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Case Red: The Collapse of France
In Case Red, Robert Forczyk shows that there was much more to the fall of France than Dunkirk. In fact, even after that legendary evacuation in June 1940 there were still large British formations fighting the Germans alongside their French allies. After mounting a vigorous counterattack at Abbeville and then engaging a tough defense along the Somme, the British were forced to conduct a second evacuation from the ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, and St. Nazaire. While France was in its death throes, politicians and soldiers debated what to do--flee to England or North Africa, or seek an armistice.
Case Red captures the drama of the final three weeks of military operations in France in June 1940, and explains the great impact it had on the course of relations between Britain and France during the remainder of the war. It also addresses the military, political, and human drama of France's collapse in June 1940, and how the windfall of captured military equipment, fuel, and industrial resources enhanced the Third Reich's ability to attack its next foe--the Soviet Union.
Case Red captures the drama of the final three weeks of military operations in France in June 1940, and explains the great impact it had on the course of relations between Britain and France during the remainder of the war. It also addresses the military, political, and human drama of France's collapse in June 1940, and how the windfall of captured military equipment, fuel, and industrial resources enhanced the Third Reich's ability to attack its next foe--the Soviet Union.
474 pages, Paperback
Published January 22, 2019
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About the author
Robert Forczyk
58 books72 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 56 reviews
January 14, 2018
This is the first book I have come across that offers any detailed narrative on the second half of the Fall of France in 1940. Normally anything post the first Brexit, at Dunkirk, is glossed over in sometimes as little as a single sentence. However, Case Red finally brings to light the fierce fighting, operational and tactical gambits, and the personalities involved in the French nightmare of 1940.
Dealing with far more, however, than just Case Red, the author does an excellent job of showcasing how both the French and British were ludicrously ill prepared for a new war. All the while, the National Socialists in Germany were making very ominous, and obvious, preparations for precisely that.
The works focus is on the French side of the tale, and this is the best way by which one can fully comprehend why the victors of the First World War, lost so completely in the opening rounds of the Second.
The French were no strangers to utilizing military force between the wars. In Syria and North Africa they used brute military force to stamp out two Muslim insurgencies (proving that with enough will power, and logistics, you really can kill enough adherents to a dangerous ideal to make them say uncle) and spent a fortune on not just building the technological marvel that was the Maginot Line, but also the Navy.
Even so, much like the current US and NATO, French insistence on focusing on counterinsurgency operations, and in technological marvels would damn them to the nightmare to come.
The French were incapable of forming a coherent doctrinal plan for mechanized warfare prior to the outbreak of war, and their efforts to improvise one post hostilities came up short in practice. The French also fell behind in the aerial arms race, with the Luftwaffe being significantly superior on a technological level to the French Air Force the AdA.
France's greatest mistake, however, was also one that both the United States and NATO seem to be making on a routine basis. France was utterly convinced of the benefits of collective security. As such she wasted years, resources, and ultimately lives in her quest to build a cordon sanitaire around Germany, composed of weaker states too far away from France for any reasonable strategic cooperation. France's misplaced faith in collective security, her adherence to pacifist thinking and the misguided notion that the abhorrence of war would prevent an outbreak of one doomed not just her, but ultimately the entire world, to the hell of the Second World War.
Once the war and invasion did occur, however, the author goes to great lengths to point out the heroic resistance offered by the much despised (even by her own citizens) French Army and Air Force. He also showcases the at best lackluster and at worst criminally negligent way in which the British routinely failed to aid their continental ally. That said, he also does an excellent job at pointing out how the British were the least prepared for war of all the major powers, and couldn't have contributed much at the outset anyway.
German reliance on far more flexible junior leadership (genuine leadership, too, as opposed to management and administration; clearly history bears out which is the Superior methodology), as well as heavier organic firepower per unit helped ensure victory over a troubled, yet heroic French military.
Overall, this is an excellent look at a sad fall of a once great power. A great power brought down largely by it's own victors guilt, willful lack of preparation, and inability to show the right kind of ruthlessness at the time it was most needed.
Highly recommended.
Dealing with far more, however, than just Case Red, the author does an excellent job of showcasing how both the French and British were ludicrously ill prepared for a new war. All the while, the National Socialists in Germany were making very ominous, and obvious, preparations for precisely that.
The works focus is on the French side of the tale, and this is the best way by which one can fully comprehend why the victors of the First World War, lost so completely in the opening rounds of the Second.
The French were no strangers to utilizing military force between the wars. In Syria and North Africa they used brute military force to stamp out two Muslim insurgencies (proving that with enough will power, and logistics, you really can kill enough adherents to a dangerous ideal to make them say uncle) and spent a fortune on not just building the technological marvel that was the Maginot Line, but also the Navy.
Even so, much like the current US and NATO, French insistence on focusing on counterinsurgency operations, and in technological marvels would damn them to the nightmare to come.
The French were incapable of forming a coherent doctrinal plan for mechanized warfare prior to the outbreak of war, and their efforts to improvise one post hostilities came up short in practice. The French also fell behind in the aerial arms race, with the Luftwaffe being significantly superior on a technological level to the French Air Force the AdA.
France's greatest mistake, however, was also one that both the United States and NATO seem to be making on a routine basis. France was utterly convinced of the benefits of collective security. As such she wasted years, resources, and ultimately lives in her quest to build a cordon sanitaire around Germany, composed of weaker states too far away from France for any reasonable strategic cooperation. France's misplaced faith in collective security, her adherence to pacifist thinking and the misguided notion that the abhorrence of war would prevent an outbreak of one doomed not just her, but ultimately the entire world, to the hell of the Second World War.
Once the war and invasion did occur, however, the author goes to great lengths to point out the heroic resistance offered by the much despised (even by her own citizens) French Army and Air Force. He also showcases the at best lackluster and at worst criminally negligent way in which the British routinely failed to aid their continental ally. That said, he also does an excellent job at pointing out how the British were the least prepared for war of all the major powers, and couldn't have contributed much at the outset anyway.
German reliance on far more flexible junior leadership (genuine leadership, too, as opposed to management and administration; clearly history bears out which is the Superior methodology), as well as heavier organic firepower per unit helped ensure victory over a troubled, yet heroic French military.
Overall, this is an excellent look at a sad fall of a once great power. A great power brought down largely by it's own victors guilt, willful lack of preparation, and inability to show the right kind of ruthlessness at the time it was most needed.
Highly recommended.
February 5, 2024
I've come to very much enjoy reading and respect Robert Forczyk's works of WWII history and Case Red does not disappoint. Although this book is primarily focused on Germany's second major operation in France during 1940 known as Case Red, Dr. Forczyk first develops the foundation for understanding what happened during those fateful days of May and June 1940. He spends a good portion of the first third of the book providing the overview of the military developments and industrial status of France, Britain and Germany. Case Yellow, the initial invasion of France in May 1940 is then covered in some depth, and finally we get to the subject matter of the book - Case Red.
I found the discussion around the development of military technology and unit TTPs to be very informative just as I did in his book Case White. It was in-depth comparing these developments across the three belligerents - France, Britain and Germany. The author also spends some time discussing the moral of the military and dispelling more than a few myths regarding France's military's willingness to fight.
Coverage of the military operations is primarily at the corps and division level, although where necessary the author does go to the regimental and battalion levels. The maps could have been a bit more prolific and situated earlier in the text in order to help the reader understand the movements and actions of units. Military leaders at the corps level and above are covered in some detail with more time spent with those French leaders - both military and political - at the national level - Gamelin, Waygand, etc.
