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The University Center for Human Values Series
Cazadores, campesinos y carbón: Una historia de los valores de las sociedades humanas
¿Qué determina los principios morales de una sociedad?
Después del éxito de ¿Por qué manda Occidente... por ahora?, Ian Morris aborda la ambiciosa tarea de explicar la evolución de los valores de las sociedades humanas desde la prehistoria hasta la actualidad. Este es un libro provocador que explica de dónde proceden y cómo y por qué han evolucionado.
En una original propuesta, el libro incorpora capítulos escritos por críticos acérrimos de Morris: el historiador Richard Seaford, el sinólogo Jonathan D. Spence, la filósofa Christine M. Korsgaard y la escritora Margaret Atwood. Morris responde a sus argumentos de forma inteligente e incisiva.
Después del éxito de ¿Por qué manda Occidente... por ahora?, Ian Morris aborda la ambiciosa tarea de explicar la evolución de los valores de las sociedades humanas desde la prehistoria hasta la actualidad. Este es un libro provocador que explica de dónde proceden y cómo y por qué han evolucionado.
En una original propuesta, el libro incorpora capítulos escritos por críticos acérrimos de Morris: el historiador Richard Seaford, el sinólogo Jonathan D. Spence, la filósofa Christine M. Korsgaard y la escritora Margaret Atwood. Morris responde a sus argumentos de forma inteligente e incisiva.
431 pages, Hardcover
First published March 22, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 59 reviews
April 17, 2015
The subtitle says it all: How Human Values Evolve. In itself this is not particularly new or compelling, but the manner in which Ian Morris pursues the concept is. Mr. Morris is focused on the different ways each of these cultural stages of human development [hunter-gatherer, farming, and industrialization] captures energy. Foragers on a good day would capture no more than 10,000 kilocalories per person; agrarians no more than 10,000 kilocalories per person, whereas industrialized Western economies in 1800 captured 38,000 kilocalories and this went up to 230,000 kilocalories in the 1970s. These numbers represent only a small part of Mr. Morris's examination of culture and morality through energy capture and the methods these capture used. The technique of capture would also speak to the values these cultures produced and supported -- sometimes with a great deal of bloodshed.
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels is highly reductive and Mr. Morris has acknowledged this in the book, but argues reduction is not in and of itself bad or simplistic. Specifically he says "My defense is that all scholarship is reductionist." By way of example he cites Martin Gilbert's massive 8 volume biography of Winston Churchill that was published as 13 separate books [some volumes were too big to fit between the covers of a single book]. Even at this size the author still had to 'reduce' Churchill's life to words and a finite number of volumes. Reductionism is not a bad thing by itself. Everyone, scientist or commoner, reduces large amounts of data to more manageable sizes in order to act and interpret what is going on about them.
Whether or not the argument is justifiable should be left to the individual reader to decide. However, as an interpretive tool for determining how cultures functioned and what their values were it is a very interesting trope [rhetorical device].
The structure of the book is quite interesting, as well. The author presents his thesis and the argument/data to prove this. Once finished, several others, who had attended his lectures upon which this book is based, are given space to rebut his argument. Once they have had their say the author inserts what amounts to a defense against their arguments. For all practical purposes the book is a dialogue between opposing points of view.
First and foremost it must be recognized this is an academic debate and therefore not as vigorous as one might expect it to be. The arguments are learned and abstract, but still interesting.
Ultimately, Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels was a brilliant read. Nonetheless, theories as comprehensive as this [theories of everything] usually end up being wrong, but the methodology/hypothesis reveals some overlooked elements of cultural interpretation. For this alone the book is worth the read.
Rating: 4 out of 5 stars. The book lost one star because it is a little dry, but this should be expected of academic works.
Recommended for readers curious about anthropology; futurism [the end of the book projects forward]; science; cultural evolution, and debate.
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels is highly reductive and Mr. Morris has acknowledged this in the book, but argues reduction is not in and of itself bad or simplistic. Specifically he says "My defense is that all scholarship is reductionist." By way of example he cites Martin Gilbert's massive 8 volume biography of Winston Churchill that was published as 13 separate books [some volumes were too big to fit between the covers of a single book]. Even at this size the author still had to 'reduce' Churchill's life to words and a finite number of volumes. Reductionism is not a bad thing by itself. Everyone, scientist or commoner, reduces large amounts of data to more manageable sizes in order to act and interpret what is going on about them.
Whether or not the argument is justifiable should be left to the individual reader to decide. However, as an interpretive tool for determining how cultures functioned and what their values were it is a very interesting trope [rhetorical device].
The structure of the book is quite interesting, as well. The author presents his thesis and the argument/data to prove this. Once finished, several others, who had attended his lectures upon which this book is based, are given space to rebut his argument. Once they have had their say the author inserts what amounts to a defense against their arguments. For all practical purposes the book is a dialogue between opposing points of view.
First and foremost it must be recognized this is an academic debate and therefore not as vigorous as one might expect it to be. The arguments are learned and abstract, but still interesting.
Ultimately, Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels was a brilliant read. Nonetheless, theories as comprehensive as this [theories of everything] usually end up being wrong, but the methodology/hypothesis reveals some overlooked elements of cultural interpretation. For this alone the book is worth the read.
Rating: 4 out of 5 stars. The book lost one star because it is a little dry, but this should be expected of academic works.
Recommended for readers curious about anthropology; futurism [the end of the book projects forward]; science; cultural evolution, and debate.
November 16, 2024
This is the third book by Professor Morris that I have read and I have enjoyed them all, despite not necessarily agreeing with all his conclusions. He is an entertaining author who tries to make his prose intelligible to the general reader.
In this book he discusses human value systems. I will not try to reproduce his insights in detail for I'm sure I would not do them justice. Simply put, he considers a society's value system to be an attribute of that system that can be either an asset or a hindrance to the society in its relationships with other societies. Like the giraffe with the longer neck who can reach more leaves and therefore has a competitive advantage over the other giraffes, a society with a value system that best fits its needs has a similar advantage over other societies. The compatibility of a value system with its society's economic system is the biggest factor in whether the value system will be an asset or a hindrance. Therefore, hunter-gatherers will eventually adapt a value system that corresponds to their way of life, and agricultural and industrial societies will do likewise, and no one should be surprised that societies built around different economic systems have different value systems.
After making his case, Morris includes 70 pages of comments from others who don't necessarily agree with his conclusions. He then closes with 60 pages of his responses to the comments. This can get a little rowdy and they call each other bad names like "sociological positivist". Apparently in some sectors of academia these are fightin' words, however I admit that I was only vaguely aware of the nature of the dispute.
In this book he discusses human value systems. I will not try to reproduce his insights in detail for I'm sure I would not do them justice. Simply put, he considers a society's value system to be an attribute of that system that can be either an asset or a hindrance to the society in its relationships with other societies. Like the giraffe with the longer neck who can reach more leaves and therefore has a competitive advantage over the other giraffes, a society with a value system that best fits its needs has a similar advantage over other societies. The compatibility of a value system with its society's economic system is the biggest factor in whether the value system will be an asset or a hindrance. Therefore, hunter-gatherers will eventually adapt a value system that corresponds to their way of life, and agricultural and industrial societies will do likewise, and no one should be surprised that societies built around different economic systems have different value systems.
After making his case, Morris includes 70 pages of comments from others who don't necessarily agree with his conclusions. He then closes with 60 pages of his responses to the comments. This can get a little rowdy and they call each other bad names like "sociological positivist". Apparently in some sectors of academia these are fightin' words, however I admit that I was only vaguely aware of the nature of the dispute.
April 24, 2015
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve by Ian Morris
This book is dense with footnotes, displaying the author’s smug confidence in his considerable erudition. Unfortunately, the book itself does not demonstrate much aptitude for wise understanding on Morris’ part. Yes, he has a big idea: human values evolve to fit the wealth of society. That seems obvious enough, but the characteristic which gives the book a frisson of originality is the fact that for the purposes for the author’s argument, wealth is defined exclusively in terms of calories – energy capture. Thus the forager, who can extract only his minimal daily requirement of energy, resolves disputes by violence; the farmer, who can extract much more through co-operation, begins to turn toward a process of law, preferring hierarchical governance; fossil fuelers turn back to individual action, with the result that hierarchy is less appealing and fairness is fostered by the abundance of energy that is now available to their societies. This is probably true to some extent, but what about the evolution of language, what about the gradual accumulation of shared stories as stimulants to the evolution of human values? Is there a forest here somewhere?
The book is a print version of one of the Princeton Tanner Lectures and follows the form of that series. Four distinguished thinkers from different disciplines were invited to respond to the lecture. The guest lecturer then provides a rebuttal, which here appears as the final chapter of the book. This process is designed to maximize both the objectivity and value of the lecturer’s argument. Surprisingly, it doesn’t work all that well. The respondents, while distinguished in their own fields, are too narrowly focused to cope with Morris’ blindingly inclusive span. The Princeton philosopher-respondent, who appears to be a regular to the Tanner lectures, suffers from the wordiness which may be a mark of her breed. However, when after having made the perfectly persuasive argument that there is absolutely no evidence that we Fossil Fuelers have any less recourse to violence than our foraging co-inhabitants of the biosphere, present or past, she misses the point that forbidden is not the antithesis of obligatory. I wonder what it takes to become a Princeton Philosopher. This is a tiny quibble, but I will explain why I bring it up in a moment.
The author’s rebuttal is perhaps his strongest chapter, but despite disclaimers to the contrary, he conveys an obvious note of dudgeon. Worse, the whole of his argument is filled with disabling logical flaws. For example, what are we to make of someone who claims to be writing about ethics and then offers the following as the first of two universal premises (he calls them assumptions):
There are several core values that nearly all humans care about deeply. There is room for debate over what belongs on the list, but fairness, justice, love, hate, respect, loyalty, preventing harm, and a sense that some things are sacred seem to be strong candidates.
There certainly is room for debate. What about trust; what about hope? Surely, if as is widely held today, our brains evolved to make us specialists in the future, those two values belong on the list.
His second “assumption” is no better:
These core values are biologically evolved adaptions.
That is certainly not a universally accepted premise and is perhaps the most perfect example of begging the question that I have ever encountered, since this assumption is precisely what he spends a large part of the book trying to prove. I also found the note of scientism he conveys annoying. I couldn’t understand where he got the anthropological time frame he uses, and it didn’t really matter anyway, since he is discussing a period that goes back only about 10,000 years. He is also in the pollyannaish mode of much futurist writing: Benjamin Friedman – trust capitalism, in time it will fix everything; Michael Schermer – trust science, it knows best. Nonetheless, he concludes with a bleakly horrible vision of the future: The WEIRD (Western, educated, industrial, rich, democratic) shall inherit the Earth, and live together as algorithms on a super computer after the biosphere crashes utterly. That is a conflation, but Morris actually says these things and appears to mean them.
Of all of the thinkers involved with this book, only Margaret Atwood, as one of the four respondents, covers herself with glory. As one might expect, her response is written in elegant, witty, pristinely clear English. That is why I gave one example of sloppy English thinking. Atwood, by contrast, is one of the guardians of the contract of meaning within the English language and she does a splendid job. Maybe, as in the ages of Homer, or Shakespeare, for example, it is to the tellers of stories that we need to turn for true wisdom.
For the most part the ideas in the book are poorly presented and reasoned, perhaps because the author is so convinced of his erudition that he doesn’t see the need to rigourously examine his own thinking. This is pernicious. It is what renders the voice of the humanities largely surplus to the debate about the future.
I thought the book was mostly terrible, and I give it no stars.
This book is dense with footnotes, displaying the author’s smug confidence in his considerable erudition. Unfortunately, the book itself does not demonstrate much aptitude for wise understanding on Morris’ part. Yes, he has a big idea: human values evolve to fit the wealth of society. That seems obvious enough, but the characteristic which gives the book a frisson of originality is the fact that for the purposes for the author’s argument, wealth is defined exclusively in terms of calories – energy capture. Thus the forager, who can extract only his minimal daily requirement of energy, resolves disputes by violence; the farmer, who can extract much more through co-operation, begins to turn toward a process of law, preferring hierarchical governance; fossil fuelers turn back to individual action, with the result that hierarchy is less appealing and fairness is fostered by the abundance of energy that is now available to their societies. This is probably true to some extent, but what about the evolution of language, what about the gradual accumulation of shared stories as stimulants to the evolution of human values? Is there a forest here somewhere?
