La fragilidad del bien: Fortuna y ética en la tragedia y la filosofía griega (La balsa de la Medusa nº 202)

by Martha C. Nussbaum, Antonio Ballesteros Jaraiz (Translator)

La fragilidad del bien es su obra más celebrada y marca ya un hito en los estudios clásicos y en el análisis de la relación entre la ética, la tragedia y la filosofía griegas. En este ámbito, Martha C. Nussbaum afronta interpretaciones nuevas en un panorama investigado con rigor y minuciosidad y advierte la actualidad de muchos de los problemas planteados por la poesía y la tragedia griegas. La presente edición revisa las anteriores, corrige los errores e incluye una extensa introducción en la cual la autora tiene en cuenta la evolución de su pensamiento y desarrolla nuevos conceptos.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics, History, Greece, Literary Criticism, Criticism

900 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1986

About the author

Martha C. Nussbaum is Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, appointed in the Law School and the Philosophy Department. Among her many awards are the 2018 Berggruen Prize, the 2017 Don M. Randel Award for Humanistic Studies from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the 2016 Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy.

Reviews

[Lukas op de Beke · Rating 4 out of 5]

A few lines of thought expressed in this book have stuck with me. First, Nussbaum breathes new life in the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. She makes the compelling case that plays like Antigone, Agamemnon, the Seven against Thebes were not merely pieces of drama, produced for the amusement of the Athenian public, but were in fact also permeated by evaluations and conceptions of the good life. From the predicaments Agamemnon and Creon finds themselves in, there is much to learn about how to act in the face of adversity and misfortune.

Moreover, while today we are quick to banish poets and dramaturgists to the fringes of society as a group of "weltfremde" bohemians, in the 5th and 4th centuries BC, the poets played a central role in ethical thought and, what is more, they were taken very seriously by the likes of Plato and Socrates as rival thinkers and educators. In the Apology and the Republic for instance, poets and dramaturgists are often the object of sharp condemnation.

A second refreshing observation by Nussbaum centers on Plato and aims at a tension between his hardline, intellectualist views on the attainment of the Good in the Republic and the Symposium on the one hand, and his more nuanced, impassioned and eros-inspired views in the Phaedrus. My personal preference (and, I am inclined to think, Nussbaum's as well) lies with the latter Plato, as here, Plato gives a more "human" and this-worldly conception of the Good Life, which also happens to sit easier with the account of Aristotelian ethics that follows.

Speaking of Aristotle, thirdly, it is clear that his is considered as the most accurate and truthful account of the Good Life. Although the intellectualist Plato, and to a lesser extent, the Plato of Phaedrus, still fall short of accounting for the impact of luck on a Good Life, Aristotle makes the mature observation that without risk, external factors beyond one's control, and external goods (most prominenty, friends and philia), many virtues are simply not attainable. (Incidentally, Nussbaum takes great care to stress that eudaimonia is in essence found in activity, not in a state of being. It is not enough to "be" good, as the athlete is only cheered for when racing and not for what he is capable of on the sidelines, the good person must actually "do" good, in order to achieve real good "livING".) There is no courage or resilience without adversity, no generosity without riches, no philia without trust and a certain openness to the world, and no political activity without a polis. Eudaimonia then, is, contrary to the Plato of the Republic and Symposium who pleaded for the Good Life as a life in solitary contemplation rid of all passions and appetites, vulnerable. To be sure, Aristotle stresses that the virtuous, while vulnerable to luck, need not and ordinarily will not be overcome by it.

[Dr. A · Rating 5 out of 5]

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There is this conundrum in moral philosophy that, even if you cultivate a good character and act always intent on doing the right thing, fate may intervene to throw some bad luck your way so that, what had been a good life begins to look like a terrible life. In short, doing the right thing is no guarantee that one will be rewarded with a good or easy life. (It may even be argued that the opposite is true. In a corrupt world, doing the right and moral thing will often comes with some negative consequences. But this is not the topic of this book).

In The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Martha Nussbaum examines the problem that luck and fate pose in Ancient Greek philosophy and literature. The Greeks were fascinated with fate and devoted much thought to the topic, thought that is today unsurpassed. Nussbaum takes up the Ancient texts in order the address this question anew from a contemporary perspective, with wonderful results. As has been written elsewhere, her writing combines the rigor of scholarship with the imagination necessary to grapple with this issue as it emerges in contemporary life.

Rejecting Socrates and Plato’s teaching on the subject, Nussbaum argues that indeed, a life that flourishes through the practice of virtue can come to end up a terrible life due to circumstances beyond a person’s control. The bottom line is that being and doing good is no guarantee of a good life. But is the reverse true? Can a wicked, vicious person inadvertently enjoy a good life? You will have to read Nussbaum to learn more.

Nussbaum has been quite prolific and has written a number fantastic and well received works, including: the collection of essays Love Knowledge Essays on Philosophy and Literature , Upheavals of Thought The Intelligence of Emotions , and Not For Profit Why Democracy Needs the Humanities . Finally, readers who enjoy Nussbaum’s work will also want to pick up her most recent work, Political Emotions Why Love Matters for Justice .

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[Paul Crider · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone who has read quite a bit of later Nussbaum, finally getting to this, her first major book that I know of, was a treat. Most of the themes she takes up in her later works already make some appearance here: a defense of emotions and their cognitive bases, a positive normative view of human dependence, a belief in the philosophical contributions of literature; even her feminism and capabilities perspectives make a showing.

[Abdulwausay Ansari · Rating 5 out of 5]

Scholarship at its finest. In this impressive volume, Martha Nussbaum--one of the greatest living philosophers, and an incredibly generous person if my one meeting with her is any indicator--is doing many things.

She is, for one, doing impressive exegetical work on Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides as well as on Greek philosophy (particularly, the works of Plato and Aristotle).

She is also addressing a problem that has contemporary relevance, both in contemporary moral philosophy as well as our moral lives in general. To these ends, Nussbaum is arguing for a position that she believes is right and can be a weighty player in contemporary debates; she also has a didactic purpose. Nussbaum is shedding light on an area of the moral life with the intention to help us better understand and live the moral life.

Finally, Nussbaum is also doing the work of creative writing--she is such a brilliant writer that one can't help but be moved by her prose and use of literary tropes much in the way we are moved by brilliantly written literature.

But what exactly is this book about? What is the concern to which Nussbaum is replying with exegetical, philosophical, didactic and stylistic work all at once? Nussbaum is addressing the problem of vulnerability, that is, the problem of how our lives are subject to horrible happenings that we have no control over, happenings that can derail us from living a good life. She is fleshing out this problem of vulnerability as the tragedians saw it then showing Plato's reply to this problem: his reply was to minimize vulnerability. After which, she gives us Aristotle's view on the problem and argues for why his view is right and why Plato's view fails. For Aristotle, vulnerability was a condition of human life, and, if we are to pursue some of the greatest values in our lives (like love, familial relationships, and friendships), we must come to terms with our vulnerability, for living a life of love, family and friendship will involve the possibility that all these beautiful goods can be taken away from us without our having any say on the matter.

This book will affect you emotionally, engage you cognitively and move you volitionally. We rarely get scholarship as good as the scholarship in this massive but rewarding book.

[James · Rating 5 out of 5]

Martha Nussbaum's genius for inductive thinking (starting with the specific and working toward the general) is apparent on virtually every page of this monumental work. It's so monumental I basically read it via the index, following her reasoning and skipping around as a page or passage caught my eye. Her chapter on Plato's *Symposium* is a most brilliant account of that dialogue. The conceptual links she welds together are so substantial that one can "visit" this book almost as a reference text--not only on Greek thought, but also on all of experience.

[Jim Robles · Rating 5 out of 5]

I enjoyed this one. Professor Nussbaum has an amazing grasp of a phenomenally wide range of aspects of the central challenges of our lives.

The Chapter 11 treatment of Aristotle's view of the dialectic between luck and rationality is very good and also relevant. The eudiamon life does require the resources that come to those with good fortune. At the same time planning and control, driven by rationality, are also required. If you are not experiencing eudaimonia it could be that one or both factors are missing. Too much luck can blind one to what a significant factor it is.

There is clear recognition of the extent to which our ontology effects our epistemology - ". . . just as in Chapter 9 we saw that our deep beliefs about voluntary action made it unlikely that we would ever discover that there was no such thing" (p. 321).