Excellent read and resource for anyone interested in the early years of WWII.
I found the discussion around the development of military technology and unit TTPs to be very informative just as I did in his book Case White. It was in-depth comparing these developments across the three belligerents - France, Britain and Germany. The author also spends some time discussing the moral of the military and dispelling more than a few myths regarding France's military's willingness to fight.
Coverage of the military operations is primarily at the corps and division level, although where necessary the author does go to the regimental and battalion levels. The maps could have been a bit more prolific and situated earlier in the text in order to help the reader understand the movements and actions of units. Military leaders at the corps level and above are covered in some detail with more time spent with those French leaders - both military and political - at the national level - Gamelin, Waygand, etc.
Excellent read and resource for anyone interested in the early years of WWII.
August 11, 2021
A 15 and a half hour unabridged audiobook.
I admire the amount of time the author spent on the prelude to the war (roughly the first six hours). The decisions made by each country in the decade prior regarding military strategy, expenditure, training, personnel assignments, technological research, priorities, defense industry, diplomacy, etc. If you're only dissecting the battle phase you're missing everything that led up to it, which is crucial to understand decisions made and events transpiring during the campaign.
I wasn't disappointed. I was glad to get a deeper understanding of what occurred after Dunkirk. Some of the French higher ups were defeatist nearly from the start, the fact that Pasis was abandoned when it could have served as a long tough battle which would have allowed for the French to reorganize elsewhere is bothersome- save the city and lose the country. The French upper echelon military command can probably be generally and properly described as feckless.
That's not to say it's all Frances fault. The speed at which Belgium and Holland collapsed certainly falls on their respective shoulders, relatively low numbers of British ground troops that were engaged in France was likewise not to be overlooked. I suppose the Germans played a tiny part in the end results as well.
I enjoyed this book.
I admire the amount of time the author spent on the prelude to the war (roughly the first six hours). The decisions made by each country in the decade prior regarding military strategy, expenditure, training, personnel assignments, technological research, priorities, defense industry, diplomacy, etc. If you're only dissecting the battle phase you're missing everything that led up to it, which is crucial to understand decisions made and events transpiring during the campaign.
I wasn't disappointed. I was glad to get a deeper understanding of what occurred after Dunkirk. Some of the French higher ups were defeatist nearly from the start, the fact that Pasis was abandoned when it could have served as a long tough battle which would have allowed for the French to reorganize elsewhere is bothersome- save the city and lose the country. The French upper echelon military command can probably be generally and properly described as feckless.
That's not to say it's all Frances fault. The speed at which Belgium and Holland collapsed certainly falls on their respective shoulders, relatively low numbers of British ground troops that were engaged in France was likewise not to be overlooked. I suppose the Germans played a tiny part in the end results as well.
I enjoyed this book.
September 18, 2024
A well-researched, energetically-written and much-needed history of the fall of France in the summer of 1940, with the emphasis on the second half of the campaign, dubbed Case Red by the Germans. The French may have made many mistakes in May and June 1940 (not the least of which was entrusting their army to a pair of incompetent and defeatist commanders: Gamelin and Weygand) but the number of casualties they both suffered and inflicted on their enemies proves that they fought hard. But they were outclassed at the tactical and operational levels. German units tended to have much greater firepower, and they fought as a more effective combined arms team than the French could usually do. The brilliant "Sichelshnitt" stroke in the Ardennes and across the Meuse destroyed almost 1/2 the French Army, but Case Red put the issue away.
Much of the book is devoted to debunking the various myths and mistruths that have grown up around it, especially those spread by English-speaking authors. Generally speaking, French military technology in 1940 was equal to or even better than the German's: both French tanks and anti-tank guns tended to be superior to German models. German artillery, on the other hand, was both more modern and had larger calibers than their French counterparts. The French just barely managed to produce a modern fighter that could match the Messerschmidt 109 - there were many problems with French military industries between the wars - and not enough attention was paid by the French to field anti-aircraft guns, motorizing their combat engineers, and producing quality crew-served infantry weapons.
Despite having lost the cream of her army in the north, the French fought hard during Case Red; the breakthrough battles that the Germans had to fight were tough and bitter, given their numerical and aerial superiorities. The French army was actually prepared to fight it out for Paris, but Weygand's arbitrary decision to declare it an open city robbed the French of the chance of slowing down the Germans and tying up a good portion of their infantry in an urban battlefield. All in all, there is much to ponder here, and Colonel Forczyk has done a man's job filling in the important gaps in our knowledge of the 1940 summer campaign in France, especially the battles south of the Somme and the Aisne. The maps could have been better, a general map of Case Red was especially lacking, but they are easy to find in other sources. All in all, an important addition to one's World War II library.
Much of the book is devoted to debunking the various myths and mistruths that have grown up around it, especially those spread by English-speaking authors. Generally speaking, French military technology in 1940 was equal to or even better than the German's: both French tanks and anti-tank guns tended to be superior to German models. German artillery, on the other hand, was both more modern and had larger calibers than their French counterparts. The French just barely managed to produce a modern fighter that could match the Messerschmidt 109 - there were many problems with French military industries between the wars - and not enough attention was paid by the French to field anti-aircraft guns, motorizing their combat engineers, and producing quality crew-served infantry weapons.
Despite having lost the cream of her army in the north, the French fought hard during Case Red; the breakthrough battles that the Germans had to fight were tough and bitter, given their numerical and aerial superiorities. The French army was actually prepared to fight it out for Paris, but Weygand's arbitrary decision to declare it an open city robbed the French of the chance of slowing down the Germans and tying up a good portion of their infantry in an urban battlefield. All in all, there is much to ponder here, and Colonel Forczyk has done a man's job filling in the important gaps in our knowledge of the 1940 summer campaign in France, especially the battles south of the Somme and the Aisne. The maps could have been better, a general map of Case Red was especially lacking, but they are easy to find in other sources. All in all, an important addition to one's World War II library.
April 18, 2021
Goes a long way to dispel some still commonly accepted myths about the Fall of France in 1940.
March 18, 2019
A compelling account of the lesser covered second half of the Battle of France focusing on what occurred after Dunkirk evacuation. While it gets a little to into the weeds of individual units and actions for a non military person like myself, it provides a good summary of the deficiencies in French military and political leadership as well as the failure of its system of alliances that led to the fall of the 3rd Republic.
May 6, 2019
Forczyk shares in painstaking detail all of what went into the Nazi invasion of France. And it was worth all the considerable effort that it took to get through it - prepare yourself.
March 11, 2024
There is no doubt that Mr. Forczyk has both command and attention to detail for which he can be commended. Unfortunately his rather dense prose and slightly fatuous conclusions do not make for an interesting or even a relatively informative read.
The introduction started out well enough as the author laid out his contentions as to how the fall of Metropolitan France might benefit from reappraisal. He lays out six areas of conventional wisdom which he wishes to challenge, and which essentially boiled down to weak morale, faulty military doctrine, poor training, the impact of the Maginot Line, poor military leadership and political division. He admits all these factors have merit but suggests there was more to the French collapse than this. So far so good perhaps - however, unfortunately, I never really discovered what the other factors might have been, except that in the author's mind, the British and Alanbrooke, in particular, seemed peculiarly at fault.