The book is a print version of one of the Princeton Tanner Lectures and follows the form of that series. Four distinguished thinkers from different disciplines were invited to respond to the lecture. The guest lecturer then provides a rebuttal, which here appears as the final chapter of the book. This process is designed to maximize both the objectivity and value of the lecturer’s argument. Surprisingly, it doesn’t work all that well. The respondents, while distinguished in their own fields, are too narrowly focused to cope with Morris’ blindingly inclusive span. The Princeton philosopher-respondent, who appears to be a regular to the Tanner lectures, suffers from the wordiness which may be a mark of her breed. However, when after having made the perfectly persuasive argument that there is absolutely no evidence that we Fossil Fuelers have any less recourse to violence than our foraging co-inhabitants of the biosphere, present or past, she misses the point that forbidden is not the antithesis of obligatory. I wonder what it takes to become a Princeton Philosopher. This is a tiny quibble, but I will explain why I bring it up in a moment.
The author’s rebuttal is perhaps his strongest chapter, but despite disclaimers to the contrary, he conveys an obvious note of dudgeon. Worse, the whole of his argument is filled with disabling logical flaws. For example, what are we to make of someone who claims to be writing about ethics and then offers the following as the first of two universal premises (he calls them assumptions):
There are several core values that nearly all humans care about deeply. There is room for debate over what belongs on the list, but fairness, justice, love, hate, respect, loyalty, preventing harm, and a sense that some things are sacred seem to be strong candidates.
There certainly is room for debate. What about trust; what about hope? Surely, if as is widely held today, our brains evolved to make us specialists in the future, those two values belong on the list.
His second “assumption” is no better:
These core values are biologically evolved adaptions.
That is certainly not a universally accepted premise and is perhaps the most perfect example of begging the question that I have ever encountered, since this assumption is precisely what he spends a large part of the book trying to prove. I also found the note of scientism he conveys annoying. I couldn’t understand where he got the anthropological time frame he uses, and it didn’t really matter anyway, since he is discussing a period that goes back only about 10,000 years. He is also in the pollyannaish mode of much futurist writing: Benjamin Friedman – trust capitalism, in time it will fix everything; Michael Schermer – trust science, it knows best. Nonetheless, he concludes with a bleakly horrible vision of the future: The WEIRD (Western, educated, industrial, rich, democratic) shall inherit the Earth, and live together as algorithms on a super computer after the biosphere crashes utterly. That is a conflation, but Morris actually says these things and appears to mean them.
Of all of the thinkers involved with this book, only Margaret Atwood, as one of the four respondents, covers herself with glory. As one might expect, her response is written in elegant, witty, pristinely clear English. That is why I gave one example of sloppy English thinking. Atwood, by contrast, is one of the guardians of the contract of meaning within the English language and she does a splendid job. Maybe, as in the ages of Homer, or Shakespeare, for example, it is to the tellers of stories that we need to turn for true wisdom.
For the most part the ideas in the book are poorly presented and reasoned, perhaps because the author is so convinced of his erudition that he doesn’t see the need to rigourously examine his own thinking. This is pernicious. It is what renders the voice of the humanities largely surplus to the debate about the future.
I thought the book was mostly terrible, and I give it no stars.
July 21, 2020
The good stuff first: It's a very readable book and if you didn't know much about hunters & gatherers (foragers) yet, you get a nice introduction (somewhat less so with farmers and "fossil fuel culture", because that's just not possible in the space allocated to it).
But now that I've read it, I really don't understand what its purpose is. Morris thesis that "each age gets the thought/values it needs" is so simplistic and all-encompassing that it can't explain anything; even worse, it doesn't even describe much, since it's necessarily so reductionist (encompassing basically all of human history in a few hundred pages) that it can't spend any serious amount of page count on discussing... well, anything, really, that doesn't fit exactly into the presented thesis.
Morris starts out stating that he wants to explain why Mr George, a man he met in Greece half a lifetime ago, was comfortable riding on his donkey while his wife had to walk besides him. He mentions Mr George over and over again (I don't know why - obviously Mr George is just a MacGuffin so he can present his thesis). His explanation: Mr George was still mired in farming age thought, while Morris himself had progressed to fossil fuel ideals, which explains his "culture shock".
Or maybe Mr George was just an idiot.
Or maybe Mr George had chronic knee-pain and his wife didn't.
Or maybe Mr George worked the whole day picking olives in the sun and his wife had iced tea in the shade of a tree with the grand kids. Unlikely, perhaps, but who knows? Morris doesn't seriously offer alternative explanations for Mr George's behavior.
And that's one thing that's wrong with the book: It postulates a single fits-everything,everywhere explanation and portrays it as necessary and, if not inevitable, then overwhelmingly likely. It ignores any kind of complexity and it doesn't provide alternative explanations, not even to show why Morris' thesis would trump them.
We're left with an interesting idea that, if you look a bit deeper, runs afoul of so many details that, like Morris says in the beginning, you have to wonder if it's not so reductionist as to be worthless, and I for one think exactly that.
The book fails to deliver on the promise of the title. Morris can't convincingly link his index of energy capture to the values we and our ancestors held and explain their evolution, and after reading his sweeping tale, I think that's not just because he didn't have the page count to do it properly, but because his views on humans, human societies, how they function and what drives them are flawed. I can't be sure, because the arguments he presents are never more than skin-deep and therefore don't reveal much about what he actually believes, but that's the impression I get from the book. I hoped for more.
But now that I've read it, I really don't understand what its purpose is. Morris thesis that "each age gets the thought/values it needs" is so simplistic and all-encompassing that it can't explain anything; even worse, it doesn't even describe much, since it's necessarily so reductionist (encompassing basically all of human history in a few hundred pages) that it can't spend any serious amount of page count on discussing... well, anything, really, that doesn't fit exactly into the presented thesis.
Morris starts out stating that he wants to explain why Mr George, a man he met in Greece half a lifetime ago, was comfortable riding on his donkey while his wife had to walk besides him. He mentions Mr George over and over again (I don't know why - obviously Mr George is just a MacGuffin so he can present his thesis). His explanation: Mr George was still mired in farming age thought, while Morris himself had progressed to fossil fuel ideals, which explains his "culture shock".
Or maybe Mr George was just an idiot.
Or maybe Mr George had chronic knee-pain and his wife didn't.
Or maybe Mr George worked the whole day picking olives in the sun and his wife had iced tea in the shade of a tree with the grand kids. Unlikely, perhaps, but who knows? Morris doesn't seriously offer alternative explanations for Mr George's behavior.
And that's one thing that's wrong with the book: It postulates a single fits-everything,everywhere explanation and portrays it as necessary and, if not inevitable, then overwhelmingly likely. It ignores any kind of complexity and it doesn't provide alternative explanations, not even to show why Morris' thesis would trump them.
We're left with an interesting idea that, if you look a bit deeper, runs afoul of so many details that, like Morris says in the beginning, you have to wonder if it's not so reductionist as to be worthless, and I for one think exactly that.
The book fails to deliver on the promise of the title. Morris can't convincingly link his index of energy capture to the values we and our ancestors held and explain their evolution, and after reading his sweeping tale, I think that's not just because he didn't have the page count to do it properly, but because his views on humans, human societies, how they function and what drives them are flawed. I can't be sure, because the arguments he presents are never more than skin-deep and therefore don't reveal much about what he actually believes, but that's the impression I get from the book. I hoped for more.
September 8, 2019
In his earlier book: Why the West Rules, Ian Morris developed his system of historimetrics. Supported by a detailed archeological study, IM argues that societies undergo discreet changes each time they pass through key thresholds in energy utilisation. In Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve, IM applies these ideas to political and moral philosophy, showing how mankind’s native moral code adapts to differing material conditions.
For instance, hunter/gatherers operate in small bands, performing undifferentiated tasks without protection from a central authority. It was natural that their social relations would be egalitarian and violent.
Agriculturalists needed to organise for large scale projects such as irrigation and the defense of fixed resources. They developed hierarchical structures with clear distinction between in-group and out-group mediated by religion and, later, nationalism.
Industrialisation led to a partial return to egalitarianism, de-emphasising the importance of locality and giving rise to the universalist doctrines of the enlightenment. The moral system of foragers is extinct, while that of farmers and fossil fuel societies live on, often in tense proximity because of their differing moral codes.
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels follows a debate format: In the first chapters, IM summarises his thesis. Objections are then raised from three very different perspectives: from a professor of ancient Greek literature, a professor of moral philosophy, and a novelist of dystopian fiction. Then follows IM's responses.
Whereas IM's ideas are set out in some detail; the arguments of his critics are presented only telegraphically. One critique was only five pages. Too bad! Some of their thinking was new to me. I would have enjoyed the chance to learn more.
The best part of the book may be the final chapter (IM's rebuttal). I have to say, if I were in IM's place, I would have felt overwhelmed. Not so much because of the strength of the objections, but because it must be very hard to respond to challenges from such varied perspectives. But IM mounted a suave defense. What I liked best was IM's restatement of his critics' arguments, which was usually clearer than the originals.
Because of the lecture format, Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels is less detailed than Why the West Rules. But the chance to listen to well reasoned critique and response in the same volume was very stimulating, and I wish there was more of it. If you have already read Why the West Rules, or if you are familiar with the books of Jared Diamond, Jonathan Haidt, Yuval Hariri and Steven Pinker, you may find IM’s ideas familiar, and you'll lose nothing by skimming the first three chapters and moving directly to the critiques.
This book is likely to appeal to people from a scientific background, or anyone else who is eager to make sense of history as something more than just "one damned thing after another".
For instance, hunter/gatherers operate in small bands, performing undifferentiated tasks without protection from a central authority. It was natural that their social relations would be egalitarian and violent.
Agriculturalists needed to organise for large scale projects such as irrigation and the defense of fixed resources. They developed hierarchical structures with clear distinction between in-group and out-group mediated by religion and, later, nationalism.
Industrialisation led to a partial return to egalitarianism, de-emphasising the importance of locality and giving rise to the universalist doctrines of the enlightenment. The moral system of foragers is extinct, while that of farmers and fossil fuel societies live on, often in tense proximity because of their differing moral codes.
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels follows a debate format: In the first chapters, IM summarises his thesis. Objections are then raised from three very different perspectives: from a professor of ancient Greek literature, a professor of moral philosophy, and a novelist of dystopian fiction. Then follows IM's responses.
Whereas IM's ideas are set out in some detail; the arguments of his critics are presented only telegraphically. One critique was only five pages. Too bad! Some of their thinking was new to me. I would have enjoyed the chance to learn more.
The best part of the book may be the final chapter (IM's rebuttal). I have to say, if I were in IM's place, I would have felt overwhelmed. Not so much because of the strength of the objections, but because it must be very hard to respond to challenges from such varied perspectives. But IM mounted a suave defense. What I liked best was IM's restatement of his critics' arguments, which was usually clearer than the originals.
Because of the lecture format, Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels is less detailed than Why the West Rules. But the chance to listen to well reasoned critique and response in the same volume was very stimulating, and I wish there was more of it. If you have already read Why the West Rules, or if you are familiar with the books of Jared Diamond, Jonathan Haidt, Yuval Hariri and Steven Pinker, you may find IM’s ideas familiar, and you'll lose nothing by skimming the first three chapters and moving directly to the critiques.
This book is likely to appeal to people from a scientific background, or anyone else who is eager to make sense of history as something more than just "one damned thing after another".
October 2, 2015
I always enjoy the sense of intellectual daring when an academic in one field attempts to reduce all of human knowledge to their own subspeciality; here Professor Morris shows how all of human values, and consequently human civilization, are a product of geography. Written with verve, it is a fascinating survey from a geographical, anthropological, and philosophical standpoint, and much of what is best in the book comes from the commentaries written by other academics and writers in those fields.
September 28, 2022
Durchaus interessante Ansätze und viele Informationen, aber auch eine Reihe offener Fragen. Der Diskussionsteil hat mich enttäuscht, weil die Einwände mitunter sehr konstruiert wirkten, aber auch der Antwortteil war nicht rundum zufriedenstellend.
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October 16, 2022Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels (2015) argues that the values we hold most dear stem from one fundamental source: energy. While anthropologists have spent centuries attempting to understand differences between cultures, few have attempted to explain those differences. This book does just that. Ian Morris is professor of classics and a fellow of the Stanford Archaeology Center at Stanford University.
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Investigate the source of our most fundamental values.
Where do our moral values come from? Is it religion? Philosophy? Our cultural practices and traditions?
Well, yes – religion, philosophy, and culture do play major roles in shaping the expression of a particular society’s values. But in the author’s view, there’s actually a much more fundamental source that determines which moral system we abide by, whether we’re in modern-day Europe or Qing dynasty China. That source is energy.
