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On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
"A masterful analysis of the strategy, or lack thereof, in the Vietnam War ... a book that every policy maker in Washington should absorb." — Max Cleland, Atlanta Journal Constitution
Required reading at The National, Naval, and Air War Colleges, as well as other high level military institutions throughout the United States, American Strategy in Vietnam has become one of the most-well-respected investigations of the strategic and tactical policies of the U.S. Army during the twentieth century. Crackling with keen insight and clarity, this invaluable resource has renewed the study of strategy and its vital relationship to the art of war.
Drawing heavily on the brilliant theories of the great Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, this is the definitive politico-military assessment of the Vietnam War. Instead of merely examining the individual strategic flaws of the conflict, the book embraces a larger scope: how the weak relationship between military strategy and national policy led to the Vietnam War's unpopular and faulty definition--and eventual failure. Particularly relevant today, this important exposé stresses the futility of any military action without the full support and involvement of the country's people.
Required reading at The National, Naval, and Air War Colleges, as well as other high level military institutions throughout the United States, American Strategy in Vietnam has become one of the most-well-respected investigations of the strategic and tactical policies of the U.S. Army during the twentieth century. Crackling with keen insight and clarity, this invaluable resource has renewed the study of strategy and its vital relationship to the art of war.
Drawing heavily on the brilliant theories of the great Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, this is the definitive politico-military assessment of the Vietnam War. Instead of merely examining the individual strategic flaws of the conflict, the book embraces a larger scope: how the weak relationship between military strategy and national policy led to the Vietnam War's unpopular and faulty definition--and eventual failure. Particularly relevant today, this important exposé stresses the futility of any military action without the full support and involvement of the country's people.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1982
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About the author
Harry G. Summers Jr.
48 books8 followersHarry G. Summers Jr. is best known as the author of an analysis of the Vietnam War, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982). An infantry colonel in the US Army, he had served as a squad leader in the Korean War and as a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam War. Summers was also an instructor and Distinguished Fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and served on the negotiation team for the United States at the end of the Vietnam War.
Aside from his books, Summers wrote a syndicated national newspaper column on national security affairs for the Los Angeles Times and was the editor of Vietnam Magazine. He was also a frequent speaker at colleges, lectures, and debates.
During Operation Desert Storm, Summers served as a color commentator and analyst on the ongoing live network news broadcasts and for a time became a familiar face to the television viewers. In 1992, he wrote a book on the Gulf War, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War.
Aside from his books, Summers wrote a syndicated national newspaper column on national security affairs for the Los Angeles Times and was the editor of Vietnam Magazine. He was also a frequent speaker at colleges, lectures, and debates.
During Operation Desert Storm, Summers served as a color commentator and analyst on the ongoing live network news broadcasts and for a time became a familiar face to the television viewers. In 1992, he wrote a book on the Gulf War, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War.
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December 14, 2021
In his book THE ARMY AND VIETNAM, Andrew Krepinevich laments that no lessons were learned by the military in Vietnam. As Harry Summers demonstrates, though, many lessons were learned during the Vietnam conflict. His work ON STRATEGY: A Crytical Analysis of the Vietnam War, which proposes a theory of the reasons for America's military failure in the Third World country, achieved a great deal of publicity and even the status of a reliable source on its subject among Army officers. The problem is that those lessons were wrong.
Summers whole theory centers on the claim that the Army's fatal mistake was its becoming overly involved in combating guerrilla insurgency in the South and missing the actual threat – the North Vietnamese. According to him, the Army had become "unfaithful" to its principles, and that is what had led it into the Vietnamese quagmire. The main problem with his theory is that it is based on an incorrect assumption about whether or not the Army should have brought its principles from the European, Pacific, and, most importantly, Korean theaters into the Vietnamese conflict at all. To prove that Summers' assumption was indeed incorrect, let's examine those principles themselves.
The success of American military strategy in the Korean War – a conflict that, for the matter of fact, was large-scale and bore little similarity to the low-level warfare in Vietnam – convinced Army leaders they could apply it to all types of wars in Southeast Asia from then on. That strategy was essentially one of attrition. It was cumbersome and relied predominantly on enormous quantities of manpower and matériel. As Andrew Krepinevich explained in his book, faithful to its name, the war of attrition is exhausting and costly. Furthermore, it guarantees success only provided victory is measured in men, matériel, and territory lost by the enemy. In other words, provided the war is fought by one conventional army against another conventional army.
In Vietnam, as both military and civilian advisers knew, that was simply not the case. Well, the American Army indeed was, and persisted in remaining, a conventional army, but the Viet Minh was anything but. It was a well-organized, invisible guerrilla force that penetrated South Vietnam and made life intolerable for the Americans by refusing to fight a war on their terms. Instead of engaging in battles, it conducted a campaign of terror in the countryside, molested American units from time to time, and then retreated into the impenetrable jungle to heal its wounds and reinforce. Most importantly, it gained its strength from the loyal support of the local population, which often sympathized with it more than with the American allies, who, in many aspects, were difficult to distinguish from the French colonialists. Generally, the situation was not looking sunny for the American Army – it was wasting increasing numbers of men and amounts of material with no definitive success in sight, for how exactly do you measure success in a war in which gaining territory means nothing?