There have been times in my life when, after totally hosing up, I have realized that I had three choices: 1) deny what happened; 2) acknowledge what happened, but claim that it was O.K.; or 3) acknowledge how completely wrong/failed/self-indulgent/delusional/etc. I had been and been and try to be better. 1) and 2) are a form of death: if you make those choices, something goes on but it is no longer the same "you." The discussion around p. 366 and p. 367 articulates this much better than I ever could.

Appreciating the ancients does require that retrodiction (p. 370, etc.) win out over presentism: to ask if Aristotle was misogynistic is very much that same as asking if President Lincoln was racist. Professor Nussbaum does very well in addressing this (p. 371).

Chapter 13, on Euripides' Hecuba is wonderfully relevant for this evening's discussion of Benito Cereno by Herman Melville.

It would be better if I was less desultory: there were too many "interruptions" in getting through this.

The nineteenth book I have finished this year.

Preface

p. xvi. A major theme in Fragility, as I have suggested, was the role of the emotions in informing us about matters of ethical significance.

p. xx. Aristotle's views about women do not repay serious scrutiny, even as falsehoods.

p. xx. For the Stoics, by contrast, the bare possession of the capacity for moral choice gives us all a boundless and and equal dignity.

p. xxiv. By now, it is no longer true that Kantianism and Utilitarianism are the two dominant ethical approaches. Most introduction to the subject would not mention the "virtue ethics approach" as a third major paradigm.

p. xxx - xxxi. But surely Cicero is correct when he observes that the person who does not active wrong cannot take credit for justice, if what he has done is to sit by idle when he could be helping human being who have been assaulted or harmed.

p. xxxii. Job is right to renounce his attempt to accuse God of wrongdoing, and to accept the inscrutable mysteriousness of His actions.

p. xxxvii. As Philoctetes knew, pity means action: intervention on behalf of the suffering, even if it is difficult and repellent. If you leave out the action, you are an ignoble coward, perhaps also a hypocrite and a liar. If you help, you have done something fine.

1 Luck and ethics

p. 3. This book will be an examination of the aspiration to rational self-sufficiency in Greek ethical thought.

p. 7. For our bodily and sensuous nature, our passions, our sexuality, all server as powerful links to the world of risk and mutability. . . . Furthermore, these 'irrational' attachments import, more than many others, a risk of practical conflict and so of contingent failure in virtue.

p. 11. But Plato . . . He argues, first, that only a very few people are in a position to engage in serious ethical reflection and choice; the others should simple be told what to do.

Part I Tragedy: fragility and ambition

2 Aeschylus and practical conflict

p. 25. Tragedy also, however shows something more deeply disturbing: its hows good people doing bad things, things otherwise repugnant to their ethical character and commitments, because of circumstances whose origin does not lie with them.

p. 33. If we think of the omen as pointing towards the war crimes of the Greeks, we are reminded of the way in which circumstances of war can alter and erode the normal conventions of human behavior towards other humans, rendering them, in their indifference to the slain, either bestial or like killers of beasts.

p. 37. The ceremony of animal sacrifice, from which Greek tragedy, in Burkert's view, derives its name, expressed the awe and fear felt by this human community towards its own murderous possibilities.

p. 45. 'Now I shall change my life to a better one than before.'

p. 49. Aeschylus, then, shows us not so much a 'solution' to the 'problem of practical conflict' as the richness and depth of the problem itself.

3 Sophocles' Antigone: conflict, vision, and simplification

p. 54. the pursuit of honor may require an injury to friendship.

p. 69. . . . style of the major ethical thinker of the half-century preceding this play, that it, to the style of Heraclitus.

p. 75. It suggests that the richer our scheme of values, the harder it will prove to effect harmony within it.

tuche
Web definitions
Greek word for "fortune". What happens to an individual in their day to day affairs, as with the lot or part of fortune.

Part II Plato: goodness without fragility?

4 The Protagoras: a science of practical reasoning

p. 90. The need of human beings for philosophy is, for him, deeply connected with their exposure to luck; the elimination of this exposure is a primary task of the philosophical art as he conceives it.

bucephalus
Web definitions
Bucephalus or Bucephalas was Alexander the Great's horse and one of the most famous actual horses of antiquity. Ancient accounts state that Bucephalus died after the Battle of the Hydaspes in 326 BC, in what is now modern Pakistan, and is buried in Jalalpur Sharif outside of Jhelum, Pakistan. ...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucephalus

p. 101. What they lack are laws, civic education, the institution of punishment.

p. 103. . . . the implication is that moral training promotes healthy and natural growth, attacking problems which, left unattended, would blight the child's full natural development.

p. 109. . . . what we badly want is peace and quiet.

Eudoxus of Cnidus
www.math.tamu.edu/~dallen/history/eud...‎

p. 117. In short, I claim that Socrates offers us, in the guise of empirical description, a radical proposal for the transformation of our lives.

p. 119. For it shows us an apparently insoluble tension between our intuitive attachment to a plurality of values and our ambition to be in control of our planning through a deliberative techne.

p. 122. Interlude 1: Plato's anti-tragic theater

p. 124. . . . in the fifth and early fourth centuries, it was the poets who were regarded as the most important ethical teachers.



p. 128. He lacked both dedication and humility; and these features of his character were displayed as defects that left him ill-prepared for the activity of self-scrutiny.

elenchos
Web definitions
Socratic method, named after the classical Greek philosopher Socrates, is a form of inquiry and discussion between individuals, based on asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking and to illuminate ideas. ...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elenchos

p. 134. By themselves, without a grasp of the general form, particulars cannot be objects of insight.

5 The Republic: true value and the standpoint of perfection

p. 137. Too infirm to walk easily in the city, his bodily desires dimmed by advancing years, he lacks many of the younger men's distractions; he finds his love of argument correspondingly increased (328 C-D).

p. 138. The Republic argues that the best life for a human being is the life of the philosopher, a life devoted to learning and the contemplation of truth.

p. 147. But the central example of pure of genuine enjoying is the intellectual activity of the philosopher. (We should never lose sight of the importance of mathematical reasoning and contemplation for Plato as central case of these pursuits.)

p. 149. WE can see how the belief that there is a stable truth there to be known in nature, apart from the changing circumstances of human life, would lend force to a Platonic account of activity-value. We can see, too, how a belief in eternal, non-context-dependent paradigmatic objects wold tend to support his belief that contemplative activity is maximally stable, unvarying, and context-independent.

p. 150. . . . for where there is no deficiency of in either power or knowledge, there is no room, conceptually, for hope.

p. 152. In the Phaedo we see, similarly, that Socrates is confident that everything that is him will survive, unscathed, the death of the body (115 C-E) and its desires.

p. 157. It is a long and difficult matter to learn to detach ourselves from our human needs and interests, or to get to a point at which we can do so at will.

This sounds very much like "Nirvana."

6 The speech of Alcibiades: a reading of the Symposium

p. 166. His story is, in the end, a story of waste and loss, of the failure of practical reason to shape a life.

p. 168. . . . our need to grope for understanding this central element of our live through hearing and telling stories.

p. 172. We were once, he tells us, perfect and self-sufficient physical beings.

p. 176. We turn now to the speech that attempts to restructure that world, making it safe for practical reason.

p. 183. But the correct interpretation seems to be that Socrates has so dissociated himself from his body that he genuinely does not feel its pain, or regard its sufferings as things genuinely happening to him. . . . We are invited, instead, to look for the explanation in his psychological distance from the world and from his body as an object in that world.

p. 192. . . . the Platonic picture of the soul is not so much a scientific fact as an ethical ideal, some thing to b chosen and achieved.

p. 194. A self-critical perception of one's cracks and holes, which issues naturally in comic poetry, is an important part of what we value in Alcibiades and want to salvage in ourselves. So it seems not accidental that Dionysus, god of tragic loss, should stand for both.

p. 198. The Symposium now seems to us a harsh and alarming book.

7 'This story isn't true': madness, reason, and recantation in the Phaedrus

p. 201. Erotic relationships of long duration between particular individuals (who see each other as such) are argued to be fundamental to psychological development and an important component of the best human life.

p. 203. The Phaedrus, I shall argue, is this apologia -

p. 205. - as if, among the parts of oneself, only the logistikon is the author of genuinely voluntary actions, while the other elements are unselective causal forces.

