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Definition
The purpose of this book is to clarify the concept of definition and improve defining activities.
- GenresPhilosophy
216 pages, Hardcover
First published December 31, 1950
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24 people want to read
About the author
Richard Robinson
227 books11 followersLibrarian note:
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There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name
This profile may contain books from multiple authors of this name.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
November 8, 2019
The project of this book is to clarify the nature of definition, and it does a superb job. I love books like this. Well off the beaten-path, almost unknown, yet elegantly written and packed with lucid, practical ideas.
It's odd how neglected "definition" is as a subject of analysis, considering its importance in persuasion, in reasoning correctly, and in improving our understanding. It's like the ground zero of all language and symbolic activity, and when we don't get the foundation right, the whole structure turns out crooked (sometimes that's the intention!).
Robinson divides definition into three main categories: lexical definition, stipulative definition, and real definition. The first two are what he calls "word-thing" definition, and here he presents an intriguing list of the seven methods that people use to associate a symbol with a thing.
To give you the flavor of some of Robinson's discoveries, consider the long-running question: Can a definition be true or false? There's been a lot of debate on that point due to conflation of various meanings of the word definition. To unravel the issue, Robinson first defines "lexical definition" to mean a statement to the effect that "some people, somewhere, at some time, used a certain word or symbol to indicate a certain thing." For example, the ancient Hebrews used the word "geshem" to mean "rain." That's a true statement, and thus this kind of definition can be true or false. A "stipulative definition," on the other hand, is a suggestion in which a person says "let's use word X" to mean a certain thing. Definitions of that type cannot be true or false.
The third part of the book discusses "real definition," a topic which plays an important role in the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Spinoza and many others. The idea here is that when Socrates asks one of his interlocutors "What is justice?" or "What is piety?" he's not looking for the definition of a word. He's looking for an illuminating analysis of the thing indicated by the word. Real definition is a slippery, difficult topic, and Robinson does an admirable job of unraveling the tangle.
Part of the interest here is how real definition is used to surreptitiously advocate values. For example, Robinson discusses how Tolstoy classified certain things as "art" and certain things as "not art" (including his own great novels!) in his book What Is Art? Here it is evident that Tolstoy is using the definition of art as a subterfuge to advocate his own tastes or ideals as objective realities. It's a form of essentialism that is closely intertwined with real definition and Aristotelian philosophy. Many topics in the culture wars revolve around a similar sort of essentialism. For example, is a man who has undergone a sex change really a woman? Both sides appeal to essentialism. One side says that the sex-changed man really is a woman because, deep inside, she was essentially, inherently a woman all along. The other side says that the sex-changed man really isn't a woman because, deep inside, he is essentially, inherently a man and always will be, no matter what procedures he undergoes. This is all wrangling over real definition and Aristotelian essences, so the issues Robinson addresses in this section are as much in play today as they were in Aristotle's time. Which is not to say that Robinson rules out real definition as an entirely counterproductive activity. It isn't. His strategy is to break real definition down into the various activities which are conflated under the term. He then counsels us to continue those which are productive, and reject those which are not.
Finally, Robinson has many interesting, and counter-intuitive conclusions on the traditional rules of how definition should be done. (Should definition be done at the end or the beginning of a text? Are some words undefinable? Must some words be left undefined? Can a term be defined using the term itself? etc.) This is a great book if you want to improve the clarity of your thinking, logic and arguments. I will be turning to it again and again in the future. It definitely deserves a wider readership.
It's odd how neglected "definition" is as a subject of analysis, considering its importance in persuasion, in reasoning correctly, and in improving our understanding. It's like the ground zero of all language and symbolic activity, and when we don't get the foundation right, the whole structure turns out crooked (sometimes that's the intention!).
Robinson divides definition into three main categories: lexical definition, stipulative definition, and real definition. The first two are what he calls "word-thing" definition, and here he presents an intriguing list of the seven methods that people use to associate a symbol with a thing.
To give you the flavor of some of Robinson's discoveries, consider the long-running question: Can a definition be true or false? There's been a lot of debate on that point due to conflation of various meanings of the word definition. To unravel the issue, Robinson first defines "lexical definition" to mean a statement to the effect that "some people, somewhere, at some time, used a certain word or symbol to indicate a certain thing." For example, the ancient Hebrews used the word "geshem" to mean "rain." That's a true statement, and thus this kind of definition can be true or false. A "stipulative definition," on the other hand, is a suggestion in which a person says "let's use word X" to mean a certain thing. Definitions of that type cannot be true or false.
The third part of the book discusses "real definition," a topic which plays an important role in the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Spinoza and many others. The idea here is that when Socrates asks one of his interlocutors "What is justice?" or "What is piety?" he's not looking for the definition of a word. He's looking for an illuminating analysis of the thing indicated by the word. Real definition is a slippery, difficult topic, and Robinson does an admirable job of unraveling the tangle.
Part of the interest here is how real definition is used to surreptitiously advocate values. For example, Robinson discusses how Tolstoy classified certain things as "art" and certain things as "not art" (including his own great novels!) in his book What Is Art? Here it is evident that Tolstoy is using the definition of art as a subterfuge to advocate his own tastes or ideals as objective realities. It's a form of essentialism that is closely intertwined with real definition and Aristotelian philosophy. Many topics in the culture wars revolve around a similar sort of essentialism. For example, is a man who has undergone a sex change really a woman? Both sides appeal to essentialism. One side says that the sex-changed man really is a woman because, deep inside, she was essentially, inherently a woman all along. The other side says that the sex-changed man really isn't a woman because, deep inside, he is essentially, inherently a man and always will be, no matter what procedures he undergoes. This is all wrangling over real definition and Aristotelian essences, so the issues Robinson addresses in this section are as much in play today as they were in Aristotle's time. Which is not to say that Robinson rules out real definition as an entirely counterproductive activity. It isn't. His strategy is to break real definition down into the various activities which are conflated under the term. He then counsels us to continue those which are productive, and reject those which are not.
Finally, Robinson has many interesting, and counter-intuitive conclusions on the traditional rules of how definition should be done. (Should definition be done at the end or the beginning of a text? Are some words undefinable? Must some words be left undefined? Can a term be defined using the term itself? etc.) This is a great book if you want to improve the clarity of your thinking, logic and arguments. I will be turning to it again and again in the future. It definitely deserves a wider readership.
Displaying 1 of 1 review