The best thing Army leaders could have done to solve this predicament was to do in Rome as the Romans do – drop the strategy of attrition for good and adapt its cumbersome military apparatus to the craft of guerrilla warfare. This would have allowed the Army to fight on the same terms as the Viet Minh and, therefore, to measure victory and loss accurately. Most importantly, by focusing on counter-insurgency, the Army would have recognized the pressing need to cut off guerrilla access to the South Vietnamese population. That would have been a severe blow for the Viet Minh and would have let America have the upper hand in the conflict.
After 1965, it slowly began to dawn on some Army officers that a greater focus on counter-insurgency would shift the course of the war in their favor, so some local-level initiative was taken. However, it remained local-level only and did not achieve any major success exactly because the high-ranking military brass stubbornly stuck to the "principles" Summers accuses them of abandoning. To the end, the American Army remained a conventional military force fighting a war of attrition. For this, it paid a high price in both men and matériel, and ultimately suffered a humiliating defeat.
What is even more troubling, all the lessons learned among the low echelons of the Army were quickly, and often deliberately, forgotten. Army officers preferred to embrace interpretations and conclusions that supported the (ineffective) conventional strategies the high-ranking military leaders had insisted on in Vietnam. Hence, misleading studies like Henry Summers' work were taken for truth itself.
I do not recommend ON STRATEGY. It is, as I already mentioned, based on wrong assumptions that lead to harmful conclusions that, in turn, make the road to future Vietnams look smooth, honorable, and inviting. I do recommend Andrew Krepinevich's The Army and Vietnam – an outstanding study that would serve as an effective antidote to this book. I believe, and hope, it would prove to be interesting and persuasive even for supporters of Summers' theory.
Summers whole theory centers on the claim that the Army's fatal mistake was its becoming overly involved in combating guerrilla insurgency in the South and missing the actual threat – the North Vietnamese. According to him, the Army had become "unfaithful" to its principles, and that is what had led it into the Vietnamese quagmire. The main problem with his theory is that it is based on an incorrect assumption about whether or not the Army should have brought its principles from the European, Pacific, and, most importantly, Korean theaters into the Vietnamese conflict at all. To prove that Summers' assumption was indeed incorrect, let's examine those principles themselves.
The success of American military strategy in the Korean War – a conflict that, for the matter of fact, was large-scale and bore little similarity to the low-level warfare in Vietnam – convinced Army leaders they could apply it to all types of wars in Southeast Asia from then on. That strategy was essentially one of attrition. It was cumbersome and relied predominantly on enormous quantities of manpower and matériel. As Andrew Krepinevich explained in his book, faithful to its name, the war of attrition is exhausting and costly. Furthermore, it guarantees success only provided victory is measured in men, matériel, and territory lost by the enemy. In other words, provided the war is fought by one conventional army against another conventional army.
In Vietnam, as both military and civilian advisers knew, that was simply not the case. Well, the American Army indeed was, and persisted in remaining, a conventional army, but the Viet Minh was anything but. It was a well-organized, invisible guerrilla force that penetrated South Vietnam and made life intolerable for the Americans by refusing to fight a war on their terms. Instead of engaging in battles, it conducted a campaign of terror in the countryside, molested American units from time to time, and then retreated into the impenetrable jungle to heal its wounds and reinforce. Most importantly, it gained its strength from the loyal support of the local population, which often sympathized with it more than with the American allies, who, in many aspects, were difficult to distinguish from the French colonialists. Generally, the situation was not looking sunny for the American Army – it was wasting increasing numbers of men and amounts of material with no definitive success in sight, for how exactly do you measure success in a war in which gaining territory means nothing?
The best thing Army leaders could have done to solve this predicament was to do in Rome as the Romans do – drop the strategy of attrition for good and adapt its cumbersome military apparatus to the craft of guerrilla warfare. This would have allowed the Army to fight on the same terms as the Viet Minh and, therefore, to measure victory and loss accurately. Most importantly, by focusing on counter-insurgency, the Army would have recognized the pressing need to cut off guerrilla access to the South Vietnamese population. That would have been a severe blow for the Viet Minh and would have let America have the upper hand in the conflict.
After 1965, it slowly began to dawn on some Army officers that a greater focus on counter-insurgency would shift the course of the war in their favor, so some local-level initiative was taken. However, it remained local-level only and did not achieve any major success exactly because the high-ranking military brass stubbornly stuck to the "principles" Summers accuses them of abandoning. To the end, the American Army remained a conventional military force fighting a war of attrition. For this, it paid a high price in both men and matériel, and ultimately suffered a humiliating defeat.
