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The Gift of Death, Second Edition & Literature in Secret
The Gift of Death, Jacques Derrida’s most sustained consideration of religion, explores questions first introduced in his book Given Time about the limits of the rational and responsible that one reaches in granting or accepting death, whether by sacrifice, murder, execution, or suicide. Derrida analyzes Czech philosopher Jan Patocka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History and develops and compares his ideas to the works of Heidegger, Lévinas, and Kierkegaard. One of Derrida’s major works, The Gift of Death resonates with much of his earlier writing, and this highly anticipated second edition is greatly enhanced by David Wills’s updated translation.
This new edition also features the first-ever English translation of Derrida’s Literature in Secret. In it, Derrida continues his discussion of the sacrifice of Isaac, which leads to bracing meditations on secrecy, forgiveness, literature, and democracy. He also offers a reading of Kafka’s Letter to His Father and uses the story of the flood in Genesis as an embarkation point for a consideration of divine sovereignty.
“An important contribution to the critical study of ethics that commends itself to philosophers, social scientists, scholars of religion . . . [and those] made curious by the controversy that so often attends Derrida.”—Booklist, on the first edition
170 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 1, 2008
About the author
Jacques Derrida
655 books1,875 followersJacques Derrida was a French philosopher best known for developing deconstruction, a method of critical analysis that questioned the stability of meaning in language, texts, and Western metaphysical thought. Born in Algeria, he studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he was influenced by philosophers such as Heidegger, Husserl, and Levinas. His groundbreaking works, including Of Grammatology (1967), Writing and Difference (1967), and Speech and Phenomena (1967), positioned him at the center of intellectual debates on language, meaning, and interpretation.
Derrida argued that Western philosophy was structured around binary oppositions—such as speech over writing, presence over absence, or reason over emotion—that falsely privileged one term over the other. He introduced the concept of différance, which suggests that meaning is constantly deferred and never fully present, destabilizing the idea of fixed truth. His work engaged with a wide range of disciplines, including literature, psychoanalysis, political theory, and law, challenging conventional ways of thinking and interpretation.
Throughout his career, Derrida continued to explore ethical and political questions, particularly in works such as Specters of Marx (1993) and The Politics of Friendship (1994), which addressed democracy, justice, and responsibility. He held academic positions at institutions such as the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the University of California, Irvine, and remained an influential figure in both European and American intellectual circles. Despite criticism for his complex writing style and abstract concepts, Derrida’s ideas have left a lasting impact on contemporary philosophy, literary theory, and cultural criticism, reshaping the way meaning and language are understood in the modern world.
Derrida argued that Western philosophy was structured around binary oppositions—such as speech over writing, presence over absence, or reason over emotion—that falsely privileged one term over the other. He introduced the concept of différance, which suggests that meaning is constantly deferred and never fully present, destabilizing the idea of fixed truth. His work engaged with a wide range of disciplines, including literature, psychoanalysis, political theory, and law, challenging conventional ways of thinking and interpretation.
Throughout his career, Derrida continued to explore ethical and political questions, particularly in works such as Specters of Marx (1993) and The Politics of Friendship (1994), which addressed democracy, justice, and responsibility. He held academic positions at institutions such as the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the University of California, Irvine, and remained an influential figure in both European and American intellectual circles. Despite criticism for his complex writing style and abstract concepts, Derrida’s ideas have left a lasting impact on contemporary philosophy, literary theory, and cultural criticism, reshaping the way meaning and language are understood in the modern world.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
December 20, 2015
We have here a kind of shibboleth, a secret formula such as can be uttered only in a certain way in a certain language.
As the Poet sang, "God said to Abraham, kill me a son. . ." Grant us then, a huddle of actors on our moral boards. We know of Abe and Isaac. Their plight is understood. Enter the dark invader (cue Weil's music for Seeräuberjenny) who ruminates, massages and kneads. Is this God revealed? No, it is Derrida. Mocker Jack, Jacques the Reader, Herr Doktor Deconstruction, uncanny unraveler, a gnostic Houdini, Jacky of the Trace, the Aporia and the Author's last wheeze. The Gift of Death proved to be a monstrous book, so dense and slippery. Derrida engages the idea of one's death, whether one owns, can give (in term of control) whether such can be subsumed a tradition or a small "h" history. No Antigone this time around but there is an exploration of Nietzsche's notion of debt in morality. Most pages were read at least three times. I thought the culminating argument into Noah and the Flood was simply profound. The earlier sections, most notably the opening one were almost inscrutable.
