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This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War
Updated with maps, photographs, and battlefield diagrams [Note: the kindle version of this edition does not have any of this], this special fiftieth anniversary edition of the classic history of the Korean War is a dramatic and hard-hitting account of the conflict written from the perspective of those who fought it. Partly drawn from official records, operations journals, and histories, it is based largely on the compelling personal narratives of the small-unit commanders and their troops. Unlike any other work on the Korean War, it provides both a clear panoramic overview and a sharply drawn "you were there" account of American troops in fierce combat against the North Korean and Chinese communist invaders. As Americans and North Koreans continue to face each other across the 38th Parallel, This Kind of War commemorates the past and offers vital lessons for the future.
540 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1963
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5077 people want to read
About the author
T.R. Fehrenbach
43 books81 followersTheodore Reed Fehrenbach, Jr. was an American historian, columnist, and the former head of the Texas Historical Commission (1987-1991). He graduated from Princeton University in 1947, and had published more than twenty books, including the best seller Lone Star: A History of Texas and Texans and This Kind of War, about the Korean War.
Although he served as a U.S. Army officer during the Korean War, his own service is not mentioned in the book. Fehrenbach also wrote for Esquire, The Atlantic, The Saturday Evening Post, and The New Republic. He was known as an authority on Texas, Mexico, and the Comanche people. For almost 30 years, he wrote a weekly column on Sundays for the San Antonio Express-News. T.R. Fehrenbach was 88 years old at the time of his death.
Although he served as a U.S. Army officer during the Korean War, his own service is not mentioned in the book. Fehrenbach also wrote for Esquire, The Atlantic, The Saturday Evening Post, and The New Republic. He was known as an authority on Texas, Mexico, and the Comanche people. For almost 30 years, he wrote a weekly column on Sundays for the San Antonio Express-News. T.R. Fehrenbach was 88 years old at the time of his death.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 283 reviews
August 15, 2024
T.R. Fehrenbach served during the Korean War as an officer in the U.S. Army. His experience shaped this book. This Kind Of War is an account of the military aspects of the Korean War (1950-1953) with a fair amount of social commentary to go along with it. Fehrenbach addresses the conflict in American society between the social liberalism that the civilian world values and the more Spartan, totalitarian world that the military prefers. Fehrenbach comes down on the side of the military, but he makes a good case as to why armies can't engage in the more easy-going existence of the civilian world. War isn't a game and it sure isn't easy-going.
The book was first published in 1963. It's about a war that had ended (well at least the shooting stopped) ten years earlier. It's still relevant in 2012. I first read it in 1991 when I was going through the Armor Officer Basic Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At that time, we were focused on Iraq. This book could be found (possibly still is) on recommended reading lists for both officers and NCOs. Though the Communist threat had faded by then (Fehrenbach is concerned about how the Communists are more serious than the West) I still felt like it had many lessons to teach. I would argue it still does. For while one's enemies might change war doesn't. However, the tone of the book isn't militaristic or warlike. The book takes a professional military viewpoint and that's significant. Those who are unfamiliar with how the U.S. military works might not understand how important that difference is, but it matters.
The book itself very readable. Dramatic and suspenseful it moves along at a brisk pace. While long ,with over six hundred pages, it never drags. If I can find any fault it would be the lack of a bibliography, footnotes and/or end-notes. There is an acknowledgement at the beginning of the book in which Fehrenbach states that the book was compiled from many sources. That's all well and good, but it would have been better to have listed those various sources. Nevertheless it's a well written book. I've held onto my copy for the past twenty-one years and ,while I long ago stopped serving in the U.S. Army, I have no intention of getting rid of it.
The book was first published in 1963. It's about a war that had ended (well at least the shooting stopped) ten years earlier. It's still relevant in 2012. I first read it in 1991 when I was going through the Armor Officer Basic Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At that time, we were focused on Iraq. This book could be found (possibly still is) on recommended reading lists for both officers and NCOs. Though the Communist threat had faded by then (Fehrenbach is concerned about how the Communists are more serious than the West) I still felt like it had many lessons to teach. I would argue it still does. For while one's enemies might change war doesn't. However, the tone of the book isn't militaristic or warlike. The book takes a professional military viewpoint and that's significant. Those who are unfamiliar with how the U.S. military works might not understand how important that difference is, but it matters.
The book itself very readable. Dramatic and suspenseful it moves along at a brisk pace. While long ,with over six hundred pages, it never drags. If I can find any fault it would be the lack of a bibliography, footnotes and/or end-notes. There is an acknowledgement at the beginning of the book in which Fehrenbach states that the book was compiled from many sources. That's all well and good, but it would have been better to have listed those various sources. Nevertheless it's a well written book. I've held onto my copy for the past twenty-one years and ,while I long ago stopped serving in the U.S. Army, I have no intention of getting rid of it.