If anything, through the rather turgid narrative, the author actually reinforces the conventional thinking he wishes to challenge. He highlights many institutional failings from defeatism on the part of the French General Staff down. The failure to hold defensive lines, on a large scale and in numerous instances (despite real bravery in a number of what were essentially isolated actions) does nothing to suggest that the French Army was prepared mentally, appropriately equipped or even close to using the right doctrines to allow it succeed. The situation France found itself in and the outcomes that then ensued can only be put down poor leadership, both militarily and politically. There is nothing in Mr. Forczyk's book which suggests otherwise.
No doubt I may have missed some nuances but when the text is so heavily leavened with the numeric references (such 1ere BCC, Ee DCR, 24e DI) of at least 150 separate French Military units and their commanders (virtually none of which are given any sort of biographical detail) along with what seems a similarly large number of German units which don't even seem to merit a mention in the index, it becomes very hard to engage deeply with the writing. In fact, for me, the book almost became a showcase for the author to show off just how much detail he had conjured up, while unfortunately failing to derive little of import or interest from the information he presented.
There was one area though on which the book was engaging and that was the analysis that the Author gave to the Maginot Line - it would seem that this defensive fortification, which relatively speaking wasn't nearly as great an expense as that lavished on the Navy, played a positive role (from the French perspective) in determining German actions. Mr. Forczyk shows there was in fact some strategic benefit to these fortifications while, on the other hand, the French Navy played next to no part in events, let alone key ones.
What I found downright odd was the castigation of the British - the author freely admits that training etc wasn't any better than the French, yet he repeatedly implied that had the British somehow hung on in France (despite being no more than 10% of French military manpower at its peak, and which in any case was collapsing around them), had somehow had more appetite for combat (than the French or Belgiums presumably?) or provided more aircraft etc it may have meant that the French could have held out for longer and then continued the fight from North Africa.
Then, extremely irritatingly, the author says in his conclusion that "the concept of continuing the war form North Africa was not really viable and might have proved a liability for the allied cause".
This surely means that there is only one inescapable conclusion (but it is not the one the author seems able to come to). That is, in light of their resources at the time and how future events transpired, the British were absolutely right to be circumspect about whether the battle for France was winnable to any degree, and especially in their desire to wisely use the Second BEF and its aviation resources. Therefore Alanbrooke, in ignoring Churchill's Francophile flights of fancy, did well to pull out when he did - this pragmatism is what made him such a great partner for Churchill in the future
All in all, I can't recommend this book - there is nothing revelatory in it, there is lots to be bemused by and, frankly, it is a very dull read.
The introduction started out well enough as the author laid out his contentions as to how the fall of Metropolitan France might benefit from reappraisal. He lays out six areas of conventional wisdom which he wishes to challenge, and which essentially boiled down to weak morale, faulty military doctrine, poor training, the impact of the Maginot Line, poor military leadership and political division. He admits all these factors have merit but suggests there was more to the French collapse than this. So far so good perhaps - however, unfortunately, I never really discovered what the other factors might have been, except that in the author's mind, the British and Alanbrooke, in particular, seemed peculiarly at fault.
If anything, through the rather turgid narrative, the author actually reinforces the conventional thinking he wishes to challenge. He highlights many institutional failings from defeatism on the part of the French General Staff down. The failure to hold defensive lines, on a large scale and in numerous instances (despite real bravery in a number of what were essentially isolated actions) does nothing to suggest that the French Army was prepared mentally, appropriately equipped or even close to using the right doctrines to allow it succeed. The situation France found itself in and the outcomes that then ensued can only be put down poor leadership, both militarily and politically. There is nothing in Mr. Forczyk's book which suggests otherwise.
No doubt I may have missed some nuances but when the text is so heavily leavened with the numeric references (such 1ere BCC, Ee DCR, 24e DI) of at least 150 separate French Military units and their commanders (virtually none of which are given any sort of biographical detail) along with what seems a similarly large number of German units which don't even seem to merit a mention in the index, it becomes very hard to engage deeply with the writing. In fact, for me, the book almost became a showcase for the author to show off just how much detail he had conjured up, while unfortunately failing to derive little of import or interest from the information he presented.
There was one area though on which the book was engaging and that was the analysis that the Author gave to the Maginot Line - it would seem that this defensive fortification, which relatively speaking wasn't nearly as great an expense as that lavished on the Navy, played a positive role (from the French perspective) in determining German actions. Mr. Forczyk shows there was in fact some strategic benefit to these fortifications while, on the other hand, the French Navy played next to no part in events, let alone key ones.
What I found downright odd was the castigation of the British - the author freely admits that training etc wasn't any better than the French, yet he repeatedly implied that had the British somehow hung on in France (despite being no more than 10% of French military manpower at its peak, and which in any case was collapsing around them), had somehow had more appetite for combat (than the French or Belgiums presumably?) or provided more aircraft etc it may have meant that the French could have held out for longer and then continued the fight from North Africa.
Then, extremely irritatingly, the author says in his conclusion that "the concept of continuing the war form North Africa was not really viable and might have proved a liability for the allied cause".
This surely means that there is only one inescapable conclusion (but it is not the one the author seems able to come to). That is, in light of their resources at the time and how future events transpired, the British were absolutely right to be circumspect about whether the battle for France was winnable to any degree, and especially in their desire to wisely use the Second BEF and its aviation resources. Therefore Alanbrooke, in ignoring Churchill's Francophile flights of fancy, did well to pull out when he did - this pragmatism is what made him such a great partner for Churchill in the future
All in all, I can't recommend this book - there is nothing revelatory in it, there is lots to be bemused by and, frankly, it is a very dull read.
January 29, 2025
I wanted to like this one, I really did. Unfortunately I found myself unable to finish it.
This book read as contrarian in the worst of ways; the author spends a considerable amount of time listing the books and ideas which he objects to, and seems to build his picture of the collapse of France specifically to oppose the views of others. This leads to often strange and unexpected declarations. Take the introduction of the French general Gamelin as an example. Gamelin is a controversial figure in French history, who is often accused of having poorly prepared France for war, and then having led French forces poorly; he confessed to being surprised by the German invasion of Norway, and he vastly overestimated German resistance during France's 1939 invasion of Germany - resulting in France's withdrawing without a fight when a determined attack could have crippled a vulnerable Germany.
There is a good debate to be had about how much the man can be blamed for these decisions given his imperfect knowledge and political situation, but this book isn't here for a good debate. This book is here to be contrarian. As such, Gamelin is introduced as follows: "Gamelin's decade-long effort to prepare the French Army for war with Germany marks him as an exceptional planner with good insight into enemy capabilities and intentions." It's quite a bold claim, isn't it? This book has opinions, and it has them strongly.
The other great problem is the breaks of logic in the book. Strange questions are thrown out at the reader. How can the Maginot Line have been a waste of recourses if the German Western Wall wasn't a waste of recourses, the author cries out! "How can one side's fortification programme be harmful to morale, but not the other side's similar programme?" It's a fair question he asks, and one that's deserving of a careful discussion which just doesn't happen. We're left with "How can French wall be bad if German Wall existed?".
My favourite breakdown of reason takes place in the early stages of the book, and you'll have to trust that I'm leaving nothing significant out. The author sets out to prove that the French army did not suffer moral issues as follows: 1) During the Phony War (i.e. before the main French battles began) the French Army had 12623 non-battle deaths from all causes. 2) Some of these would have been suicide although we don't know how many. 3) During this time the German army had just under 10000 non-battle deaths. 4) We know that 777 of these were suicide. 5) Therefore the Germans seemed pretty sad themselves. 6) So France couldn't have had any real moral issues compared to the Germans.