The book takes you on a journey from humanity’s days of hunting and gathering all the way to our present fossil-fuel age. Along the way, you’ll see how energy collection has played a central role in determining whether a society accepted violence or championed equality. And get out your crystal ball – we’ll also be taking a look at how future methods of energy capture could dramatically reshape our values, in as little as 80 years.
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Our values may have evolved in line with our methods of energy capture.
In 1982, the author and his colleagues were working at an archaeological dig site in rural Greece. One evening, an old Greek husband and wife passed by. The husband was riding a donkey, while the wife was on foot carrying a heavy sack. One of the author’s colleagues asked the husband, “Why isn’t your wife riding the donkey?” The husband replied simply, “She doesn’t have one.”
To modern Western adults, this apparent scene of selfishness might seem unthinkable. But why exactly are most Westerners so averse to gender hierarchies like this one, not to mention other kinds of hierarchies? Are they simply more in tune with the notions of fairness and equality?
The real answer may lie in a more practical phenomenon: the way we capture energy.
Over the years, many people have attempted to understand human values. But not quite so many have attempted to explain our values – that is, why we value what we do.
The author’s theory is that our values evolve – in much the same way that our genes do.
We all know evolution’s basic premise: that organisms with genes most suited to their environment will pass those genes along, perpetuating beneficial traits. Over millions of years, this can result in major changes to the original organism.
Similarly, human values that suit a particular environment will allow a society to flourish, whereas a society with mismatched or outdated values won’t last long. This will lead certain values to dominate and others to die out.
And what force dictates which values stand the test of time? In a word, energy, or more accurately, energy capture. This term defines the process of obtaining or deriving units of food energy – kilocalories – from our environment. Different methods of energy capture work best alongside different values and ways of organizing society.
We can see this in action in our example of the Greek farmer. He probably wasn’t hogging the donkey just because he was a jerk – he may just have been operating according to the hierarchical values of farming societies. Similarly, fossil-fuel users don’t champion gender equality and democracy because we’re saints, but because those values work best in fossil fuel-based societies.
How did this all play out for the earliest human societies? Let’s find out.
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Foragers shunned inequality and hierarchy, but accepted violence as a part of life.
In today’s day and age, less than 1 percent of the population still gets its food from hunting and gathering.
It can be hard to imagine a time when all humans were foragers – but for the first 90 percent of human history, that’s exactly what we were. Our energy source was all around us: in the wild fruits, nuts, and animals with which we coexisted.
While foraging groups of the past and present each have vastly different and unique cultures, all of them share a few essential characteristics. This is especially true when it comes to their values.
Foraging groups are generally quite small, consisting of a few dozen to a few hundred people. They’re nomadic, traveling from place to place wherever food is abundant. And they’re particularly resistant to hierarchies – especially when it comes to wealth.
We can measure the specific amount of wealth inequality in a society by looking at its Gini coefficient or Gini score. Gini scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating total wealth equality, while a 1 means that a single person in the group owns absolutely everything.
According to one study that looked at five different groups, foraging societies have an average Gini score of 0.25. That’s significantly lower than both farming and fossil fuel societies.
Why such a low score? Well, foraging involves lots of moving around from place to place. In that environment, it’s a lot easier to have just a few portable possessions than many large items to lug around.
But that’s not all. Food supplies that foragers catch or kill must be shared, so that all group members get the calories they need to survive. In fact, in foraging societies, upstart foragers who decide to start hogging food are mocked, ostracized, or in extreme cases, killed.
It’s true: foragers are equal in most ways, but they’re also indisputably violent. In the twentieth century, one in ten foragers died a violent death.
But why is violence so present for foragers? Well, without centralized governments, eliminating threats is much easier and faster with violence than with diplomacy. And in some foraging societies, violent men have more sexual partners and children than less violent men. For foragers, it seems, evolution favors violence.
---
Farming societies were strongly hierarchical and looked more negatively on violence than foragers had.
Picture a day in the life of a typical early farmer. Your land lies somewhere warm and fertile – perhaps Mesopotamia. You have a wife who stays home and cares for your many children. Every day, you wake up and spend the vast majority of your time working, with the occasional social call here and there.
Whether you know it or not, these conditions dictate your most deeply-held values. But what exactly are those values.
Without exception, every time a farming society rose above an energy capture of 10,000 kilocalories per day, a few so-called “elites” took charge to manage – or control – the populace and their markets. And in almost every case, the person at the top was a god-like ruler whose authority supposedly came from some kind of higher power.
Through religion, farmers rationalized and legitimized hierarchy. To varying degrees, people accepted the idea that a higher power wanted some people to be at the top and others at the bottom. In farming societies, the average Gini score was 0.45. That meant that 10 percent of the population was extracting about 80 percent of the wealth from everyone else.
But the establishment of a ruling class did have a silver lining: it helped quell violence among farmers. An outside entity with ultimate authority could intimidate everyone into acting peacefully instead of violently – at least, most of the time. This was actually good for business, since violence could very easily disrupt the labor process.
And really, ensuring the success of labor was the foundation for everything else in farming societies. After all, farmers could only survive if they produced enough food to live on and enough goods to sell at the market. This encouraged them to work hard to amass material wealth, which they could pass down to their children to ensure their survival, too.
But while material wealth meant survival, it also reinforced gender hierarchies. Possessive male farmers wanted to ensure that they were bestowing their wealth to children who were really theirs. This led to an increased emphasis on virginity, which put women in an even more subservient position.
Farming values held sway across the globe for almost 9,000 years. But everything changed when fossil fuels came into the picture.
---
Fossil fuel societies value equality and prefer peace over violence.
The world today is remarkably homogeneous when it comes to moral values.
A 2007 poll found that 80 percent of people globally are pro-democracy. A 2009 poll of 16 countries found that 86 percent of respondents considered gender equality important. And a cross-continental Gallup poll conducted between 2008 and 2010 found that 69 percent of people are absolute pacifists when it comes to violence.
These results are just a taste of the more equal and peaceful world that fossil fuels have brought us.
Since fossil fuels became the dominant source of energy in the eighteenth century, Gini scores have fluctuated greatly. France’s Gini score in 1860 was an astonishingly unequal 0.61, while in the US in 1970, it was a reasonable 0.36.
But despite these ups and downs, the global Gini score today is decidedly lower than it was for our farming ancestors.
Why so? Well, in the fossil fuel age, it’s easy to pay workers high wages and provide benefits. We also don’t need to strongly stratify labor, so it makes sense that everyone should have the opportunity to live well.
As for gender and political hierarchy, they’ve never been as flat as they are today.
There are a number of reasons for this.
For one, as we’ve seen, we’re healthier than ever before – and that applies to our children too. Since they now have a better chance of surviving, there is less pressure for women to have many of them. And while farmers may have needed many extra hands to help with labor, that’s not necessary in the fossil fuel age. So women are able to take up years of paid work, and contribute to the market economy before and after having children.
Another reason for flatter hierarchies is that fossil fuel societies are far more secular than agrarian ones. Without religion, the rule of a god-like king starts looking a lot less legitimate.
This more level playing field allows fossil fuel societies to function well. When citizens are mobile and societies democratic, markets are just more efficient. Similarly, violence seems increasingly unnecessary for solving our problems nowadays.
Of course, not every fossil fuel society has immediately opted for equality and peace over force. Take today’s post-Maoist China. Since the 1980s, China has been growing economically at a much faster rate than other nations. However, this path has also brought with it environmental disaster, intense corruption, and violent protests.
---
We don’t know exactly how technological advancements will change our values – but we can be sure that they will.
Without a doubt, fossil fuels have shaped how our societies are formed, and which values they hold dear. But we know that technology – both in energy and other areas – is developing at a mind-boggling pace. How might our values adapt to a world that may soon look very different?
One theory that attempts to answer this is called the “Soothing Scenario.” It holds that as countries like China and India continue to develop economic and political power, they’ll start adopting values like freedom and democracy to a greater extent.
Sure sounds soothing. But will it really happen?
There’s already some evidence that supports the Soothing Scenario. Just look at places like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have all seen great strides toward liberalism since 1945.
Some theorists, however, favor a different depiction of the future. They believe that Asian countries have Westernized mostly because of the West’s dominant global position. If the global power center shifts to the East, they predict, Westerners may find themselves becoming “Chinese-ified.”
This theory also holds some weight. If social development continues to rise at each country’s current rate, Eastern development will overtake Western development in 2103.
Of course, it’s probably unrealistic to assume that we’ll continue to develop globally at our current pace. In fact, development will probably happen much faster!
Conservative estimates suggest that energy capture will leap to almost a million kilocalories per day by 2103. Cities will have populations of 140 million people each. Life expectancy will probably rise to over a hundred years in developed countries. And eventually, we could all be walking around with computer chips embedded in our brains!
With enough kilocalories to feed and power the whole world, all hierarchy could cease to exist. Violence, too, would be pointless in a world where humans are equally empowered by technology. But that’s only if everyone has access to that technology. If the distribution is uneven, a few powerful post-humans could drive the humble Homo sapiens into extinction.
Even if all these guesses are incorrect, we can say with certainty that the humans of 2103 will be very different to the humans of today. And we can also be sure that they will adopt ebxactly the values that will help them thrive.
---
Throughout history, societies have adopted the values that made their particular method of energy capture the most efficient and effective. Foragers had flat hierarchies but frequently used violence to settle disputes. Farmers, on the other hand, had steep political, material and gender-based hierarchies but were less tolerant of violence. And fossil fuel users – meaning us – value equality and see violence as pointless or even morally abhorrent. As for future societies, we may not know what they will look like, but we can be sure that the values they adopt will be the ones that help them flourish.
---
Investigate the source of our most fundamental values.
Where do our moral values come from? Is it religion? Philosophy? Our cultural practices and traditions?
Well, yes – religion, philosophy, and culture do play major roles in shaping the expression of a particular society’s values. But in the author’s view, there’s actually a much more fundamental source that determines which moral system we abide by, whether we’re in modern-day Europe or Qing dynasty China. That source is energy.
The book takes you on a journey from humanity’s days of hunting and gathering all the way to our present fossil-fuel age. Along the way, you’ll see how energy collection has played a central role in determining whether a society accepted violence or championed equality. And get out your crystal ball – we’ll also be taking a look at how future methods of energy capture could dramatically reshape our values, in as little as 80 years.
---
Our values may have evolved in line with our methods of energy capture.
In 1982, the author and his colleagues were working at an archaeological dig site in rural Greece. One evening, an old Greek husband and wife passed by. The husband was riding a donkey, while the wife was on foot carrying a heavy sack. One of the author’s colleagues asked the husband, “Why isn’t your wife riding the donkey?” The husband replied simply, “She doesn’t have one.”
To modern Western adults, this apparent scene of selfishness might seem unthinkable. But why exactly are most Westerners so averse to gender hierarchies like this one, not to mention other kinds of hierarchies? Are they simply more in tune with the notions of fairness and equality?
The real answer may lie in a more practical phenomenon: the way we capture energy.
Over the years, many people have attempted to understand human values. But not quite so many have attempted to explain our values – that is, why we value what we do.
The author’s theory is that our values evolve – in much the same way that our genes do.
We all know evolution’s basic premise: that organisms with genes most suited to their environment will pass those genes along, perpetuating beneficial traits. Over millions of years, this can result in major changes to the original organism.
Similarly, human values that suit a particular environment will allow a society to flourish, whereas a society with mismatched or outdated values won’t last long. This will lead certain values to dominate and others to die out.
And what force dictates which values stand the test of time? In a word, energy, or more accurately, energy capture. This term defines the process of obtaining or deriving units of food energy – kilocalories – from our environment. Different methods of energy capture work best alongside different values and ways of organizing society.
We can see this in action in our example of the Greek farmer. He probably wasn’t hogging the donkey just because he was a jerk – he may just have been operating according to the hierarchical values of farming societies. Similarly, fossil-fuel users don’t champion gender equality and democracy because we’re saints, but because those values work best in fossil fuel-based societies.
How did this all play out for the earliest human societies? Let’s find out.
---
Foragers shunned inequality and hierarchy, but accepted violence as a part of life.
In today’s day and age, less than 1 percent of the population still gets its food from hunting and gathering.
It can be hard to imagine a time when all humans were foragers – but for the first 90 percent of human history, that’s exactly what we were. Our energy source was all around us: in the wild fruits, nuts, and animals with which we coexisted.
While foraging groups of the past and present each have vastly different and unique cultures, all of them share a few essential characteristics. This is especially true when it comes to their values.
Foraging groups are generally quite small, consisting of a few dozen to a few hundred people. They’re nomadic, traveling from place to place wherever food is abundant. And they’re particularly resistant to hierarchies – especially when it comes to wealth.
