Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within

by Anna Matveeva, Michael O. Slobodchikoff (Foreword)

This book tells the story of insurgency in Ukraine’s Donbas region from the perspective of the rebels, who sought and continue to seek either independence from Ukraine or unification with Russia. As such, it provides a unique insight into their thinking and motivations, which need to be understood if the conflict is to be resolved. Those making and remaking the conflict are placed in the centre of the story which uses the words of the combatants themselves. It shows how volunteer fighters, driven by a wide and diffuse set of motivations, emerged from Ukraine, Russia, and different parts of the world, stood at the rebellion's heart. The book focuses on the participants’ own voices and personalities, drawing extensively on first-hand research and interviews.Rather than rendering Ukraine a chess piece on the geopolitical board, the rebellion shows that ordinary people, rather than elites, can act as a decisive force. Donbas says something about why large numbers of people make the decision to take part in a collective violent action, when material rewards are low or non-existent, and mortal risks high. It stands as an important text on the study of modern insurgencies, revealing how violent conflicts happen via issues of politicized identity and involvement of non-state actors. This book places this conflict into the context of other conflicts worldwide and demonstrates how ideas and narratives are constructed to provide meaning to a struggle. The insurgency has produced a conflict sub-culture, rich with symbolism, narrative, and communications, made possible by the digital age and a social media-savvy population. These beliefs and ideas have had the power to pull people from different parts of the world.This book follows the stages of assembling different conflict ingredients together, and the rebellion’s zigzagging fortunes after it became apparent that Moscow was not going to repeat the Crimea scenario in Donbas. It analyses the logic of armed struggle and the tactics deployed by warring parties. The book also sheds light on the developments in Moscow, discusses the phenomenon of the Russian Spring movement and concludes with the prospects for a peaceful solution.

Genres: Politics

357 pages, Kindle Edition

Published December 20, 2017

Reviews

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

До тридцати я гипермаркет охранял
Теперь в груди звереет гордость у меня
Благослови - взорвется "Русская Весна"
Мы все в крови, нам оправдание - война!

Что ж перед нами очередной образец пророссийской пропаганды. Мне не потребовалось тратить много времени на выяснения этого утверждения, ибо уже третья глава рассматривает проблему Крыма-2014. Когда я только увидел название главы, я подумал, как же у автора получится оправдать действия России? Я не могу, конечно, сказать, что автор прямо оправдывает действия РФ, ибо тогда книга станет выглядеть откровенной пророссийской пропагандой. Дело в том, что автор как бы подталкивает читателя к идеи, что аннексия Крыма стала результатом действий участников Майдана и той власти, которая пришла после свержения Януковича, т.е. автор не оправдывает действия Москвы, но как бы намекает, что трагедии в этом нет, что это было естественно в ситуации, которую создали участники Майдана. Разумеется, это откровенная ложь и действия России по отношению к Крыму ничем кроме как попранием закона назвать нельзя. Собственно этот шаг показывает во что превратились международные договоры, т.е. что Путин одним своим решением фактически уничтожил, сделал бессмысленным подписание любых международных договоров. Вот скажите мне, какой смысл в международных договорах, если в любой момент крупная страна может их нарушить и ей за это ничего не будет? Автор этого не пишет, но утверждает, что это политики Украины сами создали такую ситуацию, за что у Украины отобрали часть территории. Но мне хочется спросить автора: что такого происходило в Крыму из-за чего «можно» было его отобрать? Может быть, там были очень кровавые разборки между разными группами? Не было такого, т.е. никто в Крыму не погиб. Может официальные украинские власти, бомбили Крым? Тоже такого не было. Что угрожало жителям Крыма в тот момент, учитывая, что там располагалась российская военная база? Ответ очень неприятный для официальных российских властей, ибо никакой угрозы для жителей Крыма не существовало и не могло существовать в принципе. Как я отметил, украинские войска или праворадикальные группы даже не пытались что-то устроить в Крыму, ибо власть в Украине, как почти в любой стране, сконцентрирована в столице. Да, была трагедия в Одессе, но это была Одесса, а не Севастополь. Но посмотрим, что же пишет автор, точнее как она пытается оправдывать Россию. Начинает она с далёкой истории, а точнее, с ельцинского правления и российско-чеченского военного конфликта.