It's a shame. The author has the capacity for some good scholarship, but he's got himself worked up and the book feels more like an angry, half-formed, forum post than a real work of history.
This book read as contrarian in the worst of ways; the author spends a considerable amount of time listing the books and ideas which he objects to, and seems to build his picture of the collapse of France specifically to oppose the views of others. This leads to often strange and unexpected declarations. Take the introduction of the French general Gamelin as an example. Gamelin is a controversial figure in French history, who is often accused of having poorly prepared France for war, and then having led French forces poorly; he confessed to being surprised by the German invasion of Norway, and he vastly overestimated German resistance during France's 1939 invasion of Germany - resulting in France's withdrawing without a fight when a determined attack could have crippled a vulnerable Germany.
There is a good debate to be had about how much the man can be blamed for these decisions given his imperfect knowledge and political situation, but this book isn't here for a good debate. This book is here to be contrarian. As such, Gamelin is introduced as follows: "Gamelin's decade-long effort to prepare the French Army for war with Germany marks him as an exceptional planner with good insight into enemy capabilities and intentions." It's quite a bold claim, isn't it? This book has opinions, and it has them strongly.
The other great problem is the breaks of logic in the book. Strange questions are thrown out at the reader. How can the Maginot Line have been a waste of recourses if the German Western Wall wasn't a waste of recourses, the author cries out! "How can one side's fortification programme be harmful to morale, but not the other side's similar programme?" It's a fair question he asks, and one that's deserving of a careful discussion which just doesn't happen. We're left with "How can French wall be bad if German Wall existed?".
My favourite breakdown of reason takes place in the early stages of the book, and you'll have to trust that I'm leaving nothing significant out. The author sets out to prove that the French army did not suffer moral issues as follows: 1) During the Phony War (i.e. before the main French battles began) the French Army had 12623 non-battle deaths from all causes. 2) Some of these would have been suicide although we don't know how many. 3) During this time the German army had just under 10000 non-battle deaths. 4) We know that 777 of these were suicide. 5) Therefore the Germans seemed pretty sad themselves. 6) So France couldn't have had any real moral issues compared to the Germans.
It's a shame. The author has the capacity for some good scholarship, but he's got himself worked up and the book feels more like an angry, half-formed, forum post than a real work of history.
February 12, 2018
Dr. Forczyk combines not only a PhD in military history, but also served as a tank officer in the US Army. This gives him a wonderful perspective of not only what happened, but why things happened - and the unique capabilities and limitations of armored forces that make his works into tank warfare during the Second World War so powerfully insightful. Dr. Forczyk is not for the the casual reader: he goes into a considerable amount of detail and the less engaged might be turned off by the vast number of battalions, regiments, divisions and corps that one needs to keep track of, in both French and German. Dr. Forczyk also has strong opinions: no one is going to mistake his stance on the performance of General Weygand or Petain, de Gaulle or de Lattre de Tassigny, or Guderian, Rommel and Rundstedt on the German side. You might feel offended and feel that Dr. Forczyk strays from "historical objectivity" in this regard, but I personally don't feel that it is a problem: all authors display a bias in their works and Dr. Forcyzk unapologetically keeps his out front and in the open, which makes it easier to recognize and deal with.
If you are interested in a highly detailed, thoughtful and readable account of armored warfare in the Second World War, Dr. Forczyk is preeminent.
If you are interested in a highly detailed, thoughtful and readable account of armored warfare in the Second World War, Dr. Forczyk is preeminent.
January 20, 2025
This was a very interesting deep dive into the Fall of France that continued past Case Yellow, the initial German plan for the invasion of France through Case Red which was the second, post Dunkirk, wave of attacks that actually shattered the Franco-British Alliance and ultimately defeated France. The author goes into great detail, down to the tactical level, to demonstrate that many theories about the Fall of France don't really hold water. The "cheese eating surrender monkeys" slur is just a slur. The French took 600,000 casualties during the campaign and in many small unit engagements were equal to the Germans both in materiel and morale. The problems were at the theater and strategic level and, frankly, at the political level throughout the Third Republic and also in Britain. Resourcing decisions were made in the interwar years that made the outcome of 1940 almost inevitable though the reluctance to fight in and for Paris also played a major role. All in all this was a very enlightening book, I quite enjoyed it.
October 30, 2021
Most WW2 histories pretty much stop describing the 1940 German invasion of France after Dunkirk. They might give the last three weeks of that campaign a paragraph or two in a good general history or a few pages or a chapter in books that purport to tell the whole story of the campaign. Case Red is not just the name of the book, but the German code name for their last operation in that campaign.
Just as the author did in Case White, the author's book about the 1939 invasion of Poland, he discusses the pre war preparations of the major combatants and how our perceptions of those preparations have been skewed by years of propaganda. He thereby sets the table to demonstrate why we get France 1940 so wrong. The German army didn't consist of splendidly trained unstoppable automatons, every man with his own personal tank,, who planned out their Blitzkrieg campaign with precision and unified purpose. E.g., they didn't even use the word Blitzkrieg and less than 20% of their army was mechanized.The French army was not entirely a poorly trained mob of "cheese eating surrender monkeys". The British, already well into a program of re armament, were fully mechanized. The reader gets the impression that this campaign didn't have to go the way it did. If the Germans had lost their nerve after the Meuse breakout, if the French had put better troops in the Ardennes....on and on.
In short, this book doesn't have any great revelations, but is a good to excellent popular history synthesis of ideas that have been around a while. FWIW, I recommend it for anyone who has an interest in the subject.
Just as the author did in Case White, the author's book about the 1939 invasion of Poland, he discusses the pre war preparations of the major combatants and how our perceptions of those preparations have been skewed by years of propaganda. He thereby sets the table to demonstrate why we get France 1940 so wrong. The German army didn't consist of splendidly trained unstoppable automatons, every man with his own personal tank,, who planned out their Blitzkrieg campaign with precision and unified purpose. E.g., they didn't even use the word Blitzkrieg and less than 20% of their army was mechanized.The French army was not entirely a poorly trained mob of "cheese eating surrender monkeys". The British, already well into a program of re armament, were fully mechanized. The reader gets the impression that this campaign didn't have to go the way it did. If the Germans had lost their nerve after the Meuse breakout, if the French had put better troops in the Ardennes....on and on.
In short, this book doesn't have any great revelations, but is a good to excellent popular history synthesis of ideas that have been around a while. FWIW, I recommend it for anyone who has an interest in the subject.
February 6, 2018
have you always wondered what a specific French tank (crew names supplied) of the 41e BCC of the 3e DCR was doing around half-past eight on the evening of June 12, 1940? if so, then this book is for you!
because there are almost 300 pages of such [presumably meticulously researched] blow-by-blow accounts, often down to the individual tank platoon or even a single tank, with times, dates, places, weather, what's for dinner, etc. in this book, to cover roughly six weeks of fighting. handy if you're in the business of stamping out cookie-cutter expansion packs for turn-based strategy games, otherwise - mind-boggling.
on the positive side, title notwithstanding, Case Red is not just about Fall Rot. it covers all of Battle of France and only gets to Fall Rot about half-way through the book. and yes, there are also a couple of chapters of higher-level how-s and why-s, some background info, brief discussion of the equipment of each side, a helping of politics and a side dish of author's 20/20 hindsight and opinions. but the important stuff tends to get drowned in minutiae.
granted, this is Forczyk and it's Osprey (who'da thunk, right?), but i'd say this time they went overboard with the padding.
because there are almost 300 pages of such [presumably meticulously researched] blow-by-blow accounts, often down to the individual tank platoon or even a single tank, with times, dates, places, weather, what's for dinner, etc. in this book, to cover roughly six weeks of fighting. handy if you're in the business of stamping out cookie-cutter expansion packs for turn-based strategy games, otherwise - mind-boggling.
on the positive side, title notwithstanding, Case Red is not just about Fall Rot. it covers all of Battle of France and only gets to Fall Rot about half-way through the book. and yes, there are also a couple of chapters of higher-level how-s and why-s, some background info, brief discussion of the equipment of each side, a helping of politics and a side dish of author's 20/20 hindsight and opinions. but the important stuff tends to get drowned in minutiae.
granted, this is Forczyk and it's Osprey (who'da thunk, right?), but i'd say this time they went overboard with the padding.