We can measure the specific amount of wealth inequality in a society by looking at its Gini coefficient or Gini score. Gini scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating total wealth equality, while a 1 means that a single person in the group owns absolutely everything.
According to one study that looked at five different groups, foraging societies have an average Gini score of 0.25. That’s significantly lower than both farming and fossil fuel societies.
Why such a low score? Well, foraging involves lots of moving around from place to place. In that environment, it’s a lot easier to have just a few portable possessions than many large items to lug around.
But that’s not all. Food supplies that foragers catch or kill must be shared, so that all group members get the calories they need to survive. In fact, in foraging societies, upstart foragers who decide to start hogging food are mocked, ostracized, or in extreme cases, killed.
It’s true: foragers are equal in most ways, but they’re also indisputably violent. In the twentieth century, one in ten foragers died a violent death.
But why is violence so present for foragers? Well, without centralized governments, eliminating threats is much easier and faster with violence than with diplomacy. And in some foraging societies, violent men have more sexual partners and children than less violent men. For foragers, it seems, evolution favors violence.
---
Farming societies were strongly hierarchical and looked more negatively on violence than foragers had.
Picture a day in the life of a typical early farmer. Your land lies somewhere warm and fertile – perhaps Mesopotamia. You have a wife who stays home and cares for your many children. Every day, you wake up and spend the vast majority of your time working, with the occasional social call here and there.
Whether you know it or not, these conditions dictate your most deeply-held values. But what exactly are those values.
Without exception, every time a farming society rose above an energy capture of 10,000 kilocalories per day, a few so-called “elites” took charge to manage – or control – the populace and their markets. And in almost every case, the person at the top was a god-like ruler whose authority supposedly came from some kind of higher power.
Through religion, farmers rationalized and legitimized hierarchy. To varying degrees, people accepted the idea that a higher power wanted some people to be at the top and others at the bottom. In farming societies, the average Gini score was 0.45. That meant that 10 percent of the population was extracting about 80 percent of the wealth from everyone else.
But the establishment of a ruling class did have a silver lining: it helped quell violence among farmers. An outside entity with ultimate authority could intimidate everyone into acting peacefully instead of violently – at least, most of the time. This was actually good for business, since violence could very easily disrupt the labor process.
And really, ensuring the success of labor was the foundation for everything else in farming societies. After all, farmers could only survive if they produced enough food to live on and enough goods to sell at the market. This encouraged them to work hard to amass material wealth, which they could pass down to their children to ensure their survival, too.
But while material wealth meant survival, it also reinforced gender hierarchies. Possessive male farmers wanted to ensure that they were bestowing their wealth to children who were really theirs. This led to an increased emphasis on virginity, which put women in an even more subservient position.
Farming values held sway across the globe for almost 9,000 years. But everything changed when fossil fuels came into the picture.
---
Fossil fuel societies value equality and prefer peace over violence.
The world today is remarkably homogeneous when it comes to moral values.
A 2007 poll found that 80 percent of people globally are pro-democracy. A 2009 poll of 16 countries found that 86 percent of respondents considered gender equality important. And a cross-continental Gallup poll conducted between 2008 and 2010 found that 69 percent of people are absolute pacifists when it comes to violence.
These results are just a taste of the more equal and peaceful world that fossil fuels have brought us.
Since fossil fuels became the dominant source of energy in the eighteenth century, Gini scores have fluctuated greatly. France’s Gini score in 1860 was an astonishingly unequal 0.61, while in the US in 1970, it was a reasonable 0.36.
But despite these ups and downs, the global Gini score today is decidedly lower than it was for our farming ancestors.
Why so? Well, in the fossil fuel age, it’s easy to pay workers high wages and provide benefits. We also don’t need to strongly stratify labor, so it makes sense that everyone should have the opportunity to live well.
As for gender and political hierarchy, they’ve never been as flat as they are today.
There are a number of reasons for this.
For one, as we’ve seen, we’re healthier than ever before – and that applies to our children too. Since they now have a better chance of surviving, there is less pressure for women to have many of them. And while farmers may have needed many extra hands to help with labor, that’s not necessary in the fossil fuel age. So women are able to take up years of paid work, and contribute to the market economy before and after having children.
Another reason for flatter hierarchies is that fossil fuel societies are far more secular than agrarian ones. Without religion, the rule of a god-like king starts looking a lot less legitimate.
This more level playing field allows fossil fuel societies to function well. When citizens are mobile and societies democratic, markets are just more efficient. Similarly, violence seems increasingly unnecessary for solving our problems nowadays.
Of course, not every fossil fuel society has immediately opted for equality and peace over force. Take today’s post-Maoist China. Since the 1980s, China has been growing economically at a much faster rate than other nations. However, this path has also brought with it environmental disaster, intense corruption, and violent protests.
---
We don’t know exactly how technological advancements will change our values – but we can be sure that they will.
Without a doubt, fossil fuels have shaped how our societies are formed, and which values they hold dear. But we know that technology – both in energy and other areas – is developing at a mind-boggling pace. How might our values adapt to a world that may soon look very different?
One theory that attempts to answer this is called the “Soothing Scenario.” It holds that as countries like China and India continue to develop economic and political power, they’ll start adopting values like freedom and democracy to a greater extent.
Sure sounds soothing. But will it really happen?
There’s already some evidence that supports the Soothing Scenario. Just look at places like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have all seen great strides toward liberalism since 1945.
Some theorists, however, favor a different depiction of the future. They believe that Asian countries have Westernized mostly because of the West’s dominant global position. If the global power center shifts to the East, they predict, Westerners may find themselves becoming “Chinese-ified.”
This theory also holds some weight. If social development continues to rise at each country’s current rate, Eastern development will overtake Western development in 2103.
Of course, it’s probably unrealistic to assume that we’ll continue to develop globally at our current pace. In fact, development will probably happen much faster!
Conservative estimates suggest that energy capture will leap to almost a million kilocalories per day by 2103. Cities will have populations of 140 million people each. Life expectancy will probably rise to over a hundred years in developed countries. And eventually, we could all be walking around with computer chips embedded in our brains!
With enough kilocalories to feed and power the whole world, all hierarchy could cease to exist. Violence, too, would be pointless in a world where humans are equally empowered by technology. But that’s only if everyone has access to that technology. If the distribution is uneven, a few powerful post-humans could drive the humble Homo sapiens into extinction.
Even if all these guesses are incorrect, we can say with certainty that the humans of 2103 will be very different to the humans of today. And we can also be sure that they will adopt ebxactly the values that will help them thrive.
---
Throughout history, societies have adopted the values that made their particular method of energy capture the most efficient and effective. Foragers had flat hierarchies but frequently used violence to settle disputes. Farmers, on the other hand, had steep political, material and gender-based hierarchies but were less tolerant of violence. And fossil fuel users – meaning us – value equality and see violence as pointless or even morally abhorrent. As for future societies, we may not know what they will look like, but we can be sure that the values they adopt will be the ones that help them flourish.
December 18, 2022
Un libro brillante con el que (creo que) no concuerdo. Me ha gustado mucho el formato de diálogo con otras voces. Reseña de *mucho texto* y fuertemente contradictoria 🙃
No estoy de acuerdo con su aproximación excesivamente determinista que, al estilo de Monstesquieu, establece que las leyes (los valores: división del trabajo por género, igualdad/desigualdad, esclavitud/salario) derivan de la naturaleza necesaria de las cosas (capacidad de captura de la energía). Así, «cada época tiene las ideas que necesita». Esto le lleva a afirmar que los valores liberales tradicionalmente asociados a la modernidad occidental son en verdad universales para nuestro tiempo, pues responden a la estructura propia de una sociedad basada en combustibles fósiles. Por lo que todos los países necesariamente los adoptarán. ¿Qué espacio hay para la agencia y factores de otra índole?
Por una parte, el conflicto social está claramente ausente de la argumentación, siguiendo un esquema funcionalista. Las estructuras sociales nacen de la captura de energía y sirven a la formación de un consenso moral necesario y funcional a los miembros de una sociedad. Dice R. Seaford que «las ideas de Morris se acercan más a las ideas de nuestra clase gobernante que a las ideas que nuestra época necesita» y, añade: «[si] ”el proceso competitivo de la evolución cultural nos empuja hacia los valores que mejor funcionan en una etapa concreta de la captura de energía”, ¿para quién funcionan?». Cui bono? Las explicaciones de Morris respecto a fenómenos conflictivos siguen la lógica de que la excepción confirma la regla, es decir, que las manifestaciones de disenso han sido más anomalías, desviaciones o alternativas erróneas respecto del contrato moral básico.
Por otra parte, afirma que los valores humanos básicos (justicia, equidad, amor, respeto, lealtad…) vienen determinados por nuestra evolución biológica durante milenios, pero que la particular configuración de los mismos en las distintas épocas se explica por su inserción funcional en una sociedad cazadora-recolectora/agraria/industrial y cómo los interpretan sus habitantes. Me ha interesado más la posición de Korsgaard, que acepta la existencia de “valores morales reales” -naturales-, pero difiere a la hora de explicar por qué hay una variabilidad empírica: más que variar por ser funcionales a cada tipo de sociedad, lo que ocurre es que los marcos ideológicos de cada sociedad los distorsionan (ej. los ideales de género patriarcales distorsionan nociones intrínsecas de igualdad o autonomía). Así, si siguiendo a Morris, los valores de los cazadores-recolectores se asemejan a los industriales (cuestionamiento de la jerarquía y la desigualdad, frente al modelo agrario piramidal), podríamos entender que la ideología del Antiguo Régimen enmascaró esos valores originarios hasta que la alfabetización y el desarrollo científico ayudaron a quebrarla. Sin embargo, podemos seguir en el bucle: ¿cuánto esencialismo nos podemos permitir a la hora de definir unos valores como naturales y entender sus variaciones u opuestos como producto de la ideología? ¿Estamos representando realmente el desarrollo histórico o ejerciendo presentismo desde nuestra mirada científica de la realidad (entendiendo la ciencia contemporánea como un constructo de valores y métodos particular de su época)? ¿Realmente importa, si al final todos son relatos dirigidos a sujetos insertos en esa época, una manera de contarnos nuestra historia?
Quiero decir, ¿podemos salir de nuestra episteme particular y alcanzar un atisbo de universalismo moral transhistórico? Para Morris, es evidente que no. Nuestra forma de abordar lo que es malo y bueno, lo que consideramos natural o no, es propia de una sociedad basada en los combustibles fósiles y evidentemente va a diferir de la de los habitantes de sociedades agrarias no a causa de un velo ideológico, sino del mundo de realidad que cada uno habita. El imperativo categórico kantiano no es un universal cultural, sino el centro del universo moral de las sociedades industriales.
Quizás lo que más me intriga del libro es su intención de (re-)construir una macroteoría de la evolución social en un contexto histórico que ha rechazado esas grandes narrativas tanto en las ciencias sociales como en el discurso cultural. Y me parece muy notable la capacidad para sostener decentemente su tesis en una investigación de tales dimensiones. Me sorprende, no obstante, que no cite a quienes bosquejaron sus ideas inicialmente (Durkheim, Morgan, Rostow…).
Con todo, ha sido una lectura muy estimulante y creo que es la formulación más completa y cuidada que he leído de esta perspectiva.
No estoy de acuerdo con su aproximación excesivamente determinista que, al estilo de Monstesquieu, establece que las leyes (los valores: división del trabajo por género, igualdad/desigualdad, esclavitud/salario) derivan de la naturaleza necesaria de las cosas (capacidad de captura de la energía). Así, «cada época tiene las ideas que necesita». Esto le lleva a afirmar que los valores liberales tradicionalmente asociados a la modernidad occidental son en verdad universales para nuestro tiempo, pues responden a la estructura propia de una sociedad basada en combustibles fósiles. Por lo que todos los países necesariamente los adoptarán. ¿Qué espacio hay para la agencia y factores de otra índole?
Por una parte, el conflicto social está claramente ausente de la argumentación, siguiendo un esquema funcionalista. Las estructuras sociales nacen de la captura de energía y sirven a la formación de un consenso moral necesario y funcional a los miembros de una sociedad. Dice R. Seaford que «las ideas de Morris se acercan más a las ideas de nuestra clase gobernante que a las ideas que nuestra época necesita» y, añade: «[si] ”el proceso competitivo de la evolución cultural nos empuja hacia los valores que mejor funcionan en una etapa concreta de la captura de energía”, ¿para quién funcionan?». Cui bono? Las explicaciones de Morris respecto a fenómenos conflictivos siguen la lógica de que la excepción confirma la regla, es decir, que las manifestaciones de disenso han sido más anomalías, desviaciones o alternativas erróneas respecto del contrato moral básico.