Discussing this period of relative tranquility, Kuzio claims that The confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus which had close ties to the Crimean Tatars would have intervened against Russia in the event of a Crimean conflict. “Cooperation was already well established between Ukrainian paramilitaries and the Chechen leadership in the Chechen conflict where Ukrainian paramilitaries had by then participated on the Chechen side. At least 100 Tatars fought in Chechnya from the Adalet Party led by former airborne officer Fevzi Kubedinov. Adalet had 1,500 paramilitaries who were from former airborne forces who were used by the Mejlis for security and bodyguard operations.”

Уже один этот абзац даёт представление, куда ведёт автор. Автор тем самым пытается дискредитировать любые антироссийские действия крымских татар, прочно пытаясь увязать их с чеченскими террористами, которые не просто воевали с российской армией в Чечне, но и устраивали теракты. Автор как бы говорит: и вот с этими людьми (крымскими татарами) вы хотите солидаризироваться? Да они союзники ваххабитов. Конечно, автор так не пишет, но другого вывода из цитаты выше я сделать не могу. Идём дальше.

In a VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) opinion poll taken in February 2015, 1 year after the referendum, around half of Crimean Tatars said they would support the decision to join Russia if the referendum was to be repeated. Only a quarter said they would vote to remain in Ukraine.

Вот это тоже великолепная цитата. В чём проблема? Во-первых, ВЦИОМ является государственной структурой, которая публикует социологические опросы, которые требует от этой организации российская власть. Это всё равно, что принимать за правду социологические опросы, проводимые в Советском Союзе. В России все прекрасно знают, что верить цифрам ВЦИОМа нельзя ни в коем случаи. Но не это главное в этой цитате, а то утверждение, которое выводится. Автор как бы говорит, что да, аннексировали, но посмотрите, даже самые ярые противники аннексии – крымские татары – в итоге не так чтобы и против. Это – образец пропаганды и манипуляции со стороны автора. И чтобы закрепить этот тезис, автор цитирует довольно неоднозначную личность – профессора Соловья. Да-да, того самого. Я напомню, что профессор Соловей позиционируется в качестве оппозиционера. Но вот что он говорит (кстати, да, он действительно много раз заявлял подобное):

MGIMO Professor Valerii Solovei summed up the prevailing sentiment: “I cannot imagine circumstances under which Crimea would return to Ukraine.”

Как говорится, «рыбка плывёт, назад не отдаёт». В данном случаи автор как бы намекает: «что было, то было». Вон, даже российская несистемная оппозиция признаёт, что Крым уплыл от Украины навсегда и с этим ничего не поделать. Хитро!

Putin himself argued the opposite—no premeditated annexation plot existed in Kremlin before the events spiraled down in Kyiv in 2014. Informed observers in Moscow agreed on this. Even if different scenarios and contingency plans were floated, the prevailing view was to support the ruling president and the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Вот ещё один хороший образец пропаганды, цель которой заявить, что «это не мы, это нас спровоцировали». Опять же, важным тут является смещение ответственности, которое заключается в простой идеи: не трогали бы Януковича, Крым продолжал бы оставаться в составе Украины, а раз свергли его, вот сами себя и вините. Ну и последняя цитата, которая очень хорошо показывает, как автор пытается оправдать действия России в отношении Крыма.