This was one of the 'free will issues" in Phil 270, as though my appetites are not part of me.

p. 215. Sense and emotion are guides towards the good and indices of its presence:

Is this British sentimentalism?

p. 218. The focus on character takes away much of love's replaceability; the focus on history removes the rest.

p. 220 Plato's myth reveals that the complete devine wisdom is, for human being, permanently unavailable.

p. 221 &222. . . . niggardly . . .

p. 226. The really significant point, however, is that philosophy is now permitted to be an inspired, manic, Muse-loving activity.

p. 231. It would not be fanciful to see Plato as expressing, both in the Republic's denunciation and in this praise, his complex attitude towards the passive and receptive aspects of his own sexuality, aspects which, for a proud Greek gentleman of his time, could not have been easy to accept.

p. 232. . . . that he has found what eluded his teacher, a fusion of clarity and passion.

Part III Aristotle: the fragility of the good human life

8 Saving Aristotle's appearances

p. 241. Philosophy begins when we acknowledge the possibility that the way we pre-pre-philosophically see the world might be radically in error.

p. 248. Very rarely is truth a matter of majority vote (Metaph. 1009b2)

p. 249 - 250. This is so because our practices and our language embody a reliance on such experts, frequently making their judgments constitutive of truth.

p. 258. The Platonist encourages us to neglect this work by giving us the idea that philosophy is a worthwhile enterprise only if it takes us away from the 'cave' and up into the sunlight.

p. 260. - much as friends who have become strangers or enemies need a mediator to effect a reconciliation.

9 Rational animals and the explanation of action

p. 273. And in fact we are by now aware that the Plato of the Phaedo and the Republic is willing, even eager, to pay this price.

orexis
Web definitions
The affective and conative character of mental activity as contrasted with its cognitive aspect; the appetitive aspect of an act; desire, appetite
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/orexis

p. 276. Moving is seen to be intrinsically connect with a lack of self-sufficiency or completeness, and with the inner movement towards the world with which needy creatures are fortunately endowed.
The Identity of Indiscernibles
First published Wed Jul 31, 1996; substantive revision Sun Aug 15, 2010
This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz's Law’ and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties.

p. 281. The central point is that, however it is to be construed, the physiological feature are not causes of the animal's movement any more than Polyclitus's having kidneys is the cause of his sculpting the statue.

p. 282. . . . actions performed under external physical constraint.

See Harry Frankfurt.

p. 286. The intentional selectivity of appetite shows us how it can be engaged for positive support in the search for the good.

The argument at the bottom of p. 287 and top of p. 288 seems, to me, to fail to address the challenge of our perception of free will vs. its purported reality. i.e. - I act, then form the impression that I willed the action.

10 Non-scientific deliberation

Aristotle on the truth vs. people on p. 292.

There is what can be taken as a critique of military standards, and standards in general, on p. 301 - 304. Still . . . .

p. 302. These three features are: mutability, indeterminacy, particularity.

p. 306. Aristotle insists that a person's character and value commitments are what that person is in and of himself; personal continuity requires a high degree, at least, of continuity in the general nature of these commitments.

p. 308. If I do generous acts, but only with constant effort, strain, and reluctance, I am not really acting generously; I am not worthy of the same commendation as the person who enjoys his generosity and does the action with his whole heart.

11 The vulnerability of the good human life: activity and disaster

p. 319. All of this will put us in a position to appreciate the importance that Aristotle attaches to tragic poetry as a source of moral learning and draw some conclusions abut the relationship between Aristotelian philosophizing and tragedy.

I have to take the top of p. 323 as offering far more support for the emergence of Stoicism than for Epicureanism.

Aristotle's view of the elderly and their loss of virtue, on p. 338 - 339, resonates with what I am experiencing.

12 The vulnerability of the good human life: relational goods

The p. 346 discussion, of Aristotle's view of, family and education, make it pellucid that both are required for proper development.

p. 347. To value a public scheme of education is to value something both vulnerable and difficult to realize.

p. 348. For these reasons, Aristotle argues that no person who has the natural capacity for practical reason should be held in slavery.

p. 353. Plato attempted to eliminate, as grounds of conflict, both private property and the exclusiveness of sexual relations.

The bottom of p. 355 touches on Aristotle's classification of friendships.

Love on p. 368 - 370.

Appendix to Part III: human and divine

Interlude 2: luck and the tragic emotions

p. 378. They are the: the relationship between tragic action and tragic character, and the nature and value of the tragic emotions.

p. 381. For if the good person is, as Republic III (388) insists, altogether self-sufficient, that is, in need of nothing from without to complete the value and goodness of his life (cf. Ch. 7 $ IV, Ch. 5 $ IV), then, first of all, tragic action becomes irrelevant to our search for good human living.

p. 385. In the Phaedo, which is a clear case of Platonic anti-tragedy, there is repeated stress on the fact that Socrates' predicament is not an occasion for pity.

p. 386. Plato's argument, repeatedly, is the correct beliefs about what is and is not important in human life remove our reasons for fear.

13 The betrayal of convention: a reading of Euripides' Hecuba

This (esp. p. 405) is a wonderfully timely section for this evenings discussion of Benito Cereno by Herman Melville.

[Elizabeth Pyjov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lucid and beautiful.

[about Antigone]: “It is also a play about teaching and learning, about changing one’s vision of the world, about losing one’s grip on what looked like secure truth and learning a more elusive kind of wisdom” (52).

[P J M]

Only read the introduction and seen her talk about Hecuba but um, I cried

[Laurens Trommel · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Dit boek onderzoekt het streven om het goede van een goed menselijk leven door de sturende macht van de rede tegen het toeval te beschermen.” Wat is goed (grieks: eudaimonia)? Wat is het belang van de opmerking dat het om een goed ménselijk leven moet gaan? Welke rol spelen emoties en begeerten bij de rede? Wat betekent toeval (grieks: túche)? Nussbaum werpt talloze vragen op en in dit lijvige boek van 570 pagina’s plus ongeveer 100 pagina’s aan voetnoten gaat zij deze en nog veel meer beantwoorden. En de kracht van Nussbaum in dit boek is dat zij dat heel gestructureerd doet, de lezer aan de hand van drie kernvragen meeneemt. Die vragen luidden: (1) hoeveel ruimte moet een rationele invulling van een leven bieden aan zaken als vriendschap, liefde, maatschappelijke betrokkenheid, gehechtheid aan geld of bezit, allemaal zaken die zelf kwetsbaar zijn en die derhalve iemand die zijn of haar goed-zijn daarop baseert ook afhankelijk van het toeval maken? (2) Bestaan de afzonderlijke bestanddelen van een goed leven harmonieus naast elkaar of kunnen ze onder omstandigheden die iemand niet in zijn macht heeft strijdige eisen stellen, wat op zich afbreuk kan doen aan de goedheid van de betreffende persoon? (3) Wat is de ethische waarde van de zogeheten ‘irrationele delen van de ziel’: begeerten, gevoelens en emoties?

Het boek is verdeeld in drie delen. Na een uitvoerige en heldere inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) beschrijft zij hoe deze drie vragen/problemen aan de orde komen in een aantal tragedies uit de vijfde eeuw voor Christus (Agamemnon; Zeven tegen Thebe; Antigone), die vasthouden aan een onherleidbare rol voor het toeval bij het bepalen van een mensenleven en de waarde daarvan (deel I, hoofdstukken 2 en 3 ). Vervolgens beschrijft Nussbaum Plato’s poging in zijn dialogen uit de middenperiode om het leven van mensen te beschermen door het immuun te maken voor het toeval (deel II, hoofdstukken 4 t/m 7). Tot slot komt het meest uitvoerig aan bod hoe Aristoteles allerlei inzichten en waarden uit de tragedies weer oppakt en een opvatting van morele rationaliteit formuleert die mensen onafhankelijk moet maken op een voor mensen passende manier (deel III, hoofdstukken 8 t/m 13). Volgens Nussbaum kan tragische poëzie een inhoudelijke bijdrage leveren aan een onderzoek naar toeval en menselijke goedheid die ontbreekt als we ons zouden beperken tot traditioneel filosofische teksten. Tussen de hoofdstukken door gaat Nussbaum in zogenoemde ‘tussenspelen’ nader in op het belang van stijl: haar aanname (die overigens overtuigt) is dat de stijl waarin menselijke dilemma’s worden besproken niet neutraal is, maar dat daarin al een opvatting tot uitkomt komt over wat inzicht is en hoe de ziel dat kan verwerven. Dus het verschil tussen proza en poëzie, de dialoogstijl van Plato en meer komt ook uitgebreid aanbod. Nussbaum tracht ook in haar eigen schrijven recht te doen aan deze opvatting, om in de hoofdstukken over de tragedies een ontvankelijkheid voor metaforische en emotionerende taal te hanteren (meer literaire elementen), en in de hoofdstukken over met name Aristoteles een meer wetenschappelijke, verklarende stijl. Persoonlijk waardeer ik met name haar verklarende stijl, haar gestructureerdheid, maar het is zeker waar dat Nussbaum ook goed ontvankelijkheid weet over te brengen.