May 19, 2010
As a former Army officer, I have read many military history books; and I assert that "This Kind of War" is the best military history book I have ever read. As a retired Army officer and Korean War veteran writing approximately 10 - 15 years after the conflict, Fehrenbach does a masterful job in his account. He seamlessly is able to provide an comprehensive account of the conflict across the tactical, operational, and strategic spheres. He recounts the plight of the frozen foot soldier and marine at Chosin Reservoir as easily as he does tells the story of the MacArthur / Truman brush-up. In doing so, he doesn't weigh the casual, non-military down with tactical and operational play-by-play like so many military history books.
A must read.
A must read.
November 18, 2008
T.R. Fehrenbach's "This Kind of War" is more of a "U.S. Army" history of the Korean War. It is long on tactical/operational detail, placing less stress on politics, diplomacy and grand strategy surrounding the war.
Ferhenbach has an ax to grind, but it is strictly professional. He despairs over the state of the army at the start of the war, unprepared, under-equipped and under-trained, then analyzes and chronicles how the force hardened after being bloodied. The author accepts reality, albeit with some complaint, that political necessity forced the US to defend its interests far from home in wars that required far less than total national commitment. Then he gripes at what a poor job the "national command authority" did selling this necessity to the American people.
Fehrenbach really takes aim at the Doolittle Commission of 1946. This body rearranged the relationship between the line soldier and his NCO and CO, basically robbing commanders of their ability to enforce discipline. The author devotes pages to this, citing it as the principle cause for the army's softening in the inter-war years. (I checked for citations about this body in three different books on US military history, finding brief citation in only one.)
From there, the nitty-gritty of endless company and battalion fights are recited in lengthy detail. But Fehrenbach does not succumb to the dry explanations that often accompany the arrows drawn on maps, more often found in the writings of armchair generals. Leadership plays a key role in winning the hard fight. The author will stress this when units do well, but does not lay blame as hard as Halberstam did in "The Coldest War." (There were times when Halberstam was vehement about MacArthur--Fehrenbach simply notes that he made mistakes, but does not list them all.)
There is also some generational distance that the reader may have a hard time grasping. Fehrenbach decries how permissive American society had become--in 1950!!! The young men who fought in Korea had personal experience in the Great Depression and certainly experienced rationing during WWII. Like their parents, they enjoyed some measure of peace and prosperity during the post-WWII years. Maybe permissive isn't the right word here, as we associate "permissive" with Woodstock, 1969, not Peoria, 1949. The author again stresses the necessity for a professional army that trains realistically and accepts deployment, battle and suffering without question, while acknowledging the necessity for a citizen army in a democracy that may not be well-motivated to fight a war for reasons of state ( as opposed to a total war for national survival).
I wish I read "This Kind of War" a decade ago. Better late than never--this one stays on my shelf.
October 6, 2025
This was a fine book. I just realized I don’t care about this war enough to finish it
July 23, 2017
Soap box: Fehrenbach is a huge fan of General McArthur and is cutting him all kinds of slack for his decisions which cost UN soldiers lives and suffering and prolonged the war. He's even made statements about how it's Truman's fault for not giving McArthur clearer instructions! I'm all but pulling my hair out, I'm so frustrated with this one-sided history. Do I finish the book? It's hard for me to deliberately not finish a book, and this is almost like a train wreck... where you close your eyes to not see, but peek just because you want to know just how bad it can get.
I would recommend anyone interested in reading about the Korean War to pick up The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War which is more balanced and less pro-McArthur.
Later: I'm glad that I finished this book. Written in 1963 Fehrenbach pointed out that Americans like big wars... wars where we can go all in. He called them "jihads" or wars with righteous causes. (Not a term with the same connotation today in 2012.) He argued that the rest of the century needed to be fought by "legions" which he defined as professional, well trained soldiers who understood that they are called to spend their blood for political reasons and for strategic battles. Still not my favorite Korean War book but an interesting interpretation of the conflict and the lessons that we should have learned from it.
I would recommend anyone interested in reading about the Korean War to pick up The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War which is more balanced and less pro-McArthur.
Later: I'm glad that I finished this book. Written in 1963 Fehrenbach pointed out that Americans like big wars... wars where we can go all in. He called them "jihads" or wars with righteous causes. (Not a term with the same connotation today in 2012.) He argued that the rest of the century needed to be fought by "legions" which he defined as professional, well trained soldiers who understood that they are called to spend their blood for political reasons and for strategic battles. Still not my favorite Korean War book but an interesting interpretation of the conflict and the lessons that we should have learned from it.
