On a Knife's Edge: The Ukraine, November 1942–March 1943

by Prit Buttar

From critically acclaimed Eastern Front expert Prit Buttar, this is the engrossing story of the German resurgence after the battle of Stalingrad. Containing haunting first-hand accounts of the horrors of life on the front line, this gripping narrative reveals in startling detail the story of a bitter struggle for survival against terrible odds.

The battle of Stalingrad was the turning point of World War II. The German capture of the city, their encirclement by Soviet forces shortly afterwards, and the hard-fought but futile attempts to relieve them, saw bitter attritional fighting and extremes of human misery inflicted on both sides.

The surrender of General Friedrich von Paulus’s army left Germany’s eastern armies severely weakened, but the Red Army had suffered enormous losses as it overreached itself in trying to exploit its great victory. The war was not over. Germany would continue the fight, and the battles that took place in the winter of 1942/43 would show the tactical and operational skill of Erich von Manstein and the Wehrmacht as they attempted to avert total disaster.

In this title, now available in paperback, a renowned expert on warfare on the Eastern Front reveals the often-overlooked German counteroffensive post-Stalingrad, and how it prevented the whole Axis front line from collapsing.

Drawing on first-hand accounts, On a Knife's Edge is a story of brilliant generalship, lost opportunities and survival in the harshest theater of war.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Russia, Military Fiction, Military History, Germany

464 pages, Hardcover

First published October 18, 2019

About the author

Prit Buttar studied medicine at Oxford and London before joining the British Army as a doctor. After leaving the army, he has worked as a GP, first near Bristol and now in Abingdon. He is extensively involved in medical politics, both at local and national level, and served on the GPs’ Committee of the British Medical Association. He appears from time to time on local and national TV and radio, speaking on a variety of medical issues. He contributes regularly to the medical press. He is an established expert on the Eastern Front in 20th century military history.

Reviews

[8stitches 9lives · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having despised history at school, mainly due to the teacher and not the subject, I made a conscious decision to try and learn about important historical topics myself. No-one was more surprised than me when I found I actually loved learning about such topics. Prit Buttar is an Oxford-educated general practitioner and considered an expert on the Eastern Front in 20th-century military history. On a Knife's Edge focuses on an often overlooked part of the World War II conflict and explores in detail the impact of the war on the Ukraine.

This is a meticulously researched book which certainly comes across as though it would have taken a huge effort and amount of time to compile. On the whole, this is a thoroughly engaging and in-depth exploration of the impact of WWII on Ukraine from November 1942–March 1943. It is highly detailed, complex and complicated but that is exactly what you would expect with such a volatile, dangerous and ever-changing situation on the Eastern Front.

This may be a book to dip in and out of at leisure as it is intense and full of different people whose German and Russian names make them easy to confuse with one another. I did often think that it felt rather disjointed because of all of the information we are supplied with and it made for a slow and sometimes tedious read. However, if you are particularly interested in WWII, the Eastern Front or history of the Ukraine, I'm sure this will be very enjoyable, and I have much admiration for Buttar taking the time to make this as authentic as possible. It's definitely worth the read!

Many thanks to Osprey Publishing for an ARC. I was not required to post a review, and all thoughts and opinions expressed are my own.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

On a Knife's Edge is the story of Soviet vs German warfare in the Ukraine from 1942 to 1943. This topic is Prit Buttar's specialty, and one that he is very knowledgeable about. It is not the first that I have read by him. There are a lot of dates and unit designations as well as obscure locations that the casual reader may not recognize. There are enough personal interviews to make the book interesting, though at times it can be a bit dry. I would classify his work overall and his work on this book as scholarly. For those interested in the subject, it is an excellent book.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