What is even more troubling, all the lessons learned among the low echelons of the Army were quickly, and often deliberately, forgotten. Army officers preferred to embrace interpretations and conclusions that supported the (ineffective) conventional strategies the high-ranking military leaders had insisted on in Vietnam. Hence, misleading studies like Henry Summers' work were taken for truth itself.
I do not recommend ON STRATEGY. It is, as I already mentioned, based on wrong assumptions that lead to harmful conclusions that, in turn, make the road to future Vietnams look smooth, honorable, and inviting. I do recommend Andrew Krepinevich's The Army and Vietnam – an outstanding study that would serve as an effective antidote to this book. I believe, and hope, it would prove to be interesting and persuasive even for supporters of Summers' theory.
November 27, 2020
On Strategy is interesting, but lacking in wider perspective, i.e., it does not address the key question of whether the US should have been fighting in Vietnam in the first place, and if not, why did the military not say so to the civilian leadership. I read this many years ago as a Cadet at West Point, but even then I did not fully accept Summers' thoughts on how the war might have been won. I think the US encountered an enemy in the Vietnamese who were simply tougher and more patient and more convinced of the rightness of their cause than the US was, and as Napoleon said, the moral is to the physical as ten to one. And in the South Vietnamese, they also had one of the poorest allies the US has fought alongside. I remember comparisons being made in the '60's between Korea and Vietnam, implying that, surely if we could fight the Communists to a draw in Korea, we could also do it in Vietnam. This simplification overlooked too many key facts to list here, but suffice it to say that the two wars were not at all comparable. Korea is a peninsula with oceans to secure an army's flanks, the ROK Army was dedicated and tough, and the South Koreans believed in their cause; nothing equivalent can be said about Vietnam.
The book is in many ways a mechanism to excuse the defeat in Vietnam by blaming it on political leaders, and the politicians do have to shoulder the majority of the blame, since they were the ones who put the military, and millions of US teenagers and young men into Vietnam without clearly explaining to the US public what would be required to "win". At the end of the day, the US did not have to fight a war in Vietnam, and should not have done so. I grew up in a military family and my father served in Vietnam (and WW2 and Korea); he was part of the WW2 generation that believed the US could do anything it decided to do, which is or was true in general. But the war in Vietnam was begun on such flawed premises with such an unreliable ally in the South Vietnamese government, that anyone with eyes to see should have realized we would come to grief there. But the intelligence community, in particular, the guys who brought us the Bay of Pigs invasion, wanted to sell the idea that defeating North Vietnam would be "easy". And the military, despite their later claims, did not push back and speak truth to power, or not enough. And many of them believed their own myths anyway.
This book is worth reading, but recognize the bias the author brings to his subject. I understand that bias; my best friend's father was shot down but was rescued, another friend grew up without his father, who died in the war. When you have bled for a cause, it's hard to say it was wrong, or even badly executed. But it's important for Americans to see these things clearly and to understand which wars are actually necessary, and likely to be successful, rather than plunging ahead into new adventures like Iraq. This book is only a very small step toward that understanding, and should be supplemented by other reading.
The book is in many ways a mechanism to excuse the defeat in Vietnam by blaming it on political leaders, and the politicians do have to shoulder the majority of the blame, since they were the ones who put the military, and millions of US teenagers and young men into Vietnam without clearly explaining to the US public what would be required to "win". At the end of the day, the US did not have to fight a war in Vietnam, and should not have done so. I grew up in a military family and my father served in Vietnam (and WW2 and Korea); he was part of the WW2 generation that believed the US could do anything it decided to do, which is or was true in general. But the war in Vietnam was begun on such flawed premises with such an unreliable ally in the South Vietnamese government, that anyone with eyes to see should have realized we would come to grief there. But the intelligence community, in particular, the guys who brought us the Bay of Pigs invasion, wanted to sell the idea that defeating North Vietnam would be "easy". And the military, despite their later claims, did not push back and speak truth to power, or not enough. And many of them believed their own myths anyway.
This book is worth reading, but recognize the bias the author brings to his subject. I understand that bias; my best friend's father was shot down but was rescued, another friend grew up without his father, who died in the war. When you have bled for a cause, it's hard to say it was wrong, or even badly executed. But it's important for Americans to see these things clearly and to understand which wars are actually necessary, and likely to be successful, rather than plunging ahead into new adventures like Iraq. This book is only a very small step toward that understanding, and should be supplemented by other reading.
September 23, 2017
On Strategy is the cornerstone of the 'revisionist school' of Vietnam War historiography-those who argue that the war was ultimately winnable with a greater degree of military commitment. Summers uses Clausewitz to castigate the civilians responsible for Vietnam, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara's systems analysts, for failing to set objectives with a chance of victory. Army senior leadership is close behind, for failing for the siren lure of counter-insurgency and failing to hold to traditional strategic arts in a nuclear era.