May 2, 2008
There's lots of sentimental bullshit about lions and legions and stoic defense of the frontiers and the necessity of harsh, just, professional men to do unspeakable things in the service of polite, gentle folk, which is unfortunate because on balance it's a good book. This stuff is partially redeemed by truly incisive analysis of the war effort and a ground-level perspective. Fehrenbach frequently summarizes entire operations not by a bloodless, detached narration of bold arrows moving over topo maps but by description drawn from personal accounts of artillery barrages, supply drops, finding bayoneted prisoners in trenches and (this is a popular one) the smell of human feces. The author does this because he himself was a participant in many of the operations he describes and his perspective saves this book from the maw of mediocrity. If you're at all interested in Korea and what it was like for the men that fought there then this is the place to start. And if you're looking for some hilarious lion metaphors you can check here too I guess.
January 24, 2016
I find the period between WWII and the start of the American troop deployments to Vietnam fascinating. So much history between Europe and Asia; between the West and the Communist Block. I also find Korea rarely covered and for that reason, I regularly grab a book on the subject, albeit not often enough.
Fehrenbach covered the ground war of Korea well. He started with the Japanese occupation and left with the repatriation of POWS. Some books cover the early part of the war and gloss over the hill battles. Fehrenback paid adequate attention to all phases of the Korean conflict. I found his commentary on the South Korean points of view enlightening as well. A good all around story of the Forgotten War.
Fehrenbach covered the ground war of Korea well. He started with the Japanese occupation and left with the repatriation of POWS. Some books cover the early part of the war and gloss over the hill battles. Fehrenback paid adequate attention to all phases of the Korean conflict. I found his commentary on the South Korean points of view enlightening as well. A good all around story of the Forgotten War.
February 24, 2021
Some questionable comments in the book that can be described as dated or worse.
When the North Koreans overran Seoul, information on all of the 5,000 South Koreans who worked at the American embassy was left behind. None of them survived.
It is difficult to know what happened from the Communist side. There never seems to be a lot of information about that. It is such a closed society in the North.
As with any disaster, we need to learn the need to prepare for the worst. Something we are not doing for the climate catastrophes heading our way now. Nor does it seem for just about anything else. Let us please learn the need for good governance and forget about this idea that anything goes is somehow a way to protect the future.
The author is critical of the idea of a "pampered, undisciplined, egalitarian army" that Americans "had long desired and had at last achieved. They had been raised to believe the world was without tigers, then sent to face those tigers with a stick."
The first edition was published in 1963. There are moments of racism that I find offensive. For example, here is a quote from Chapter 16:
"The Koreans, North and South, are by any standard a brave people, but they are mercurial, rising one moment to extremes of exaltation, dropping quickly back into despair. They can be martyrs on any given day, traitors the next. They have been called, not without reason, the Irish of the Orient. And in some cases, not even rigid Communist training, with its denial of basic human nature, can eradicate the nature of the Korean peasant."
Yet not long after that is some fascinating information about the war: Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku surrendered to American soldiers and was completely cooperative. He was the highest ranking soldier to surrender. Yet in captivity, "he would do more damage to the U. N. cause than he had ever accomplished while serving with the Inmum Gun."
And I need to finish every book that I review or not give any stars.
In the end, I was not happy with the author intrusions.
When the North Koreans overran Seoul, information on all of the 5,000 South Koreans who worked at the American embassy was left behind. None of them survived.
It is difficult to know what happened from the Communist side. There never seems to be a lot of information about that. It is such a closed society in the North.
As with any disaster, we need to learn the need to prepare for the worst. Something we are not doing for the climate catastrophes heading our way now. Nor does it seem for just about anything else. Let us please learn the need for good governance and forget about this idea that anything goes is somehow a way to protect the future.
The author is critical of the idea of a "pampered, undisciplined, egalitarian army" that Americans "had long desired and had at last achieved. They had been raised to believe the world was without tigers, then sent to face those tigers with a stick."
The first edition was published in 1963. There are moments of racism that I find offensive. For example, here is a quote from Chapter 16:
"The Koreans, North and South, are by any standard a brave people, but they are mercurial, rising one moment to extremes of exaltation, dropping quickly back into despair. They can be martyrs on any given day, traitors the next. They have been called, not without reason, the Irish of the Orient. And in some cases, not even rigid Communist training, with its denial of basic human nature, can eradicate the nature of the Korean peasant."
