What Is Philosophy for?

by Mary Midgley

Why should anybody take an interest in philosophy? Is it just another detailed study like metallurgy? Or is it similar to history, literature and even religion: a study meant to do some personal good and influence our lives?

Mary Midgley addresses these provocative questions in her most up-to-date statement on the various forms of our current intellectual anxieties and confusions and how we might deal with them. In doing so, she provides a robust, yet not uncritical, defence of philosophy and the life of the mind.

This defence is expertly placed in the context of contemporary debates about science, religion, and philosophy. It asks whether, in light of rampant scientific and technological developments, we still need philosophy to help us think about the big questions of meaning, knowledge, and value.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory

232 pages, Paperback

First published September 1, 2018

About the author

Mary Beatrice Midgley (née Scrutton; 13 September 1919 – 10 October 2018[1]) was a British philosopher. She was a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Newcastle University and was known for her work on science, ethics and animal rights. She wrote her first book, Beast And Man (1978), when she was in her fifties. She has since written over 15 other books, including Animals and Why They Matter (1983), Wickedness (1984), The Ethical Primate (1994), Evolution as a Religion (1985), and Science as Salvation (1992). She has been awarded honorary doctorates by Durham and Newcastle universities. Her autobiography, The Owl of Minerva, was published in 2005.

Midgley strongly opposed reductionism and scientism, and any attempts to make science a substitute for the humanities—a role for which it is, she argued, wholly inadequate. She wrote extensively about what philosophers can learn from nature, particularly from animals. A number of her books and articles discussed philosophical ideas appearing in popular science, including those of Richard Dawkins. She also wrote in favour of a moral interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis. The Guardian described her as a fiercely combative philosopher and the UK's "foremost scourge of 'scientific pretension.'"

Reviews

[Todd · Rating 3 out of 5]

For her last work, on the one hand, I would’ve loved to have said that Midgley transcended the bounds of 21st century philosophy. As a work of old age, on the other hand, I was worried that Midgley would have lost a step. The truth fell somewhere in between. In this late work, Midgley argues that our thoughts over time have moved from the myths and dogmas of religion to the myths and dogmas of scientism, which in many parts go largely unchecked. The problems of the new era she argues can be seen emerging out of the old problems of the past. However, the new problems require the various lenses and frames we now have available, including the ability to separate science facts from science fiction. At the same time, the science that we aspire for is closer to a humanistic social science than the physics so often put on a pedestal and enthroned by the positivists of the early 20th century. We could extend her thought and say that the largely restricted knowledge in the 19th century, closed off by and large to white Anglo-Saxon men, was severely flawed due to nature of the privileged and unequal restricted access and the walls keeping others out. This is not to say that with the levelling of knowledge we’ve gone to something altogether wonderful. Rather, Midgley argues that in the forms it took, where for example through Facebook and Google searches, the openness of access to all sorts of media and social media has created ready access to low-quality information and even in many cases to disinformation. Out of these constellations, she shows there are all sorts of otherwise seemingly highly intelligent people believing in the dystopian myths of some coming computer dominance and AI control. These are perfectly fine in the stories of science fiction and in the hands of science fiction authors. However, the problem is when we start believing these myths for real. At that point, we often stop facing down critically the problems closer to reality and the problems that will actually be facing us. For example, with autonomization there has been the loss and displacement of jobs. This has already happened to formerly solid blue-collar jobs in manufacturing and in factories. The threat could be this comes next to other jobs and other workers in other sectors. As a criticism, we could say the pacing of this book although not terrible also was not excellent. The arguments follow logically enough in sequence. However, they do not really build up to a finale or grand conclusion. So as a work of philosophy, it’s a bit anti-climactic. Maybe in the grand scheme that’s how it has to be; the earth keeps rotating and revolving and the story keeps going. In any case, I would have loved to have said that this book was a revelation. Alternatively, we might have feared Midgley lost her critical edge in this last work. The truth was something much more humane and human, realizing neither our greatest hopes nor our greatest fears.

[Peter Geyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mary Midgley states here that she writes though exasperation, which I presume means she thinks there's been a lack of thought in particular ideas and by particular persons. These ideas range from philosophy itself, where some philosophers have contended the past doesn't matter and only the last 20 years of thinking is relevant, to free will, selfishness, matter, mind, machines and the singularity.

I must admit to being a fan of her quiet, clear writing and way of thinking. It's like sitting in a comfortable lounge area having a serious, friendly, discussion. All the issues of the age are presented, it seems. This may be because what she writes is compatible with other interests and reading, but she's also not a polemicist.