As the Poet sang, "God said to Abraham, kill me a son. . ." Grant us then, a huddle of actors on our moral boards. We know of Abe and Isaac. Their plight is understood. Enter the dark invader (cue Weil's music for Seeräuberjenny) who ruminates, massages and kneads. Is this God revealed? No, it is Derrida. Mocker Jack, Jacques the Reader, Herr Doktor Deconstruction, uncanny unraveler, a gnostic Houdini, Jacky of the Trace, the Aporia and the Author's last wheeze. The Gift of Death proved to be a monstrous book, so dense and slippery. Derrida engages the idea of one's death, whether one owns, can give (in term of control) whether such can be subsumed a tradition or a small "h" history. No Antigone this time around but there is an exploration of Nietzsche's notion of debt in morality. Most pages were read at least three times. I thought the culminating argument into Noah and the Flood was simply profound. The earlier sections, most notably the opening one were almost inscrutable.
February 17, 2015
Always a pleasure to follow along as D reads through something—here, some obscure cat (Patocka) is the focus, plus the usual dosage of Heidegger, and then a bunch of Kierkegaard.
No idea about the Czech phenomenologist, but the stuff on Fear & Trembling is first rate. Consider:
That part isn’t really the point, though—it rather re-reads the sacrifice of Isaac stuff, along with Kierkegaard. This rereading deconstructs the notion that religion might be an ethical source:
(66-67). The incorporate/repress stuff is Patocka’s analysis of Christianity’s supersession of Judaism’s supersession of paganism, or so (“the demonic secret, and the orgiastic sacred, have been surpassed” (4)—“religion comes into being the moment that the experience of responsibility extracts itself from that form of secrecy called demonic mystery” (5)—yeah, I know, right? Anyway: apparently, Platonism subordinates the orgiastic mystery, and Christianity represses Platonism, or so.)
Upshot: “There is no front [i.e., made plain earlier that this trope stands in for the heraclitean polemos] between responsibility and irresponsibility [NB: made clear earlier that “the demonic is originally defined as irresponsibility” (5)] but only between different appropriations of the same sacrifice, different orders of responsibility also, different other orders: the religious and the ethical, the religious and the ethico-political, the theological and the political, the theologico-political, the theocratic and the ethico-political, and so on; the secret and the public, the profane and sacred, the specific and the generic, the human and the nonhuman” (70-71).
Recommended for those concerned with the general economy of sacrifice, readers who unfold the mystagogical hypocrisy of a secret, and persons who suspect with Nietzsche that Christianity’s stroke of genius is a thaumaturgical secret .
No idea about the Czech phenomenologist, but the stuff on Fear & Trembling is first rate. Consider:
So Paul says—and this is one of the ‘adieux’ I mentioned earlier:(57)—which is a quotation of Philippians 2:12, the source of Kierkegaard’s title, here aligning much too perfectly with Derrida’s normal linguistic critique of the structure presence/absence. It’s kinda one of the most sublime things I’ve ever read, to be honest, the pointing out of the fortuitous correspondence of cause at this solitary textual locus between K and D’s most famous concerns.
Wherefore my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, (non ut in praesentia mei tantum, sed multo magis nunc in absentia mea/ me hos en te parousia mou monon alla nun pollo mallon en te apousia mou), work out your own salvation with fear and trembling (cum metu et tremore/meta phobou kai tromou).
That part isn’t really the point, though—it rather re-reads the sacrifice of Isaac stuff, along with Kierkegaard. This rereading deconstructs the notion that religion might be an ethical source:
In order to assume his absolute responsibility vis-à-vis absolute duty, to put his faith in God to work, or to the test, he must also in reality remain a hateful murderer, for he consents to put to death. In both general and abstract terms, the absoluteness of duty, of responsibility, and of obligation certainly demands that one transgress ethical duty, although in betraying it one still belongs to it and at the same time recognizes it. The contradiction and the paradox must be endured in the instant itself. The two duties must contradict one another, one must subordinate (incorporate, repress) the other. Abraham must assume responsibility for sacrificing his son by sacrificing ethics, but in order for there to be sacrifice, the ethical must retain all its value; the love for his son must remain intact, and the order of human duty must continue to insist on its rights.
(66-67). The incorporate/repress stuff is Patocka’s analysis of Christianity’s supersession of Judaism’s supersession of paganism, or so (“the demonic secret, and the orgiastic sacred, have been surpassed” (4)—“religion comes into being the moment that the experience of responsibility extracts itself from that form of secrecy called demonic mystery” (5)—yeah, I know, right? Anyway: apparently, Platonism subordinates the orgiastic mystery, and Christianity represses Platonism, or so.)