Russia’s takeover of Crimea was not inevitable. It was propelled by a confluence of three factors that came together at the same historical junction: a surge of ethno nationalism unleashed by pro-Maidan forces which the new power-holders in Kyiv went along with, fears of Russian identity-bearers that this nationalism would be directed at them, and the ability of Russian leadership to react decisively and in force. The element of spontaneity, local initiative and quality of leadership played a significant role in shaping the outcome. The fire of resistance and display of a local drive for secession played an important role, and Crimea’s fate was sealed in a matter of days. Disarray of Ukrainian security structures contributed, because the new Kyiv power-holders until very recently were their opponents who caused street chaos which the forces of law and order were trying to contain. Neither politicians nor the military trusted each other. However, were the standoff to last, Kyiv could have mobilized its pro-Maidan militias and loyal units among armed forces and SBU, with possibly very bloody consequences.
<…>
Looking at politics of regional identity, changed jurisdictions and demographic shifts on the peninsula, the idea that Crimea was always unconditionally Ukrainian, subsequently to be invaded by Russia, misses a more complex picture.
<….>
No preconceived state project by Putin to annex Crimea was likely to have existed, but the moment came along when the pro-Russian majority got moralized in the face of fears of moves directed against them and anticipated aggression of pro-Maidan forces. Putin can be accused of taking advantage of the situation, but it was laid out for him by the turbulent events within Ukraine and the existing pro-Russian sentiment.

Что важно в этой цитате? Смещение всей ответственности с России на Украину и полное игнорирование фактов, т.е. игнорирование факта отсутствия каких-либо кровавых конфликтов в самом Крыме. Как великолепно показала автор книги «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition», самые кровавые стычки между участниками Майдана и Анти-Майдана произошли в Одессе, Киеве и Харькове. А самые спокойные акции были в Донецке. В Крыму вообще была тишина, т.е. там никто ни в кого не стрелял. Автор эти факты игнорирует. В Киеве была стрельба. Но это было в столице! А причём тут дальние регионы, у которых есть своя региональная политическая и экономическая элита так же как свои региональные силовые ведомства, которые могли бы справиться с любой провокацией? Моя идея в том, что жителям Крыма ничего не угрожало. Однако автор намеренно выворачивает факты наизнанку, представляя историю так, что жителям Крыма что-то угрожало, и поэтому Россия аннексировала территорию, т.е. по мнению автора, это была защита населения Крыма. Но это полная ерунда, которая не соответствует действительности. Если завтра будут разворачиваться очень кровавые события в Берлине, и там будет происходить то же самое что в Киеве в 2014, это означает, что Франция имеет право оккупировать западные немецкие земли, так что ли?

Так что, прочитав эту главу о Крыме, я посчитал, что я достаточно ознакомился с мнением автора и её книгой и могу закончить своё знакомство с этой работой.

Well, here we have another example of pro-Russian propaganda. I did not need to spend much time to clarify this assertion because the third chapter already deals with the issue of Crimea 2014. When I saw the title of the chapter, I thought, how can the author justify Russia's actions? I cannot, of course, say that the author directly justifies Russia's actions, for then the book would look like blatant pro-Russian propaganda. The point is that the author as if pushing the reader to the idea that the annexation of Crimea was the result of the actions of the Maidan participants and the authorities that came after the overthrow of Yanukovych, i.e., the author does not justify the actions of Moscow, but as if hints that there is no tragedy in it, that it was natural in the situation created by the Maidan participants. Of course, this is a blatant lie, and Russia's actions in relation to Crimea cannot be called anything but a violation of the law. This step shows what international treaties have turned into, i.e., that Putin, with one decision, has destroyed and made the signing of any international treaties meaningless. Tell me, what is the point of international treaties if, at any moment, a large country can violate them, and nothing will happen to it? The author does not write this but claims that it was Ukrainian politicians themselves who created such a situation, for which Russia took away part of Ukraine's territory. But I would like to ask the author: what was going on in Crimea that made it "possible" to take it away? Maybe there was a very bloody fight between different groups there? There was no such thing, i.e., no one died in Crimea. Maybe the official Ukrainian authorities bombed Crimea? That didn't happen either. What was the threat to the residents of Crimea at that time, given that there was a Russian military base there? The answer is very unpleasant for the official Russian authorities because no threat to the residents of Crimea existed and could not exist in principle. As I noted, Ukrainian troops or right-wing radical groups did not even try to organize anything in Crimea because power in Ukraine, as in almost any country, is concentrated in the capital. Yes, there was a tragedy in Odessa, but it was Odessa, not Sevastopol. But let's see what the author writes or how she tries to justify Russia. She starts with distant history, more precisely, with Yeltsin's rule and the Russian-Chechen military conflict.