'On a Knife's Edge', by Prit Buttar is yet another excellent work by one of the best military historians in the West, dealing with Russian/Ukrainian and Soviet military history. The book focuses on the period of the Eastern Front of the Second War when Ukraine became a primary focus for both sides' strategic decision making. This is the first of a trilogy dealing with Ukraine on the Eastern Front.
One could argue that it should have been a quadrilogy, as Mr. Buttar could have started with Operation Barbarossa, but he makes the point very early on that neither the Germans nor the STAVKA saw Ukraine as the focal point of military operations until the beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive around Stalingrad in late 1942. Even though the largest individual battle of the Second War would be waged around Kiev in September of 1941, it's strategic locus was as a means of eliminating the very real threat to the southern flank of what the Germans saw as the final drive of the War to Moscow, and ultimate victory.
And it would be following the Stalingrad disaster for the Germans that both sides began to realize that Ukraine, and he who controlled her, would ultimately win the conflict.
*****
The book begins with a brief overview of how both sides got to where they were in the summer of 1942, immediately before the opening of Operation Blau, and the German drives to the Volga and into the Caucasus. Both sides General Staff's were laser focused on Moscow, and both sides would come to ruin, in a sense, in front of that great city.
The Germans would continue their forward momentum in late Autumn 1941 well beyond the point when they should have called a halt to consolidate their gains, and refresh and re equip their mauled forces. As it was, they established a pattern that both sides would follow well into 1943.
The Germans, astounded at their own success, and greedily grasping at every operational target of opportunity, reduced their spearheads by dispersion, and were already on the ragged edge by the time Zhukov kicked off the Red Army counteroffensive around Moscow.
The Red Army would do so well, so rapidly, that Stalin, likewise, began greedily pouring over the maps and assumed, as the Germans had only a few weeks prior, that his enemy was finished and that he could begin grasping at every operational target of opportunity that crossed his Armies paths. The main problems with this was that the Red Army was still not the equal of the Wehrmacht in the winter of 1941-42 in terms of operational or tactical expertise, and so Soviet operations showcased a fair share of enthusiastic clumsiness in this their first major strategic offensive.
In believing that the Axis forces were done for, Stalin ordered a general strategic offensive all along the Eastern Front, something that the Soviet military was simply not ready for. This order came at around the same time that the Germans were recovering from the shock of their whipping around Moscow, and were restoring their equilibrium. The resultant winter battles mostly went the German's way, and the Red Army threw away a large percentage of the strength they had rebuilt following the disastrous summer and autumn of 1941.
Stalin compounded his strategic error by continuing the general offensives into the spring, and focused on the Crimea and Ukraine during the spring operations.
Here is where the author's introduction of two opposing commanders: Vatutin and Manstein, really gets interesting as he spends a deal of time detailing the various planning from both sides in these spring operations, from their two perspectives. It's also around this point that the author delves deeply into analytical territory, moving away from a primarily narrative focused account.
He spends some time showcasing how both sides, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, were evolving by the time of the spring 1942 battles. Unlike most Western historians, Prit Buttar showcases a Red Army that was rapidly learning, adapting, and adopting from their enemy, and becoming an exponentially better force for it. The constricting authority of the Commissariat was removed, giving field officers a level of independence not known since the Czarist era. And military discipline was more strictly enforced, with some of the more ridiculous Communist philosophies (such as the rank and file are the equals of their commanding officers, that genuinely makes for an absolutely impossible situation when orders must be obeyed) entirely abandoned on a permanent basis.
And while the Soviet's never officially codified German Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) into their toolbox, they understood that in order to make the Red Army more flexible, and therefore more lethal, they had to give junior subordinates on the scene more leeway to accomplish their goals. Coterminous with the improvements of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht was adopting the polar opposite doctrinal approach.
While the Soviet's were loosening the strictures on the Red Army, the Wehrmacht was binding their own arms with emphasis on more centralized control, and taking away the freedom of action of subordinates on the scene. This was a trend that would continue for the rest of the war, and would both greatly improve the Red Army, while likewise hampering the Wehrmacht.
Even so, in the spring and early summer of 1942, the Germans were still operationally and tactically superior to their opponents, and while the author only gives a very brief overview of the ensuing operations (the Taman Peninsula in Crimea, the ending of the siege of Sevastopol, and the harrowing 2nd Kharkov), it's enough to make the point that the Germans and their Axis allies (Hungary, Romania, Italy, Slovakia and Croatia to stick to the focus on the operations centered around Ukraine) had considerable ability to recover from disaster.
The terrible defeats suffered by the Red Army in the spring of 1942, especially 2nd Kharkov, practically opened the door for the German drives across the Don, and towards the Volga and the Caucasus. Even so, the same pattern established the prior October plays out again.
The Germans experience a series of incredible successes, and even though they are denied the taking of Voronezh, they seemingly roll on to victory after victory throughout the summer, to the point where they believe, once again, that the Red Army is a spent force, and the end of the war is in site.
However, just as the Germans and their Axis allies displayed an incredible ability to recover and bounce back from defeat, so too could the Red Army. One of the points Prit Buttar makes in his books, to include his phenomenal quadrilogy on the Eastern Front of The Great War, is that the Russian/Soviet forces are really not that different in terms of capabilities as their Western counterparts. He hammers home the point that there is still a myth regarding the Eastern Front in Western historiography that the Wehrmacht was defeated by brute force, or simply the Russian masses. This really isn't true. The Red Army wouldn't overwhelmingly outnumber the Wehrmacht on the average until late 1944 following the summer 1944 offensives begun with Operation Bagration. Until then, the Red Army would have only a marginal overall superiority in terms of manpower over their foes. While they would always have a material advantage over their foes, the Wehrmacht was a truly excellent tactical force, and was supremely dangerous well into late in the war.
However, it was in the sphere of operational ability, the ability to maneuver an enemy into contact at a place and time of your choosing, that the Russians would steadily outpace their German foes. And while tactical brilliance has a tendency to offer grace for a large number of strategic sins, it simply isn't enough to provide full redemption. Even so, in the realm of tactics, or the ability to best an opponent at the point of contact, in a fluid, dynamic engagement of extreme violence, the Red Army was exponentially increasing its own expertise.
The old mantra of human and tank waves simply no longer holds. The Red Army was an Army that was good at fighting battles, they just had to learn their lessons the hard way, from damned good, and harsh, school masters.
It is with the planning and preparations for the Soviet winter offensives of 1942-43 that the book really begins to narrow its focus, and deepen its level of analysis, and sharpen it's detail. Operations Uranus and Saturn are described in extraordinary detail, both the planning and the execution (Mars is mentioned in brief, as it was connected to the events further south, but the fighting around Rzhev and the Rzhev Salient had only peripheral consequence for the Red Army in their operations in the south, albeit it did tie down German Panzer reserves which would soon be desperately needed elsewhere).
Both operations were calamitous to Germany's allied formations.
The Romanians, the Italians, and the Hungarians would suffer tremendous disasters during the Soviet offensives to each side of the Stalingrad area. The Germans had focused their main drive on the city of Stalingrad, and their 6th Army would soon be trapped in an enormous pocket once the Red Army ripped the front wide open with their offensives.
This book is the first I have read to spend a great deal of time looking at events from the Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian perspectives. Most books gloss over the obliteration of their armies in these massive operations, ignoring the fact that it took incredibly hard fighting for the Soviet's to break through in both cases, and that a terrible amount of human suffering was involved.
Prit Buttar does not shy away from showcasing the human misery of this vast conflict. He utilizes a large number of first person accounts from soldiers, officers, and even civilians involved (honestly, my only real complaint with this book is that, sometimes, he went too far with the human element, as the pages and pages of block quotes from primary sources tended to distract from the main focus, but that's a personal quibble of mine) to burrow the point in that this was a human experience.
More than just arrows on a map, or symbols representative of armored brigades and infantry corps', this was a war where real people suffered and died. And the suffering on the Eastern Front was to a scale that boggles the mind.
Hitler's greatest error was in treating the Slav's like subhuman trash. When the Germans invaded, many Ukrainians who had survived the horror of forced collectivization and the Holodomor, welcomed the Germans as liberators. However, the National Socialists adhered to racial purity policies that were ridiculous (their own mantra of purity based upon Indo-European ethnic types was broken by their own actions, as the Slav's are indeed Indo-European themselves…) and self defeating.
The abysmal abuse and oppression that the Nazis visited upon the Russians and the Ukrainians ensured that any goodwill that would have been theirs thanks to the policies of the Communist system, was entirely erased. Even so, many did work with the Germans, especially in aiding in eradicating Jews. And the author does showcase the building of such units as the Vlasov Army, or militantly anti-Communist Red Army prisoners of war who were formed into formations loyal to the Nazis to fight against the Red Army.
Needless to say, in a war where the enemy offers battle in terms of total cultural annihilation, such traitors tend not to meet a kind end.
One scene that really stuck with me is of a Red Army unit, at the tip of their spearhead, driving deep behind German lines, encounters a group of Russian families who had been evicted from their homes and forced into being refugees as the winter set in. These poor people were found, clumped together, frozen to death on the open steppes of Ukraine. It left the Soviet soldiers with a feeling of hollowness, as though a measure of their humanity had been stolen by the site, and that only hatred could be left to them.
That was the war between the National Socialist Germans and the Soviet's.
The armies of Romania, Italy, and Hungary were all but annihilated by the Red Army offensives. But it wasn't a cake walk, and contrary to popular opinion, they could, and did offer effective resistance often enough to make the victory a hard won one for the Soviet's. Even so, utilizing equipment that was outmatched by that of the Red Army, and not being trained to the level of their German allies or their Soviet foes, they did succumb to the pressure and collapsed.
The obliteration of their allies armies to either flank allowed the Red Army to surround and trap 6th Army, and to drive deep into the German rear.
Enter von Manstein.
Manstein not only has to deal with a terrible dilemma at the front, but he also has to deal with Hitler at higher headquarters. Manstein fights hard to get Hitler to allow him to launch a relief effort to breakout the 6th Army, but Hitler's refusal to allow the 6th Army to breakout on its own (and von Paulus' rigid adherence to orders), as well as effective Red Army resistance dooms the effort.
The Soviet victory at Stalingrad was a stunning one.
This was the first truly enormous Red Army victory of the war, and it ripped the entire southern section of the front wide open. Now the Germans had to scramble to disengage from the Georgian frontier down in the Caucasus, and to withdraw towards the Don as rapidly as they could to avoid being cut off themselves, and the Germans had to throw every available reserve into the fray to keep the escape route open across the Don.
It wound up being a close run affair, but, once again, the cycle of events on the Eastern Front plays out.
Stalin and the STAVKA are now convinced, again, that the Germans are done for, and that the opportunity exists to begin grasping for targets of operational opportunity. Once again, the Red Army fights it's way forward to exhaustion and diffusion.
Stalin sets his eyes on the prize of Kharkov, the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union and a major industrial center. Taking Kharkov becomes a bit of an obsession, and as the Red Army must scrape together forces for that task, they are also asked to advance beyond Rostov, and to trap the German forces further south, to the east of Mariupol, and destroy them against the Sea of Azov. It's yet another general strategic offensive, and yet again the Germans are beginning to recover from their earlier disasters, and are building fresh forces for a counterblow of their own.
And this time, the blow will be delivered by their best commander who will have, for the last time in the war, leeway to oversee operations as he sees fit. Hitler is less and less willing to give his field commanders free reign in their operations. With von Manstein, however, he relents. Much to the tragedy of the aspirations of the Red Army.
Beginning in the south, von Manstein begins a series of fluid, rolling counterpunches with panzer heavy mechanized formations that knock the Red Army forces back. The Soviet intentions to trap the German forces in the south between Mariupol and the Sea of Azov instead see their own forces ground to bloody tatters in a series of fluid, rapid moving tactical encounters with fast moving German armored formations. The Germans display, once again, that near mythical tactical brilliance, for perhaps the final time in the war.
In the south von Manstein's forces either rout or annihilate the Soviet spearheads, and recover a considerable amount of ground that the Red Army had very recently liberated. But rather than plunge forward towards the Don Steppe, the Germans swing north, to connect with a new formation, the First SS Panzer Corps, which is counterattacking towards Kharkov, recently liberated by the Red Army when the German commander on the scene disobeys direct orders from Hitler to stand fast.
Now the Red Army forces, heretofore high on success, find themselves once again facing annihilation in a German trap. Although the Germans fail to form another massive pocket of multiple Soviet armies, they do inflict considerable damage, retake Kharkov (again, that poor city changed hands a number of times, probably one reason why the main city square is now named Svoboda or Freedom square), and restore their strategic equilibrium on the southern sector of the front.
The February 1943 battles showcased that, still, the Germans were superior in terms of maneuver warfare, but the Red Army had come far from their stumbling 1941 days. The late winter German recovery would be the final time that the Wehrmacht, and now the Waffen-SS, would have a notable edge over their opponents in one on one encounters. From here on out, the Red Army would learn their harshly taught lessons and would refine their own methodology of warfare.
The Germans managed to restore the front, but they were further west than they had been the year prior, and the Soviet's held a huge salient in the front centered around a Russian town which, heretofore, had meant very little. A town that would, in the near future, be synonymous with the clash of armor: Kursk.
*****
This really is an outstanding work of military history, Prit Buttar is easily the finest of the Western historians working on the subject today (US Army Colonel David Glantz is another fine historian, but he simply lacks the writing capabilities of Mr. Buttar). This is an excellent work of astute and erudite analysis, as well as fascinating narrative.
There is still plenty to write about in regards to The Great Patriotic War, and hopefully Mr. Buttar decides to keep working in this field for a few more years yet.
Very highly recommended.