July 9, 2018
Of the several books I have read over the years covering the May-June 1940 Battle of France I have to say that Forczyk's "Case Red" is my favorite. Many books on the subject do as good of a job detailing the run up to the start of WW2, the different plans, strategies, POVs and armaments of the opposing powers and do as good of a job covering the first phase of the Battle of France up until the evacualtion at Dunkirk. "Case Red" does a much better job at the the second phase of the German invasion of France and how vigorously (and vainly) the French tried to fight the German onslaught.
Many readers in the US and UK have long considered the French effort half hearted and feebly contested. Forczyk makes a case for while French leadership was a muddled mess and some like Petain were craven and treasonous, the French forces threw themselves against the German tide and lsuffered 250,000 casualties with almost 100K dead in 45 days of fighting. It would be years later, if ever, before US and UK forces faced those type losses in comparable time frames as what the French suffered.
Also surpising is given how much is made of the Dunkirk evacuation, how feckless the British effort was in the early Summer of 1940.
Many readers in the US and UK have long considered the French effort half hearted and feebly contested. Forczyk makes a case for while French leadership was a muddled mess and some like Petain were craven and treasonous, the French forces threw themselves against the German tide and lsuffered 250,000 casualties with almost 100K dead in 45 days of fighting. It would be years later, if ever, before US and UK forces faced those type losses in comparable time frames as what the French suffered.
Also surpising is given how much is made of the Dunkirk evacuation, how feckless the British effort was in the early Summer of 1940.
January 5, 2024
Robert Forczyk has basically written a textbook on the fall of France in World War II. This is a book that I could easily see being assigned to students in military academies around the world. It is clear in its hypothesis and relentlessly bombards the reader with detail upon detail of the German invasion of France in 1940.
Despite the incessant detail that made the book at times unlistenable (there are a lot of acronyms of military units), the book does an impressive job of justifying itself. At first it's a decent rebuttal to the stereotype of French cowardice and incompetence in WWII by explaining military and industrial policy, next it is an hour-by-hour military history of the invasion, and finally it is an examination of the results of military and political incompetence of the French and British.
It is possible that this could be a better book to read physically rather than by audiobook, as the reader may be able to better keep track of events in the book by associating words on the page with certain units and areas, rather than having these names blow by at 1.7 speed. It may also be very useful to have a map of France somewhere nearby as you read or listen. I'm good at geography but I'm no expert on the location of every river and town in France. Placing the events on the map as the book progresses helped provide a geospatial context to what was happening, though I didn't attempt to do this until Paris was invaded and the French army was collapsing.
Still, I did extract some value out of this book, mainly the answer to a question I've had for a while which was: how did France's army collapse so suddenly and quickly? The answers are here, and mostly addressed in the first few chapters, so if the reader doesn't want to slog through acronym-riddled minutia of military maneuvers, they can just skim the first few chapters on the lead up to the war and the final chapter of the aftermath for the answer. The actual fighting is a good war story but, as I addressed, its very dense.
A recommend for anyone in any military, or only for those civilians who are SUPER into military affairs and military history. I like military history a lot and even this was a bit much for me.
Despite the incessant detail that made the book at times unlistenable (there are a lot of acronyms of military units), the book does an impressive job of justifying itself. At first it's a decent rebuttal to the stereotype of French cowardice and incompetence in WWII by explaining military and industrial policy, next it is an hour-by-hour military history of the invasion, and finally it is an examination of the results of military and political incompetence of the French and British.
It is possible that this could be a better book to read physically rather than by audiobook, as the reader may be able to better keep track of events in the book by associating words on the page with certain units and areas, rather than having these names blow by at 1.7 speed. It may also be very useful to have a map of France somewhere nearby as you read or listen. I'm good at geography but I'm no expert on the location of every river and town in France. Placing the events on the map as the book progresses helped provide a geospatial context to what was happening, though I didn't attempt to do this until Paris was invaded and the French army was collapsing.
Still, I did extract some value out of this book, mainly the answer to a question I've had for a while which was: how did France's army collapse so suddenly and quickly? The answers are here, and mostly addressed in the first few chapters, so if the reader doesn't want to slog through acronym-riddled minutia of military maneuvers, they can just skim the first few chapters on the lead up to the war and the final chapter of the aftermath for the answer. The actual fighting is a good war story but, as I addressed, its very dense.
A recommend for anyone in any military, or only for those civilians who are SUPER into military affairs and military history. I like military history a lot and even this was a bit much for me.
January 10, 2023
PopKulturowy Kociołek:
Spora część publikacji (jak zresztą zauważa sam autor) dotyczących kampanii francuskiej, skupia się zwykle na pierwszych tygodniach walk, kończąc na ewakuacji wojsk alianckich pod Dunkierką. Owszem jest to wyrazisty symbol wygranej Niemców i upadku Europy. Nie można jednak zapominać o innych faktach i niuansach, które dają znacznie szerszy obraz całości. W Fall Rot Forczyk postanowił więc uzupełnić te braki, prezentując czytelnikowi obszerniejszy obraz upadku Francji, gdzie wszystko (nawet pozornie drobne szczegóły), miały wpływ na katastrofalny finał.
Sam początek publikacji to skupienie się na działaniach aliantów w latach poprzedzających wojnę. Autor skupia się tu między innymi na ekonomiczno-polityczno-społecznym obrazie poszczególnych krajów oraz ich zachowaniu w obliczu nieubłaganie zbliżającego się konfliktu. Niebagatelne znaczenie dla obrony Francji miała między innymi nie tylko „współpraca” z Wielką Brytanią, ale również błędna i krótkowzroczna polityka zagraniczna Belgii. Znajdziemy tutaj również wzmiankę na temat naszego kraju i gwarancji, jakie otrzymaliśmy od aliantów.
Dopiero takie przygotowanie pozwala odbiorcy na właściwe zrozumienie dalszej części książki. Rozdziałów, w których autor bardzo szczegółowo analizuje kolejne etapy walki (z mocnym nastawieniem na militarną stronę, zarówno aliantów, jak i Niemców), włącznie z krytyką niektórych działań czy zachowaniem niektórych dowódców. Stwierdzenie jednak, że Francja upadła przez niekompetentne dowodzenie i niskie morale/ pacyfistyczne nastawienie żołnierzy jest tylko ułamkiem prawdy. Jak na doświadczonego wojskowego przystało, autor dostrzega drobne błędy (na które inni nie zwracali uwagi), które w połączeniu ze sobą stawały się przysłowiową kulą u nogi zbliżającą Francję do nieuchronnego upadku. Forczyk słusznie również zauważa, że w wielu sytuacjach polityka i działania na froncie mało kiedy były ze sobą zbieżne.
https://popkulturowykociolek.pl/recen...