Sadly, this is her last book as she died in 2018 at 99. The prose could be from an adult of any age at all. A must read for those who wish to engage with particular current issues in science and society, and perhaps an incentive to read earlier works.

[Humphrey J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sort of a "so close, yet so far" type job.
The book is an easy read, & covers many interesting points on the function of philosophy, and Midgley's response to contemporary concerns cutting across the various faces of philosophy (analytic & continental in particular).

[More in-depth thoughts below:]

Midgley's formulation of philosophy has many parallels with those proposed in the continental tradition-
early on she illustrates the use philosophy has in working out the conceptual ramifications of innovations in the sciences (much alike Alain Badiou's discussion of the relation of Marxism to philosophy in "Philosophy for Militants", albeit this time with Quantum Physics),
and proceeds to elaborate a conception of philosophy as a cartographical venture: a process of resolving varying disciplines into more comprehensive "world-pictures".
(What she frames as re-introducing the activity of the right-side of the brain to the left).

At times she also takes on a dialectical approach to this progression (affirmed by a very brief reference to Hegelian dialectics), whereby her "philosophical plumbing" (which she uses interchangeably with the map analogy) is to resolve certain blockages and attend to proverbial "stenches" emerging from certain entanglements and disentanglements in human activity.

Ultimately, however, Midgley's approach is most comparable to that of (the also late) Michel Serres.

First in regards to the notion of communication between disciplines (a pluralist rendering, as opposed to Badiou's 4 truth procedures)- as the penultimate chapter's title suggests: to conceive of "one world[,] but with many windows".
(Although this lacks the substantial metaphysical basis that Serres elaborates in his model of the Klein bottle)

Second in regards to the role of what Serres calls "Global Intuitions" & "Figures of Thought"- rendered in Midgley as:
"Symbols - images - visions - dreams - dramas: [...]" (p. 102).

In Midgley's text such are seen as, like Serres, being upstream of philosophical(, societal, scientific, etc) developments and in a certain sense overcoding that which opposes or contradicts them. Philosophy thus must acknowledge this fact and work to introduce new global intuitions and figures of thought so as to replace the outmoded old ones.

Midgley's biggest gripe in this regard is "Mechanolatry" as succeeding the Christian vision (the latter one that Midgley critiques on the basis of its entanglements with the imagery of war); one that, as emblematic of the negative face of the Dualism birthed from certain lines of Christianity to its culmination in Rene Descartes, significantly neglects the inner life of mankind.
Midgley's text is staunchly opposed to Physicalisms & Materialisms as such, holding that the global intuition of the machine had supplanted the Christian God, particularly in regards to the Singularity, which Midgley considers a manic, and importantly *less soulful* caricature of Christian eschatology.

As such, Midgley's treatment of the prospect of Artificial Intelligence, and human/machinic modification & combination, occupies a surprising amount of the text.
Substantial effort seems to be simultaneously directed at dismissing the very notion of the Singularity (tragically by drawing on quotes from Noam Chomsky) & expressing her utter horror that people seem complacent or even happy with the notion.

As alluded to above the theoretical background of the text is irreductionist monism (at times pairable with in vogue New Materialisms/Vitalisms), & Midgley's critique of the notion of artificial-intelligence-as-such (singularity aside) is grounded in a resultant claim that consciousness & intelligence are an impliable pairing.

This can be seen most evidently in her description of reasoning as covering "a vast range of activities from pondering, brooding, speculating, comparing, contemplating, defining, enquiring, meditating, wondering, arguing and doubting to proposing, suggesting and so forth." (p. 156)
(As such, to reference my great teacher Pete Wolfendale, Midgley resorts to some *ideal body* comparable to the Spiritual/Sacred Body)

The other critique seems to be launched from the (personally fascinating) notion that machines can only be conceived of as derivatives of the organic- the mistake of referring to machines constructing machines & etc.
[Although this is argued and argued far more forcefully and consistently in works of philosophers such as Raymond Ruyer & Geroges Canguilhem ("Machine & Organism" is particularly great in this regard), as well as their disciples]
The only issue is that Midgley ignores important consequences of positing the machinic as *exosomatisms* of the organism:- namely that as extensions of the human, and human intelligence as such, the machine-enhanced intelligence that Midgley actively condemns as "fable" and "science fiction" becomes feasible once more, if not already at work (this is, of course, to act like I'm a Critical Post-Humanist).

As final remarks on the text, it is brilliant to see how these lines brings her into conversation with Ted Kaczynski, & how disparate her proposals have become from those of James Lovelock (*ref the Novacene)- a former advocate of Midgley's - in regards to the viability of A.I. & Climatic systems.

