 5]

"I really liked it" doesn't really sum up what I feel here. More like, I was really frustrated that a lot of the advice for how not to alienate an entire region and how American soldiers might be "more appropriately" trained, consulted, and deployed is being thrown by the wayside. "More appropriately" in quotes of course because the whole thing is a complete travesty--I'd still be angry if we were going in "more appropriately," but the extent to which the observations and outlines and findings here have been ignored--it would be an obvious farce if the resultant death-count weren't in the millions. God forgive us.

[Hans · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good summary of events leading up to 9/11. However their other analysis were a bit off. First, their predictions of a all out failed state in Iraq have failed to materialize despite their warnings. Second, the Department of National Intelligence was a re-inventing of the wheel that will only exacerbate the problem next time creating that many more bureaucratic channels for information to travel through before reaching those who actually need it.

Let me guess, after the next major terrorist attack they are going to create the Department of Anti-Terrorism, and it will become a huge bureaucratic machine that absorbs the intel community. I hope I am not right.

[Ali Al-Birminghami · Rating 4 out of 5]

The report assesses the current situation in Iraq (political, economic, civil infrastrucure, security) and then offers 79 recommendations, notably the need to engage with Syria and Iran, and the 'surge' tactic.

Definately worth contrasting current efforts in Iraq with the report's recommendations (pubished in Dec 2006). Also interesting to note that 4 out of the 5 on the committee have a backround in Law.

[Bella · Rating 3 out of 5]

Current as of Dec 2006. The book gives assessment and 79 recommendations by the bipartisan study group.
The new approach consists of: A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus, and B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves.
I liked how the report outlined the direct and indirect involvement and interests of the neighboring states; sectarian violence; key Iraqi power players; and Maliki's suggested "milestones".

[Tyler]

Read this the month after I got back from Iraq. I liked alot of the proposals at the time, although most weren't followed. It felt good to see that some of the operations that I was involved in were mentioned in the report. It was also nice that the lack of success we had in those operations was also accurately reported.

[Jessica]

People should review the Expert Working Groups section. It is interesting to see so many contributions from PFC Energy, Citigroup, Bechtel Corp, RAND corp., and The Brookings Institute. Why are these corporations making suggestions on what our government policy should be toward Iraq?

[Alexia · Rating 5 out of 5]

I learned a lot from this book. A homeless man on the subway told me it was a bunch of lies, but i think there was a lot of good information in it which helped me better understand the current situation in Iraq.

[Rae · Rating 3 out of 5]

A lot of money and time was spent to determine what we already know i.e. that the situation in Iraq is a miserable mess unless and until the ethnic and tribal groups within the country learn to live with one another without resorting to violence to solve problems. There's nothing new here.