[Qedrák · Rating 5 out of 5]

Helyenként rendkívül tömény, igazi második világháborús fanatikusoknak ajánlott könyv. Prit Buttar, akárcsak más könyveiben, részletesen végigveszi a keleti front egy adott időszakának alakulását. Ez itt jelesül a Sztálingrád és a Kurszk közötti időszak.

A cím részben arra utal, hogy mind a Wehrmacht, mind pedig a Vörös Hadsereg az összeomlás szélés egyensúlyozott, bár a tárgyalt időszakban elsősorban előbbi volt az érintett. A szovjetek ugyanis 1942. november 19-én megindították az Uránusz hadműveletet és attól fogva úgy haladtak át a német és a szövetséges csapatokon, mint kés a vajon. És már-már úgy tűnt, hogy ezzel a lendülettel meg sem állnak Berlinig (erre csak később került sor), de Erich von Manstein szervezett ellentámadása megsemmisítette a támadó szovjet csapatok egy jelentős részét. Kurszkkal a könyv már nem foglalkozik.

A szövegnek alapvetően két rétegét különböztethetjük meg. Buttar ugyanis a hivatalos jelentéseket és visszaemlékezéseket felhasználva mutatja be, hogy miként születtek meg az egyes hadműveleti döntések a német és a szovjet vezérkarban. Így például jelentős teret kap Sztálingrád kérdése, hogy vajon milyen alternatívája volt Paulusnak (a délnyugati irányú kitörés) és hogy ez miért nem valósult meg. Azt például elég sokat ecseteli, hogy Manstein követelései ellenére a berlini főhadiszállás Hitler ragaszkodását Sztálingrádhoz miért nem tudta leszerelni, de az is szóba kerül, hogy a bekerített német alakulatok sokkal nagyobb szovjet erőket kötöttek le, ami felveti azt is, hogy egy kitörés esetén a szovjet támadás messzebbre jutott volna a kelet-európai síkságon.