Upshot: “There is no front [i.e., made plain earlier that this trope stands in for the heraclitean polemos] between responsibility and irresponsibility [NB: made clear earlier that “the demonic is originally defined as irresponsibility” (5)] but only between different appropriations of the same sacrifice, different orders of responsibility also, different other orders: the religious and the ethical, the religious and the ethico-political, the theological and the political, the theologico-political, the theocratic and the ethico-political, and so on; the secret and the public, the profane and sacred, the specific and the generic, the human and the nonhuman” (70-71).
Recommended for those concerned with the general economy of sacrifice, readers who unfold the mystagogical hypocrisy of a secret, and persons who suspect with Nietzsche that Christianity’s stroke of genius is a thaumaturgical secret .
April 14, 2011
I actually finished reading this about a week ago, but have just been sitting on it since. It was our latest choice for The Totally Pretentious Bookclub in my real world, so I a) wanted some of my thoughts to percolate for a week or so and b) wanted to wait at least until the bookclub meeting to finalize my thoughts here. Now that we have had Complete Percolation and the fellow bookies left a few hours ago, I've come to one unavoidable fact:
Postmodern philosophy pisses me off.
I had an inkling when reading A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but it's decidedly confirmed after reading Derrida. (Let me just interrupt myself to say that this is the first Derrida I've read. It probably won't be the last, but it is the first, so for now I'm going to call him another postmodern douche-hole like Deleuze and Guattari.)
A few things that might have made this read more enjoyable:
*Had I read Derrida's book (Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money) that first introduced some of the thoughts discussed in this book. I have a feeling I would have picked up on a few other things.
*Had I read Jan Patocka first considering Derrida analyzes the crap out of him here.
*Had I read Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling which came up numerous times, particularly in regards to discussion of the mysterium tremendum.
Obviously we were completely unprepared for this one.
Really, though, let's be honest (and this is something all of Bookclub could agree on) - Derrida thought he was pretty darn special. You could practically hear him guffawing smugly through the pages, one of those really obnoxious stereotypical French guffaws. This isn't to say that Derrida doesn't present some interesting thoughts here, but there doesn't seem to be an exact thesis that he follows.
The discussion on religion (using Abraham and Isaac as his examples) was annoying, and not just because I'm an atheonostic (yeah, I just made that up) but because I'm certain Derrida could have made his point without bringing religion into the mix. He didn't discuss the Crucifixion which I was surprised by, considering that seems to be historically, biblically, whatever, the ultimate sacrifice. He mentioned original sin a few times (but then never quite defined it himself which was, again, annoying), and then he spent all that freaking time talking about Abraham and Isaac. Is religion all so pervasive that it automatically becomes the go-to for philosophers trying to make their point?
And now I'm just rambling.
I'd rather read Derrida over Deleuze and Guattari, but I have a feeling I'd rather have D&G over for cocktails instead of Derrida.
Postmodern philosophy pisses me off.
I had an inkling when reading A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but it's decidedly confirmed after reading Derrida. (Let me just interrupt myself to say that this is the first Derrida I've read. It probably won't be the last, but it is the first, so for now I'm going to call him another postmodern douche-hole like Deleuze and Guattari.)
A few things that might have made this read more enjoyable:
*Had I read Derrida's book (Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money) that first introduced some of the thoughts discussed in this book. I have a feeling I would have picked up on a few other things.
*Had I read Jan Patocka first considering Derrida analyzes the crap out of him here.
*Had I read Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling which came up numerous times, particularly in regards to discussion of the mysterium tremendum.
Obviously we were completely unprepared for this one.
Really, though, let's be honest (and this is something all of Bookclub could agree on) - Derrida thought he was pretty darn special. You could practically hear him guffawing smugly through the pages, one of those really obnoxious stereotypical French guffaws. This isn't to say that Derrida doesn't present some interesting thoughts here, but there doesn't seem to be an exact thesis that he follows.
The discussion on religion (using Abraham and Isaac as his examples) was annoying, and not just because I'm an atheonostic (yeah, I just made that up) but because I'm certain Derrida could have made his point without bringing religion into the mix. He didn't discuss the Crucifixion which I was surprised by, considering that seems to be historically, biblically, whatever, the ultimate sacrifice. He mentioned original sin a few times (but then never quite defined it himself which was, again, annoying), and then he spent all that freaking time talking about Abraham and Isaac. Is religion all so pervasive that it automatically becomes the go-to for philosophers trying to make their point?
And now I'm just rambling.
I'd rather read Derrida over Deleuze and Guattari, but I have a feeling I'd rather have D&G over for cocktails instead of Derrida.