Summers' argument is dressed up in a lot of Clausewitzian jargon, but the core is fairly simply. Vietnam was a war fought in 'cold blood' without a mobilization of the population, which separated the American people from the military mission, as color TV brought the savagery of war to everyone's living rooms for the first time. American posture was a strategic defensive, which require endurance and the hope that the situation of the war will turn in your favor. Tactical successes at Ia Drang, in the Tet Offensive, and the Christmas Bombings were rendered irrelevant by a refusal to bring the war to North Vietnam, and strike directly at their political leadership, their military logistics, or their alliances with China and Russia. American leaders took counsels of their fears of turning the Cold War atomic hot, and bought into North Vietnamese propaganda of a people's war.
In the one sense, Summers isn't wrong. Vietnam was fought without clear objectives beyond the continued existence of the Republic of South Vietnam. But he misses some key points. If War Comes to Long An is accurate, Viet Cong terror and assassinations had decimated the South Vietnamese government long before the main introduction of US troops. As a battalion level officer in Vietnam, Summers should have something to say about the tool of ambush and mines, and the difficulty in bringing communist guerrillas to battle. The American people were not comprehensively mobilized, but it's hard to think of a strategic US interest at issue in Indochina, both in terms of contemporary superpower politics and with the benefit of historical hindsight.
Finally, for the "well if you're so smart, you do it" question, Summers' suggestion for how to fight the war involves a cordon of US troops stretching across Laos from the Vietnamese DMZ through to the border with Thailand, and heavy ongoing air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong. I can't see this being easy, or avoiding a massive escalation of the Cold War.
My final assessment is that Summers wants to have his cake and eat it to. If Vietnam demanded full American mobilization, it was definitely part of the Cold War and must be seen in terms of DEFCON levels and nuclear risk. If Vietnam is a limited war, then the relatively paucity of American interests in the region against the absolute interests of the North Vietnamese leadership to reunify their country must be accepted. Either way, Summers isn't wrong but he isn't yet right. This is an important book on the Vietnam War, but one that must be read carefully and in context.
Summers' argument is dressed up in a lot of Clausewitzian jargon, but the core is fairly simply. Vietnam was a war fought in 'cold blood' without a mobilization of the population, which separated the American people from the military mission, as color TV brought the savagery of war to everyone's living rooms for the first time. American posture was a strategic defensive, which require endurance and the hope that the situation of the war will turn in your favor. Tactical successes at Ia Drang, in the Tet Offensive, and the Christmas Bombings were rendered irrelevant by a refusal to bring the war to North Vietnam, and strike directly at their political leadership, their military logistics, or their alliances with China and Russia. American leaders took counsels of their fears of turning the Cold War atomic hot, and bought into North Vietnamese propaganda of a people's war.
In the one sense, Summers isn't wrong. Vietnam was fought without clear objectives beyond the continued existence of the Republic of South Vietnam. But he misses some key points. If War Comes to Long An is accurate, Viet Cong terror and assassinations had decimated the South Vietnamese government long before the main introduction of US troops. As a battalion level officer in Vietnam, Summers should have something to say about the tool of ambush and mines, and the difficulty in bringing communist guerrillas to battle. The American people were not comprehensively mobilized, but it's hard to think of a strategic US interest at issue in Indochina, both in terms of contemporary superpower politics and with the benefit of historical hindsight.
Finally, for the "well if you're so smart, you do it" question, Summers' suggestion for how to fight the war involves a cordon of US troops stretching across Laos from the Vietnamese DMZ through to the border with Thailand, and heavy ongoing air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong. I can't see this being easy, or avoiding a massive escalation of the Cold War.
My final assessment is that Summers wants to have his cake and eat it to. If Vietnam demanded full American mobilization, it was definitely part of the Cold War and must be seen in terms of DEFCON levels and nuclear risk. If Vietnam is a limited war, then the relatively paucity of American interests in the region against the absolute interests of the North Vietnamese leadership to reunify their country must be accepted. Either way, Summers isn't wrong but he isn't yet right. This is an important book on the Vietnam War, but one that must be read carefully and in context.
February 7, 2017
Started out so strong and interesting and after a while I felt a little like the author was repeating the same thoughts over and over and just changing up how he presented them in each new chapter. It's still worth reading, but this will never be considered a comprehensive history of the war, or a comprehensive anything for that matter. Make this an auxiliary compendium to go along with some other books on the subject.
April 14, 2011
Colonel Summers offers a critical analysis on the pursuit of the war in Vietnam, strictly from a military strategy standpoint (he stays out of the "ideological" arena). It's focus is on what went wrong, what went right, as well as what needed to improve. In his analysis, he uses the standards of Clausewitz as stated in "On War".
June 20, 2025
From the purely military perspective detached from political reality, this was a great analysis of Vietnam War where we learnt the disastrous consequences of not having a clear objective, a clear plan, and a clear strategy.