As should he clear above, the text, despite its various flaws, compelled me to think. I do look at the various potentials of the text & wonder how much more substantial it would be if there were greater communication with the continental tradition (who's main representative in the text is a single use of Maurice Merlau-Ponty to say how science is derivative of our experience of the world) that contains so many substantial engagements with the issues and thematic variations that she here contends with.

[Sandra · Rating 4 out of 5]

«No entanto, aquilo que realmente nos acontecer será de certeza determinado pelas escolhas humanas. Nem mesmo as máquinas mais admiráveis poderão fazer melhores escolhas do que as pessoas que supostamente as estarão a programar. Portanto, com certeza que será melhor confiarmos no uso das nossas Mentes do que esperar que a Matéria realize a tarefa.» P. 232

Este livro claro e estimulante (pena o (des)acordo ortográfico, atrapalha a leitura): o dualismo ocidental baseado na distinção mente-corpo e razão emoção apenas explicam uma parte da realidade; a inteligência assume várias formas; a inteligência artificial e a confiança absoluta nas suas possibilidades impedem os seres humanos de confiar nas suas próprias capacidades e acção.

[Peter Van der Boom · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hoewel Mary Midgley door een vriendin als ‘ truttebol’ is omschreven, blijf ik groot fan van deze kraakheldere filosofe. Wars van moeilijkdoenerij ontrafelt ze de kluwe waarin de hedendaagse filosofie is terechtgekomen: eindeloze debatten over tegenstellingen (geest-materie, natuur-cultuur) die niet beslecht kunnen, maar ook niet hoeven worden. Probeer de wereld wat meer als een geheel te zien!

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really good introduction to a way of doing philosophy for the sake of being human wisely.

[Kevin Crowe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Far too often philosophers use obscure language, jargon and complex sentences that have many people scratching their heads. Anyone who has struggled to make sense of Kant, Hegel or Derrida - all philosophers with interesting, useful and important ideas - will understand that. One of the virtues of Mary Midgley is her ability to explain her ideas in clear and plain language that anyone can understand. Her last book, "What is Philosophy For", was published in 2018, just weeks before her death aged 99. It is in many ways a summary of the perspectives and ideas she has been working on since being a student at Oxford University in 1937.

All her life Mary was an opponent of the mind/body dualism and of the materialism and logical positivism that was at the heart of much 20th century British philosophy. She was also a critic of the existentialism that was popular on the continent and of the way that the ideas of Darwin and Marx (among others) have been twisted out of all recognition. For example, here she makes it clear that Darwin thought there was more to evolution than natural selection and survival of the fittest, even quoting him on his objection to his ideas being misrepresented. What a pity later writers such as Richard Dawkins ignored Darwin on this.

She is also highly critical of behaviourism in psychology and of sociobiology (a theory that argues that the ideas of Darwin can be applied to society). She is critical of the notion that the physical sciences - and particularly physics and chemistry - have all the answers. She refers to this as "scientism". She argues that science does have some of the answers, but by no means all, particularly in the area of free will.

Importantly, she refuses to get into the argument between determinism and free will, instead suggesting that different approaches and responses are needed for different phenomena. As an example, she uses the various maps of the world that are found at the beginning of many atlases, where there will be different maps for population, geographical features, climatic features, etc. All of these maps are equally valid and only by taking on board all the maps can we truly understand the world.

She is also highly critical of those who see AI and technology as the future, whether it is those who welcome machine intelligence or those who fear it. Intelligence, she argues, involves a degree of consciousness: the ability to learn from what we did in the past and to process such learning, both intellectually and emotionally. This, she believes, is something we share with animals. But it is something that human-made machines based on circuits and electronics cannot do. She argues that machines can never take the place of conscious animals (which is what we as human beings are) and if we attempt to create such machines, we will put ourselves at great risk. (A good example is perhaps driverless cars: such a vehicle can be programmed, but it cannot make decisions based on emotional intelligence).

Ultimately, she sees the role of the philosopher as being similar to that of the plumber. We call in the plumber when we discover an unpleasant smell or when our toilet backs up or floods. Most of the time we don't need the plumber, but when we do, they will do whatever is necessary to source the stink and to clear the loo, even if that means tearing up floorboards. And she is in no doubt that the dualists, logical positivists, materialists, behaviourists, etc have created the most awful stink that needs clearing up.

Although I don't agree with everything she says, I have for some time been an admirer of Mary Midgley: at times she is like an breath of fresh air, she has no time for any pretensions and believes in a philosophy that is both useful and inclusive. And to be able to write so succinctly and clearly at the age of 99 is also an achievement.