October 29, 2012
The Gift of Death extends the type of method that Derrida developed earlier on in his career, but now applied to questions relating to ethics and responsibility. Keeping with his interest regarding transcendental problems, responsibility presupposes the situation of a transcendental subject who places themself in the position of the respondent in an internal dialogue with themself as another who assumes the call to responsibility, which Derrida describes as the voice of the father in his reading of Kafka's letter. The death which Derrida speaks of therefore, is a metaphorical death, a process of self mortification which occurs in positioning ourselves as the recipient of the call of absolute responsibility. It in a sense, repeats the idea of the trace of death as passivity which invades pure active intentionality in his studies of Husserl; this would be the continuous part . He generalises the voice of God in this way arguing that this call to responsibility is equivalent to the call of an absolute other internal to ourselves and conditiong the emergence of the problem of responsibility. The problem with this however is that Derrida's thinking is always an exploration which begins from presuming the necessity of the positing of the transcendental subject. Derrida would reply however, that ethical problems always suppose that such a subject has been presupposed, ethics implying a responsibility which would in a sense be infinite. He argues therefore that this problem of responsibility is not an exceptional situation but rather the condition which pertains with us as far as we might be subjects of language. We are differentiated within ourselves in a totally intimate and silent dialogue. In saying that responsibility is this totally silent and internal dialogue he also argues that it becomes a form of irresponsibility owing to it not being in anyway a social phenomenon. Responsibility is something which can only occur in a condition of total immanence to ones self. You probably could argue, along with Merleau-Ponty, in response, that there is something to be said in terms of our embodiment which doesn't presuppose language. One problem with this deconstructive style is it can become something approximating a philosophy by numbers. Thinking becomes the thinking through of the play of the system outside of its admitted bounds, the aproria which one opens up by placing thought in relation to some transcendental center. The process can seem a little mechanical be Derrida himself highlighted this very condition through the idea of the writing machine. Derrida's interesting style goes a little way to countering this effect though.
November 19, 2011
Not done yet, but I wanted to make a note of how stunning and beautiful Derrida's discussion of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac is. He discusses the sacrifice (via Kierkegaard and Levinas) to get at the problem of responsibility. Those critics who claim Derrida was a nihilist blah blah blah have never read his work because one doesn't have to read him strangely to see something deeply religious and meaningful. There are lots of word games that will probably bother people not used to Derrida's style (he is similar to Hegel in that you know immediately when you are reading something by him or one of his followers), but don't let that initial annoyance or uneasiness stop you. The ultimate lesson in all of Derrida's work is to be a better/closer reader of all texts; one could do worse than begin with this one.
...
Derrida puts forward a really interesting reading of the binding of Isaac at the beginning of 'Literature in Secret'. He argues the thing G-d was testing was Abraham's ability to keep a secret, not his ability to sacrifice his son. Abraham had to keep his plans to sacrifice Isaac secret from Sarah and Isaac, secret from everyone.
(Curiously, the majority opinion in Islamic theology is that it was Ishmael, not Isaac, who was taken to be sacrificed.)
...
Derrida puts forward a really interesting reading of the binding of Isaac at the beginning of 'Literature in Secret'. He argues the thing G-d was testing was Abraham's ability to keep a secret, not his ability to sacrifice his son. Abraham had to keep his plans to sacrifice Isaac secret from Sarah and Isaac, secret from everyone.
(Curiously, the majority opinion in Islamic theology is that it was Ishmael, not Isaac, who was taken to be sacrificed.)
April 8, 2009
I took this partly as an introduction to Jan Patocka's phenomenology. (Got some Patocka from the UCLA library to follow up.)
But saying that Derrida analyzes Patocka is like saying that John Coltrane covers a tune. Derrida just takes Patocka's essay number 5 from Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History and uses it as a springboard for his own journey. He explores the concept of responsibility in great depth. This quote really landed with me, as it expressed a concern I had always had about the reliance on an established ethics as opposed to personal morality:
"...far from ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics incites to irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply, to account for and thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept."
Derrida returns over and over in his analysis to the Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac and his choice between a secret (inexplicable) responsibility to god and a public responsibility to the community.
One of the great discussions of responsibility I've ever encountered.
But saying that Derrida analyzes Patocka is like saying that John Coltrane covers a tune. Derrida just takes Patocka's essay number 5 from Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History and uses it as a springboard for his own journey. He explores the concept of responsibility in great depth. This quote really landed with me, as it expressed a concern I had always had about the reliance on an established ethics as opposed to personal morality:
"...far from ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics incites to irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply, to account for and thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept."
Derrida returns over and over in his analysis to the Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac and his choice between a secret (inexplicable) responsibility to god and a public responsibility to the community.
One of the great discussions of responsibility I've ever encountered.
July 10, 2012
An accessible, deeply thoughtful, and even beautiful book.