In het eerste deel blijkt dat de tragedies niet zozeer een oplossing voor het probleem van morele conflicten geeft, als wel de rijkdom en diepgang van dat probleem toont. Dat het meedogenloos vereenvoudigen van waarden om conflicterende verplichtingen uit te sluiten (zoals Kreon, maar ook Antigone zelf!) met een te grote prijs betaald moet worden. Zowel Kreon als Antigone hanteert een smalle, beperkte morele strategie: in de ene is één enkele menselijke waarde tot het ultieme doel gemaakt (burgerschap); in de andere gaat één bepaalde plicht boven alle andere (het begraven van doden). In de Agamemnon blijkt dat er soms conflicten zijn waarbij elk alternatief vreselijk is (het offeren van een kind of heiligschennis tegen de goden), waarbij geen sprake is van eigen toedoen en hoe dan ook een prijs betaald moet worden. Maar dan, zo laat Nussbaum zien, is voor een goed leven nog steeds van belang wat de visie en emotionele reactie is van de persoon op het conflict.

Vanaf pagina 150 stappen we over naar Plato’s ‘extreme, strenge en mooie voorstel voor een onafhankelijk menselijk leven’. Volgens Plato is een hoofdtaak van de filosofie het uitschakelen van het risico dat mensen blootstaan aan toeval. Het toeval heeft zo’n grote invloed omdat mensen zich hechten aan kwetsbare objecten en activiteiten; meervoudige waarden nastreven en onze plannen en streven wordt ontspoord door hartstochten en behoeften. Plato is op zoek naar een wetenschap (grieks: techné) die de mens hiertegen kan wapenen. Daarbij is meten van groot belang, om met wetenschappelijke kennis uiteenlopende zaken kwalitatief homogeen en onderling uitwisselbaar te maken.

Een mooie passage van Nussbaum (p. 176) is voor mij het citeren waard: “Als we overwegen om onze huidige ethische ziektes met een nieuwe vaardigheid te bestrijden, moeten we dan ook met de grootst mogelijke zorgvuldigheid bedenken wat voor leven we met die nieuwe vaardigheid zullen krijgen en welke nieuwe doelen daarmee gepaard gaan. Misschien willen we helemaal geen ingrijpende oplossing als het gevolg daarvan is dat we niet langer menselijk zijn. Dan is het immers nauwelijks óns leven meer dat gered wordt.” Een belangrijke waarschuwing in het licht van de huidige (al dan niet terechte) hype van Artificial Intelligence (AI) en de vaak verwachte grootse zegeningen die dit voor de mensheid met zich zal brengen.

Na hoofdstuk 4 volgt het eerste tussenspel: ‘Plato’s antitragische theater’. Van belang is om te realiseren dat in de Griekse oudheid allerlei verschillende soorten teksten onderricht in ethische kennis boden (epische, lyrische, tragische, komische poëzie, natuurwetenschappelijke of historische verhandelingen en de retorica), en met name dichters als belangrijkste ethische leraren werden beschouwd. Nussbaum laat zien hoe de dialoogvorm van Plato door zijn vorm van actief, lopend gesprek en open einde een dialectische relatie met de lezer tot stand brengt, van wie een kritische en actieve betrokkenheid bij de uitwisseling van ideeën wordt gevraagd (min of meer zoals van een toeschouwer bij een tragedie wordt gevraagd dat hij er over nadenkt wat de gebeurtenissen voor zijn eigen waardestelsel betekenen). Maar we zien in de dialogen van Plato niet (1) personages die betrokken zijn in een handeling en (2) de niet-verstandelijke elementen van de menselijke ziel. Dat dit volgens Nussbaum (zie ook later hierover uitgebreid Aristoteles) een gebrek is, is inmiddels wel duidelijk. Plato is in zijn middenperiode (Nussbaum laat mooi de ontwikkeling van Plato zien en zelfs dat Plato expliciet terugkomt van eerdere denkbeelden) ervan overtuigd dat in het morele en intellectuele leven van mensen reacties vanuit de zintuigen en emoties een sterk negatieve rol spelen, en dat een goede menselijke ontwikkeling het beste kan worden bevorderd door het intellectuele deel van de ziel te ‘scheiden’ van dergelijke reacties. De stijl van Plato, de filosofische dialoogstijl, zet zich af tegen het zuiver literaire en in deze stijl brengt tot uiting dat het verstand (zonder emoties, zonder begeerten) de ultieme bron van waarheid is. Stijl is dus allesbehalve neutraal.

Vervolgens wordt in hoofdstuk 5 De Republiek besproken, waarin wordt betoogd dat het beste leven voor een mens het leven van de filosoof is, een leven gewijd aan leren en nadenken over waarheid. En waarin het beste leven een leven is dat door de rede wordt geregeerd. Iemand waarbij hechting aan inherent instabiele doelen zoals liefde, seks, macht en rijkdom ontbreekt, is daarmee vanzelf ook de gangbaarste oorzaken van waardeconflicten kwijt. Zoals Nussbaum hier al laat doorschemeren (en bij het deel over Aristoteles verder uitwerkt), is dit een goddelijk ideaal, wat onaantrekkelijk is omdat het minachting inhoudt van allerlei dingen die we belangrijk vinden en omdat het voor ons leven áls mens niet relevant is. Is het wel mogelijk om de wereld en de waarde ervan te zien en te kennen los van onze menselijke interpretaties en zienswijzen, die gevormd zijn door onze belangstelling, betrokkenheid en leefwijze? Een interessant argument van Plato is dat de mens van nature een wezen is dat via de rede zijn louter menselijke grenzen wil overstijgen. Daar valt wel het een en ander op af te dingen, maar dat bepaalde groepen mensen dit toejuichen bewijst de stroming van het transhumanisme.

In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het Symposium uitgebreid besproken, met de nadruk op Socrates’ toespraak en – meest interessant – die van Alkibiades. Als hem wordt gevraagd om over liefde te spreken, wil Alkibiades het over een concrete liefde hebben. Zijn hele toespraak is een poging de uniekheid over te brengen. Zijn verhaal brengt waarheden over met behulp van beelden en gelijkenissen. Via Alkibiades’ toespraak komen we erachter dat er een vorm van inzicht is die neerkomt op een alerte reactie van verstand, voorstellingsvermogen en gevoel op de concrete bijzonderheden van een situatie. Verder wordt onder meer de rol van dichterlijke of literaire teksten bij moreel onderricht bepleit: voor echt begrip is het vaak noodzakelijk dat het voortkomt uit de cognitieve activiteit van verbeeldingskracht, emoties en zelfs lustgevoelens. Door jezelf in een probleem te verplaatsen en het te ervaren, en omdat we niet alles zelf kunnen ervaren wat noodzakelijk is voor een goed leven, kan de literatuur met haar verhalen en beelden ons stimuleren.

Hoofdstuk 7 vervolgt met de Faidros, waaruit een gedeeltelijke herroeping van Plato’s eerdere standpunt blijkt. Er volgt een nieuwe opvatting van de rol van gevoelens, emotie en concrete liefde in een goed leven. De niet-verstandelijke elementen worden door Plato nu gezien als noodzakelijk als bron van motiverende energie, en hebben een belangrijke sturende rol bij ons streven naar inzicht. Ze hebben een cognitieve waarde, want ze geven de persoon als geheel de informatie waar het goede en schone te vinden is. Wat Waarheid betreft, het verstand bereikt haar nog steeds, maar niet alle waardevolle waarheden hebben nu de vorm van algemene verklaringen of definities. De hartstochten en de daardoor geïnspireerde handelingen zijn intrinsiek waardevolle bestanddelen van het beste leven voor een mens. Opvallend is dus dat Plato nu bereid is om over de vraag naar het beste leven te oordelen vanuit het standpunt van de belangen, behoeften en beperkingen van het betreffende wezen (dus een menselijk leven). Deze gewijzigde opvatting van Plato werkt door in zijn stijl: meer dan eerdere besproken toespraken van Plato bevat deze metaforen, personificaties, kleurrijke, ritmische en verfijnde taal. Hij spreekt behalve het verstand ook het voorstellingsvermogen en de gevoelens aan.