A szöveg másik rétegét a személyes visszaemlékezések adják. Naplók, beszámolók mutatják be, hogy az egyszerű katonáknak mit kellett átélnie a kiadott parancsok nyomán. Német, szovjet, olasz és román visszaemlékezéseket is idéz, amelyek nem függetlenül a hadihelyzet állásától, jól megvilágítják a térképek felett eldöntött offenzívák és ellenoffenzívák valóságát. A Sztálingrádot felmenteni kívánó teljesen esélytelen német támadásról például igen sok beszámolót idéz.

A hadműveletről hadműveletre követett kronológiából természetesen nem maradhattak ki a magyarok sem. Ebben az időszakban ugyanis a Vörös Hadsereg véres emlékeztetőt adott Horthy-kor Magyarországának arról, hogy a katonaság nem díszengyenruhás parádé a budai Várban. Buttar egyébként nem marasztalja el a magyarokat a katonai teljesítményük miatt, de természetes adottságnak veszi, hogy a gyengén felszerelt, rosszul feltöltött alakulatok képtelenek voltak visszaverni a szovjeteket. Ami talán érdekes információ ebben a kötetben, hogy a magyar hadtörténeti munkák ki szokták emelni, hogy a németek nem szállították le az ígért felszereléseket a magyaroknak. Ez kétségtelenül így is volt, ám Buttar könyvéből kiderül, hogy ezt nem valamiféle gonoszságból tették, hiszen a saját csapataik is állandó lőszer- és felszereléshiánytól szenvedtek. Az is egy érdekes momentum, hogy az orosz visszaemlékezésekben a magyarok nem feltétlenül tűntek fel negatív színben, bár az olaszokat még jobban kímélték, mint a mieinket. Ez annak köszönhető, hogy a taljánok bántak leginkább kesztyűs kézzel a helyi lakossággal, a magyarok meg valahol a németek és az olaszok között voltak félúton. Még az is érdekességszámba ment nekem, hogy a magyar vereség klasszikus helynevei, mint Uriv vagy Voronyezs elő sem fordultak a könyvben, ellenben egy halom olyan település, amiről nem hallottam, igen.

A kötet tényleg ajánlható mindenkinek, aki szeretne fejest ugrani a második világháború egy kevésbé ismert szakaszába. Az öt csillagot csak azért nem tudom megadni, mert ahogy a Molyon @Anton_Gorogyeckij jelezte: az egyes fejezetekhez kapcsolt térképek pocsékul néznek ki. Az a helyzet, hogy még a Wikipédiára is használhatóbb térképek kerülnek fel, mint amit itt láthatunk, a kissé következetlen hadsereg-jelölés, az egy-két településnév meg szöveghez való lazább viszony inkább arra ösztökélt, hogy a neten keresgéljek a könyvhöz használható térképeket.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

It took me a little longer to finish this book, but I was glad to have read it. I would say that this book is great for understanding the southern sector (Ukraine) of the Eastern Front between the battle of Stalingrad and the buildup of Kursk. I do have to say, I have managed to have a short conversation with the Author, Mr. Buttar on Facebook, and he is a nice man, and I really hope he continues writing books on the eastern front. I will admit that for a while I was feeling like it was a little difficult to read, and that was because I was having to deal with some other issues, but overall the book was great. One thing I really liked was how the author quoted various soviet and german sources, and being able to read them added to the book.

[T. Fowler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prit Buttar takes the reader through the desperate German efforts in the Ukraine, during the winter of 1942-43, first to save the trapped 6th Army in Stalingrad, and then to prevent the advancing Soviet armies from reaching the Donets, whereby they would destroy the entire southern group of surviving German armies. In the final chapters, he describes in detail how Field Marshal von Manstein managed to gather enough strength in panzer forces and brilliantly use them to defeat the over-confident Soviet forces around Kharkov, stabilizing the front for the winter. He uses many excerpts from memoirs and war diaries from both German and Soviet sources to show the desperate fighting that took place in terrible frigid winter conditions. My only criticism is that the battles would have been more easily followed if they had been summarized a bit more, instead of describing the fighting for many villages not shown on maps.

[Judy McCarver · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ahead of WWII, Hitler and Stalin had signed a neutrality pact which included the two of them splitting up the spoils of Europe after Germany had won the war. But Hitler being Hitler, liar and deceiver, pulled out of this deal and in June, 1941 commenced with Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia. He thought it was going to be quick and easy and over in a matter of months. He vastly underestimated the fortitude and fighting capability of the Russians.

This book can be overwhelming to read, in that, your senses can be on overload with all of the information. There is so so much. It is a comprehensive and exhaustive, blow by blow account of the late 1942-Spring 1943 segment of the battle on the Eastern Front starting with the moment the Germans gave up on getting to Moscow and turned their sights instead on Stalingrad and the the North Caucasus of Russia (oil). They did subsequently seize and occupy Stalingrad. However, in an Operation of their own, Code named Uranus, the Russians were successful in encircling Germany's 6th army, trapping them in Stalingrad. Operation Winter Storm then involved the German 4th Panzer Army's attempt to break the Soviet encirclement of the German 6th Army out of Stalingrad. But this failed and they had to pull back. It failed for lots of reasons, not the least of which Hermann Göring and Hitler were intent on running the front lines of the battles from the safety of their command post in Berlin, not trusting their field commanders to do the job.

The author does a wonderful job of recounting the prowess and masterful fighting ability of both Russian and German commanders, in particular Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Manstein on the German side. Manstein was clearly a brilliant military strategist, but Hitler was full of ego and was insistent on not giving up any seized territory even if it meant the total destruction of the units occupying said territories. Manstein, a Wehrmacht officer of the old Prussian tradition, was yet also devoted to Hitler and the cause of National Socialism.

In the end, General Paulus, a Hitler devotee, commander of 6th Army finally surrendered at Stalingrad. Approximately 91000 Germans and Axis members were taken prisoner. Only about 5000 of them made it back alive to Germany after the war. That doesn't include the thousands who died on the ground in the battle of Stalingrad. He had ample opportunity in the beginning of the siege to break out of Stalingrad but Paulus refused to go against the commands of his psychopathic leader, Hitler. And for that literally thousands of young men died needlesly.

