Vietnam 1945: The Quest For Power

by David G. Marr

1945: the most significant year in the modern history of Vietnam. One thousand years of dynastic politics and monarchist ideology came to an end. Eight decades of French rule lay shattered. Five years of Japanese military occupation ceased. Allied leaders determined that Chinese troops in the north of Indochina and British troops in the South would receive the Japanese surrender. Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with himself as president.

Drawing on extensive archival research, interviews, and an examination of published memoirs and documents, David G. Marr has written a richly detailed and descriptive analysis of this crucial moment in Vietnamese history. He shows how Vietnam became a vortex of intense international and domestic competition for power, and how actions in Washington and Paris, as well as Saigon, Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh's mountain headquarters, interacted and clashed, often with surprising results. Marr's book probes the ways in which war and revolution sustain each other, tracing a process that will interest political scientists and sociologists as well as historians and Southeast Asia specialists.

Genres: History

602 pages, Paperback

First published June 1, 1995

About the author

David George Marr is an American/Australian historian specializing in the modern history of Viet Nam. Dr. Marr is currently Emeritus Professor and Visiting Fellow in the School of Culture, History & Language at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University (Canberra, ACT).

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Nineteen forty-five is the most important year in the modern history of Vietnam," asserts David G. Marr. It ended a thousand years of monarchic rule, eight decades of French colonial system, and five years of Japanese occupation. 

On March 9 1945, the Japanese suddenly overthrew the French colonial government they had been sustaining for over three years. This coup and the Great Famine of 1944-1945, the biggest disaster in modern Vietnamese history, triggered many changes in the country. Then, only five months later, Japan surrendered, and the ICP, Viet Minh, and their allies seized power from the Japanese-sponsored royal government in Hanoi. On September 2, Nguyen Ai Quoc, now known as Ho Chi Minh, announced the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and proclaimed himself its president. 

As Marr argues, contrary to popular belief, the ICP did not play a predominant role in the events leading to the August Revolution. In fact, the Party was only one of many forces urging for change. While most of the August uprisings were ignited by Viet Minh slogans, many local groups did not know what that organization actually stood for and were not connected to its general headquarters. The hundreds of "people's" and "revolutionary" committees that affirmed their loyalty to Ho's government were in fact motivated by the desire to avenge past injustices, which the DRV leaders tried but often failed to quench for the sake of national independence.

Soon after the March 1945 coup, Charles de Gaulle again informed the world France intended to regain Indochina. However, in the following months, French officials completely lost track of what was going on in their former colony. When a French commissioner for Indochina was appointed in mid-August and troops were sent in, armed resistance was the Vietnamese population's natural and expected reaction. 

World War II had a profound effect on the country. It destroyed the colonial import-export system and caused a devastating famine. Furthermore, it created a mood of excitement among the Vietnamese, which resulted in frequent outbreaks of anti-colonial violence. Because the ICP had survived years of severe French repression due to its kind of military discipline and secrecy, it could make the most of those shifts in attitude, explains Marr. The time was ripe for action, and unlike the royal government and the various non-communist nationalist groups, the communist activists understood this well in 1945. 

After the Japanese interned the French colonial forces in March, armed guerrilla squads were built up to the point that the royal government's Civil Guard refused to patrol the countryside north of Hanoi without Japanese accompaniment. Following Japan's capitulation, the guards disbanded or crossed over to the Viet Minh. Although south of Hanoi the guerrilla fighters were poorly armed, they still achieved local success because the royal government was in too big a chaos to defend itself and because the Civil Guard often refused to shoot demonstrators. Thus, the existing system was being gradually overthrown without much bloodshed. "Power went to those who planted a Viet Minh flag on a government office, held the keys to the Civil Guard armory, or controlled the telegraph key," writes Marr. Thousands of people were thrown in prison, but what should be done with them remained a mystery. 

According to the author, at this point Vietnam had experienced a national insurrection, but not yet a revolution because in most places former colonial authorities continued to function, landlords kept collecting rents, and owners of enterprises were still fully controlling their workers. However, all those rooted relationships were questioned by the people. Every citizen's behavior was carefully analyzed for signs of treason.

Marr also presents Vietnam from the perspective of what was happening outside the country. Five foreign powers – France, Japan, China, the United States, and Great Britain – were interested in Indochina during the Second World War. None of them could make up its mind how exactly to treat this territory, though. For example, the military officers and civilians Imperial Japan dispatched to Indochina from different ministries often disagreed with each other and sometimes even worked to hinder each other, and Americans held opposing views about whether Indochina should remain a French colony.

In general, in 1945, Indochina became the main focus of arguments among the Allies about the future of all colonies, China's role of a great power, and France's post-war strength. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt attempted to make Indochina a test case of Allied intentions in regard to international control over colonial territories. Prime Minister Churchill, on the other hand, resisted Roosevelt's ideas to preserve British colonialism. De Gaulle insisted that after the wartime humiliations it had suffered, France deserved better and Indochina had to be given back. China, meanwhile, lost its intelligence sources inside Indochina and had to establish a connection with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh in order to regain them. This policy went contrary to Washington's increasing readiness to defend French claims. (France was to play an important role in the post-war recover of Europe, and the USA could not risk its relations with it.)

Thus, only a few days after the momentous September 2 Chinese troops would arrive in Hanoi, while British and French troops would thunder into Saigon, and Ho Chi Minh's fledgling government would come under enormous pressure. The Viet Minh expanded its mobilization efforts. Prior to the August revolution, it had recruited forces mainly north of Hanoi. Afterwards, it increased its power considerably, recruiting in the south, and was able to direct the people's efforts away from petty revenge and towards a joint struggle for national independence. Because of foreign intervention, however, this struggle would soon degrade into a protracted and costly war. 

David G. Marr has written an outstanding study of the critical for Vietnam year 1945. He draws upon an impressive amount of never-before-examined archival material and weaves a vivid narrative of the political and social upheaval that engulfed the Vietnamese population. Recommendable.