Op pagina 336 begint het meest uitgebreide deel III, over Aristoteles. Aristoteles ontwikkelt een opvatting over de juiste verhouding van een mens tot toeval (tuché) die neerkomt op een terugkeer naar en een nadere formulering van allerlei inzichten van de tragedies. Aristoteles uitgangspunt is ethisch antropocentrisme: elk onderzoek hoe de mens zich tot toeval en de wereld van de natuur verhoudt, moet impliciet of expliciet aangeven wat het betekent om een menselijk dier te zijn. Hoofdstuk 8 gaat dan ook uitgebreid in op wat het betekent om mens te zijn, over hoe wij kennis vergaren en het belang van fenomenen (of verschijnselen) in verhouding tot theorie. Volgens Aristoteles staan verschijnselen en waarheid niet tegenover elkaar, zoals Plato geloofde. Wij kunnen alleen maar waarheid hebben binnen de kring van verschijnselen, omdat we alleen daar kunnen communiceren en verwijzen. Zodra we gaan theoretiseren, benadrukt Aristoteles telkens weer, lopen we onmiddellijk het gevaar van een te sterke vereenvoudiging. Onze taal en leefwijzen zijn rijker en complexer dan veel filosofische stromingen erkennen.

In hoofdstuk 9 staat de verklaring van handelen centraal. Waarom bewegen dieren? Volgens Aristoteles heeft een analyse van gedrag belangrijke gevolgen voor de ethiek, met name als het vragen over onze kwetsbaarheid en passiviteit betreft. In plaats van louter passief een invloed te ondergaan, hebben we een complexe ontvankelijkheid die openstaat voor de wereld en zich op haar beurt naar buiten op de wereld richt (streven). Hiermee wordt rationeel handelen gedemystificeerd, omdat we daar nu op dezelfde manier naar kijken als naar de bewegingen van dieren. Evenals die bewegingen is het een selectief reiken naar iets en richt het zich op objecten waarvan gedacht wordt dat ze in verband staan met de ervaren behoeften. Dieren lijken minder dierlijk en mensen meer op een dier. We zijn geen inerte objecten en geen volmaakte goden, wij worden niet eenvoudig voortbewogen van binnenuit en bewegen evenmin spontaan uit onszelf, maar omdat we onvolledig zijn, reiken we allemaal naar buiten, naar dingen in de wereld.

Hoofdstuk 10 is de aristotelische tegenhanger van de hoofdstukken 4 en 5. Aristoteles zegt allereerst dat het maken van morele afwegingen niet wetenschappelijk is en ook niet kan zijn en ten tweede dat de passende maatstaf voor een correcte keuze volledig menselijk is, die zijn of haar oordeel baseert op een lange en brede ervaring. Aristoteles benadrukt het belang van praktisch inzicht, en stelt de praktijk boven theorie. Nussbaum laat zien dat Aristoteles hierin niet doorslaat: regels zorgen voor bestendigheid en stabiliteit in situaties waarin vooringenomenheid en hartstocht het oordeel dreigen te vertroebelen. Dus wetten en algemene regels blijven ook bij Aristoteles hun waarde houden.

Hoofdstuk 11 gaat over de kwetsbaarheid van het goede menselijke leven en de rol die rampspoed heeft. Aristoteles beschrijft, zoals zijn methode vaker is, twee extreme standpunten om ons te helpen een standpunt te vinden dat rekening houdt met de drijfveren van beide groepen, maar de uitwassen ervan vermijdt. Dit betekent echter niet per se een veilige, saaie middenweg. Elk extreem standpunt wordt serieus genomen als authentiek onderdeel van de verschijnselen en daarmee moet rekening worden gehouden. Nussbaum geeft een heldere samenvatting van dit hoofdstuk op p. 467 die ik parafraseer: een goed karakter van een deugdzaam volstaat op zich zelf niet om ten volle goed te leven. We eisen dat dit goede karakter een uitdrukking of vervulling krijgt door handelen. Door te handelen krijg je met de wereld te maken, zodat je kwetsbaar wordt. Elke invulling van goed leven heeft dit element van risico. Een meegevende, open houding tegenover de wereld verleent hem de kwetsbaarheid, maar ook de schoonheid van een plant.

Hoofdstuk 12 vervolgt met de rol van relaties in het goede menselijke leven en de kwetsbaarheid die dat met zich brengt. Ook hier geldt dat je voor een goed menselijk leven risico gaat lopen, dat is onvermijdelijk. Maar als je eenheid en harmonie nastreeft door mogelijke bronnen van conflict weg te halen, verdwijnt daarmee ook de waarde. Omdat het doel van de aristoteliaan echter niet zozeer geluk is in de zin van tevredenheid, als wel in de zin van een vervuld leven dat rijk is aan waarden, is het geen oplossing dat je dan maar een waarde weglaat om je gelukkiger te voelen, dat je minder eisen aan de wereld stelt om prettigere antwoorden te krijgen.

Na hoofdstuk 12 volgt het tweede tussenspel over toeval en de tragische emoties. De grote tragische verhalen verkennen het verschil tussen onze goedheid en goed leven, tussen wat we zijn (ons karakter, onze bedoelingen, idealen, waarden) en in hoeverre we erin slagen als een goed mens te leven. Volgens Aristoteles kunnen medelijden en angst een bron van verlichting of verheldering worden, omdat iemand die op zijn of haar reacties afgaat en er gehoor aan geeft, een rijker zelfinzicht krijgt inzake de banden en waarden waarop deze reacties berusten. Dit in tegenstelling tot bijvoorbeeld Plato waarbij medelijden en angst nooit meer zijn dan een bron van misleiding en verwarring. Deze emoties, deze reacties zijn dan ook waardevol en verhelderend en net als het inzicht en de percepties van het verstand ook elementen van een juiste morele perceptie van onze situatie. Voor wie daar verder in is geïnteresseerd, heeft Nussbaum het nog omvangrijkere boek ‘Oplevingen van het denken, over de menselijke emoties’ geschreven.

Het laatste hoofdstuk, 13, gaat nader in op de tragedie van Euripides, Hekabe. Wat dit stuk laat zien door zijn verkenning van de mogelijkheden van een ideaal zoals dat van Aristoteles, is dat er waarde verloren gaat wanneer de risico’s die specifiek menselijke deugden met zich meebrengen worden uitgesloten. De mens zit als sociaal wezen tussen dieren en goden in en wordt ten opzichte van deze onafhankelijke wezens gedefinieerd door zijn open, kwetsbare aard, door de relationele aard van zijn belangrijkste waarden. Maar als mens-zijn een kwestie is van de aard van iemands vertrouwen en betrokkenheid en geen onveranderlijk van nature gegeven feit, dan is de mens ook het wezen dat het gemakkelijkst kan ophouden zichzelf te zijn – ofwel door zich (platonisch) te verheffen tot de onafhankelijkheid van het goddelijke, ofwel door af te glijden naar de onafhankelijkheid van hondsheid. Het betoog van Aristoteles waarin hij de inzichten van de tragedies voortzet en verfijnt, herinnert ons er echter aan dat we nooit zuiverheid of eenvoud kunnen bereiken zonder dat ons leven aan rijkdom en volheid verliest.

Na lezing van dit indrukwekkende boek krijg ik direct de neiging om de dialogen van Plato, de tragedies van Aischylos, Sophocles en Euripides te gaan lezen. Ervaring leert echter dat dit soms taaie kost kan zijn. Het is de grote verdienste van Nussbaum dat zij op een zeer gestructureerde wijze deze antieke Griekse denkers toegankelijk en relevant maakt voor mensen die willen nadenken en wellicht keuzes willen maken over wat een goed menselijk leven voor hen inhoudt.