[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

What is Philosophy For? Well, among other things, it can be a very good bullshit detector.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the venom concealed behind Mary Midgeley’s amiable writing style. This book delivers some very strong knocks against a number of long-established philosophical positions and its arguments are reminiscent of similar outbursts by Iris Murdoch. “What makes me write books is usually exasperation, and this time it was a rather general exasperation against the whole reductive, scientistic, mechanistic, fantasy-ridden creed which still distorts the world-view of our age.” [P189]

Arguably, Midgeley’s main targets in this book, written in 2018 at the age of 99, were the same as those she did battle against as a student at Oxford in the 1940s, which were the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle and the Behaviourists in Psychology, but their restrictive and very limiting philosophical tenets remain at the heart of many important modern trends, particularly among advocates for artificial intelligence, despite having long lost any serious credibility. What annoys Midgeley, like Murdoch, is having to argue with people who claim to have got rid of the mystical, superstitious nonsense of metaphysics, but in reality display utter incompetence in the face of precisely the sort of problem for which metaphysics – or philosophy – is the essential remedy.

In order to make her points, Midgeley comes up with a number of extremely elegant arguments which make her book a delight to read. She addresses the longstanding confusions of mind-body dualism, the impossibility of reducing all useful knowledge to materialist or physicalist terms, the reality of mind and mental phenomena, and she deals at some length with the prophets of artificial intelligence / transhumanism.

”But the philosopher’s task is not – as some people mistakenly think – merely to look inward. It is to organize what concerns everybody. Philosophy aims to bring together those aspects of life that have not yet been properly connected so as to make a more coherent, more workable world-picture… Thus world pictures – perspectives, imaginative visions of how the world is – are the necessary background of all our living.” p73

[Kristy · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found the first part of this book really insightful, but it became far too repetitive in its presentation of arguments. The latter half of the book also seemed to contradict the emphasis of bringing divorced elements together again by simply tearing down the physical sciences to uplift the philosophical mind, while completing disregarding the prominence of Cartesian dualism in todays society in which the mind is held as superior to the body. I would have loved an exploration of this contradiction. Additionally, I went into this book thinking that climate change would hold a bigger role and although it is noted as a hugely significant question, she never goes beyond that. I know she wrote about human and nonhuman animals in a previous work, but I had hoped there would be advanced thoughts regarding this. This also then resulted in a lack of critique of dominant economic systems and philosophies despite the heavy focus on ‘machinery’. All in all, a bit of a disappointment although I would recommend the first part.

[Calvin Gleeson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mary Midgley manages to explain what Philosophy is in the 20th/21st century and also justifies the practice of doing Philosophy, so this book is worthwhile in this sense at the very least. She might also persuade you that you don't need a Phd to read and write about philosophical subjects, but you need to be able to think logically and present a coherent argument. After writing this I might change my rating to 5 stars!

[OĞUZHAN KIRIKBAŞ · Rating 3 out of 5]

From the title of the book I expected a general script about the reason of existance of the philosopy. On contrary to my expectations the book is about how wrong is the direction of state of art scientific method and the posibility of existance of an alternative way of thinking. Writer also mentioned the artifical intelligence as a fruit of this wrong direction. Not for the average philosopy readers.

[Hazel · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliant book for both seasoned readers in philosophy and lay people. Not only does Midgley cover a broad set of historico-philosophical ideas in an accessible manner but she does so with charm! Dry, self assured charm.

[Luke · Rating 4 out of 5]

How can reddit ever recover?

[Antoine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cool overview of philosophy as a way of linking together different ways of seeing the world but somewhat devolves into a slightly cheap anti-science/objectivism book.

[Steve Dewey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Enjoyable read, although nearly half of it seemed to be MM standing on a street corner waving her fist at science (including one or two passing strawpeople, I thought).

[Melissa]

Goodreads review

[Sharad Pandian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Midgley does her usual thing of arguing that a naive approach to descriptions and discourse that doesn't take seriously their contingent histories and purposes is bound to lead us to error. Once we recognize that our attempts to describe are many, we realize the difficult job is to live with this pluralism, instead of obsessing about reducing them to one another. (Plus Philosophy is important because it's apparently really good at helping us do this).

This has been her project since Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature and so it isn't particularly new. Plus, my sense is that in her justified desire to stress the importance of not effacing perspectives, she doesn't seriously grapple with the ways different descriptions actually compete, the ways they can be in tension with each other. So I'm not sure how much value this adds, but considering that the reductionist and monist tendencies seem to endure everywhere, perhaps she should be cut some slack for not being super nuanced.

[Mills College Library]

100 M6294 2018