Summers basically concluded that deploying US Forces to Vietnam with the intent of “nation-building” was a mistake which he implied faults at the Civil Administration. Of course, he also put the blame on military officials not willing to stand up and take responsibility for actions in Vietnam and merely following along the flow with civil authorities.
Summers also stated through Clausewitz about how US Military is focused only on “preparation for war” rather than “war proper”. Due to military’s lack of feedback in what and how they are supposed to do things, civil administration reverted into the loop of “preparation for war” without realizing that they also need to plan out “war proper”, the plan on how to engage the war. So US Military went into Vietnam with “what” to engage the North Vietnamese but not “how” to engage the North Vietnamese.
Overall, a decent book although it’s lacking a political dimension necessary to understand why US lost at Vietnam. Summers believed that US could have won at Vietnam if civi administration wasn’t “paralyzed” by fears of escalation (Soviet and China) and focused purely on how to defeat the enemy. Sounds like an ideal scenario until you realize that the reality doesn’t work like that. Geopolitics and ideological reality play a significant factor in how everything work. A single misstep could result in mutually assured global destruction. Summers suggested a plan to deploy US Forces along the borders of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam to isolate the North Vietnamese while South Vietnamese fights Vietcong and engages in “nation-building”. It sounds proper until you realize how much escalation it will result in and how much persuasion would be needed to drag the Americans into this conflict.
Despite how much Summers criticized MacArthur for his lack of understanding of political reality, Summers does what MacArthur did exactly would have done. The mindset that “If we had deployed more and fight harder strategically, we would have won this war.”
Summers basically concluded that deploying US Forces to Vietnam with the intent of “nation-building” was a mistake which he implied faults at the Civil Administration. Of course, he also put the blame on military officials not willing to stand up and take responsibility for actions in Vietnam and merely following along the flow with civil authorities.
Summers also stated through Clausewitz about how US Military is focused only on “preparation for war” rather than “war proper”. Due to military’s lack of feedback in what and how they are supposed to do things, civil administration reverted into the loop of “preparation for war” without realizing that they also need to plan out “war proper”, the plan on how to engage the war. So US Military went into Vietnam with “what” to engage the North Vietnamese but not “how” to engage the North Vietnamese.
Overall, a decent book although it’s lacking a political dimension necessary to understand why US lost at Vietnam. Summers believed that US could have won at Vietnam if civi administration wasn’t “paralyzed” by fears of escalation (Soviet and China) and focused purely on how to defeat the enemy. Sounds like an ideal scenario until you realize that the reality doesn’t work like that. Geopolitics and ideological reality play a significant factor in how everything work. A single misstep could result in mutually assured global destruction. Summers suggested a plan to deploy US Forces along the borders of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam to isolate the North Vietnamese while South Vietnamese fights Vietcong and engages in “nation-building”. It sounds proper until you realize how much escalation it will result in and how much persuasion would be needed to drag the Americans into this conflict.
Despite how much Summers criticized MacArthur for his lack of understanding of political reality, Summers does what MacArthur did exactly would have done. The mindset that “If we had deployed more and fight harder strategically, we would have won this war.”
February 15, 2013
A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional superiority can exhaust itself against a militarily sophisticated third world country. Clausewitz's theory and Summers explanation of "friction"in war ..."how even the simplest of tasks become difficult as countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance"...is worth the read alone.
Summers makes clear there is no such thing as a "splendid little war," "a war fought on the cheap," or "a slam dunk war." Contrary to popular mythology, maintaining public support for a war is always a problem. It was problem during the American Revolutionary War, World War II and as it is now during the fifth year of the war in Iraq. The enemy always has havens, political sanctuaries and brutal responses in every war: Apache Indians skillfully used Mexican territory to avoid capture, the North Viennese used tunnels and neutral countries to move troops and supplies, the Taliban hides in remote mountain caves, Al Qaeda rules from the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and Iraqi insurgents use IED's and suicide bombers.
Arrogance, superpower status and wishful thinking don't win wars...even winning every encounter doesn't mean you will inflict your will on the enemy or cause the enemy to beg for peace. If you want to know how to use an army wisely and understand the need to manage political expectations, On Strategy will get you started.
Summers makes clear there is no such thing as a "splendid little war," "a war fought on the cheap," or "a slam dunk war." Contrary to popular mythology, maintaining public support for a war is always a problem. It was problem during the American Revolutionary War, World War II and as it is now during the fifth year of the war in Iraq. The enemy always has havens, political sanctuaries and brutal responses in every war: Apache Indians skillfully used Mexican territory to avoid capture, the North Viennese used tunnels and neutral countries to move troops and supplies, the Taliban hides in remote mountain caves, Al Qaeda rules from the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and Iraqi insurgents use IED's and suicide bombers.
Arrogance, superpower status and wishful thinking don't win wars...even winning every encounter doesn't mean you will inflict your will on the enemy or cause the enemy to beg for peace. If you want to know how to use an army wisely and understand the need to manage political expectations, On Strategy will get you started.