Meanwhile Manstein when he realized that 6th Army could not be broken out of Stalingrad turned his attention to regaining the original frontline of November 1942 which existed before all of the Stalingrad madness began. He was successful in doing that. The operation afterwards came to be known as the "Backhand Blow." But we know how the story ends beyond this book. Germany ultimately lost on the Eastern Front to Russia and thank God, lost the war as well.

This author also includes tons of personal narratives of people who were in these battles, from Generals all the way down to Infantrymen. It is so surreal to read their words. And it offers invaluable insight into the intricacies, the nightmares, and the horrors of the many many battles fought in the frozen tundra of the Eastern Front.

On another note, Italian 8th Army was completely obliterated in this battle on the Eastern Front. Italy was a committed member of the Triple Axis with Germany and Japan. They were committed such by their dictator Mussolini, himself an egotistical pig who saddled himself up on the side of the Nazis thinking it would lend him grand personal benefit. It was pure folly on his part to commit his under trained and under equipped country to a war he could never win.

Also the brutal acts of both the Russians and the Germans against POW's was absolutely sickening. And of course to add to that misery, the Germans often mass murdered thousands of civilians and Jews along the course of the battle, to include children. But both of these armies were known for their merciless behavior off of the battle field. It is one thing to die on the battlefield in the fight. It is another thing all together to mow down a column of unarmed prisoners with machine guns and bayonets or to burn civilians alive in a barn.

I know a lot about WWII and the various battles fought by the Allies. But I knew very little about the details of the battle on the Eastern Front between Russia and Germany. This book is a game changer for that.

[Philip Kuhn · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book overall and Buttar is a very good writer. He covers the entire Ukrainian battles of the time period and the lives of ordinary soldiers. Good book if you are interested the German Soviet war, which I am. It was very interesting on how he contrasts the narrative of soldiers in a battle with their claims of number killed and tanks destroyed with the enemy army record. Sometimes they claimed more tanks destroyed than the enemy actually had. After a while he says "you know how those figures go."
Good book overall for Eastern Theater buffs,

PHIL Kuhn

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Highly recommended for a detailed, balanced and multi-facetted account

[Fred · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was disappointed by this book. Buttar did inadequate research, which led him to perpetuate the errors of others and make new errors of his own. In some parts it reads like a game of telephone. He rewords text from Glantz’s From the Don to the Dnepr, but he didn’t study Glantz’s maps to get a complete understanding of the situation. So his rewording creates several inaccurate statements. (Glantz’s maps are perfectly readable with a magnifying glass, so the tiny print is not a legitimate excuse for ignoring them.) His bibliography does not include Glantz’s Stalingrad trilogy, which helps to explain many of the book’s other weaknesses. If you have Glantz’s books, Hayward’s Stopped at Stalingrad, and Harrison’s Rollback, there’s no reason to bother with this one. This is one of those books that provoked me to make a list of the errors.

Page 32 falsely states that 5th Tank Army encountered 24th Panzer Division, citing Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942 (p. 201). Forczyk's book does not say this. You could argue that Buttar cites Forczyk only for the 5th Tank Army casualties and is making us take his word for it about the 24th Panzer.

The two books don’t agree on the casualties either. Buttar says 73 tanks were lost while Forczyk says by the end of the battle it was down to a tank strength of 27%. It looks like some sloppy note-taking occurred, and I can’t vouch for Forczyk’s number either. Forczyk and Glantz (To the Gates of Stalingrad p. 153) agree on the number of tanks lost (341 and “roughly half of its 641”, respectively), and Glantz’s initial strength of 641 is believable, so I am inclined to believe that 300 tanks survived, or 47%.

Pages 48 and 72: 22nd Panzer Division was upgraded to mostly PzIIIs and PzIVs before Operation Uranus. It had transferred 51 Pz38(t) hand-me-downs to Panzer-Verband 700.

Page 106: 23rd Panzer Division was not a part of 57th Panzer Corps in the Caucasus campaign. It was in 40th Panzer Corps and then 3rd Panzer Corps.

Page 111: 4th Cavalry Corps had 61st and 81st Cavalry Divisions, with 85th Tank Brigade attached. Cavalry divisions had regiments, not brigades. 115th Cavalry Division had been disbanded in October.

Page 125: 5th Shock Army was not a fresh new reinforcing army: only the HQ and 7th Tank Corps were new arrivals. The army took command of rifle divisions already present in the sector that had been carved out for it. 4th Guards and 258th Rifle Divisions and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps came from 5th Tank Army while 300th and 315th Rifle Divisions came from 51st Army.

11th Panzer Division didn’t stay close to establishment strength during the Chir battle. It started understrength and then melted away. On 6/28 it had 155 tanks, 12/7 70 tanks, 12/10 58 tanks, 12/11 45 tanks, and 12/13 33 tanks.

Page 129: 23rd Rifle Division was with the forces encircling Stalingrad and did not defend against Winter Storm. 51st Army didn’t have any rifle corps either.

Page 148: 3rd Panzer Corps had 13th Panzer Division, not 3rd Panzer Division. 3rd Panzer Division was in 40th Panzer Corps.

Page 151: The 29th Corps was a German corps that commanded some Italian units. This is correctly stated on page 209.

Page 159: It was the Vicenza Division that had been held in reserve. Julia had been on the front line and was relieved by Vicenza so that Julia could move south to defend against Operation Little Saturn.

Pages 168, 206, 213, 215, 265, 283, and 357: Hitler (and Wahl on p. 400) were procrastinating, not prevaricating.

Page 169: 55th Tank Regiment, not Brigade.

Page 190: 19th Panzer Division had not been with Army Group South that summer. It was with Army Group Center until December. It did not fight at Bryansk, rather it fought at Belyi against Operation Mars.

Page 193: 2nd Guards Army didn’t have a 2nd Guards Corps. He could have meant 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps or the 13th Guards Rifle Corps.

228th Stug Abteilung was at the front by 12/16, not 12/22. See Forczyk’s Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942 p. 237.