Discussing this period of relative tranquility, Kuzio claims that The confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus which had close ties to the Crimean Tatars would have intervened against Russia in the event of a Crimean conflict. “Cooperation was already well established between Ukrainian paramilitaries and the Chechen leadership in the Chechen conflict where Ukrainian paramilitaries had by then participated on the Chechen side. At least 100 Tatars fought in Chechnya from the Adalet Party led by former airborne officer Fevzi Kubedinov. Adalet had 1,500 paramilitaries who were from former airborne forces who were used by the Mejlis for security and bodyguard operations.”

This paragraph alone gives an idea of where the author is leading. The author thereby tries to discredit any anti-Russian actions of the Crimean Tatars, firmly trying to link them with Chechen terrorists, who not only fought with the Russian army in Chechnya but also organized terrorist attacks. The author, as if, says: "Do you want to solidarize with these people (Crimean Tatars)? They are allies of the Wahhabis!" Of course, the author doesn't write like that, but I can't draw any other conclusion from the quote above. Let's move on.

In a VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) opinion poll taken in February 2015, 1 year after the referendum, around half of Crimean Tatars said they would support the decision to join Russia if the referendum was to be repeated. Only a quarter said they would vote to remain in Ukraine.

That's a great quote, too. What is the problem? First, VCIOM is a state structure that publishes the sociological surveys that the Russian government demands of this organization. This is like taking sociological surveys conducted in the Soviet Union as truth. Everyone in Russia knows very well that the VCIOM figures are not to be believed in any case. But that is not the main thing in this quote, but the statement that is derived. The author seems to say that yes, they annexed (Crimea), but look, even the most ardent opponents of the annexation - Crimean Tatars - in the end, are not so much against it. This is a sample of propaganda and manipulation on the part of the author. To strengthen this thesis, the author quotes an ambiguous person - Professor Solovei. Yes, yes, the very same one. I will remind you that Professor Solovei is positioned as an oppositionist. But here's what he says (by the way, yes, he has indeed stated this many times):

MGIMO Professor Valerii Solovei summed up the prevailing sentiment: “I cannot imagine circumstances under which Crimea would return to Ukraine.”

In this case, the author seems to hint: "What has been, has been". Even Russia's non-systemic opposition recognizes that Crimea has sailed away from Ukraine forever, and there is nothing that can be done about it. Clever!

Putin himself argued the opposite—no premeditated annexation plot existed in Kremlin before the events spiraled down in Kyiv in 2014. Informed observers in Moscow agreed on this. Even if different scenarios and contingency plans were floated, the prevailing view was to support the ruling president and the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Here is another good example of propaganda, the purpose of which is to claim that "we didn't do it - we were provoked". Again, the important thing here is the shift of responsibility, which consists of a simple idea: if Yanukovych had not been touched, Crimea would have continued to be part of Ukraine, but if you overthrew him, you are to blame. The last quote shows very well how the author is trying to justify Russia's actions about Crimea.