September 23, 2013
This is better than anything I've ever read about the Vietnam War. He shines in communicating what the theater looked like and how politics shaped the actions of the players.
February 10, 2011
The best analysis of the Vietnam War I have read. Harry Summers, who was there, takes a birds-eye view of the overall strategic situation, and explains exactly what the USA did wrong.
September 20, 2013
The single most impressive account of Vietnam from the strategic, not political, standpoint. A must read if you are a student of military history.
August 13, 2024
A must read for all military historians and strategists. Col Harry Summers takes a Clausewitz approach to the Vietnam War to explain why everything played out the way it did and how things can be rectified in future wars.
A prescient work to be sure by 1982 standards, it was clearly largely inspired by his own Vietnam experiences. While reading it I couldn’t stop but ponder on how these lessons learned were clearly applied by military and political leaders less than a decade after its publishing during the Gulf War. Thankfully he wrote a followup called On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, which I am going to read next.
The more baffling question of course is how we then seemingly threw those valuable lessons out the window. I really wish that Col Summers could have lived long enough to provide his post mortem on the 2021 Afghanistan humiliation (and of course the two decades that preceded it). But I suppose in my lifetime there will be enough works written on that to fill a library as well. But given that - it is imperative that strategists can commit the lessons in this book to heart.
A prescient work to be sure by 1982 standards, it was clearly largely inspired by his own Vietnam experiences. While reading it I couldn’t stop but ponder on how these lessons learned were clearly applied by military and political leaders less than a decade after its publishing during the Gulf War. Thankfully he wrote a followup called On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, which I am going to read next.
The more baffling question of course is how we then seemingly threw those valuable lessons out the window. I really wish that Col Summers could have lived long enough to provide his post mortem on the 2021 Afghanistan humiliation (and of course the two decades that preceded it). But I suppose in my lifetime there will be enough works written on that to fill a library as well. But given that - it is imperative that strategists can commit the lessons in this book to heart.
July 20, 2024
I never went to Vietnam, as I was born in 1976. While I've had my opinions about the war I never fought in, I've started to get more interested in the conflict and for the most part, some of the opinions have been abandoned and changed due to new information and the like. This book is a synopsis and the lessons learned from the Vietnam War. It goes over what went wrong, and how things could have gone better had some things had been done, as opposed to what happened. Overall, it is a good book and I'm wondering why Goodreads gives it a low rating. And having served in Iraq and Afghanistan, I hope to read a book about those wars too, even though I participated in them in my own small world. I would look at this book as a way to understand the war's failures, and what should be done to fix it for the next one. While reading this book, I realized that the issues we had with Afghanistan show that the Army didn't learn much from this book, even though it was originally published in 1982.
July 25, 2025
This 122 page book published in 1981 by the Army War College is a short but dense critical review of the War in Vietnam. What I loved about it, at least in part, are the references to 18th century’s Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal work, On War. I’d heard about Clausewitz many times over the years, but never read it thinking it couldn’t be all that relevant to modern warfare. Boy was I wrong. It’s stunning how his ideas and precepts are as relevant today as then. Clausewitz aside, I was impressed by the detailed analysis of the war we waged in Vietnam, both politically and militarily (obviously linked), and how we “won” virtually every major battle yet lost the war. The comparisons to whst we did in Korea during thst conglixt were enlightening. This was for me a fascinating, cogent, and surprisingly understandable history of that conflict.
July 9, 2024
I read this over 35-40 years ago and remembered it very well when it came up in cobmversation today.. What Col. summers had laid out in the context of von Clauswitz became the basis for the inappropriately tagged "Powell Doctrine" of the Gulf War. Powell may have effected it; Summers set the intellectual guardrails and deserves far more credit than history has given him.
Great book. Should be on the required reading list for freshman orientation of the next Congress with a pop quiz to ensure the new Congress has read it. We can't continue to bleed our fisc on insignificant, never-ending foreign wars.
Great book. Should be on the required reading list for freshman orientation of the next Congress with a pop quiz to ensure the new Congress has read it. We can't continue to bleed our fisc on insignificant, never-ending foreign wars.
February 24, 2019
This is a not a light read. It is written by a military officer for a professional audience. So don't pick this up if you are looking for a popular history of the Vietnam War. Summers has some fascinating perspectives on what when wrong with the war from both military and political perspectives. He digs deep into military theory--deeper than I have previously ventured. It took some effort to make it through, but it made me think, and that is what I was looking for.
April 30, 2018
Very relevant to today
This book has many principles and examples from Vietnam that are both insightful and relevant to today for political and military strategists and practicians. It is well worth reading and spending time in reflection.
This book has many principles and examples from Vietnam that are both insightful and relevant to today for political and military strategists and practicians. It is well worth reading and spending time in reflection.