Por otra parte, afirma que los valores humanos básicos (justicia, equidad, amor, respeto, lealtad…) vienen determinados por nuestra evolución biológica durante milenios, pero que la particular configuración de los mismos en las distintas épocas se explica por su inserción funcional en una sociedad cazadora-recolectora/agraria/industrial y cómo los interpretan sus habitantes. Me ha interesado más la posición de Korsgaard, que acepta la existencia de “valores morales reales” -naturales-, pero difiere a la hora de explicar por qué hay una variabilidad empírica: más que variar por ser funcionales a cada tipo de sociedad, lo que ocurre es que los marcos ideológicos de cada sociedad los distorsionan (ej. los ideales de género patriarcales distorsionan nociones intrínsecas de igualdad o autonomía). Así, si siguiendo a Morris, los valores de los cazadores-recolectores se asemejan a los industriales (cuestionamiento de la jerarquía y la desigualdad, frente al modelo agrario piramidal), podríamos entender que la ideología del Antiguo Régimen enmascaró esos valores originarios hasta que la alfabetización y el desarrollo científico ayudaron a quebrarla. Sin embargo, podemos seguir en el bucle: ¿cuánto esencialismo nos podemos permitir a la hora de definir unos valores como naturales y entender sus variaciones u opuestos como producto de la ideología? ¿Estamos representando realmente el desarrollo histórico o ejerciendo presentismo desde nuestra mirada científica de la realidad (entendiendo la ciencia contemporánea como un constructo de valores y métodos particular de su época)? ¿Realmente importa, si al final todos son relatos dirigidos a sujetos insertos en esa época, una manera de contarnos nuestra historia?
Quiero decir, ¿podemos salir de nuestra episteme particular y alcanzar un atisbo de universalismo moral transhistórico? Para Morris, es evidente que no. Nuestra forma de abordar lo que es malo y bueno, lo que consideramos natural o no, es propia de una sociedad basada en los combustibles fósiles y evidentemente va a diferir de la de los habitantes de sociedades agrarias no a causa de un velo ideológico, sino del mundo de realidad que cada uno habita. El imperativo categórico kantiano no es un universal cultural, sino el centro del universo moral de las sociedades industriales.
Quizás lo que más me intriga del libro es su intención de (re-)construir una macroteoría de la evolución social en un contexto histórico que ha rechazado esas grandes narrativas tanto en las ciencias sociales como en el discurso cultural. Y me parece muy notable la capacidad para sostener decentemente su tesis en una investigación de tales dimensiones. Me sorprende, no obstante, que no cite a quienes bosquejaron sus ideas inicialmente (Durkheim, Morgan, Rostow…).
Con todo, ha sido una lectura muy estimulante y creo que es la formulación más completa y cuidada que he leído de esta perspectiva.
February 2, 2024
Ian Morris says right up front that not everyone thinks he’s got it exactly right, but his story of how human values and moral norms are related to how human beings use energy is an eye opener.
Human beings need energy to survive, and obviously we need sources of energy.
The first human-like hunter-gatherers used energy that they could kill or pickup, and the first farmers planted their energy sources and domesticated a few animals, and now we depend (fatally?) on fossil fuel energy to live our lives.
Morris explains (attributes causes) how different ways of “capturing” energy are connected to how we feel about ourselves and how we deal with others.
If you’re satisfied with what you know about your code of values and the “do unto others…” stuff, then read Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels and learn some new stuff.
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com
Human beings need energy to survive, and obviously we need sources of energy.
The first human-like hunter-gatherers used energy that they could kill or pickup, and the first farmers planted their energy sources and domesticated a few animals, and now we depend (fatally?) on fossil fuel energy to live our lives.
Morris explains (attributes causes) how different ways of “capturing” energy are connected to how we feel about ourselves and how we deal with others.
If you’re satisfied with what you know about your code of values and the “do unto others…” stuff, then read Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels and learn some new stuff.
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com
July 15, 2020
Heute hab ich mal wieder ein Sachbuch für euch. Und zwar eines, auf das ich schon seit Monaten gespannt war. Wie beeinflussen Energiequellen eine Gesellschaft? Macht doch auch Sinn, oder? Dass sich eine Gesellschaft verändert, wenn sie vom Jagen und Sammeln zur Landwirtschaft übergeht, oder wenn sie von der Landwirtschaft zur Nutzung von fossiler Energie wechselt. Das sind ja alles starke Einschnitte ins Leben, die sehr vieles ändern können. Aber in dem Ausmaß, wie es Morris hier beschreibt? Ich bin mir nicht sicher. Stellenweise erschien mir der Zusammenhang zwischen Energiequelle und Gesellschaft etwas zu weit hergeholt. Gerade wenn es um die Werte einer Gesellschaft ging. Da stellte ich mir dann doch die Frage, ob man eine Veränderung nicht auch einen anderen Grund haben könnte? Klar wäre der dann auch wieder (zumindest irgendwie) von einer Energiequelle beeinflusst - aber das ist in Gesellschaften ja immer so, dass alles irgendwie miteinander zusammenhängt, oder nicht?
Problematisch fand ich, dass Morris seine Theorie nutzt, um beispielsweise das Vorgehen der Terrorgruppe Boko Haram zu erklären. Das hätte er vielleicht nicht tun sollen, denn damit landete er in einer Situation, aus der er nur schwer wieder rauskommt. In einem späteren Abschnitt stellt er zwar klar, dass er das Vorgehen einer solchen Gruppierung nicht verteidigen oder als richtig bezeichnen will, auf mich als Leserin wirkte es aber zumindest auf den ersten Blick fast so. Egal wie es gemeint ist: Das wirkte definitiv falsch.Vielleicht hätte Morris sich hier klarer und sofort nach diesem Beispiel positionieren müssen.
Die von Morris verwendete Sprache ist recht wissenschaftlich. Er verweist auf Kulturwissenschaftler und verschiedene Theorien, verwendet Fachsprache. Ich hätte das nicht verstanden, wenn ich nicht vor einem Jahr den Kurs "Einführung in die Kulturwissenschaft" belegt hätte und selbst mit diesem Wissen, fand ich den Text stellenweise doch eher schwer. Für Leute ohne Vorwissen ist dieses Buch definitiv nicht geeignet.
Was ich gut finde, ist, dass Morris seine KritikerInnen zu Wort kommen lässt. In diesem Buch können wir die Sicht von vier KritikerInnen lesen, die Morris These kritisieren und auseinander nehmen, jede und jeder aus einem anderen Blickpunkt. Diese Abschnitte fand ich fast am spannendsten. Gerade das Kapitel von Margaret Atwood war sehr cool. Anschließend folgt dann noch ein Kapitel von Morris, in dem er auf die Kritiken eingeht. Das fand ich spannend, denn so musste er sich tatsächlich mit diesen anderen Sichtweisen auseinandersetzen.
Mein Fazit? Spannende Theorie, die aber meiner Meinung nach nicht so viel erklären kann, wie es der Autor gerne hätte. Der Schreibstil ist leider nicht für die breite Leserschaft geeignet. Gut fand ich, dass sich der Autor eingehend mit seinen KritikerInnen beschäftigt hat.
Problematisch fand ich, dass Morris seine Theorie nutzt, um beispielsweise das Vorgehen der Terrorgruppe Boko Haram zu erklären. Das hätte er vielleicht nicht tun sollen, denn damit landete er in einer Situation, aus der er nur schwer wieder rauskommt. In einem späteren Abschnitt stellt er zwar klar, dass er das Vorgehen einer solchen Gruppierung nicht verteidigen oder als richtig bezeichnen will, auf mich als Leserin wirkte es aber zumindest auf den ersten Blick fast so. Egal wie es gemeint ist: Das wirkte definitiv falsch.Vielleicht hätte Morris sich hier klarer und sofort nach diesem Beispiel positionieren müssen.
Die von Morris verwendete Sprache ist recht wissenschaftlich. Er verweist auf Kulturwissenschaftler und verschiedene Theorien, verwendet Fachsprache. Ich hätte das nicht verstanden, wenn ich nicht vor einem Jahr den Kurs "Einführung in die Kulturwissenschaft" belegt hätte und selbst mit diesem Wissen, fand ich den Text stellenweise doch eher schwer. Für Leute ohne Vorwissen ist dieses Buch definitiv nicht geeignet.
Was ich gut finde, ist, dass Morris seine KritikerInnen zu Wort kommen lässt. In diesem Buch können wir die Sicht von vier KritikerInnen lesen, die Morris These kritisieren und auseinander nehmen, jede und jeder aus einem anderen Blickpunkt. Diese Abschnitte fand ich fast am spannendsten. Gerade das Kapitel von Margaret Atwood war sehr cool. Anschließend folgt dann noch ein Kapitel von Morris, in dem er auf die Kritiken eingeht. Das fand ich spannend, denn so musste er sich tatsächlich mit diesen anderen Sichtweisen auseinandersetzen.
Mein Fazit? Spannende Theorie, die aber meiner Meinung nach nicht so viel erklären kann, wie es der Autor gerne hätte. Der Schreibstil ist leider nicht für die breite Leserschaft geeignet. Gut fand ich, dass sich der Autor eingehend mit seinen KritikerInnen beschäftigt hat.
July 30, 2020
Ian Morris is clearly a big picture man. I had read his book on "War: what is it good for" and it is a similar attempt to provide some sweeping generalisations about human history ...and maybe even some "rules" which have universal application. In the case of the current book his basic thesis is that humankind's development can essentially be slotted into three broad categories: 1). The forager, 2). The Farmer and 3). The consumer of fossil fuels. (As he admits somewhere, he was trying very hard to achieve a catchy alliteration with his title: I think he achieved it).
If I can try and capture his line of reasoning he thinks that foragers were basically free-ranging individuals and there is little hierarchy. Wealth....such as it is....is fairly evenly distributed and "every man is his own headman". Rates of violence, particularly competition over women, was high ....he claims a 10 percent chance of dying a violent death.And, of course, energy use per person was low (around 5,000 kcal/capita/day).....probably most of that from fires to keep warm or to cook.
Things changed significantly as foragers settled down into agricultural communities. A pattern emerged of elites and a "general acceptance of glaring inequalities.....and occasional outburst of levelling rage". Pillage and rape and enslavement of adjoining agricultural communities was common. Though (the point he makes in his book about what is war good for?) when various communities were subjugated, that generally led to a period of peace under one overlord. Successful rulers gradually drove down the rates of violent death. And there was a tendency of religion to re-enforce the notion that the elites were placed there by the gods and a hierarchy was ordained by the gods.....this kept the peasants in their place!! Energy consumption per capita still remained low....generally around 6,000kcal/cap/day but might have risen to around 30,000kcal/cap/day in some societies. He makes the point (p158) that shipping gave an energy bonus all around the Atlantic of about 10% ...which he seems to attribute to comparative advantage and trade. (Though he doesn't seem to take into account the actual wind-energy harvested by sailing ships.....which must have been huge. (Sufficient to sustain the huge grain trade between India and the Roman Empire for hundreds of years). Rates of violence were apparently lower in agricultural communities than with foragers. And society was male dominated.
The discovery and use of fossil fuels (coal, gas, petroleum) changed everything. Hard to argue with this. Per capita consumption of energy rose abruptly in western nations from around 1800 to about 230,000 kcal/cap/day and other nations are following the same sort of trajectory but with a later start date. Populations exploded, demand for goods likewise exploded ...and the timing was fortuitous because factories were producing at a massively increased rate over cottage industries. Inequality increased...and fossil fuels tended to sweep away the demand for forced labour (Though this could be argued). Women have achieved much greater equality and form a much greater proportion of the paid workforce. There appears to have been a retreat of religion ....and, according to Morris, despite world wars etc., the chance of dying a violent death has continued to retreat. Democracy has expanded and continues to be the preferred political system by most people . (Though one might wonder about what is happening in China these days). Inequality (in terms of incomes) appears to have risen though Morris toys with the idea that equality might be more about "equal opportunity". In the USA the Gini index has risen from around 0.36 in the late 60's to around 0.47 in 2014. And even in China the Gini coefficient rose from around 0.3 in 1976 to 0.47 in 2009. (Higher number means more inequality).
Hence, Morris advances the thesis that there have basically been three forms of human social structures over the past 20,000 years or so and each has a characteristic usage of energy. And human values adjusted between these three stages of human social structures so there is a relationship between energy use and human values.
What is especially interesting about this book is that because these were "the Tanner lectures on human values" delivered in Princeton in 2012, we have the benefit of a series of "replies" from various specialists:
A Professor of ancient greek suggests that Morris does not truly account for farming values which vary widely..and singles out Ancient Anthems as a challenge for Morris.