Russia’s takeover of Crimea was not inevitable. It was propelled by a confluence of three factors that came together at the same historical junction: a surge of ethno nationalism unleashed by pro-Maidan forces which the new power-holders in Kyiv went along with, fears of Russian identity-bearers that this nationalism would be directed at them, and the ability of Russian leadership to react decisively and in force. The element of spontaneity, local initiative and quality of leadership played a significant role in shaping the outcome. The fire of resistance and display of a local drive for secession played an important role, and Crimea’s fate was sealed in a matter of days. Disarray of Ukrainian security structures contributed, because the new Kyiv power-holders until very recently were their opponents who caused street chaos which the forces of law and order were trying to contain. Neither politicians nor the military trusted each other. However, were the standoff to last, Kyiv could have mobilized its pro-Maidan militias and loyal units among armed forces and SBU, with possibly very bloody consequences.
<…>
Looking at politics of regional identity, changed jurisdictions and demographic shifts on the peninsula, the idea that Crimea was always unconditionally Ukrainian, subsequently to be invaded by Russia, misses a more complex picture.
<….>
No preconceived state project by Putin to annex Crimea was likely to have existed, but the moment came along when the pro-Russian majority got moralized in the face of fears of moves directed against them and anticipated aggression of pro-Maidan forces. Putin can be accused of taking advantage of the situation, but it was laid out for him by the turbulent events within Ukraine and the existing pro-Russian sentiment.

What is important in this quote? Shifting all responsibility from Russia to Ukraine and completely ignoring the facts, i.e., ignoring the fact that there were no bloody conflicts in Crimea itself. As the author of "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition" has superbly shown, the bloodiest clashes between Maidan and Anti-Maidan participants, took place in Odessa, Kiev, and Kharkov. And the calmest actions were in Donetsk. In Crimea, there was silence, i.e., no one shot at anyone there. The author ignores these facts. There was a shooting in Kiev. But it was in the capital! And what does this have to do with the distant regions, which have their own regional political and economic elite, as well as their regional security agencies, which could cope with any provocation? My idea is that the residents of Crimea were not threatened. However, the author deliberately turns the facts inside out, presenting the story in such a way that the residents of Crimea were threatened by something, therefore, Russia annexed the territory, i.e., according to the author, it was the protection of the population of Crimea. But this is complete nonsense, which does not correspond to reality. If very bloody events unfold tomorrow in Berlin, and the same thing happens there, as in Kiev in 2014, does it mean France has the right to occupy western German lands?

So, after reading this chapter on Crimea, I felt that I had sufficiently familiarized myself with the author's opinions.

[Edz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A refreshing take on the tragic conflict that’s been ravaging the Donbas for the past 8 years, one that seeks to present the perspective of the local insurgents within a broader context.


The book starts off with an introductory section in trying to frame the Donbas rebellion in terms of other similar conflicts that have taken place throughout the past century and drawing parallels therein. It then goes over to situate the uprising within a chronological context based in Ukrainian politics since the 1990s, followed by a special focus on Crimea and then Donbas in regards to their historical legacies, language, culture, religion, as well as political developments. Afterwards, the author starts tracing the uprising since its inception in April 2014 with its small scale skirmishes leading to outright war and gradual state building culminating in both the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. She traces the tense internal processes that took place therein under the aegis of Moscow as well as the crosshairs of Kiev, noting the birth of the Russian Spring as a powerful motivator for both the rebellion and its opponents, as well as the portrayal of it as a global anti fascist struggle which challenged Euroatlantic hegemony, thus explaining the prominence of transnational and foreign volunteers within its ranks. Such a representation was facilitated by the ubiquitous reach of social media whose power cannot be underestimated in the war of ideas, which enabled the rebellion to address a global audience in support of its self-described righteous struggle. We are then treated with how the conflict was assessed within Ukraine itself amidst other crises it had to face post-Maidan as well as Russia’s position on this urgent issue. Finally, the author makes an effort to find ways to achieve peace and reconciliation in the near future amongst the various challenges that are present.

Overall, a very nice monograph which tries to show the ins and outs of the Donbas conflict by privileging the voice of the other side which rarely gets to speak out in mainstream publications, which is paramount to understand in order to solve the issue. Apart from the various typos and language errors that I’ve encountered, this is definitely a go-to book for reading up on the war in Donbas.