July 25, 2018
Essential reading on Vietnam. I don't agree with all of COL Summers' assertions or conclusions, but it is absolutely key towards understanding the perspectives on the War. Read paired with Krepinevich's The Army in Vietnam for a countervailing perspective.
October 14, 2018
A fascinating analysis of our military
The book is clearly written and comprehensive. It combines a description of historically based thinking about war with a recounting of actual military confrontations and their successes.
The book is clearly written and comprehensive. It combines a description of historically based thinking about war with a recounting of actual military confrontations and their successes.
October 21, 2019
Anyone interested in military or corporate strategy will find this book extremely illuminating. For those of us who have spent considerable time studying the Vietnam war, it is extraordinary, providing a clear analysis of the mistakes we made as a country and the results that ensued.
July 3, 2017
Interesting perspectives on a how wars have been fought in the past few years.
June 16, 2018
An excellent overview that explains how a disconnect between political and military objectives can lead to problems on the battlefield and at home.
February 14, 2020
Dated. Focused on military. Didn't really discuss the issue with a South Vietnamese government.
January 4, 2022
To sit in a Starbucks in Saigon (aka Ho Chi Minh City) and observe young Vietnamese on their mobiles one wonders who ultimately won the war. War is economics by other means.
March 20, 2023
Most direct answer to why we lost Vietnam. Our politics confined our military strategy to tactical success and ultimate failure.
July 8, 2024
Worth reading
October 25, 2024
This is way lighter in its feet than the title makes it out to be
March 11, 2025
The Book is organized in two parts. Part 1: The Political failings of the Vietnam Wa, and Part 2: The tactical failures of the Vietnam War. The book is published from the US Army War College, it does not aim to provide any viewpoint on justification of the Vietnam War. Instead it’s goal to acknowledge and educate the reader on the political and military defeat in Vietnam and to prevent future failures in U.S military strategy.
From a Military History perspective the book examines these past failures and rectifies them through Clausewitz military thought. Almost a return to basics of Western military strategy. Vietnam was not Korea, ensure the next war is not another Vietnam.
The Author provides fair and detailed criticism on how America lost in Vietnam, if you want a social history of the era or any social perspectives I recommend Max Hastings.
From a Military History perspective the book examines these past failures and rectifies them through Clausewitz military thought. Almost a return to basics of Western military strategy. Vietnam was not Korea, ensure the next war is not another Vietnam.
The Author provides fair and detailed criticism on how America lost in Vietnam, if you want a social history of the era or any social perspectives I recommend Max Hastings.
August 2, 2016
So far i have a few issues with this work. I'm going to list them in order of their importance to me rather than order they appear with the most important last.
It's a little right wing for my taste. I'm a liberal socialist. It's a book about war and the military, i wasn't expecting it to be anything but right wing but i thought i'd mention it anyway. I wouldn't have read it if this was a real deal breaker for me.
Although expected, as this book was originally written for the use of the Army War College, I find Summers' attempts to shift the blame entirely from military leaders (pp101-105) to be somewhat simplistic especially as he paints them as impotently trapped in the political mechanisms of civilian leaders with no autonomy of their own, as galling as this is he then goes on to gloss over their failure to speak up against what they apparently knew was a losing strategy from the very begining by blaming politicans for explicitly not wanting to win a military victory in Vietnam.
In the introduction Summers states that he's using Clauswitz because "although we usually ascribe their [North Vietnam's] actions to Mao's "people's war" theories, it is important to note that as an avowed Marxist-Leninist state they also drew from Clauswitz...". This in itself i have no issue with. However, he also goes on to quote Wilhelm von Schramm "Clauswitz's theories (in distorted form) "became part of the dogma of Leninism," " before completely ignoring the nuances of the quoted statement in favour of using pure Clauswitz in his analysis with little to no refrence to these distortions which he made a point to note in his introduction (the underlining in the quotes is my work). This is bad enough academic practice but he then goes out of his way to point out his use of "a source untainted by today's biases." If he's going to judge the opponent on their ideology and go out of his way to point out that it was flawed and did not resemble the original he should then take care to continue his line of argument by taking those distortions into account in his writing.
As i continue to read this book and once i've finished it i will apply any edits or additions to my review. Please do not expect this to be anytime soon as i have to write a full academic review of it for university and am a finalist, so i may very well have graduated before i have time to come back to this.
It's a little right wing for my taste. I'm a liberal socialist. It's a book about war and the military, i wasn't expecting it to be anything but right wing but i thought i'd mention it anyway. I wouldn't have read it if this was a real deal breaker for me.
Although expected, as this book was originally written for the use of the Army War College, I find Summers' attempts to shift the blame entirely from military leaders (pp101-105) to be somewhat simplistic especially as he paints them as impotently trapped in the political mechanisms of civilian leaders with no autonomy of their own, as galling as this is he then goes on to gloss over their failure to speak up against what they apparently knew was a losing strategy from the very begining by blaming politicans for explicitly not wanting to win a military victory in Vietnam.