Page 195: Wiking wasn’t moved north in order to release 16th Motorized from its position covering Elista. Wiking and half of 16th Motorized arrived at the 4th Panzer Army around 12/28. Half of 16th Motorized was left in the Elista area. The last elements of 16th Motorized left to join 4th Panzer Army around 1/10 and the 444th Security Division took over the defense of the Manych south of Elista. I believe that von Manstein's memoir Lost Victories (p. 345) was the source of Buttar's error. In this day and age we have access to so many sources that it's inexcusable to rely on von Manstein's hazy and selective memory.

Page 205: After his in-person meeting with Hitler to get permission to withdraw from the Caucasus, Zeitzler did not wait until he got back to his office to order the withdrawal. He used the telephone in Hitler’s anteroom to make the order, and he insisted that the order be sent to Army Group A immediately. When Zeitzler arrived at his office, he was told by his staff that Hitler had called and that he was to call back immediately. Hitler then told him on the phone that he had changed his mind about the withdrawal, but Zeitzler said it was too late: the order had already been sent and the withdrawal had begun. An annoyed Hitler then dropped the matter (Hayward’s Stopped at Stalingrad p. 276).

Page 215: The withdrawal of 1st Panzer Army was not slow when you consider the fact that the infantry and horses had to walk. Glantz notes in Operation Don’s Left Wing (p. 139-140) that the planned withdrawal pace was 20 km per day and that there would need to be rest days after every 3-5 days of marching.

Page 221: The Hungarians did have the Pz38(t), but the Romanians had the Pz35(t), as correctly noted on page 48.

Page 223: Map is missing the Hungarian 13th Division.

Page 256: I believe that it was Group Beukemann (commander 75th Infantry Division), not Beckmann.

Page 261: On 1/16, the gap between 4th Panzer Army and 1st Panzer Army was filled by just the 444th Security Division. Both 16th Motorized and Wiking were with 4th Panzer Army.

Page 269: It’s unclear to me when Buttar thinks that Wiking’s tanks arrived from the Caucasus. The previous paragraph covered events on 1/15 and the next date mentioned is 1/19. Tieke’s The Caucasus and the Oil (p. 275) and Glantz’s Operation Don’s Main Attack (p. 61) both state that the tanks reached the front on 1/2. As I noted above, Wiking was not deployed to cover the gap between Army Groups Don and A. It actually took over the center of 4th Panzer Army’s line.

Page 288: Buttar claims that the Germans extracted only 7 tons of oil from the Caucasus, citing Germany and the Second World War Vol. VI p. 7. But page 7 doesn’t contain that information, it’s on page 1177. And it wasn’t 7 tons total, it was a rate of 7 tons per day by early January. The book’s wording is ambiguous so Buttar’s mistake is understandable. He should have read Forczyk’s The Caucasus 1942-43 which states that the total amount was about 1000 tons and the daily rate was no more than 7-10 tons (p. 91).

Buttar notes that the loss of Maikop did not cause the Soviets to run short of fuel, and uses that fact to jump to the conclusion that Hitler’s economic objectives were questionable. Buttar is apparently unaware that Baku produced over four times as much oil as Maikop and Grozny combined. If the Germans had gotten close enough to trigger the Soviets to destroy the Baku oilfields, the loss of all their Caucasus oil would have reduced Soviet oil production by a crippling 87%.

Page 289: It couldn’t have been 3rd Mechanized Corps. I think he means either 3rd Guards Tank Corps or 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps.

Page 308: XXX Corps wasn’t new, that’s what Fretter-Pico’s HQ was called before it was promoted to Army Detachment.

Page 310: Starobelsk fell to the Soviets on 1/24, not 1/29.

Pages 314 and 334: It is incorrect to say that the SS divisions were infantry-weak. Their panzergrenadier regiments each had 3 infantry battalions, compared to 2 for the regular army’s panzer divisions.

Pages 315 and 354: 3rd Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade was part of 4th Guards Tank Corps. To list it separately is double-counting.

Page 327: The map is missing the 160th and 305th Rifle Divisions.

Page 352: I’m assuming he meant Sinelnikovo where he wrote Sinsinokovo. Von Manstein made this error too, so Buttar may have copied it from him.

The Mius line was not completely stripped of armor save for a few Stugs. It still had the 16th Motorized and 23rd Panzer Divisions.

Page 353: 206th Rifle Division was far to the North with 38th Army. That should be the 106th Rifle Brigade.

Page 354: When Popov ordered reinforcements to Krasnoarmeiskoye, 18th Tank Corps had already handed over its part of the line east of Slavyansk to 52nd Rifle Division. This is explicitly stated by Glantz in From the Don to the Dnepr (p. 118), so Buttar saying that 18th and 3rd Tank Corps were both ordered to hand over their sectors to the infantry that day is a distortion.

Page 358: The Vichy French forces were not unwilling to fight Americans. Torch cost 2225 Anglo-American casualties.

The forces advancing on Tunisia from the west were not predominantly American. The final push from the west was made by 6 British divisions, 4 American divisions (with another 2 in reserve training for Sicily), and 3 French divisions. This error completely baffles me. I’d expect it from the American hacks who think the US won the war single-handedly, but Buttar is British so he should know better.

Page 364: On 2/21 25th Tank Corps was already south of Pavlograd and Sinelnikovo. It was heading towards Zaporozhe.

Page 365: As of 2/19 4th Guards Rifle Corps was in 6th Army, not 1st Guards Army (From the Don to the Dnepr p. 114).

Page 366: 6th Panzer Division only cut off 25th Tank Corps on 2/23. Part of 1st Guards Tank Corps was cut off by Totenkopf on 2/24.

Page 372: 17th Panzer Division was ahead of only one of its neighbors (6th Panzer Division). 40th Panzer Corps did run into determined defenses, but they were to the right of 17th Panzer’s position. This is yet another instance where Buttar took an accurate Glantz statement (From the Don to the Dnepr p. 137) and reworded it into something wrong.

332nd Infantry Division didn’t reach the front until 3/5, and its position was southwest of Sumy. 75th Infantry Division defended Sumy.

Page 373: 38th Guards Rifle Division did not fight in the streets of Stalingrad. It fought just to the north, then was pulled back to reconstitute and came back for Operation Little Saturn.

Page 374: On 2/26 15th Rifle Corps was ordered to take up positions northwest of Lozovaya (From the Don to the Dnepr p. 140). At the time they were well to the northwest, while Totenkopf was to the west. So it was impossible for them to be among the units in Totenkopf’s way.

Page 389: On the map the 290th Rifle Division should be the 340th. Glantz identified it in the text, so the print being tiny on Glantz’s map is no excuse.