Spora część publikacji (jak zresztą zauważa sam autor) dotyczących kampanii francuskiej, skupia się zwykle na pierwszych tygodniach walk, kończąc na ewakuacji wojsk alianckich pod Dunkierką. Owszem jest to wyrazisty symbol wygranej Niemców i upadku Europy. Nie można jednak zapominać o innych faktach i niuansach, które dają znacznie szerszy obraz całości. W Fall Rot Forczyk postanowił więc uzupełnić te braki, prezentując czytelnikowi obszerniejszy obraz upadku Francji, gdzie wszystko (nawet pozornie drobne szczegóły), miały wpływ na katastrofalny finał.
Sam początek publikacji to skupienie się na działaniach aliantów w latach poprzedzających wojnę. Autor skupia się tu między innymi na ekonomiczno-polityczno-społecznym obrazie poszczególnych krajów oraz ich zachowaniu w obliczu nieubłaganie zbliżającego się konfliktu. Niebagatelne znaczenie dla obrony Francji miała między innymi nie tylko „współpraca” z Wielką Brytanią, ale również błędna i krótkowzroczna polityka zagraniczna Belgii. Znajdziemy tutaj również wzmiankę na temat naszego kraju i gwarancji, jakie otrzymaliśmy od aliantów.
Dopiero takie przygotowanie pozwala odbiorcy na właściwe zrozumienie dalszej części książki. Rozdziałów, w których autor bardzo szczegółowo analizuje kolejne etapy walki (z mocnym nastawieniem na militarną stronę, zarówno aliantów, jak i Niemców), włącznie z krytyką niektórych działań czy zachowaniem niektórych dowódców. Stwierdzenie jednak, że Francja upadła przez niekompetentne dowodzenie i niskie morale/ pacyfistyczne nastawienie żołnierzy jest tylko ułamkiem prawdy. Jak na doświadczonego wojskowego przystało, autor dostrzega drobne błędy (na które inni nie zwracali uwagi), które w połączeniu ze sobą stawały się przysłowiową kulą u nogi zbliżającą Francję do nieuchronnego upadku. Forczyk słusznie również zauważa, że w wielu sytuacjach polityka i działania na froncie mało kiedy były ze sobą zbieżne.
https://popkulturowykociolek.pl/recen...
April 25, 2023
I have been wanting to read this book for years. Now that I am unemployed but still with enough disposable income, the time has come. Military historians have been exploring this issue for years and I am interesting to find any fresh insights.
The narrative of the Fall of France is usually from a perspective that highlights the Wehrmacht's superior tactics, operational science, and strategy despite drawbacks such as still not having a fully mechanized force (relying on foot infantry), inferior equipment compared to the French and British counterparts. The French are always faulted on reliance on fixed defenses and moral decay of the Third Republic. That is what is accepted as history.
The story then ends with the British triumph of Operation Dynamo as the Royal Navy and thousands of sailing enthusiasts rally to take the trapped British and French soldiers off the beaches of Dunkirk.
Forczyk doesn't rest on these assumptions. Indeed, there is much more. The author begins the story back in the 1930s where the British and French made vastly erroneous assumptions about how the next war will be fought. The British were relying on the French, the French hiding their inability to produce the war machine that Britain was counting on, and the Belgians with their own agendas. Then there is Hitler and we all know how that played out.
I see where Forcyzk is squarely laying the blame in two British and French generals: Brooke and Weygand and, possibly a third, to a certain extent Marshal Petain. British General Brooke won't cooperate with the French and even defied Churchill. Weygand was a defeatist and unable to make reasonable plans.
Even after a second BEF was thrown into the fight, it did little and had to be evacuated not long after arriving. Worse, what the British and French left behind in the botched evacuation meant a giant windfall to the Germans. What the Germans gained was enough to replace their losses and prepare for the next ground war: Greece and eventually Russia. Danke Viele!!
All in all, a must-read for all World War 2 historians.
The narrative of the Fall of France is usually from a perspective that highlights the Wehrmacht's superior tactics, operational science, and strategy despite drawbacks such as still not having a fully mechanized force (relying on foot infantry), inferior equipment compared to the French and British counterparts. The French are always faulted on reliance on fixed defenses and moral decay of the Third Republic. That is what is accepted as history.
The story then ends with the British triumph of Operation Dynamo as the Royal Navy and thousands of sailing enthusiasts rally to take the trapped British and French soldiers off the beaches of Dunkirk.
Forczyk doesn't rest on these assumptions. Indeed, there is much more. The author begins the story back in the 1930s where the British and French made vastly erroneous assumptions about how the next war will be fought. The British were relying on the French, the French hiding their inability to produce the war machine that Britain was counting on, and the Belgians with their own agendas. Then there is Hitler and we all know how that played out.
I see where Forcyzk is squarely laying the blame in two British and French generals: Brooke and Weygand and, possibly a third, to a certain extent Marshal Petain. British General Brooke won't cooperate with the French and even defied Churchill. Weygand was a defeatist and unable to make reasonable plans.
Even after a second BEF was thrown into the fight, it did little and had to be evacuated not long after arriving. Worse, what the British and French left behind in the botched evacuation meant a giant windfall to the Germans. What the Germans gained was enough to replace their losses and prepare for the next ground war: Greece and eventually Russia. Danke Viele!!
All in all, a must-read for all World War 2 historians.
March 27, 2023
Much like the fantastic study this book's author, Robert Forczyk, did on the German invasion of Poland during World War II titled Case White; this well researched and very well written book takes a critical look at the German invasion of France during World War II. Just like in his Polish work's title, Red was the German code word for this invasion. Also like his previous work, Mr. Forczyk scrutinized and cross checked his sources since many western accounts of German actions in World War II rely upon German sources. This is especially true regarding either actions on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union or countries conquered early in the war like Poland and France.
Through careful reseach, Mr. Forczyk successfully analyzed both sides relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of doctrine, equipment, strategy, tactics, and moral. The last aspect, moral, is especially controversial since it is a very common misperception that French forces were easily defeated due to their weak fighting spirit and demoralized condition - neither of which was true. Although the Germans did field some very high quality and lethal armored vehicles by the end of World War II, the French armored vehicles they faced during this campaign were in many cases as good, if not superior, to German equipment of the time. This also applied to fighter aircraft, but not to the same extent.
It would be easy to give away the simple yet very well argued conclusion the author finds to be one of the primary reasons leading to France's surrender during this campaign, but I will refrain since this is an excellent book which is well worth the investment of time to read or listen to. Carried by the author's flowing yet detailed narrative, his analysis is clear and culminates neatly by the book's end. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in military history, military strategy, or who is particularly interested in World War II's European Theater of Operations (ETO).
Through careful reseach, Mr. Forczyk successfully analyzed both sides relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of doctrine, equipment, strategy, tactics, and moral. The last aspect, moral, is especially controversial since it is a very common misperception that French forces were easily defeated due to their weak fighting spirit and demoralized condition - neither of which was true. Although the Germans did field some very high quality and lethal armored vehicles by the end of World War II, the French armored vehicles they faced during this campaign were in many cases as good, if not superior, to German equipment of the time. This also applied to fighter aircraft, but not to the same extent.
It would be easy to give away the simple yet very well argued conclusion the author finds to be one of the primary reasons leading to France's surrender during this campaign, but I will refrain since this is an excellent book which is well worth the investment of time to read or listen to. Carried by the author's flowing yet detailed narrative, his analysis is clear and culminates neatly by the book's end. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in military history, military strategy, or who is particularly interested in World War II's European Theater of Operations (ETO).