March 3, 2025
I posting this other version of Derrida’s work as it includes Literature in Secret. I found it harder to read this than The Gift of Death. However, I did gain some further understanding of his philosophy from his discussion of "Pardon for not meaning (to say)".
It is hard to give a brief quote that could provide a beam of support upon which one might step delicately, one foot in front of the other, into the darkened labyrinthine attic of his mind. For one beam rests upon others and only stepping upon it I can hardly see where the beam ends and the next begins. But this quote here provides perhaps enough of a glimpse to imagine what other beams and recesses lie beyond.
"This sentence, “Pardon for not meaning (to say),” simply stays up in the air. Even if it is written in the hardness of a stone, inscribed white on black on the board or confided black on white on an immobile paper surface, captured on the lighted screen (whose appearance, however, is airier or more liquid) of a gently purring computer, the sentence is still “up in the air.” And being up in the air is what it keeps its secret of, the secret of a secret which is perhaps not one, and which, because of that fact, announces literature. Literature?" p.101
It is hard to give a brief quote that could provide a beam of support upon which one might step delicately, one foot in front of the other, into the darkened labyrinthine attic of his mind. For one beam rests upon others and only stepping upon it I can hardly see where the beam ends and the next begins. But this quote here provides perhaps enough of a glimpse to imagine what other beams and recesses lie beyond.
"This sentence, “Pardon for not meaning (to say),” simply stays up in the air. Even if it is written in the hardness of a stone, inscribed white on black on the board or confided black on white on an immobile paper surface, captured on the lighted screen (whose appearance, however, is airier or more liquid) of a gently purring computer, the sentence is still “up in the air.” And being up in the air is what it keeps its secret of, the secret of a secret which is perhaps not one, and which, because of that fact, announces literature. Literature?" p.101
September 27, 2012
Okay... I've taken time to absorb this. I've put it down, I've come back to it, I've tossed it across the room....
Although I adore many of the things Derrida says here - especially in the second half, I feel essentially that his points are lost in far too many wanderings and purposeful obfuscations. Yes, Derrida has much to contribute to the discussion of literature and spirituality, but ultimately I felt his point was this:
"Look, everybody seems to like Kierkegaard because he's deep. Deep must be the same thing as confused and muddled. I'll therefore be as confused and muddled as I believe my audience can possibly bear. Then, I'll go even further. That way only certain people will survive this stuff, and everybody else will think they should read it, based solely on the fact that so few people have."
Well, at least that's why I read it ;-)
That may not be entirely fair, of course. But as someone who adores (and has devoured) Kierkegaard, I found myself enticed, and subsequently frustrated with nearly every turn of the page. Maybe Derrida on another topic would suit me better. I will try. I will try.
Although I adore many of the things Derrida says here - especially in the second half, I feel essentially that his points are lost in far too many wanderings and purposeful obfuscations. Yes, Derrida has much to contribute to the discussion of literature and spirituality, but ultimately I felt his point was this:
"Look, everybody seems to like Kierkegaard because he's deep. Deep must be the same thing as confused and muddled. I'll therefore be as confused and muddled as I believe my audience can possibly bear. Then, I'll go even further. That way only certain people will survive this stuff, and everybody else will think they should read it, based solely on the fact that so few people have."
Well, at least that's why I read it ;-)
That may not be entirely fair, of course. But as someone who adores (and has devoured) Kierkegaard, I found myself enticed, and subsequently frustrated with nearly every turn of the page. Maybe Derrida on another topic would suit me better. I will try. I will try.
February 7, 2014
I actually found this to be quite clear and lucid (for Derrida, anyway). I won't leave a lengthy review due to the lengthy review I have in my notes... but I'd say that his prime contention is that Christianity has not yet come to Christianity, and that the assumption of responsibility, of ethics, of the political implications of the other requires a further stage, a recognition of the singularity of the self in Death and in the gaze of the other where the gaze of the other is the gaze of God and God/Other/Same are all recognized as harmful dichotomies underwriting European politics and stalling the discussion where it is today.
Easily the best and clearest piece of Derrida's on religion.
Easily the best and clearest piece of Derrida's on religion.
April 3, 2008
So, I just got this book today (in Anchorage, of all places) and I'm devouring it. The second edition is a revised translation and also includes "Literature in Secret," which covers the binding of Isaac in more detail. Brilliant, brilliant, brilliant.
February 7, 2021
Derrida’s most accessible and moving work, imo. all this talk about personal responsibility made me think about how funny it would be if this became the new bestseller amongst Jordan Peterson’s legions of sad lonely men.