[Menta · Rating 5 out of 5]

Uno de los pocos libros de filosofía que me han gustado what a time to be Alive

[Jim Cook · Rating 5 out of 5]

(Jim Cook’s Review) I’ve reviewed a couple of other books by Nussbaum on Goodreads, however the Fragility of Goodness is by far the best book of hers I’ve read to date. It’s amazing to me that she was able to complete such a deep and humane book about Classical Greek literature and philosophy when she was still in her 30’s!

Fortunately this dense forest of a book includes a very helpful and lucid introductory chapter that outlines the broad themes she will explore and the (Aristotelian) methodology she intends to utilize. As well, the book has a detailed analytical table of contents. Both of these help the reader follow and better appreciate the various threads of her, at times, quite erudite argument.

Once caveat: her book assumes a broad knowledge of Classical Greek literature and philosophy. Even the general reader who brings this background to the book will find at least some of the book’s sections on Aristotle quite challenging, as they focus on the subtleties of how various terms of moral value in Aristotle’s works have or ought to be translated into English.

Because Nussbaum’s work is fairly complex as well as wide-ranging, it is almost impossible to summarize. Consequently, I’m going to point to a few things in the book that I thought were especially interesting; and, I will criticize two arguments that she makes in the book.

Nussbaum’s approach to the discussion of philosophical matters has always been deeply interdisciplinary. This is something I like about her work. Some of her other works, for example, examines how music, especially opera, can shed light on issues in political philosophy (Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice); she has also championed what has become known as the “capability approach” to justice with Amartya Sen. In this book, among other objectives, she attempts to show how Greek dramatic writers can offer deep insights into ethical thinking.

Much of Fragility involves a discussion of several Greek tragic dramas, Agamemnon and the Eumenides by Aeschylus, Antigone by Sophocles, and Hecuba by Euripides; the middle and late period Platonic dialogues; and Aristotle’s ethical writings. A central question for Nussbaum, as for the authors of the aforementioned works, is: how much contingency or luck (tuche, in Greek) “can we humanly live with? How much should we live with, in order to live the life that is best and most valuable for a human being?” A related question (one she brings to the discussion from contemporary philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams) is: how are our moral judgements affected by contingency?

Since Kant, most philosophical discussion has taken it for granted that our moral judgements are independent of circumstances or contingency. Kantian and Post-Kantian ethics sharply distinguishes the sphere of contingent happenings from the domain of moral personality and, accordingly, the life of virtue (says Kant) is ultimately safe “against the accidents of step-motherly nature.”

One example illustrates that the matter is not that simple. Consider a driver who is late for work and decides to speed to get to work on time. As she speeds through an intersection her vehicle narrowly misses a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Now consider a second driver who acts in exactly the same manner but has the contingent misfortune to hit the pedestrian, killing him. Although both drivers had the same motives, and did the same thing, we instinctively blame the second driver more than the first one. If contingency can affect our basic moral judgements in this way, then its larger role in describing “the good life” must be considered by the philosopher.

In a nutshell, Nussbaum’s argument is that Plato generally failed to do this, apart from a partial “retraction” in his later dialogues. Aristotle, however, always kept the role of contingency front and centre in his ethical thought. I believe Nussbaum’s arguments here are convincing and, in making them, she often provides very illuminating comments on Plato’s works, especially on his Symposium.

One topic not sufficiently explored by Nussbaum is the role of “risk management” in the good human life. While she argues that an element of risk is essential to even the best of human lives she never assesses what level of risk control is appropriate and when risk management efforts reach diminishing returns. Had she written this book today (in a world struggling to appropriately navigate the impact of a global pandemic) I’m sure she might have had much more to say about this aspect of the topic.

I have some concerns about two claims Nussbaum makes in her book. The first has to do with her use of the term “Aristotelian” and the second with her explanation of Aristotle’s views about slavery and women.

Nussbaum makes several statements about utilizing an “Aristotelian methodology” in her study of the Greek dramatists and philosophers she discusses. But she never explains in any detail what this methodology actually entails. She even labels as Aristotelians contemporary philosophers like Henry Sidgwick and John Rawls! Neither of these individuals, one of whom was a utilitarian and the other a Kantian in ethical thinking, would have recognized this label as descriptive of their works.

Secondly, Nussbaum significantly whitewashes Aristotle’s account of slavery and of women. Aristotle was convinced that women were both intellectually and morally inferior to men; they were also more cowardly. Their place was in the home, not in public life. A man could never have a true friendship with a woman (or a slave). This is, perhaps, somewhat embarrassing for Nussbaum who is a fairly prominent feminist. How can she describe herself as being both a feminist and an Aristotelian? Her answer is unconvincing. She defends Aristotle’s beliefs about women by claiming it only “…shows us the tremendous power of sexual convention and sexual prejudice in shaping a view of the world. it was the one area of life in which [Aristotle] was so deeply immersed that he could not compensate for bias or partiality, he could not even follow his own method…” (p 371). Of course, Nussbaum can follow his “method” raised as she has been in a culture that is more supportive of human excellence for both sexes.

The flaw here is twofold. First, as we have seen, her definition of “Aristotelian method” is so vague it could include any approach. Second, her opinion that Aristotle’s era was responsible for his views about the opposite sex is muddled thinking in two ways. First, no one’s cultural heritage is, by itself, responsible for their thoughts and behaviour. Individuals carry that responsibility not their social conditions. A culture may set the outer boundaries of their ideas but not the specifics of their thinking. Secondly, Nussbaum exaggerates the force of one’s social environment on our specific beliefs. If what she claims is true about Aristotle’s views of women how was Plato able to escape the influence of his culture? Plato has sometimes been described as the world’s first feminist for his views about the equality of the sexes and the need for them to be treated equally as they grow up, are educated, and assume positions of responsibility in their society. While Aristotle apparently did not allow women to be students in his school in Athens, Plato did - as did Epicurus, the founding father of Epicureanism. Indeed, it’s recorded that Epicurus allowed both women and slaves to join his school. Nussbaum herself notes at one point in her book (p.497) that in his school “some women held positions of high respect”! Consider also the Greek dramatist Sophocles. His great play Antigone is examined in Nussbaum’s book The lead protagonist (Antigone) is a daring, self-assured and courageous woman. She is also a moral paragon, ready to die for for her view of ethical reality. Tradition records that this drama was first performed in Athens in about 441 BCE. It was such a success with the audience it helped secure Sophocles’ election as general and co-commander with Pericles in an expedition against Samos the next year (see C.M. Bowra, Sophoclean Tragedy, 1964, p. 63).

Surely, if misogynistic views were so widely shared in the Athens of Aristotle’s time a dramatist like Sophocles would never have thought to write a play around a character like Antigone! And, if he somehow was able to defy convention and did so anyway, his audience would have jeered his players out of the amphitheatre. But that is not what occurred. They elected the author of the drama a general and showered him with praise.

As for slavery: Anyone familiar with Aristotle’s comments about slavery in his works, especially in his Politics, will be aware of his odious defence of the practice of slavery. Slavery was common at the time and Aristotle provided the standard defence of the practice, arguing that many people are “slaves by nature” who were actually better off for being so. Indeed, Aristotle was so blinded by this ideology that he could even write that “master and slave have the same interest” (Politics 1251b). In spite of this kind of language in his works, Nussbaum claims that Aristotle “…condemns as unjust most of the actual practice of slavery in his culture…” (p. 348).

Regardless of my difference of opinion on these two aspects of her work they don’t affect it’s main arguments. I learned a great deal about Greek thought and drama of the Classical era and would highly recommend her book to anyone who has a deep interest in these topics.

[Andrew]

"if activities are the main thing in life, as we said, nobody who is makarios will ever become basely wretched. For he will never engage in hateful and base actions. We think that the really good and reasonable person will bear his luck with dignity and always do the finest thing possible given the circumstances, just as the good general will make the most warlike use of the army he has and the good shoemaker will make the best shoe he can out of the hide he is given -- and so on for all craftsmen. If this is right, then the eudaimon person would never become basely wretched; nonetheless, he will still not be makarios, if he encounters the luck of Priam. Nor indeed is he variable and easily changed, for he will not be easily dislodged from his eudaimonia, nor by just any misfortune that happens his way, but only by big and numerous misfortunes; and out of these he will not become eudaimonia again in a short time, but, if ever, in a long and complete time, if, in that time, he gets hold of big and fine things."