Page 398: 3rd Tank Army wasn’t promoted to Guards until May.

Page 402: 2nd Guards Tank Corps had one motorized rifle brigade, not two mechanized brigades. Maybe Buttar counted the independent 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade? They operated near each other in the 3rd Guards Army, but were always separate organizations.

[Dave Franklin · Rating 4 out of 5]

“On a Knife's Edge” by Prit Buttar is an excellent work by one of the best military historians in the West. The book examines the Russian/ German conflict in Ukraine in 1942-43. Buttar’s focus is on the southern Russian Front of the Second War, where Ukraine became a primary focus for both sides' strategic decision making.

Mr. Buttar’s work is assiduous- and sometimes exhausting. Neither Hitler, nor Stalin saw Ukraine as a focal point of military operations -until the beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive around Stalingrad in late 1942. The area then became the focus of conflict, irrespective of its strategic significance.

That said, the author has attempted a balanced study. He has worked to corroborate primary sources with archival accounts. However, the memoirs of soldiers in the service of dictators are notoriously unreliable. Buttar allows unreliable actors to make ridiculously outrageous claims regarding their battlefield operations. Editing here would be beneficial.

The German momentum in Operation Barbarossa stalled in late 1941. Hitler’s decision to order no retreats and consolidate his gains, was, in retrospect, militarily correct. As in many cases, however, a correct decision was extended beyond the realm of its operational plausibility.

Buttar makes the case that both Hitler and Halder assumed that the Russian Army was done in 1942; likewise, Stalin and Vassilevsky made similar assumptions. . The result was massive carnage. The Wehrmacht record in the winter of 1942-43 was tactically proficient, but strategically deficient. Soviet operations, in this, their first major strategic offensive, were inept in both respects.

The 1942-43 Soviet strategic offensive along the Eastern Front, was a symptom of the hubris that infected dictators. The Soviet military was not capable of such operations. Their strength was not what they willed; Stalin compounded this blunder by continuing his offensives into the late spring, hoping that the Crimea and Ukraine could be salvaged.

The author's discussion of Vatutin and Manstein is flawed. Buttar addresses, both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, but his analysis of operations in the spring of 1942 is not adequate. Yes, the Soviets were adapting, and adopting.and becoming a viable force. However, there is little evidence that the Red Army general staff made efforts to sustain itself as an independent, professional institution. The fate of the German generals is different and more tragic.

The Soviet's could never officially codify German Auftragstaktik, despite its efficacy. In order to make the Red Army a modern force, respondent to information and resilient, they had to alter command and control procedures. Interestingly, the Soviet's learned from the Wehrmacht’s early operations even as the German military became more reliant on centralized control. This trend would continue for the rest of the war, and would lead to improvements by the Red Army, and a diminished performance by the Wehrmacht.

Prit Buttar’s narrative accurately describes the human misery of this conflict. While his first person accounts are powerful, many lack veracity. He inserts testimony that is clear hyperbole or outright prevarication- and his later caveats do not lend much credibility to his historiography.

In addition, Buttar’s maps are completely inadequate. Unless the reader is completely familiar with Ukraine, he will be lost. Tactical maps-absent any comprehensive understanding of the vastness of the southern steppes-are not very illuminating.

This is a good read and an excellent work of military history. While Prit Buttar is a fine historian, Earl F. Ziemke’s corpus of work about the German-Soviet conflict is a better guide for the average student of WWII.

[Bruce Cline · Rating 4 out of 5]

On A Knife’s Edge, The UKRAINE, November 1942 - March 1943, by Prit Buttar (2018, 422pp). This detailed chronicle of key early Eastern Front battles of WWII focuses on the defeat and surrender of General Paulis and his besieged army at the Battle of Stalingrad, including the numerous fighting leading up to it and the immediate aftermath. In exhaustive (and mentally exhausting) detail, Buttar notes battle after battle, unit action by unit action, in the struggles between initially tactically if not strategically superior but outnumbered German armies and the rapidly developing and numerically superior (in men and ultimately materiel) Soviet forces. Both Hitler and Stalin managed much of the fighting from afar, but as the German Fuhrer tightened his operational control over his forces - much to their detriment - Stalin loosened, albeit slightly, his own grip as he began to trust his military leaders. Like the previous Buttar book on the Baltic campaigns, this volume needed significantly more maps, both of individual (and sequential) actions but more so of the bigger, strategic picture. What maps he did provide needed more detail, including keys to various icons. Additionally, the narrative suffered from little to no descriptions of behind the scenes actions of logisticians and other supporting troops (including the critical vehicle repair units), too little information about allied Italian, Hungarian, and Italian armies, communication networks, and more. He gives little sense of how the many military events worked together, other than noting that they did. Quite wonderfully, the author includes innumerable excerpts from journals and memoirs of soldiers and their leaders. This is a good book, and is a prelude to two more volumes on further fighting in the Ukraine.

[Willy Marz Thiessam · Rating 3 out of 5]

Prit Buttar produces a very well documented look into the nature of the mid to latter part of the Fascist invasion of the Soviet Union. While this is exceedingly well researched the material does tend to favour German and Italian accounts it is worth the read. The perspective is based on those accounts concentrating on Fascist reorganization in the face of a number of significant defeats. There are some good Soviet references as well and in some cases good modern Russian sources. The problem appears to be that the sense of what the average Italian or German soldier felt is adequately covered. The Soviet soldier however although quoted in abundance is not given the same sense of a lived experience. Not that this is Buttar's fault, merely there are always more avenues to develop our understanding of the historical events.

A more serious gap is not presenting to readers that this was essentially a war of extermination and expulsion, where Slavs were a temporary fixture that would eventually be erased from the landscape. As such the difference is not merely of two sides fighting, one side was fighting for much more than victory while the other showed no more humanity than the bubonic plague. Those not killed today would be tomorrows massacre and refugees. Efforts to show some restraint were merely to seek tactical advantage in the short term. While Soviet forces committed errors it was not a force of out right annhilation short term or long term.