July 28, 2019
Consisting mainly of an extended and erudite exploration of the nature and significance of Abraham's pact with Yahweh to kill Abraham's son Isaac, "The Gift of Death," along with its companion piece, "Literature in Secret," also includes relevant analyses of Kafka's "Letter to His Father" and Melville's "Bartleby the Scrivener." Together the discussions of these works seek to better explain the relationship of man to God, of the nature of secrecy in this relationship, and Literature's connection to Abraham's acts. In the service of these worthy goals, it is the final piece, however, where Kafka and literature in general is put under the microscope, that this short but rich tome reaches its peak of power. For here literature is linked to the concepts of secrecy and forgiveness, to Abraham and Yahweh's statements about the flood; this elevates literature to a position of importance and almost sacredness, a position it, in my opinion, deserves whole heartedly. So, overall, "The Gift of Death" is a serious piece that is full of weighty themes that are sometimes marred by somewhat obscure phrasing; however, its periodic opaqueness is more than made up for by a laser-like intelligence that serves to make clear the wisdom of ancient traditions and the connection of literary art with those self-same traditions. This is a book of wisdom, an epithet that few books can dare to aspire to. Read with relish!
August 12, 2026
I enjoyed the Gift of Death essays a lot more than the Literature in Secret—probably due to the latter’s obsession with bible verses which I found exhausting to read.
Derrida’s discussion on ethics and responsibility is one of my favorite ever… When I read levinas I couldn’t help but feel a bit turned off by his obsession around the other, and his turning of the other into a ‘master’ upon who’s knees I must fall, and plead, and sacrifice everything for but also always feel guilty for.
Derrida develops the relation to the Other and responsibility in a much nice way (imo). The contract, the sacrificing, it all relates to an evaluation deep down, and it ties back into the gift as that which makes it possible in the first place. It somehow both accounts for and absolve guilt.
I will definitely need to revisit these texts, as they were my first Derrida, and I undoubtedly glossed over a lot of the obscure yet insightful thoughts in here.
Lastly, i’m both a big lover and a slight hater of his prose… and I haven’t decided which I think takes precedent here when it comes to discussing the utility of essays like this.
Derrida’s discussion on ethics and responsibility is one of my favorite ever… When I read levinas I couldn’t help but feel a bit turned off by his obsession around the other, and his turning of the other into a ‘master’ upon who’s knees I must fall, and plead, and sacrifice everything for but also always feel guilty for.
Derrida develops the relation to the Other and responsibility in a much nice way (imo). The contract, the sacrificing, it all relates to an evaluation deep down, and it ties back into the gift as that which makes it possible in the first place. It somehow both accounts for and absolve guilt.
I will definitely need to revisit these texts, as they were my first Derrida, and I undoubtedly glossed over a lot of the obscure yet insightful thoughts in here.
Lastly, i’m both a big lover and a slight hater of his prose… and I haven’t decided which I think takes precedent here when it comes to discussing the utility of essays like this.
October 27, 2021
Seriously, a rare Derrida I think is worth a crap and not totally embarrassing to his faux intelligentsia. He actually makes some sense and some worthwhile points in this rather than babbling like a loon, trying to go into fields he really doesn't know or understand, using words, phrases, ideas he borrows from such, which some natural/hard scientists have actually written a book about how these postmodern French theorists are literally babbling idiots while trying to impress and intimidate the grad students forced to read them. There are so many to choose from, but for once, a book that borders on moderate reason, intelligence, reasonable communication, and also a general thesis I think is one of the rare instances the French postmodern theorists aren't simply mentally masturb*ting. So, to my shock, somewhat recommended...
March 11, 2025
“As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, command, or call of the other, l know that I can respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others. I offer a gift of death, I betray, I don't need to raise my knife over my son on Mount Moriah for that.
Day and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, l am doing that, raising my knife over what 1 love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity, incommensurably. Abraham is faithful to God only in his absolute treachery, in the betrayal of his own and of the uniqueness of each one of them, exemplified here in his only beloved son.”
Damn Jacques Derrida, I was not familiar with your game.
Day and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, l am doing that, raising my knife over what 1 love and must love, over those to whom I owe absolute fidelity, incommensurably. Abraham is faithful to God only in his absolute treachery, in the betrayal of his own and of the uniqueness of each one of them, exemplified here in his only beloved son.”
Damn Jacques Derrida, I was not familiar with your game.
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September 10, 2025Corporate wants you to find the difference between this and Tamsyn Muir’s Harrow th—IT’S THE SAME BOOK.
One thing about Derrida is he will never take the hypotenuse en route to the point. He won’t even take the length and width to the point. He’ll be stationed down the block from it, reporting back on the point’s movements, zooming in for the close-up but not recording yet. My guy will be circling the point as many times as is necessary, much like me, driving around the block as many times as is necessary to finish my song before pulling into the driveway. As Miley Cyrus says, it’s the CLIMB. Approach this and all of his work as you would poetry. Something may click 40 pages in, or 70, or on the 3rd read. Or never, but that’s the gamble you take.