[Micah · Rating 2 out of 5]

It was a well written book with good analysis, but it seemed to drag at certain points to me. I'm sure this would appeal to someone who is more interested in Greek philosophy than I am though. I can see her logic and follow her arguments well however they simply don't resonate with me as Nussbaum clearly loves Aristotle and I can take him or leave him.

[Tony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Chapter 3 on the play Antigone, by Sophocles, is excellent. And as it stands on its own, the reader could delve in here, read nothing but this chapter, and walk away decidedly improved in their understanding of that play. All the chapters on ancient tragedy read at a good clip, and reward the reader with insight (nous). Things slow down with the chapters on Plato, as Nussbaum presses her argument that the mature dialogues of Plato provide "a fusion of clarity and passion" (p.232) --no doubt anathema to some Platonists, but a worthwhile read.

Although the pace becomes glacial for the chapters on Aristotle, due to the difficulty of the material, it is fascinating to see Nussbaum attempt to defend "Protagorean anthropocentrism" (p.242), as she draws an elaborate analogy between Aristotle's ethics and the position laid out by Socrates' opponent in the Platonic dialogue, the Protagoras. And yet, it's not anthropocentrism: As she puts it, Aristotle "demystifies rational action by asking us to see it as similar to other animal motions. ... Animals look less brutish, humans more animal." (p.276) Or, "our shared animal nature is the ground of our ethical development." (p.287). Aristotle just looks anthropocentric relative to Plato's woolly-headed other-worldy "forms," not that the human species is somehow set apart from other animal species on the planet. That is, unlike Plato, Nussbaum (following Aristotle) is concerned to allow the human being to reclaim "its membership in a larger world of nature." (p.288)

The importance of the earlier discussion of Sophocles' Antigone is again underlined in later chapters that provide her discussion of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics, because Nussbaum argues (e.g. in Chapter 10, entitled "Non-scientific deliberation") that Aristotle is in some sense rehabilitating the older, pre-philosophical tradition, in the ethical field:

Aristotle has, then, attacked the technē conception of practical reason... He has developed further a conception of practical reasoning that we saw adumbrated in the Antigone, in which receptivity and the ability to yield flexibly to the 'matter' of the contingent particular were combined with a reverence for a plurality of values, for stable character, and for the shared conventions of which character, through moral education, is the internalization. .... The pre-Aristotelian tradition, we have argued, is not single-mindedly devoted to the ideal of controlling and immobilizing [tuchē, chance]: it is deeply critical of that aim. The Antigone, for example, has articulated the idea that the right sort of relationship to have with the contingent particulars of the world is one in which ambition is combined with wonder and openness. Aristotle, we have argued, returns to this tradition, in all of its complexity, defending an attitude to contingent particulars that renounces the Platonic aspiration to control and unblemished activity. (pp.309-310)

Or, in comparison to Aristotle's belief in the capacity for worldly circumstances, both good and bad for better or for worse, to affect our character (discussed by Nussbaum in Chapter 11, one of two chapters entitled "The vulnerability of the good life"):

The virtues require a stance of openness towards the world and its possibilities: as the Antigone also suggested, a yielding and receptive character of soul that is not compatible with an undue emphasis on self-protection. This openness is both itself vulnerable and a source of vulnerability for the person's eudeimonia: for the trusting person is more easily betrayed than the self-enclosed person, and it is the experience of betrayal that slowly erodes the foundation of the virtues. .... Indeed, we might say that the good are in certain ways more at risk than the bad: for it is the good euēthēs [open, guileless] person who trusts in uncertain things and therefore risks the pain of disillusionment. (p.339)

Or, once again, in the chapter rounding out her analysis of Aristotle (Chapter 12, the other chapter entitled "The vulnerability of the good life", this time addressing the subject with a focus on "relational goods"):

We find, then, in Aristotle's thought about the civilized city, an idea we first encountered in the Antigone: the idea that the value of certain constituents of the good human life is inseparable from a risk of opposition, therefore of conflict. To have them adequately is to have them plural and separate.... The singleness of Creon's simplification...impoverishes the world. (p.353)

The way Sophoclean thought or Sophoclean characters from this particular play (representing decided perspectives about human life) weave in and out of Nussbaum's exposition of Aristotle's ethics argues both for the importance of the Antigone (and hence, the essential nature of Chapter 3 in her book, the chapter where she lays out her interpretation of the play) and for her heightened interest in classical Greek tragedy in general (she also addresses Aeschylus and Euripides at length) as a realm providing insight as valuable as anything in philosophy.

[Joan Lieberman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Is someone lucky or blessed? The distance between survival and disaster is ceaselessly changing and most of us have absolutely no control over what happens. Why are we here and why do some prosper and other live lives of despair?

[Adam Gurri · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book. Examines the role of luck in our ability to be a good person and lead a good life, through the perspectives of Greek tragedy, Plato, and Aristotle, comparing the three along the way.

[Nate · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a difficult read and also a brilliant book. Her thesis is expressed eloquently: "part of the peculiar beauty of human excellence just is its vulnerability. The tenderness of a plant is not the dazzling hardness of a gem."

In addition to being an excellent commentary on Greek tragedy, Plato, and Aristotle, the book also functions as an argument for Aristotelian practical wisdom. By practical wisdom Nussbaum means a wisdom that is not only focused on universal truth, but also on particular knowledge and ways of living well in a contingent world.

When faced with genuinely difficult choices in life and responsible for situations beyond our own control (as all of us are) there are a few approaches one can take.

1) Deny that transient and contingent things are truly valuable. This is roughly the route Plato takes. If there is only one Good thing then there can't be conflicts between multiple incommensurable goods. Utilitarianism also takes this route arguing that we can compare possibilities on the basis of utility. A possible motivation for these theories is that "we are motivated to seek true, stable value because we cannot live with the pain and instability of our empirical lives." (p. 161)
2) Another route is to deny that activity and external states are important to the good life. As long as one's internal state is virtuous one can be happy. (Nussbaum doesn't mention stoicism or Buddhism, referring to this approach as the good-condition theorist...but I would generally associate either of those schools of thought as focusing primarily on internal states. I recognize that Buddhism, of course, teaches compassion and is not indifferent to external states of the world, which I why I refer only to the focus of those philosophies)

Nussbaum sides against both those approaches arguing that "complete invulnerability is purchased, Aristotle will argue, at too high a price: by imagining (as does the Platonist) a life bereft of certain important values; or by doing violence (as does the good-condition theorists) to our believes about an activity and its worth" (p. 322)

Unlike the Platonist with its focus on the universal and desire to view things from the perspective of an unlimited being, Aristotle begins with human experiences and human needs for things like food, drink, love, and companionship. "Aristotle points out that the perspective of an unlimited being is not necessarily and unlimited perspective: for from this viewpoint many values cannot be seen." (p. 342).

This ultimately leads to a very different perspective on engagement with the world. "Instead of reducing our demands on the world so that they will more consistently be met, we ought, he believes, to increase our activity in and towards the world so that it will more regularly meet our high demands. Instead of decreeing in advance that the only important things are the ones that are already under human control, we try to increase our human control over the important things." (p. 352)

This approach makes us vulnerable to tragedy precisely because we are saying there are things of moral and human importance that simply are not in our control. I side with Nussbaum and Aristotle in thinking that this fits our empirical observations of what it is like to be human. Tragedies do happen, values aren't all commensurable, and while the longing to be invulnerable from the contingencies of life is understandable we should not let it distort our view of what matters in life.

[Austin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Exceptional, emotive, and enlightening. In Fragility, Nussbaum poses us a question: to what extent is a good human life subject to external causes and effects. Nested within this are many smaller questions. How much can be learn about the "good life" from the poets and tragedians? Can a life divorced from any externality be good? Must this be the case? Nussbaum begins with discussions on Agamemnon and Antigone, which are interesting and through which she explores the lessons of tragedy and the ideas of culpability and contingency within tragedies. After this, she discusses Plato, who believed that the good life was one born of the intellect, and which stood without the passions. She pays particular attention to how Plato was writing in response to poets, and seems to really narrow in on the Republic and the Phaedo throughout the earlier chapters. She dedicates an entire chapter - the most interesting of the book by far - to the Symposium (I will further discuss this is an edit to this review at a later point), as well as to the Phaedrus to show the evolution of Plato in the late-period dialogues, and how he began to embrace the passions as motivational and informational with regards to the good things in life. Nussbaum concludes with Aristotle's conception of the good life, rooted in human experience and containing concerted human feelings. The good life is not IMMUNE to external forces as Plato suggested. To rid oneself of the particular in search of the universal is to sacrifice something - to lose some critical part of beauty/love/goodness (Alcibiades and Diatoma serve as the greatest discussion of this idea, which is carried throughout the Aristotelian chapters). Nussbaum concludes with Euripides' Hecuba, which drives the final point home. The good life is of course one that involves good choice and good character, but ultimately is subject to external forces beyond one's control, which can impede the good life and which can even erode good character. Goodness in humans, after all, is far more like goodness in a plant than we imagine. It does not stand alone, but requires nurturing, external forces, and yes - luck - in order to grow and to thrive.