A former Professor of History and expert on China suggests that Morris's broad stages of human development are maybe too sweeping and we miss the variation that a finer level of detail would give.
And the third commentator, a Professor of Philosophy, shows (really just as an aside) that Morris ignores the pastoralists in his categories. I agree. I think that nomadic herding is vastly different from sedentary farming and one did not necessarily lead to the other. So the values of nomadic herds-people might not align with his categories for farmers ....and certainly such people were a perpetual thorn in the side of the Middle East civilisations. (Not accepting political hierarchy, as farmers did, for example). She also criticises Morris's use of values along the "is-ought" criticism of David Hume. That is, Morris talks about the positive values (her words) that are actually applied by various cultures, versus real moral values which OUGHT to apply. (Hence, I think, she would argue that women's rights OUGHT to apply at all stages of human development, and slavery was wrong in all situations). Having written a Masters thesis about human values, I have some sympathy with her criticism. (Values terminology is inconsistent and rather loosely applied by everyone who writes about it).
But overall, it's a book that has made me think. One can nit-pick ...and I think that's really all the commentators have done. But, hard to totally disagree with his theses. I give it 4.5 stars.
If I can try and capture his line of reasoning he thinks that foragers were basically free-ranging individuals and there is little hierarchy. Wealth....such as it is....is fairly evenly distributed and "every man is his own headman". Rates of violence, particularly competition over women, was high ....he claims a 10 percent chance of dying a violent death.And, of course, energy use per person was low (around 5,000 kcal/capita/day).....probably most of that from fires to keep warm or to cook.
Things changed significantly as foragers settled down into agricultural communities. A pattern emerged of elites and a "general acceptance of glaring inequalities.....and occasional outburst of levelling rage". Pillage and rape and enslavement of adjoining agricultural communities was common. Though (the point he makes in his book about what is war good for?) when various communities were subjugated, that generally led to a period of peace under one overlord. Successful rulers gradually drove down the rates of violent death. And there was a tendency of religion to re-enforce the notion that the elites were placed there by the gods and a hierarchy was ordained by the gods.....this kept the peasants in their place!! Energy consumption per capita still remained low....generally around 6,000kcal/cap/day but might have risen to around 30,000kcal/cap/day in some societies. He makes the point (p158) that shipping gave an energy bonus all around the Atlantic of about 10% ...which he seems to attribute to comparative advantage and trade. (Though he doesn't seem to take into account the actual wind-energy harvested by sailing ships.....which must have been huge. (Sufficient to sustain the huge grain trade between India and the Roman Empire for hundreds of years). Rates of violence were apparently lower in agricultural communities than with foragers. And society was male dominated.
The discovery and use of fossil fuels (coal, gas, petroleum) changed everything. Hard to argue with this. Per capita consumption of energy rose abruptly in western nations from around 1800 to about 230,000 kcal/cap/day and other nations are following the same sort of trajectory but with a later start date. Populations exploded, demand for goods likewise exploded ...and the timing was fortuitous because factories were producing at a massively increased rate over cottage industries. Inequality increased...and fossil fuels tended to sweep away the demand for forced labour (Though this could be argued). Women have achieved much greater equality and form a much greater proportion of the paid workforce. There appears to have been a retreat of religion ....and, according to Morris, despite world wars etc., the chance of dying a violent death has continued to retreat. Democracy has expanded and continues to be the preferred political system by most people . (Though one might wonder about what is happening in China these days). Inequality (in terms of incomes) appears to have risen though Morris toys with the idea that equality might be more about "equal opportunity". In the USA the Gini index has risen from around 0.36 in the late 60's to around 0.47 in 2014. And even in China the Gini coefficient rose from around 0.3 in 1976 to 0.47 in 2009. (Higher number means more inequality).
Hence, Morris advances the thesis that there have basically been three forms of human social structures over the past 20,000 years or so and each has a characteristic usage of energy. And human values adjusted between these three stages of human social structures so there is a relationship between energy use and human values.
What is especially interesting about this book is that because these were "the Tanner lectures on human values" delivered in Princeton in 2012, we have the benefit of a series of "replies" from various specialists:
A Professor of ancient greek suggests that Morris does not truly account for farming values which vary widely..and singles out Ancient Anthems as a challenge for Morris.
A former Professor of History and expert on China suggests that Morris's broad stages of human development are maybe too sweeping and we miss the variation that a finer level of detail would give.
And the third commentator, a Professor of Philosophy, shows (really just as an aside) that Morris ignores the pastoralists in his categories. I agree. I think that nomadic herding is vastly different from sedentary farming and one did not necessarily lead to the other. So the values of nomadic herds-people might not align with his categories for farmers ....and certainly such people were a perpetual thorn in the side of the Middle East civilisations. (Not accepting political hierarchy, as farmers did, for example). She also criticises Morris's use of values along the "is-ought" criticism of David Hume. That is, Morris talks about the positive values (her words) that are actually applied by various cultures, versus real moral values which OUGHT to apply. (Hence, I think, she would argue that women's rights OUGHT to apply at all stages of human development, and slavery was wrong in all situations). Having written a Masters thesis about human values, I have some sympathy with her criticism. (Values terminology is inconsistent and rather loosely applied by everyone who writes about it).
But overall, it's a book that has made me think. One can nit-pick ...and I think that's really all the commentators have done. But, hard to totally disagree with his theses. I give it 4.5 stars.
July 26, 2015
I am not wholly convinced by Morris's thesis, but that did not diminish the pleasure of reading, as the evidence martialled (a large portion of human history) is very interesting for its own sake, and Morris's skills as a writer are good. The most fascinating portion of the book is, as Morris himself suggests, the debate that is encouraged by the four respondents.
May 25, 2016
An incredibly enlightening read. It makes you look at the world in ways previously never considered. This will be one to place on the bookshelf for reference.
April 16, 2016
I agree more with his detractors than him, but Mortis has written a very important book nevertheless.
January 7, 2018
This idea is quite thought-provoking, but not convincing to a believer's mind.
February 14, 2025
Ian Morris’s Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels delivers a compelling and provocative thesis: "Each age gets the thought it needs." At its core, the book explores how the tools we create and the material conditions of our world shape our moral frameworks and societal values over time. This resonated with me as a deeply insightful lens for understanding the relationship between energy systems, morality, and power structures.
In 2025, this theory feels particularly urgent. AI and automation are emerging as new tools for energy capture, while climate change reshapes our material conditions and oligarchical systems calcify wealth inequality. Morris’s framework suggests a sobering conclusion: in the "battlefield" of moral values, efficiency may trump morality. Tolerance and equality, however noble, could lose out to hierarchy and classism if the latter proves more efficient at capturing and wielding energy—and AI-driven systems, with their reliance on centralized expertise and immense resources, seem primed for this oligarchical shift.
This perspective offers a lens through which to interpret modern trends: the rise of Trumpism, the entrenched power of venture capitalists, and the resurgence of expansionist ideologies. Morris’s theory doesn’t merely coincide with these developments—it suggests they’re the logical result of shifting conditions. If this trajectory continues, we may see new hierarchies emerge, justified not by divine mandate as in Agrarian societies, but by propaganda, militarized control, and the monopolization of AI technologies. This could lay the groundwork for a society dominated by extreme capitalism and nationalist expansionism, propped up by values that justify these systems.
What struck me most was the idea that societies which internalize these "new" hierarchies might outcompete others, leading to a grim inevitability: values of classism and authoritarian control might become dominant because they are more efficient. Yet, in the long term, communal forces—perhaps religion or other stabilizing frameworks—might act as a counterweight, providing cohesion during turbulent transitions. Beyond that, I wonder if an AI-driven utopia (or dystopia)—one ruled by robotic labor and a minority elite—might emerge as the ultimate "efficient" society, energy-wise, regardless of our moral discomfort with such a world.
Morris’s work challenges us to confront these possibilities, while I don’t fully agree with all of its implications, it feels frighteningly prescient. I think it's normal for storyteller and oracles of the future to have dubious methodologies when trying to answer such an incredibly broad question, and it certainly feels like Morris has stumbled upon an essential insight into the practical functioning of morality for humanity.
In 2025, this theory feels particularly urgent. AI and automation are emerging as new tools for energy capture, while climate change reshapes our material conditions and oligarchical systems calcify wealth inequality. Morris’s framework suggests a sobering conclusion: in the "battlefield" of moral values, efficiency may trump morality. Tolerance and equality, however noble, could lose out to hierarchy and classism if the latter proves more efficient at capturing and wielding energy—and AI-driven systems, with their reliance on centralized expertise and immense resources, seem primed for this oligarchical shift.
This perspective offers a lens through which to interpret modern trends: the rise of Trumpism, the entrenched power of venture capitalists, and the resurgence of expansionist ideologies. Morris’s theory doesn’t merely coincide with these developments—it suggests they’re the logical result of shifting conditions. If this trajectory continues, we may see new hierarchies emerge, justified not by divine mandate as in Agrarian societies, but by propaganda, militarized control, and the monopolization of AI technologies. This could lay the groundwork for a society dominated by extreme capitalism and nationalist expansionism, propped up by values that justify these systems.
What struck me most was the idea that societies which internalize these "new" hierarchies might outcompete others, leading to a grim inevitability: values of classism and authoritarian control might become dominant because they are more efficient. Yet, in the long term, communal forces—perhaps religion or other stabilizing frameworks—might act as a counterweight, providing cohesion during turbulent transitions. Beyond that, I wonder if an AI-driven utopia (or dystopia)—one ruled by robotic labor and a minority elite—might emerge as the ultimate "efficient" society, energy-wise, regardless of our moral discomfort with such a world.
Morris’s work challenges us to confront these possibilities, while I don’t fully agree with all of its implications, it feels frighteningly prescient. I think it's normal for storyteller and oracles of the future to have dubious methodologies when trying to answer such an incredibly broad question, and it certainly feels like Morris has stumbled upon an essential insight into the practical functioning of morality for humanity.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 29, 2023
This is a really well-written to read after Work: A History of How we spend our Time. Here the author discusses 3 cultures or value systems; foraging values, farming values and fossil-fuel values. We belong to the fossil fuel society. He claims that types of values flourish in each society based on energy availability and the methods to capture them. People develop adaptive traits to maximize their effectiveness to survive as society changes.
The foragers who lived by gathering resources that nature provided, valued equity over hierarchy and had little violence; this society had an egalitarian value. While the farmers who domesticated nature, valued hierarchy over equity due to the division of labour that was necessary for farming and violence was inevitable parcel of the system. In the fossil fuel society that we are in now, equity is once again valued over hierarchy and violence is intolerant. However, you can still find some of the other two values still followed in the present society. The author argues that the development of the economy and traditional values do not go hand in hand. In the less developed economy, there is a prevalence of traditional values. The retarding influence of traditional values and the driving force of modernization are linked to each other.
The values practised in each society seem to be necessary for such a mode of energy capture. The author points out that when industry and services become more important people generally shift towards secularism, rationalism and self-expression. He claims that human values evolve not based on biological changes but because of the evolution in the system of energy capture. And this requires different social organizations to which the values gradually adapt. When a society or the members of a particular energy capture system test their boundaries and take part in natural experiments new societies and value systems evolve. This is also driven by necessity presented in the form of a great calamity threatening survival like migration, money, food, disease or climate.
I really loved this informative book. It also has comments from other renowned authors on what was discussed by Ian Morris in the first few chapters and his rebuttals. Very exciting to read.
The foragers who lived by gathering resources that nature provided, valued equity over hierarchy and had little violence; this society had an egalitarian value. While the farmers who domesticated nature, valued hierarchy over equity due to the division of labour that was necessary for farming and violence was inevitable parcel of the system. In the fossil fuel society that we are in now, equity is once again valued over hierarchy and violence is intolerant. However, you can still find some of the other two values still followed in the present society. The author argues that the development of the economy and traditional values do not go hand in hand. In the less developed economy, there is a prevalence of traditional values. The retarding influence of traditional values and the driving force of modernization are linked to each other.
The values practised in each society seem to be necessary for such a mode of energy capture. The author points out that when industry and services become more important people generally shift towards secularism, rationalism and self-expression. He claims that human values evolve not based on biological changes but because of the evolution in the system of energy capture. And this requires different social organizations to which the values gradually adapt. When a society or the members of a particular energy capture system test their boundaries and take part in natural experiments new societies and value systems evolve. This is also driven by necessity presented in the form of a great calamity threatening survival like migration, money, food, disease or climate.
I really loved this informative book. It also has comments from other renowned authors on what was discussed by Ian Morris in the first few chapters and his rebuttals. Very exciting to read.