January 18, 2025
Case Red tells the story of the German Invasion of France and the events leading to, and after, the BEF evacuation at Dunkirk.
Forczcyk’s premise is to remove the myth of French cowardice and lack of fight in 1940. In fact, the French Army did reasonably well against the Wehrmacht despite some very clear deficiencies in equipment and air support. Forczcyk gives his laurels to the French battle groups, the Foreign Legion and the tenacity of their colonial troops from Algeria, Morocco and Senegal. Also, leaders such as de Gaulle and Freire are credited with their tactical nous and ability to be flexible in the use of combined arms.
When the French were able to coordinate their forces, the Germans had a tough nut to crack.
Forczcyk lays out the true issues for the French:
- inferior aircraft and too few modern fighters
- few trained pilots
- too few anti tank guns
- too few anti tank mines
- relying on passive Allies (Belgium in particular)
- crippling top tier leadership (Weygand, Reynaud, Petain, Viillumin)
While the Wehrmacht preformed admirably in France and was well versed in the use of combined arms, Forcyczk undoes some of their myths of invincibility.
The German tanks were more maneuverable than the French but lacked the armor and armament of the Char Bis tanks. The German infantry however had much more firepower than their French counterparts.
Some of the lightning advances by the Wehrmacht were due in part to commanders such as Guderian and Rommel ignoring orders and pushing their units to the max.
However, the Luftwaffe was the dominant force over the battlefield. The AdA and the RAF offered uncoordinated and sporadic support in the skies over France whereas the Luftwaffe had local superiority over almost all of the hotspots.
I highly recommend this work in order to better understand what was happening in May-June 1940. Also, I’d highly recommend Forcyzck book on the invasion of Poland, Case White.
Forczcyk’s premise is to remove the myth of French cowardice and lack of fight in 1940. In fact, the French Army did reasonably well against the Wehrmacht despite some very clear deficiencies in equipment and air support. Forczcyk gives his laurels to the French battle groups, the Foreign Legion and the tenacity of their colonial troops from Algeria, Morocco and Senegal. Also, leaders such as de Gaulle and Freire are credited with their tactical nous and ability to be flexible in the use of combined arms.
When the French were able to coordinate their forces, the Germans had a tough nut to crack.
Forczcyk lays out the true issues for the French:
- inferior aircraft and too few modern fighters
- few trained pilots
- too few anti tank guns
- too few anti tank mines
- relying on passive Allies (Belgium in particular)
- crippling top tier leadership (Weygand, Reynaud, Petain, Viillumin)
While the Wehrmacht preformed admirably in France and was well versed in the use of combined arms, Forcyczk undoes some of their myths of invincibility.
The German tanks were more maneuverable than the French but lacked the armor and armament of the Char Bis tanks. The German infantry however had much more firepower than their French counterparts.
Some of the lightning advances by the Wehrmacht were due in part to commanders such as Guderian and Rommel ignoring orders and pushing their units to the max.
However, the Luftwaffe was the dominant force over the battlefield. The AdA and the RAF offered uncoordinated and sporadic support in the skies over France whereas the Luftwaffe had local superiority over almost all of the hotspots.
I highly recommend this work in order to better understand what was happening in May-June 1940. Also, I’d highly recommend Forcyzck book on the invasion of Poland, Case White.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 31, 2019
Most of us who read about or study WWII are familiar with the rapid advance of the German military through Belgium, Holland, and into France (Fall Gelb in German) resulting in the surrounding of the British and French armies of over 330,000 men that eventually were evacuated from Dunkirk. The next several weeks of often fierce resistence and even counterattacks by the British and French forces still in the field opposing the Nazi advance to capture Paris and metroplitan France (Fall Rot in German or Case Red) is more sparsely covered. This ignores a lot of military, political, and human drama that gave the Germans pause and made them fight as never before to continue their progress as resistance stiffened. But as the inevitable result became clear, another over 200,000 British troops were evacuated from other ports, Paris was declared an open city to minimize any destruction, and the French government had to make hard decisions about surrendering or evacuating to North Africa, Britain, or some other place of relative safety. A new French government, known as Vichy France, took control and signed an armistice with Germany agreeing that Germany would occupy and control the northern half of France including Paris, and Vichy France would control the southern half but under the close direction of the Nazis. Germany was able to exploit France's industries and natural resources and absorb the windfall of captured military equipment and supplies the allies had abandoned to be used against their next foe, the Soviet Union. Case Red: The Collapse of France was quick and dramatic but, unlike the commonly held belief that the French military just folded and gave up, they did put up determined resistance and were undone by some errors in strategy and lack of reinforcements in the face of superior forces that had better luck. Things could have turned out differently!
October 9, 2024
2 stars [History]
(W 2.34 | U 1.15 | T 2.52)
Exact rating: 2.01
A few lucid explanations interrupt what is otherwise a book of uselessly long, technical descriptions of army units, unit-type acronyms, situations, and movements. I read a lot of Military History, too. But Forczyk seems to have been writing a report for a War College or something, rather than a book for popular readership.
The plethora of original-language terms (German, French, and a bit of Italian) gave a +1/2 to the Writing's lexical subcategory, but the constant and inane use of them took -1/2 from the entire use category. Do we really need to read/hear "panzerdivisionen" every time instead of the English "Panzer Division" or "Général de brigade" rather than the English "Brigadier General"? It was even worse than a Wikipedia article because at least those [tend to be] simple and clear.
Positive elements:
-Thesis counterargument against French military incompetence
-extravagant and useless French naval spending contrasted with relatively inexpensive Maginot Line
-a full description of political, military, and logistical reasons France was underprepared in 1940
Negative elements not already mentioned:
-brushed away Petain's declaration that 30 years of Marxism materially affected morale
-seemed to censure Churchill's enactment of Operation Catapult
(W 2.34 | U 1.15 | T 2.52)
Exact rating: 2.01
A few lucid explanations interrupt what is otherwise a book of uselessly long, technical descriptions of army units, unit-type acronyms, situations, and movements. I read a lot of Military History, too. But Forczyk seems to have been writing a report for a War College or something, rather than a book for popular readership.
The plethora of original-language terms (German, French, and a bit of Italian) gave a +1/2 to the Writing's lexical subcategory, but the constant and inane use of them took -1/2 from the entire use category. Do we really need to read/hear "panzerdivisionen" every time instead of the English "Panzer Division" or "Général de brigade" rather than the English "Brigadier General"? It was even worse than a Wikipedia article because at least those [tend to be] simple and clear.
Positive elements:
-Thesis counterargument against French military incompetence
-extravagant and useless French naval spending contrasted with relatively inexpensive Maginot Line
-a full description of political, military, and logistical reasons France was underprepared in 1940
Negative elements not already mentioned:
-brushed away Petain's declaration that 30 years of Marxism materially affected morale
-seemed to censure Churchill's enactment of Operation Catapult
April 12, 2020
This is a very detailed operational account of the fall of France in 1940. Its title and focus is the German offensive after the Dunkirk evacuation. The author asserts in his introduction that he wants to give this hitherto neglected part of the story its due weight. This is not actually how the book works and this is understandable. It is not really possible to understand why France collapsed in June 1940 without discussing the pre-war plans and particularly the events of May 1940. It was then that the Allies were truly defeated. There was really little that could have been done after Dunkirk to have rescued the situation.