One thing about Derrida is he will never take the hypotenuse en route to the point. He won’t even take the length and width to the point. He’ll be stationed down the block from it, reporting back on the point’s movements, zooming in for the close-up but not recording yet. My guy will be circling the point as many times as is necessary, much like me, driving around the block as many times as is necessary to finish my song before pulling into the driveway. As Miley Cyrus says, it’s the CLIMB. Approach this and all of his work as you would poetry. Something may click 40 pages in, or 70, or on the 3rd read. Or never, but that’s the gamble you take.
November 28, 2017
The Gift of Death was not easy to read, but it was definitely the most lucid and compelling text I've so far read written by the Algerian-French philosopher. His treatment of the sermon on the mount is interesting, but more so is all the discussion about 'the gaze' and 'the gift'. The inner Kierkegaardian in me loves much of what Derrida does in the text, and absolutely hates the rest.
March 19, 2021
Replacing God with the absolute Other. How to encounter the absolute alterity of the Other=the ultimate lesson of philosophy. Thank Derrida for making me feel alive again.
March 4, 2023
Lit in Secret 8 Stars out of 5!!!
March 4, 2025
this book will become my career.
November 27, 2016
A wonderful text from Derrida's thinking through religion, bringing together thoughts on responsibility, forgiveness, faith, secrecy, and the relation between ourselves and God (the wholly other), which always implies or involves the relation between ourselves and every other other.
Our responsibility, qua selfhood - to the other, for the other, to God - can only be manifest through silence. It must remain in secret, at a distance from all generality and from the universal, in order to preserve or maintain the alterity of the other, and not abstract from its singularity by way of the generality of speaking. To keep the other rapt in in its own secret in order not to lose it unto the order of the Same, the self, the concept. "Authentic mystery must remain mysterious, and we should approach it only by letting it be what it is in truth, namely veiled, withdrawn, dissimulated. Authentic dissimulation is inauthentically dissimulated by the violence of unveiling"(38). The resonances of Heidegger shine through here, the thoughts of Gelassenheit and the revealing concealment of truth and Ereignis. But beneath the labyrinthian langauge the message is clear - to attempt to unveil, to make clear, the shadowy movement that is the life of alterity is to kill it, to maim it, to lose it as it is, as other, as mystery (and it can only be what it is as other or as mystery).
Our responsibility, then, is to keep secret, just as Abraham kept secret his relations with God and what God had commanded of him. To speak, to enter the realm of generality, universality, of ethics (to use Kierkegaard's terminology) is to be irresponsible to God, and to the other in all their/its alterity. The paradox of responsibility is that we must "be irresponsible in order to be absolutely responsible"(62). This sentence speaks both ways - we must be irresponsible to the generality of ethics, to the people of the state, to our families and those we live with, in order to be responsible to God and the other, by maintaining silence and aecrecy - it can also mean the reverse, that we must be irresponsible to God and the alterity of the other by speaking in order to remain responsible in the realm of the ethical, the state, and the human.
Derrida invokes Levinas in speaking of ethics not in the sense of Kierkegaard (and of most philosophical employments of this word) but in the sense of the si gular relation between one and another, oneself and the other (every other, all others, even unto God, the absolute other). Derrida lays out the deconstruction of religious ethics and how it involves an irresponsibility to some side, no matter which way it is played. But in the end toute autre est toute autre, and so to be responsible one must keep silent, remain in secret, and say nothing. Only thus can the singularity of each singular thing, singular encounter, and singular moment ring out in all its passion and life, may it flow and escape, set free once again.
Perhaps, I am deprating from Derrida. There is mich in this text that I have left lying fallow, that I have not addressed, that I have left in silence. But at the heart of the work is giving. Responsibility requires that we give, just as Abraham was willing to sacrifice Isaac; we must give up our place in the ethico-metaphysically constituted hierarchy, we must give the gift of death in goving ourselves death, giving up that which is highest to us, of greatest import. We must sacrifice ourselves for the other. An impossible responsibility, but one that our heart compells us to fulfill. The gift of death - shall we give it to the other, enclosing them in the frozen stasis of the conceptual tomb, or shall we give it to ourselves, as sacrifice for alterity, to allow the singularity of the other to move and to live. The question of giving is one of giving up, but also of letting go.