January 14, 2024
More books should be written in this format, with critiques of the main text by other academics and a response by the main author included. I especially liked Christine Korsgaard's contribution, and Margaret Atwood's chapter really showcased her wit.
This is a work of transparently reductionist big-picture history, charting the course of human values as ultimately dependent on our ways of extracting energy (through foraging, farming, and using fossil fuels). Foragers dislike inequalities in wealth and power and are quite accepting of violence. Farmers like inequality but are less accepting of violence. Fossil-fuelers (like us) abhor both inequality and violence.
In expounding such a grand thesis, Morris makes many simplifications and tries to reduce all the complex facts of world history to a single narrative. He's clear about using this method, but one wonders if history doesn't provide enough exceptions to seriously undermine the central thesis.
For instance: communism, fascism, and modern liberalism all arose in fossil-fuel societies. Granted, modern liberalism eventually won, but was this inevitable? If not, then this would seriously challenge the claim that fossil-fuel values are essentially egalitarian and anti-violence.
There is a great deal of merit to Morris's theory, but I can't accept the kind of moral relativism he seems to endorse in the final chapter. Though her chapter doesn't propose a full theory, I'm more inclined toward Korsgaards view that there is something like valuing correctly or that there are real moral values.
What does this theory suggest about the how human values will evolve into the future? In the short term, Morris promises that the WEIRD (western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic) shall inherit the Earth. Being a WEIRDo myself (and, more importantly, regarding WEIRD values as closer to correct valuing) I find this encouraging. Morris's exponential curve of social development suggests, however, that the 21st century may be in for an upheaval greater than anything we've seen before. To get to the levels of development he predicts, one has to imagine something like immortal digital minds living lives far unlike those of mere humans. The Age of Em by Robin Hanson may be read as a speculative sequel to this book. If Hanson's analysis is correct, then we may be in for a much weirder future than everyone becoming WEIRD.
This is a work of transparently reductionist big-picture history, charting the course of human values as ultimately dependent on our ways of extracting energy (through foraging, farming, and using fossil fuels). Foragers dislike inequalities in wealth and power and are quite accepting of violence. Farmers like inequality but are less accepting of violence. Fossil-fuelers (like us) abhor both inequality and violence.
In expounding such a grand thesis, Morris makes many simplifications and tries to reduce all the complex facts of world history to a single narrative. He's clear about using this method, but one wonders if history doesn't provide enough exceptions to seriously undermine the central thesis.
For instance: communism, fascism, and modern liberalism all arose in fossil-fuel societies. Granted, modern liberalism eventually won, but was this inevitable? If not, then this would seriously challenge the claim that fossil-fuel values are essentially egalitarian and anti-violence.
There is a great deal of merit to Morris's theory, but I can't accept the kind of moral relativism he seems to endorse in the final chapter. Though her chapter doesn't propose a full theory, I'm more inclined toward Korsgaards view that there is something like valuing correctly or that there are real moral values.
What does this theory suggest about the how human values will evolve into the future? In the short term, Morris promises that the WEIRD (western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic) shall inherit the Earth. Being a WEIRDo myself (and, more importantly, regarding WEIRD values as closer to correct valuing) I find this encouraging. Morris's exponential curve of social development suggests, however, that the 21st century may be in for an upheaval greater than anything we've seen before. To get to the levels of development he predicts, one has to imagine something like immortal digital minds living lives far unlike those of mere humans. The Age of Em by Robin Hanson may be read as a speculative sequel to this book. If Hanson's analysis is correct, then we may be in for a much weirder future than everyone becoming WEIRD.
January 14, 2021
I am amazed that a book which has values in the title was written by someone who did not bother to do even the most basic research into the meaning of values and valuing.
This book has an interesting set-up, where the middle few chapters are reserved for other people (such as Margaret Atwood!) who comment on and critique the main ideas explained in the first chapters, followed by a response by the main author. It is in one of these comment chapters that Morris is schooled by Christine M. Korsgaard that his theoretical fundament is missing. He replies to her in the last 30 pages and this is the place where the book finally got interesting, if a bit disconcerting. Morris does not think objective values exist. He thinks values are a product of evolution, biology and sociology. This has some very bad implications.
According to Morris's reasoning, slavery in agricultural societies is not immoral. Since agriculture is such a labour-intensive way of life, it is very hard to create excess value (or calories) without resorting to some form of slavery (or, as Morris calls it: 'forced labour'). This means that societies which adopt some form of slavery become more powerful than societies that don't. Morris then concludes that these societies think inequality is good. I think that enslaved and indentured people would beg to differ.
According to Morris, the dominant values of a society are at the mercy of our mode of energy-capture. His way of seeing the world completely erases the human capacity (and I'd like to think, even our duty) to see beyond what is easy and profitable.
Ugh.
This book has an interesting set-up, where the middle few chapters are reserved for other people (such as Margaret Atwood!) who comment on and critique the main ideas explained in the first chapters, followed by a response by the main author. It is in one of these comment chapters that Morris is schooled by Christine M. Korsgaard that his theoretical fundament is missing. He replies to her in the last 30 pages and this is the place where the book finally got interesting, if a bit disconcerting. Morris does not think objective values exist. He thinks values are a product of evolution, biology and sociology. This has some very bad implications.
According to Morris's reasoning, slavery in agricultural societies is not immoral. Since agriculture is such a labour-intensive way of life, it is very hard to create excess value (or calories) without resorting to some form of slavery (or, as Morris calls it: 'forced labour'). This means that societies which adopt some form of slavery become more powerful than societies that don't. Morris then concludes that these societies think inequality is good. I think that enslaved and indentured people would beg to differ.
According to Morris, the dominant values of a society are at the mercy of our mode of energy-capture. His way of seeing the world completely erases the human capacity (and I'd like to think, even our duty) to see beyond what is easy and profitable.
Ugh.
March 21, 2022
(PT) Três tipos de civilização, três momentos da história humana. AS suas transições modificaram a vivência para sempre. De caçadores-recoletores, para agricultores, no final da Idade do Gelo, e depois, os quase dez mil anos deste tipo de civilização até que, no final do século XVII, começamos a usar as máquinas para movermo-nos em tudo e mais alguma coisa, criando a industrialização e mudando a sociedade para sempre.
O livro de Ian Morris é um pouco enganador. É um ensaio, é verdade, mas se as pessoas procuravam História, encontraram Filosofia, Economia e Sociologia, tudo misturado de forma do qual poucos conseguem decifrar. Mas quando conseguem, entendem de uma certa forma como fomos e o que fizemos para nos adaptarmo-nos. E como aos poucos abandonamos a ideia da violência entre nós - na primeira fase, as chances de morte violenta andavam pelos 10 por cento, agora é menos de um - para começarmos a pensar mais na propriedade e na valorização da terra, no lado agrícola. Mas isso também cai quando passamos para os combustíveis fósseis, onde a urbanização e a industrialização nos levou a pensar na igualdade entre géneros, por exemplo, e na imparável ascensão da democracia.
É um livro bem interessante para entender a evolução humana, e de como as coisas, que muitos pensavam ser imutáveis - e duraram milhares de anos - podem ser mudados em três ou quatro gerações. Aliás, vendo bem, as nossas gerações atuais deixam uma marca revolucionária, do qual nada é deixado de pé, uma fasquia alta do qual a próxima geração terá de superar.
Bem interessante, mas fica o aviso: nem toda a gente consegue ler este livro.
O livro de Ian Morris é um pouco enganador. É um ensaio, é verdade, mas se as pessoas procuravam História, encontraram Filosofia, Economia e Sociologia, tudo misturado de forma do qual poucos conseguem decifrar. Mas quando conseguem, entendem de uma certa forma como fomos e o que fizemos para nos adaptarmo-nos. E como aos poucos abandonamos a ideia da violência entre nós - na primeira fase, as chances de morte violenta andavam pelos 10 por cento, agora é menos de um - para começarmos a pensar mais na propriedade e na valorização da terra, no lado agrícola. Mas isso também cai quando passamos para os combustíveis fósseis, onde a urbanização e a industrialização nos levou a pensar na igualdade entre géneros, por exemplo, e na imparável ascensão da democracia.
É um livro bem interessante para entender a evolução humana, e de como as coisas, que muitos pensavam ser imutáveis - e duraram milhares de anos - podem ser mudados em três ou quatro gerações. Aliás, vendo bem, as nossas gerações atuais deixam uma marca revolucionária, do qual nada é deixado de pé, uma fasquia alta do qual a próxima geração terá de superar.
Bem interessante, mas fica o aviso: nem toda a gente consegue ler este livro.
September 21, 2021
一般的歷史作品，中心不外是跟隨前人的足跡，了解他們的故事。但歷史不止是故事——故事不過是歷史上的糖霜，我們要嚐到的，是歷史裡的教訓。
故事要說得動人，已經相當不易；但剖析歷史的殘篇斷簡，將當中的教訓從錯綜複雜的故事情節中提煉出來，就再加是來之不易。《西方憑什麼》是我相當喜愛的作品。作者Ian Morris不止是個絕頂的說書人，特別之處在於疏爬歷史上的蛛絲馬跡，評估某個歷史時刻的能源捕獲量，並為相對客觀的不同面向的社會發展打分數，從而歸納出某時某地的社會發展指數，將數據作圖之後便可將東西方社會的發展軌跡一目了然。
這種相對科學的歷史研究論，對當時的我而言十分震撼。手上這本《人類憑什麼》是《西方憑什麼》的姊妹作，講述的是人類價值觀的演進史。
一個社會的發展背景，很明顯對個人的價值觀有重大的影響。但到底是那方面，作用如何？原來說穿了最根本的基礎正是當時的能源捕獲量。作者將人類的價值觀演化分為三個階段，分別為覓食者、農民和化石燃料。因應不同的時代，當時的人類會取得最利生存的思想（價值觀），並將能量捕獲最大化。
作者指出，能量捕獲的方式大致決定了那種人口組成與組織最具效率，這些因素則會宰制能蓬勃發展的價值觀。長期歷史顯示，無論我們對該價值觀的想法為何，文化演進的競爭過程都將我們推向能量捕獲中特定階段裡最有效的價值觀。
能量捕獲的攀升會對不同種類的社會組織發揮了有利的選擇性壓力。當人們從覓食轉到農耕時，他們發現比起小群體，農業國是更好的生存機器；而當他們從農耕轉到化石燃料時，就發現工業國是比農耕國還好的生存機器。而當能量捕獲攀升對社會組織的演變發揮選擇性壓力時，社會組織的演進，也同樣對經歷生物性演化的核心人類價值觀發揮選擇性壓力。
由此可推而廣之，很多現實世界的衝突，其實就是在不同發展階段的價值觀的衝突：塔利班、伊斯蘭國等至今還抱持著農民價值觀，碰上信奉化石能源價值觀的西方社會，發展至不能調和、無可妥協的敵對狀態幾乎是必然的結果。歷史悲劇，說到底其實還不過是價值觀的衝突？
我喜歡作者這套簡單的理論框架。或許美中不足的是，是作者的理論框架，竟然沒有包括對人類價值觀影響深遠的畜牧；另外，找來其他四位文化人評論作者的理論，反而令原本清澈的理論框架添上一層哲學濁水，不若刪去來得乾淨利落。
好書！四星推薦。
故事要說得動人，已經相當不易；但剖析歷史的殘篇斷簡，將當中的教訓從錯綜複雜的故事情節中提煉出來，就再加是來之不易。《西方憑什麼》是我相當喜愛的作品。作者Ian Morris不止是個絕頂的說書人，特別之處在於疏爬歷史上的蛛絲馬跡，評估某個歷史時刻的能源捕獲量，並為相對客觀的不同面向的社會發展打分數，從而歸納出某時某地的社會發展指數，將數據作圖之後便可將東西方社會的發展軌跡一目了然。
這種相對科學的歷史研究論，對當時的我而言十分震撼。手上這本《人類憑什麼》是《西方憑什麼》的姊妹作，講述的是人類價值觀的演進史。
一個社會的發展背景，很明顯對個人的價值觀有重大的影響。但到底是那方面，作用如何？原來說穿了最根本的基礎正是當時的能源捕獲量。作者將人類的價值觀演化分為三個階段，分別為覓食者、農民和化石燃料。因應不同的時代，當時的人類會取得最利生存的思想（價值觀），並將能量捕獲最大化。
作者指出，能量捕獲的方式大致決定了那種人口組成與組織最具效率，這些因素則會宰制能蓬勃發展的價值觀。長期歷史顯示，無論我們對該價值觀的想法為何，文化演進的競爭過程都將我們推向能量捕獲中特定階段裡最有效的價值觀。
能量捕獲的攀升會對不同種類的社會組織發揮了有利的選擇性壓力。當人們從覓食轉到農耕時，他們發現比起小群體，農業國是更好的生存機器；而當他們從農耕轉到化石燃料時，就發現工業國是比農耕國還好的生存機器。而當能量捕獲攀升對社會組織的演變發揮選擇性壓力時，社會組織的演進，也同樣對經歷生物性演化的核心人類價值觀發揮選擇性壓力。
由此可推而廣之，很多現實世界的衝突，其實就是在不同發展階段的價值觀的衝突：塔利班、伊斯蘭國等至今還抱持著農民價值觀，碰上信奉化石能源價值觀的西方社會，發展至不能調和、無可妥協的敵對狀態幾乎是必然的結果。歷史悲劇，說到底其實還不過是價值觀的衝突？
我喜歡作者這套簡單的理論框架。或許美中不足的是，是作者的理論框架，竟然沒有包括對人類價值觀影響深遠的畜牧；另外，找來其他四位文化人評論作者的理論，反而令原本清澈的理論框架添上一層哲學濁水，不若刪去來得乾淨利落。
好書！四星推薦。
June 10, 2022
Great and interesting points are raised throughout this book. Some ideas and statistics will definitely stick with me, but overall, I don't think I fully agree with the argument that Morris proposes, and I found the way he measures violence outdated and irrelevant.
