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384 pages, Hardcover
First published August 7, 2018
Islam fused religion and politics, mosque and state could never be separated, and so Arabs were all but doomed to choose between secular strongmen and religious extremists.
We set ourselves up for disappointment. Where did it go? I was often asked later, in New York or London. What happened to the nonviolent, secular-minded, Western-friendly, Silicon Valley uprising that we cheered in Tahrir Square? Who stole that revolution? That image of the revolution was as much about Western narcissism as it was about Egypt.
A council of generals had taken power from a president. One might call that a coup. But Arabs everywhere saw a revolution in Egypt.
Egyptian leaders put on a performance of hostility for their citizens at home, and, intentionally or not, that stage show helped convince American policymakers that the peace was so fragile that it demanded constant attention and payoffs—the $1.3 billion a year in aid. In truth, the Egyptian military had no hostile neighbors or, for that matter, known enemies.
The Maspero massacre was the deadliest episode of sectarian violence in the modern history of Egypt.
I have often heard Westerners talk about the need for a Muslim Martin Luther. I realized in Egypt that it is far too late for that: Abduh came and went a century ago. But Abduh’s ideas never went far. Abdel Nasser nationalized Al Azhar in the middle of the last century, and the institution became more hidebound and authoritarian than ever. Without freedom of speech and assembly, there was little hope for religious freedom either.
The parliament of beards was noisy but impotent.
Sisi had won the trust of the president by warning him of an assassination attempt that awaited him at a military funeral for those killed in the attack. (Morsi skipped it.) These close Morsi allies also said that Sisi brought evidence of corruption by Tantawi’s second in command, General Sami Anan.
Israel flew unmarked drones, jets, and helicopters. The jets and helicopters covered up their markings and flew circuitous routes to give the impression they took off from the Egyptian mainland. Sisi hid the strikes from all but a small circle of senior military and intelligence officers. No journalists were allowed in the area, and the state-dominated news media never asked questions. Israeli military censors restricted public reports of the strikes there as well.
But by the end of 2017, Israel had carried out far more than a hundred secret strikes inside Egypt: a covert air war.
Amazed British and American government officials had hinted to me for two years about the growing scale of the attacks that Israel had carried out over the Egyptian Sinai with Sisi’s blessing. By 2017, several American officials told me that Israel deserved much of the credit for the Egyptian government’s limited success in containing the Islamic State (even though more vicious jihadists sprang up to replace each leader killed, one diplomat noted). Israeli military officials griped to the Americans that Egyptians were not doing enough on their end, sometimes failing to send in ground forces after an airstrike when the Israelis had asked for a coordinated sequence of operations. But for more than two years, under two American administrations, all sides kept it quiet, afraid of the potential for unrest in Egypt if Israel’s role became known.
Egypt’s reliance on Israel, though, altered the dynamics of the region. On February 21, 2016, Secretary of State Kerry convened a secret summit in Aqaba, Jordan, with Sisi, King Abdullah, and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Part of Kerry’s agenda was a regional agreement for Egypt to guarantee Israel’s security as part of a deal for a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu scoffed. What could Sisi offer Israel? Netanyahu asked, according to two Americans involved in the talks. Sisi depended on Israel to control his own territory, for his own survival. Sisi needed Netanyahu; Netanyahu did not need Sisi.
The dam became a monument to Stalinist engineering. Its construction displaced one hundred twenty thousand Nubians, the dark.skinned Egyptians indigenous to the area. The lake formed by the dam nearly demolished the breathtaking Pharaonic temples at Abu Simbel; UNESCO saved them by paying Western European contractors to relocate the complex, stone by stone, on dried ground. The finished dam stopped the flow of silt and nutrients that had kept much of the Nile Valley so fertile for centuries.The depletion of the water devastated the farmlands downstream and the fishing around the mouth of the Nile. The slowing of the current led to an explosion in waterborne diseases like schistosomiasis.
Westerners may expect chaos in the Middle East. But Egyptians think of themselves as citizens of the world’s oldest nation, the cradle of civilization. Wild, amateur armies had stained the streets with the blood of their countrymen, in violence reminiscent of the last days of the monarchy. It felt like Syria, Libya, or Iraq, some failed state - not Egypt.
I met Carter in Cairo, and he said he understood Egyptian complaints about that arrangement: Washington was supporting a dictatorship in Cairo for the well-being of Israel. “I think that is true, we were,” he told me. “And I can’t say I wasn’t doing that as well.”
The interim prime minister later said that “close to a thousand” civilians had died that day at Rabaa. A yearlong study by Human Rights Watch released in 2014 determined that the deaths almost certainly exceeded that number and confirmed the names of at leat 817 of the dead. “The indiscriminate and deliberate use of lethal force resulted in one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history,” the study concluded. Rabaa surpassed the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in 1989 and the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005.