Our responsibility, qua selfhood - to the other, for the other, to God - can only be manifest through silence. It must remain in secret, at a distance from all generality and from the universal, in order to preserve or maintain the alterity of the other, and not abstract from its singularity by way of the generality of speaking. To keep the other rapt in in its own secret in order not to lose it unto the order of the Same, the self, the concept. "Authentic mystery must remain mysterious, and we should approach it only by letting it be what it is in truth, namely veiled, withdrawn, dissimulated. Authentic dissimulation is inauthentically dissimulated by the violence of unveiling"(38). The resonances of Heidegger shine through here, the thoughts of Gelassenheit and the revealing concealment of truth and Ereignis. But beneath the labyrinthian langauge the message is clear - to attempt to unveil, to make clear, the shadowy movement that is the life of alterity is to kill it, to maim it, to lose it as it is, as other, as mystery (and it can only be what it is as other or as mystery).
Our responsibility, then, is to keep secret, just as Abraham kept secret his relations with God and what God had commanded of him. To speak, to enter the realm of generality, universality, of ethics (to use Kierkegaard's terminology) is to be irresponsible to God, and to the other in all their/its alterity. The paradox of responsibility is that we must "be irresponsible in order to be absolutely responsible"(62). This sentence speaks both ways - we must be irresponsible to the generality of ethics, to the people of the state, to our families and those we live with, in order to be responsible to God and the other, by maintaining silence and aecrecy - it can also mean the reverse, that we must be irresponsible to God and the alterity of the other by speaking in order to remain responsible in the realm of the ethical, the state, and the human.
Derrida invokes Levinas in speaking of ethics not in the sense of Kierkegaard (and of most philosophical employments of this word) but in the sense of the si gular relation between one and another, oneself and the other (every other, all others, even unto God, the absolute other). Derrida lays out the deconstruction of religious ethics and how it involves an irresponsibility to some side, no matter which way it is played. But in the end toute autre est toute autre, and so to be responsible one must keep silent, remain in secret, and say nothing. Only thus can the singularity of each singular thing, singular encounter, and singular moment ring out in all its passion and life, may it flow and escape, set free once again.
Perhaps, I am deprating from Derrida. There is mich in this text that I have left lying fallow, that I have not addressed, that I have left in silence. But at the heart of the work is giving. Responsibility requires that we give, just as Abraham was willing to sacrifice Isaac; we must give up our place in the ethico-metaphysically constituted hierarchy, we must give the gift of death in goving ourselves death, giving up that which is highest to us, of greatest import. We must sacrifice ourselves for the other. An impossible responsibility, but one that our heart compells us to fulfill. The gift of death - shall we give it to the other, enclosing them in the frozen stasis of the conceptual tomb, or shall we give it to ourselves, as sacrifice for alterity, to allow the singularity of the other to move and to live. The question of giving is one of giving up, but also of letting go.
January 24, 2021
Gift of Death:
It’s exceptional in some ways. But for all of its vagueties it does not mean to show it, or at least Derrida may have me think. He might be nuts. There's not much driving it except word games and other people's stories. It’s placed into a specific discussion. References are thick and through Kierkegaard he does some Nietzschean things to Augustine and the Western tradition. It's French. It ended a little too cute for my taste, as if to undermine the point prior and the whole of the work. Maybe that's just philosophy. Maybe that's just French philosophy. Maybe I can come to appreciate it more. But for now I can only appreciate what I can.
It’s exceptional in some ways. But for all of its vagueties it does not mean to show it, or at least Derrida may have me think. He might be nuts. There's not much driving it except word games and other people's stories. It’s placed into a specific discussion. References are thick and through Kierkegaard he does some Nietzschean things to Augustine and the Western tradition. It's French. It ended a little too cute for my taste, as if to undermine the point prior and the whole of the work. Maybe that's just philosophy. Maybe that's just French philosophy. Maybe I can come to appreciate it more. But for now I can only appreciate what I can.
February 19, 2014
Excellent book, highly recommended. My favorite quote:
"Secrecy involves the sacrifice of what is dearest, the greatest love in the world, what is unique in love itself, one unique against another, one unique for another. For the secret of secrecy about which we shall speak does not consist in hiding something, in not revealing the truth, but in respecting the absolute singularity, the infinite separation of what binds me or exposes me to the unique, to one as to the other, to the One as to the Other." (p.123)
"Secrecy involves the sacrifice of what is dearest, the greatest love in the world, what is unique in love itself, one unique against another, one unique for another. For the secret of secrecy about which we shall speak does not consist in hiding something, in not revealing the truth, but in respecting the absolute singularity, the infinite separation of what binds me or exposes me to the unique, to one as to the other, to the One as to the Other." (p.123)
June 12, 2015
The profundity of its content was lost on me. Kierkegaard is far more profound and seemingly truthful. I say skip it!
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