In the introduction Summers states that he's using Clauswitz because "although we usually ascribe their [North Vietnam's] actions to Mao's "people's war" theories, it is important to note that as an avowed Marxist-Leninist state they also drew from Clauswitz...". This in itself i have no issue with. However, he also goes on to quote Wilhelm von Schramm "Clauswitz's theories (in distorted form) "became part of the dogma of Leninism," " before completely ignoring the nuances of the quoted statement in favour of using pure Clauswitz in his analysis with little to no refrence to these distortions which he made a point to note in his introduction (the underlining in the quotes is my work). This is bad enough academic practice but he then goes out of his way to point out his use of "a source untainted by today's biases." If he's going to judge the opponent on their ideology and go out of his way to point out that it was flawed and did not resemble the original he should then take care to continue his line of argument by taking those distortions into account in his writing.
As i continue to read this book and once i've finished it i will apply any edits or additions to my review. Please do not expect this to be anytime soon as i have to write a full academic review of it for university and am a finalist, so i may very well have graduated before i have time to come back to this.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 27, 2019
I thought this was a great book and it significantly increased my understanding of the historical context of the Vietnam War in relation to WWII, Korea, and the Cold War. The book examined the war strategies of the Americans, South Vietnamese, and North Vietnamese during the conflict in Vietnam. Summers applied various elements of Clausewitz' war theories to explain the environment and the engagement. He succinctly provided historical evidence and analysis to support the reasons for America's successes, challenges, and failures in the war.
Summers described how the Army applied Clausewitz' Principles or War to Vietnam in the 1950's - 1960's and the complex policy environment that drove many of the military strategic choices in the war. The key take away was that regardless of military or material means (capabilities) and ends (political policy), the lack of coherent and appropriate ways (military strategy) led to America's ultimate defeat. He assessed that the failure of the American war effort was due in most part by the inability of the Americans to identify and select the appropriate North Vietnamese "center of gravity" - the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) - and then apply military power and unrestricted maneuver to destroy it. Much of the American effort and resources were focused on internal events in South Vietnam such as the insurgency. Summers identified that the insurgency in South Vietnam was largely a military screen used by the NVA to set conditions for several strategic and tactical offensives when conditions were most favorable to them as Americans conducted strategic withdrawal in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The political limitations placed on the U.S. Army's ability to conduct operational maneuver in the region to destroy NVA power bases were a also significant factor in defeat. Summer's analysis of the different approaches used by America and North Vietnam and combinations of Strategic Offensive/Defensive and Tactical Offensive/Defensive and political/military will determined the outcome of war.
I highly recommend this book to anyone studying the Vietnam War, military strategy or Clausewitz in general, and U.S. Army war fighting capabilities between the 1940's and 1980's.
Summers described how the Army applied Clausewitz' Principles or War to Vietnam in the 1950's - 1960's and the complex policy environment that drove many of the military strategic choices in the war. The key take away was that regardless of military or material means (capabilities) and ends (political policy), the lack of coherent and appropriate ways (military strategy) led to America's ultimate defeat. He assessed that the failure of the American war effort was due in most part by the inability of the Americans to identify and select the appropriate North Vietnamese "center of gravity" - the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) - and then apply military power and unrestricted maneuver to destroy it. Much of the American effort and resources were focused on internal events in South Vietnam such as the insurgency. Summers identified that the insurgency in South Vietnam was largely a military screen used by the NVA to set conditions for several strategic and tactical offensives when conditions were most favorable to them as Americans conducted strategic withdrawal in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The political limitations placed on the U.S. Army's ability to conduct operational maneuver in the region to destroy NVA power bases were a also significant factor in defeat. Summer's analysis of the different approaches used by America and North Vietnam and combinations of Strategic Offensive/Defensive and Tactical Offensive/Defensive and political/military will determined the outcome of war.
I highly recommend this book to anyone studying the Vietnam War, military strategy or Clausewitz in general, and U.S. Army war fighting capabilities between the 1940's and 1980's.
April 5, 2015
This is an important work for any American trying to understand Clausewitz. Col Summers does an excellent job linking tactical actions, to strategy, to national policy using On War. He addresses several key ideas such as societal pressure, the difference between raising and fighting an army, the interplay between adversaries, and importance of understanding the kind of war you are fighting to name a few. There are insights here that illuminate our recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A senior South Vietnamese officer commented, "...when American troops came to Vietnam, they try to do everything...The Vietnamese don't rely on themselves. They rely on the Americans." Sound familiar?
Overall this is a eulogy that describes a war without a clear political objective. As such, the strategy and tactics that follow are flawed. The real gem, however, is that it presents a practical method for critical analysis using the Godfather of military theory.
Overall this is a eulogy that describes a war without a clear political objective. As such, the strategy and tactics that follow are flawed. The real gem, however, is that it presents a practical method for critical analysis using the Godfather of military theory.
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