[Patrícia Raquel Pereira · Rating 5 out of 5]

Upon first discovering Martha C. Nussbaum's philosophy, which is Aristotelian in spirit, I immediately sensed the power of her reasoning and decided to pursue the reading of her books.

This work is heterogeneous, as mentioned in the preface, invoking models to support a number of different positions.* The central theme is about the human good or "eudaimonia": "How can it be reliably good and still beautifully human?"

The main argument revolves around the role of tragedy (Part I) and the views of the tragic poets, Plato (Part II) and Aristotle (Part III). 1. The great tragic plots explore the gap between our goodness, between what we are, and how humanly well we manage to live. 2. Plato focuses on the relationship between self-sufficiency (the power of reason) and the more ungovernable parts of the human being's internal makeup. 3. Aristotle, in his turn, focused on the role in the human good life of activities and relationships that are, in their nature, especially vulnerable to reversal/fortune — elements such as love, friendship, political activity, etc. For there can exist, as Aristotle argues, a reasonable gap between being good (character) and living well (action). That gap is defined as the uncontrolled happenings (external) in a person's life and in our world. The contrast is between living a life at the mercy of luck and living a life made safer or more controlled with forethought, planning, and prediction.

*Worth mentioning that I do not agree with all her views.

[Cate Andrews · Rating 4 out of 5]

The concept "good" is overused in ordinary life, especially my own. I hear "I can't believe how good ai am" from women who deny my alterity and humanity: they don't listen they simply say and think that it, a nutshell, all that needs to be said. I then hear how unlucky I am to be different. The one who questions botox, ordinary use of the concept "beauty" for product endorsement as well as the marriage that didn't conform to ordinary desires of marrying for money and not happiness. When Jeanette Winterson wrote Why be happy when you can be normal I considered in my heterosexual body just how much women are cruel no matter to whom whether heterosexual or other choices. The luck in ordinary life is not experiencing the cruelty. Beneath the surface the knowledge lurks of the darkness denied: what does it mean to be a good woman, wife, lover, professional when cruelty has organised the socialisation process explicitly through known gossip, rumours and general criticism or implicitly through expectations and seeking that ideal. Nussbaum offers a way to reframe and rethink our social lived and the responsibility denied by others and how we might live the tragedy with responsibility for happiness to collaborate, communicate and energize our microcosm or individual worlds to support others more responsibly.

[Nick · Rating 2 out of 5]

Philosophy is often well structured, but I found this frequently recommended book rambling and disjointed. The author examines ‘goodness’ using texts from the Socratic philosophers e.g. the Socratic view that nobody does wrong willingly: we choose the lesser good only as a result of ignorance. Plato believes that what is truly intrinsically valuable is so always, and not just in a particular context or not in a particular context. Aristotle however questions the platonic good. Aristotle believes practical wisdom can only come from experience.

Philosophy proofs have to be based on our experience. We can’t just follow logical argument wherever it leads. Theory must remain committed to the way humans live, act, see - to the pragmata. You must remember you are a human being. Need to pass judgements based on our experience “phainomena”. See, take in, recognize and apply judgement based on experience. Not because one has seen all fact patterns but because if one is virtuous s/he will derive from this internalized conception of value many ongoing guidelines for action, pointers what to look for in a particular situation. This is the ‘eye of the soul’.

[Taylor Swift Scholar · Rating 5 out of 5]

I truly love this book -- it is the first philosophical text that has ever made me cry. Nussbaum explores the good life as it is conceived of by Greek tragedians, Plato in his middle period, Plato in his later period, and Aristotle. Nussbaum tracks each conception of the good life and whether it is vulnerable to external forces or whether strength of character makes a good man totally self-reliant. The highlight of this book for me is Nussbaum's reading of Plato's Symposium. I've never really felt allowed to take what anyone besides Socrates had to say seriously before, or to read much into the dialogue form, but Nussbaum does both. She gives a beautiful reading of what it means to contextualize the speech of Socrates with the others and particularly with Alcibiades bursting in. One of Nussbaum's arguments is that the best life for humans (as opposed to the best life for rocks or dogs) is inherently vulnerable because we need things from other people, like food and love. If we remove our need for other people, we are less vulnerable, but also less human.

[Tessa · Rating 4 out of 5]

The notes that I've scribbled on my mirror:
"Self-sufficiency is inefficiency.

Vulnerability (e.g. contingency, contingent values, to be incomplete, to desire, to suffer) are essential constituents of the good life.

You must acknowledge complexity.

You must not only think but feel.

We live in a society - isolation is tempting but practicality and also Aristotle insist that you DO live in a society and must act accordingly."


This is excellence in form, absolutely scrupulous, meticulous, dare I say IMMACULATE. The organization of this book is exquisite. The most beautiful table of contents I have ever witnessed. Important notes are footnotes and peripheral ones are endnotes. The notes and indices are superb. Also I loved the paper quality. THIS! Is elegance.

Re: meaning, it has well-qualified and thoughtful arguments. The insights didn't particularly rock my world and also this book is entirely too long, but still quite enjoyable.

[Shannon]

I can’t really rate this book. In places it was a slog to get through, but that was because I never took a philosophy course and am not too familiar with the Greek plays referenced in this text, which reads more like a textbook than a work of non-fiction.

Still, I learned a lot about Platonic and Aristotelian thought, enjoyed Nussbaum throwing shade at other scholars, and thought it was very well written. I just REALLY had to be in the mood to read it, and when I was it was still slow going. It demands your full attention to get anything out of it.

[Don Mitchell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Text on Ethics using Greek philosophy and plays to support a non-absolutist view. Well written and reasoned but because it uses these ancient texts as support, it got a bit tiresome as having little evidential basis. I kept thinking that I cared more about her argument and reasoning than the texts she was using as support.

The basic argument is that Ethics are situational and sometimes in conflict with each other as contraposed against Hegel's view that such beliefs represent failure to seriously wrestle with ethical implications.

[Tomo Holm · Rating 5 out of 5]

*Thoughts*

Coming to a deeper understanding of Greek tragedies have open up my eyes for the utter despair of a disposition the modern human finds itself in. With metaphysics removed after the Enligthenment, we find ourselves not only fragile but also vulnerable.

The need for theology rethinking its discourse so to appropriately engage in a conversation with the modern human is ever increasing.

[Manuel Sotomayor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Una obra verdaderamente monumental que me ha transformado como lector e investigador. Nussbaum logra algo extraordinario: convertir este libro en un seminario íntimo con los gigantes de la antigüedad griega - Sófocles, Esquilo, Eurípides, Platón, Aristóteles.

Su tesis central: la vulnerabilidad es constitutiva de nuestra naturaleza humana, no un defecto a superar sino el elemento constitutivo a entender de nosotros mismos. A través de tragedias y diálogos y ensayos filosóficos, nos muestra cómo la fortuna y las condiciones externas moldean inevitablemente nuestras vidas éticas.

Me ha sido invaluable para mi tesis doctoral, pero más importante aún, me ha ayudado a comprender mejor la condición humana. Nussbaum nos obliga a releer (o leer por primera vez) estos monumentos clásicos con otros ojos.

Gratitud infinita por esta contribución al pensamiento humano!!

[Niranjan Kunwar · Rating 5 out of 5]

My primary anchor during the early weeks of the pandemic. Never thought I'd actually read all of it - surprised myself, and how. This is an exceedingly delightful, wonderfully written enlightening masterpiece. If only every person read it! :D

[Andrea Samorini]

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FROM BOOK: Scuola di filosofie 2. XX secolo (Andrea Colamedici, Maura Gancitano)

[Colleen Fidlin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not an easy read but for those that are interested in Philosophy this book offers a lot of insights into the works of Socrates and Plato's Symposium .