My main critique of this book is the fact that Morris uses human caused death 100 humans to be the decide that fossil fuel users are completely adverse to violence in comparison to hunter-gatherers. To put it shortly, Morris believes that because foragers killed each other in higher percentages in relation to the size of their bands than modern fossil fuel using humans do, we as a society are less violent. I think this does not take into account the sheer difference in population that we have today, as nations kill millions in wars, and nowadays we have the ability to indirectly kill many, like the Ethyl Corporation's use of lead in gasoline leading to hundreds of millions of deaths worldwide.
My main critique of this book is the fact that Morris uses human caused death 100 humans to be the decide that fossil fuel users are completely adverse to violence in comparison to hunter-gatherers. To put it shortly, Morris believes that because foragers killed each other in higher percentages in relation to the size of their bands than modern fossil fuel using humans do, we as a society are less violent. I think this does not take into account the sheer difference in population that we have today, as nations kill millions in wars, and nowadays we have the ability to indirectly kill many, like the Ethyl Corporation's use of lead in gasoline leading to hundreds of millions of deaths worldwide.
March 1, 2020
Das Buch hallt etwas länger nach, da es mich etwas ratlos zurück gelassen hat. Streckenweise war es sehr trocken geschrieben. Ein paar Zahlen weniger, dafür überzeugende Argumente hätten nicht geschadet. Trotzdem eine sehr interessante These die zum nachdenken anregt, aber mich nicht vollends von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt hat.
Ian Morris stellt in seinem neuen Buch die These auf, dass die Gewinnung und Nutzung der Energiequellen unsere Werte formen und bestimmen. Seine These erklärt er anhand der Wildbeuter, Bauern und uns den fossilen Rohstoff Nutzer. Außerdem kommen ein paar Diskussionsteilnehmer zu Wort und kritisieren diese These. Ian Morris wird auch darauf eingehen
Ian Morris stellt in seinem neuen Buch die These auf, dass die Gewinnung und Nutzung der Energiequellen unsere Werte formen und bestimmen. Seine These erklärt er anhand der Wildbeuter, Bauern und uns den fossilen Rohstoff Nutzer. Außerdem kommen ein paar Diskussionsteilnehmer zu Wort und kritisieren diese These. Ian Morris wird auch darauf eingehen
July 28, 2020
The parts on foragers and farmers are interesting. The convergence in values across different foraging societies is striking, as is the same convergence across different farming societies. Similarly his observation that different farming societies gradually reached more complex stages of social organisation in a fairly similar fashion is interesting.
I was a bit less impressed by the part on industrial fossil fuel society, however. Overall, the book was quite shallow and brief (it's a series of lectures) - I understand he developed some ideas in more detail in Why the West Rules For Now. I didn't read the comments by other people, nor Morris's reply (which together are 1/3 of the book).
I was a bit less impressed by the part on industrial fossil fuel society, however. Overall, the book was quite shallow and brief (it's a series of lectures) - I understand he developed some ideas in more detail in Why the West Rules For Now. I didn't read the comments by other people, nor Morris's reply (which together are 1/3 of the book).
October 16, 2022
A very clever view on how different scales of calories and profit per person have changed societies and how this has impacted changes
As far as the book goes, It is an intriguing theory, and it certainly makes you think. I'm not sure whether it's an elegant theory tahr fits the data or it's an elegant theory because it is accurate. I will mull on this.
Its the sort of book that puts forward at truly Original Thought, and one that I will think about a lot when viewing societies and history.
Listened via Blinkist at 2x speed (12min audio).
Note I have started reading as the audio plays which I find good for memory as well as focus.
As far as the book goes, It is an intriguing theory, and it certainly makes you think. I'm not sure whether it's an elegant theory tahr fits the data or it's an elegant theory because it is accurate. I will mull on this.
Its the sort of book that puts forward at truly Original Thought, and one that I will think about a lot when viewing societies and history.
Listened via Blinkist at 2x speed (12min audio).
Note I have started reading as the audio plays which I find good for memory as well as focus.
October 16, 2022
Throughout history, societies have adopted the values that made their particular method of energy capture the most efficient and effective. Foragers had flat hierarchies but frequently used violence to settle disputes. Farmers, on the other hand, had steep political, material and gender-based hierarchies but were less tolerant of violence. And fossil fuel users – meaning us – value equality and see violence as pointless or even morally abhorrent. As for future societies, we may not know what they will look like, but we can be sure that the values they adopt will be the ones that help them flourish.
articles
October 17, 2022Throughout history, societies have adopted the values that made their particular method of energy capture the most efficient and effective. Foragers had flat hierarchies but frequently used violence to settle disputes. Farmers, on the other hand, had steep political, material and gender-based hierarchies but were less tolerant of violence. And fossil fuel users – meaning us – value equality and see violence as pointless or even morally abhorrent. As for future societies, we may not know what they will look like, but we can be sure that the values they adopt will be the ones that help them flourish.
August 31, 2020
The format for this writing is rather unusual. Derived from the Princeton Tanner Lectures, this book presents the argument, and then refutations and comments by four different thinkers from different disciplins. Ian Morris then gets to close the book with another chapter to wrap everything up.
Even though this book does not explain everything in every detail, I found the argument compelling, and the comments and critiques of the contributors were very much a valuable addition to the main text.
Even though this book does not explain everything in every detail, I found the argument compelling, and the comments and critiques of the contributors were very much a valuable addition to the main text.
September 17, 2017
Interesting thesis and book format. I enjoyed most the critiques and then Morris replies to the critiques. My opinion - glad I read the book (most of it); don't believe his thesis holds up as he presents it. It struck me quite odd that effective contraception (the pill) wasn't mentioned by Morris or the critics as a key (if not the key) game changer for women's role in the economy, and thus indirectly in shaping our value system.
Korsgaard takes Morris to task for suggesting that there are no fundamental human values. Slavery/serfdom was acceptable during agrarian times b/c that system was more successful than foraging (by darwin standards), and serfdom was (apparently) a necessary component for farming to work. IOW, people, given a choice, chose being a farmer in a caste society was better than being a forager in a tribe of equals.
Morris believes the market place (economics, ideas) does indeed work in the long run. Others (me included) believe that power, propaganda, religion, fear, ignorance, etc can prevent individuals from making free, informed choices. Slavery and women's rights are good examples.
ch 1-5
Morris lays out his case that the amount of energy readily available to humans over their existence, had a tremendous impact on the values/laws/morals that were adopted. Darwinian 'survival of the fitness' was the process that selected winning cultures, ie the cultures that best adapted to the economics of the time (foraging, farming, industrial revolution).
ch 6-9, 4 readers are asked to submit their comments
Richard Seaford
Jonathan Spence
Christine Korsgaard
Margaret Atwater
ch 9, Morris gets last word w/ the comments
Notes
Refs
Contributors
Index
=====
My Notes
p.
208, ch. 10; Morris addresses comments and critiques
223 energy capture methods drive changes in human values. Ie, hunter-gather culture and energy use have different values than agricultural than industrial (fossil fuels)
231 our cousins - apes, chimps, bonobos - have diff hierarchies and violence among members. Humans can choose (threw their culture, religion) which hierarchy to use depending on the situation.
232 foragers: non-hierarc; low energy consumed
farming: hierarch works better - provides more energy (food) per member;
fossil fuels: lots of energy; less hierarch
233 critics of thesis believe egalitarian, non-viol society is the default. Morris says farming req'ed a big shift in culture, law; Hence strict marriage and paternity laws and customs; male dominance, violence, war
235 darwin evol (genes and culture) of male/female roles for our forager ancestors
236 jealousy an evolved adaptation
238 fossil fuels (FF) liberated women; new job opportunities; FF countries (rich) have low birthrates, why?
rates of violent death decline w/ powerful gov's
241 some resource rich foragers pockets, eg Pacific coast n. america, develop wealth and thus some hierarc
242 what if no indust rev in England? More slavery in US?
244 terminology: real (preached) moral values vs positive (practiced) values
245 John Rawls: if just society is means equitable for all, then the worst off should get beneficial rules.
246 Morris claims history shows we chose hierarch for agrarian system b/c it worked better in general for people
249 majority able to exhibit real choices says Morris. Or can ideology or religion become controlling as say his critics (including me)?
252 Africa, 60's liberation from colonialism; We saw market base vs socialism gov. comparisons. [Morris, the market base guy, may be a bit too simplistic in his apples/oranges nation comparisons]
252 'Common sense is such a powerful tool' [TG Don't believe history supports this, unless personal gain (over the common) is common sense]
Korsgaard takes Morris to task for suggesting that there are no fundamental human values. Slavery/serfdom was acceptable during agrarian times b/c that system was more successful than foraging (by darwin standards), and serfdom was (apparently) a necessary component for farming to work. IOW, people, given a choice, chose being a farmer in a caste society was better than being a forager in a tribe of equals.
Morris believes the market place (economics, ideas) does indeed work in the long run. Others (me included) believe that power, propaganda, religion, fear, ignorance, etc can prevent individuals from making free, informed choices. Slavery and women's rights are good examples.
ch 1-5
Morris lays out his case that the amount of energy readily available to humans over their existence, had a tremendous impact on the values/laws/morals that were adopted. Darwinian 'survival of the fitness' was the process that selected winning cultures, ie the cultures that best adapted to the economics of the time (foraging, farming, industrial revolution).
ch 6-9, 4 readers are asked to submit their comments
Richard Seaford
Jonathan Spence
Christine Korsgaard
Margaret Atwater
ch 9, Morris gets last word w/ the comments
Notes
Refs
Contributors
Index
=====
My Notes
p.
208, ch. 10; Morris addresses comments and critiques
223 energy capture methods drive changes in human values. Ie, hunter-gather culture and energy use have different values than agricultural than industrial (fossil fuels)
231 our cousins - apes, chimps, bonobos - have diff hierarchies and violence among members. Humans can choose (threw their culture, religion) which hierarchy to use depending on the situation.
232 foragers: non-hierarc; low energy consumed
farming: hierarch works better - provides more energy (food) per member;
fossil fuels: lots of energy; less hierarch
233 critics of thesis believe egalitarian, non-viol society is the default. Morris says farming req'ed a big shift in culture, law; Hence strict marriage and paternity laws and customs; male dominance, violence, war
235 darwin evol (genes and culture) of male/female roles for our forager ancestors
236 jealousy an evolved adaptation
238 fossil fuels (FF) liberated women; new job opportunities; FF countries (rich) have low birthrates, why?
rates of violent death decline w/ powerful gov's
241 some resource rich foragers pockets, eg Pacific coast n. america, develop wealth and thus some hierarc
242 what if no indust rev in England? More slavery in US?
244 terminology: real (preached) moral values vs positive (practiced) values
245 John Rawls: if just society is means equitable for all, then the worst off should get beneficial rules.
246 Morris claims history shows we chose hierarch for agrarian system b/c it worked better in general for people
249 majority able to exhibit real choices says Morris. Or can ideology or religion become controlling as say his critics (including me)?
252 Africa, 60's liberation from colonialism; We saw market base vs socialism gov. comparisons. [Morris, the market base guy, may be a bit too simplistic in his apples/oranges nation comparisons]
252 'Common sense is such a powerful tool' [TG Don't believe history supports this, unless personal gain (over the common) is common sense]
Displaying 1 - 30 of 59 reviews