The book is strong on the details of battles. I found myself getting a bit lost in the welter of names and numbers of divisions and equipment, although the summary maps and bullet points throughout the text were helpful in navigating the course of events. The author is negatively critical of the British contribution: some good points are made but the wider context is not explored.
Many accounts of the fall of France focus on the political and social factors. These explain much of what happened. Yet a work like this that concentrates on the operational side is important too and as such is recommended for its detail and depth.
The book is strong on the details of battles. I found myself getting a bit lost in the welter of names and numbers of divisions and equipment, although the summary maps and bullet points throughout the text were helpful in navigating the course of events. The author is negatively critical of the British contribution: some good points are made but the wider context is not explored.
Many accounts of the fall of France focus on the political and social factors. These explain much of what happened. Yet a work like this that concentrates on the operational side is important too and as such is recommended for its detail and depth.
October 6, 2018
This was a nice evaluation of the struggles in France in early 1940 through a much-overlooked operation. Case Red was the second half of the invasion and defeat of France. The build-up of the operation and Case Yellow (the first operation to flank the Maginot line to Dunkirk) was exquisite. A very detailed account, I struggled through some sections of it due to the phraseology and change in language. I also found this early version littered with spelling and grammar errors, which was disappointing for such an academic account. Another difficult part of the account was the over-use of acronyms. I was constantly having to look back to the appendix to see what the author was referencing.
I did enjoy the detail and explanation of the battle strategies through out the campaign explanations. The offensive and defensive strategies were well laid out and described. The types of troops and armaments used was key to describing the events of the operations. This is a very thorough account and needed in a library of WWII literature and research.
I did enjoy the detail and explanation of the battle strategies through out the campaign explanations. The offensive and defensive strategies were well laid out and described. The types of troops and armaments used was key to describing the events of the operations. This is a very thorough account and needed in a library of WWII literature and research.
December 21, 2018
As indicated in the other reviews, the theme of this book is the last act of the Battle of France in 1940. If that's all it was, it would be a valuable edition since the narrative in most other histories covering this campaign tends to end after Dunkirk and Forczyk devotes the last third of the book to this very thing. The first two thirds of the book analyzes the reasons for this defeat and in the process, challenges a number of conventional wisdoms. This is not mere assertion but the foundation is carefully laid out. You may or may not agree but Forczyk artfully makes his case.
The book is full of anecdotes that portray French successes on the battlefield; the German victory was not obtained without cost. But the French soldier was let down by the generals, the politicians, the public, and severe case of Victory Disease. Given the decisiveness of the defeat, the book is (perhaps) surprisingly interesting and well-written to boot.
The book is full of anecdotes that portray French successes on the battlefield; the German victory was not obtained without cost. But the French soldier was let down by the generals, the politicians, the public, and severe case of Victory Disease. Given the decisiveness of the defeat, the book is (perhaps) surprisingly interesting and well-written to boot.
May 7, 2019
This a great read on a little known campaign of World War II. It was not a foregone conclusion that the fate of France was decided after the successful execution of Case Yellow, the initial invasion of France calculated to isolate its army and that of the British and affect an early end to the conflict.
The book contains a myriad number of rather important facts I was not aware of. In particular, while I was neve a fan of British general Alan Brooke, his almost criminal conduct during this period causes me to have no regard whatsoever for him.
The book is not perfect. I found the extensive use of acronyms to be fatiguing at times and not all of them are found in the guide located towards the back of the book. I also found what I believe is a minor factual error, although perhaps I misread the actual claim.
Nonetheless, this title belongs on the shelf of any serious follower of the Second World War.
The book contains a myriad number of rather important facts I was not aware of. In particular, while I was neve a fan of British general Alan Brooke, his almost criminal conduct during this period causes me to have no regard whatsoever for him.
The book is not perfect. I found the extensive use of acronyms to be fatiguing at times and not all of them are found in the guide located towards the back of the book. I also found what I believe is a minor factual error, although perhaps I misread the actual claim.
Nonetheless, this title belongs on the shelf of any serious follower of the Second World War.
November 19, 2019
Good military history, not just of Fall Rot, but also Fall Gelb. Dispels many myths about the operations including the focus on French army morale (not the major issue most books make it out to be), the monetary investment in the Maginot Line (the $4bF was not a major hindarance, especially in comparison to the French naval base in North Africa, as well as a mini Maginot Line in Tunisia), as well as supposed defects in French Army doctrine (which didn't bear out in actual combat, with the exception of two poor reserve divisions at Sedan, and the poorly thought out counterattack). Overall, good book, offering a military man's perspective on the conflict.
June 22, 2023
As my friend SB asked, why did the French, who are pretty good at the war, suck at this.
First of all, the weeks of the French collapse are not the focus of the book. I mean, it is, but there's more than that.
This is a very dry book, lots of #s and models of tanks and stuff. I love super-dry history books with lots of numbers and logistics, so the 4*.
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Answer IMO: The Germans were just too fast. Everyone else was too slow and lax (looking at you Belgium). French let their readiness atrophy - training and actual readiness. Nothing egregious frankly - the Germans just took it to another level.
First of all, the weeks of the French collapse are not the focus of the book. I mean, it is, but there's more than that.
This is a very dry book, lots of #s and models of tanks and stuff. I love super-dry history books with lots of numbers and logistics, so the 4*.
----
Answer IMO: The Germans were just too fast. Everyone else was too slow and lax (looking at you Belgium). French let their readiness atrophy - training and actual readiness. Nothing egregious frankly - the Germans just took it to another level.
July 5, 2023
This is a good solid book about the early stages of WWII when French and British forces tried and ultimately failed to stop the German Army as it swept through the low countries and into France. Books available to me in the past usually dealt with Dunkirk, then move straight into the London Blitz or the air war over Britain. This book provides a good view of the triumphs and failures of the German and French forces and the reasons behind those outcomes. It also discusses the reasons for Britain failing to come adequately come to French aid. Politics, politics, politics. Let the fighting soldier do what he is good at.
Great book for all fans of WWII history.
Great book for all fans of WWII history.
October 7, 2019
Interesting, but bogs down
This offers a re-assessment of the causes of the fall of France the course of French resistance against Germany in 1940. It is interesting and insightful in that it offers a through history of the campaign that offers many details that are omitted from conventional tellings of the tale - British responsibility for the collapse of France, the tenacious efforts of French soldiers and lower-echelon commanders. However, it does bog down a little when it gets into the smaller details of the campaign.
This offers a re-assessment of the causes of the fall of France the course of French resistance against Germany in 1940. It is interesting and insightful in that it offers a through history of the campaign that offers many details that are omitted from conventional tellings of the tale - British responsibility for the collapse of France, the tenacious efforts of French soldiers and lower-echelon commanders. However, it does bog down a little when it gets into the smaller details of the campaign.
January 16, 2022
Easy to follow. I especially liked the focus on France's wars in in North Africa before the Nazi invasion. The fact the army was focused on insurgency fighting instead of what would happen shortly in Europe. The massive costs of that venture was as important as the cost of the infamous "Maginot Line".
There is SO much more to the book and like many war histories that focus on battles I will have to read it again. But even though I didn't pick up on everything what I did get gave me some new avenues to explore in thinking about the begining of WWII. Which is what I wanted.
There is SO much more to the book and like many war histories that focus on battles I will have to read it again. But even though I didn't pick up on everything what I did get gave me some new avenues to explore in thinking about the begining of WWII. Which is what I wanted.
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