[Scott Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Audiobook) Good military history of a dynamic time on the Eastern Front in World War II. Most of the action focuses on Southern Russia/Eastern Ukraine, as the Nazis and Soviets, having withstood the brutal winter of 1941, geared up for round 2 of their fight to the death. The fighting was brutal, and any semblance of obeying international norms on POW or treatment of civilians went out the window. It was interesting to read the accounts of the Italian and Romanian soldiers, who would be at the forefront of some the critical battles, especially Stalingrad, and how they actually got better treatment than the Germans from the Soviets. Stalingrad looms large in this account, but so to does the deliberations and movements of the Nazis to try to breakout of Stalingrad. It is important to remember that Stalingrad, while a massive defeat for the Nazis, did not mean the end of their capabilities in the East. They were positioned to strike again in 1943, but by then, the USSR was passing them in fighting capabilities. The work does not cover Kursk, but it sets the stage for it.

Good military history, with some socio-economic considerations. Those who don’t have a lot of familiarity with the conflict will get plenty out of this, as well those with more study of the conflict. Worth the read regardless of format.

[Patrick Pillow · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another excellent work by the leading current expert on the Eastern Front. Make no mistake, “On A Knife’s Edge” is not an easy read. Many times I found myself having to reread passages and refer to maps, as the volume of information regarding units, armies, formations and leaders was almost insurmountable.

That being said, Buttar has always excelled at the placement of his personal accounts. It was particularly eye-opening to this reader the horrible fate of the Hungarian, Romanian and Italian armies, and Germany’s lack of support for them. In the vastness of the Russian steppe, it is easy to picture how entire units were simply swallowed up and destroyed in the battles post-Stalingrad.

“On A Knife’s Edge” is highly recommended; however, if you are new to the Eastern Front, it would be helpful to do some light reading to grasp the overall political climate and understand the deep-seeded hatred between the Communists and the Nazi Socialists. This truly was a war of survival and extermination.

[Alan M. Shaver · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the 5th of Dr. Buttar's histories of World War II on the Eastern Front that I have read, with a 6th waiting. He is meticulous and thorough in his review of the major battles all across each sector, and intersperses excerpts from unit war diaries and the personal diaries of participants, giving to his histories a true "human face". My only complaint - and a minor one at that - is the presentation could be improved if there were added to the individual battle maps an occasional larger map to facilitate placing the battle into the larger context of the war in the East. I've taken to printing out Google maps to help me better understand the relationship of particular operations to the larger context. Having read his histories of the war in the Baltics, East Prussia, Stalingrad, and the eastern Ukraine I feel my understanding of the war in eastern Europe is beginning to approach that of North Africa and western Europe. He is a terrific historian!

[Umar Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very intense read detailing the bloody and violent hell of Ukraine in 1942 and early 1943 as Soviet and German forces fought for control of Ukraine after the Stalingrad retreat by Axis forces. Buttar gives us intimate details, tactics, and an insight into the bumbling meddling of Hitler which led to the defeat of his forces combined with the bravery, professionalism, and brutality of soldiers and commanders of both sides as two empires of evil collided. This is a timely read and many of the cities we're reading about today during the Russian invasion of Ukraine are prominently featured. This book gives us context- this is a long game, and things go back and forth, so don't expect hostilities to end within our pre-conceived notions of a newscycle. And, yes, things can get worse. A lot worse. This book is evidence.

[James Kloss · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent account of the post-Stalingrad offensives in the Ukraine

I chose to read this book based on my positive experiences with Dr. Buttar's previous volumes in the Baltic and East Prussian campaigns. I was very pleased with this book as well, in particular the accounts of Operations Uranus and Saturn/Little Saturn and cataclysmic events during encirclement of Stalingrad. Although I was shocked and intrigued by the ordeals suffered by the Italian 8th army, I was fascinated by the insights into the decision making process of Erich Manstein regarding his attempts to facilitate the breakout of Sixth Army, and containing the Soviet counteroffensive.
A very compelling and readable account of the war in the Ukraine.

[Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

More of a 3.5 since I didn’t like the maps (often too narrow-focused or not synced up with the content). Continuing my tour of the eastern front with Operation Uranus, the failed German attempts to breakthrough to Stalingrad, and the following seesaw battles in Ukraine. Trying to fill in the gaps in my of WW2 and this was definitely one of them. Knew abt Stalingrad and the titanic battles at Kursk later on, but everything in between was a big 🤷🏽‍♂️. Didn’t realize how close run of a thing it was for the Germans to stabilize in the aftermath of Stalingrad!

[Tim H · Rating 5 out of 5]

Haven’t finished it yet but this is an excellent, colorful analysis on Operation Uranus and it’s aftermath. The detailed writing and description of the fighting is brought to life with eye witness accounts of soldiers and commanders on both sides. One of the better books I’ve read on the Eastern front. The audiobook is great.

[Allen Edwards · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book, one of few books which takes into account the other nations involved in the second world war, Italy, Romania, Hungary for instance not just on Germany & the Allies. Book explains well how the Germans were in a hopeless situation right from off and missed many opportunities to help themselves on the Eastern Front.

[Rudy · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's OK. A bit too eclectic a mix of operational level and personal experience, sometimes a bit of a chore to slog through. I suppose several of the quotes passages are excellent at presenting the tension though (a particular episode of the third battle of kharkov comes to mind when panzers ambush t34s).

[David A Carbo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent coverage and good read of 1942 into the Spring of 43 on the Eastern front. Only tweak would be larger and more detailed maps showing battles, borders, rivers and general area. Onto next one in his series.

[James · Rating 3 out of 5]

Solid book... but over half of it, maybe even two thirds, is actually about Stalingrad and the surrounding battles like Winter Storm. So I was a little disappointed there was not more pages on the fighting in actual Eastern Ukraine

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

good read, but poor maps.

[Jacob · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great insight into a pivotal point on the eastern front.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

Covers a time period on the WWII Eastern Front, with a freshness and up to date perpective. Fills in gaps in our knowledge of battles in Ukraine, especially for a Western audience.

[Mr Kenneth Jones · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a powerfully written book that to me sets the scene very clear at this juncture on the Eastern Front in 1942-1943. To any enthusiast on this historical period it is a must read.

[Steve Switzer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Superb narrative from buttar with individual accounts interpolating the operational narrative he is now my go to eastern front historian for both world wars

[Penecks · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pleasantly mixes dry troop movement reports with decent writing and enough personable passages from the ground units and commanders to be a great book for those starting out into the more academic side of WWII history. As suggested by the timeline this book is less about Stalingrad and Uranus and more about the follow up fighting around Kharkov, as well as the great pains taken by the Germans to secure large portions of the front from collapse.