Yet not long after that is some fascinating information about the war: Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku surrendered to American soldiers and was completely cooperative. He was the highest ranking soldier to surrender. Yet in captivity, "he would do more damage to the U. N. cause than he had ever accomplished while serving with the Inmum Gun."
And I need to finish every book that I review or not give any stars.
In the end, I was not happy with the author intrusions.
August 1, 2013
times change and so do our expectations and language. there's some 1920s era world history free ebook floating around, and although the work is completely readable, the modern reader is somewhat shocked to see written without any sense of irony
as if, of course, Africans or African-Americans are one person, 'the Negro...'
T.R. Fehrenbach wrote his classic 1961 Korean War history just before the 60s sexual and social revolution. so in two or three places, Fehrenbach writes things like
but actually aside from this and the de rigeur criticism of the ROK army, Fehrenbach's work is still surprisingly readable, accessible, and valuable today. he isn't quite as military-focused as the paratrooper officer Max Hastings nor does he include 7 out of 10 chapters of modern left criticism of the US Army in 1950 as does the currently very popular Bruce Cumings. unlike Halberstam he doesn't drown the book half in criticism of Douglas MacArthur, but he does provide some coverage of Chipyongni and the North Korean prison revolt on their POW island in the south. overall the work is professional and proficient.
the Negro should blame himself for his plight, for nations must organize themselves first...
as if, of course, Africans or African-Americans are one person, 'the Negro...'
T.R. Fehrenbach wrote his classic 1961 Korean War history just before the 60s sexual and social revolution. so in two or three places, Fehrenbach writes things like
the North Korean soldier could survive on three rice balls a day
but actually aside from this and the de rigeur criticism of the ROK army, Fehrenbach's work is still surprisingly readable, accessible, and valuable today. he isn't quite as military-focused as the paratrooper officer Max Hastings nor does he include 7 out of 10 chapters of modern left criticism of the US Army in 1950 as does the currently very popular Bruce Cumings. unlike Halberstam he doesn't drown the book half in criticism of Douglas MacArthur, but he does provide some coverage of Chipyongni and the North Korean prison revolt on their POW island in the south. overall the work is professional and proficient.
August 3, 2011
Great book about the Korean War. I read this book because while in the Marines one of my commanding officers gave me an copy of chapter 25, entitled, Proud Legions. That chapter is still my favorite in the book because it talks about the valor and fighting ability of the Marine Corps compared to other fighting units.
The thing that I enjoyed the most about the book is that it taught me a lot about the Korean war. I drew a lot of parallels between the war in Iraq and the Korean war. If you read this book look for the similarities, they blew me away. For example their was a horrible incident at a POW camp that altered the entire war. Can you say Abu Ghraib?
The thing that I enjoyed the most about the book is that it taught me a lot about the Korean war. I drew a lot of parallels between the war in Iraq and the Korean war. If you read this book look for the similarities, they blew me away. For example their was a horrible incident at a POW camp that altered the entire war. Can you say Abu Ghraib?
January 2, 2024
This book is a thorough history of the Korean War from start to finish. Although socially and culturally ignorant in many ways (published in the early 1960s), it is very well-written, and any time TRF strays from the history, his assertions are thought-provoking and valuable. There is so much I didn’t know about the conflict: about its dangerous and clunky inception, about the defeat of the Republic of Korea’s army prior to American involvement, about American military ineptitude and incompetence in the beginning of the war, about global concern for the expansion of the war within Asia and even into Europe.
The book does an excellent job at dodging propagandist narratives and evaluating the US Army objectively: we are not and have never been tactically superior, we are good strategically, we have ample logistical assets, we enter wars soft and learn quickly; it is very conceivable in a deadlier conflict that the big first loss could be insurmountable. We have a chip on our shoulder (the level of spite and pettiness of Chinook crewmembers will never fail to astound me). I appreciated these critiques.
A lot of Army officers read this book, specifically focusing solely on Chapter 6: Task Force Smith. It seems they often somehow only come away with the idea: ‘if these soldiers don’t salute me we’re going to lose the next war.’ In reality the message should be: ‘if I can’t foster a fighting culture - within a system that lets us exclusively train to fight - we’re going to lose the next war.’
Last, the Korean War labeled as the ‘forgotten war’ is misleading because it implies the American people experienced the war and then forgot it. This book illuminates more appropriate phrasing and sequencing for the conflict: the hidden war. The American people barely knew there was a war occurring due to government censorship of the media and an overall lack of governmental transparency. Regardless of the government’s success in obstructing the flow of information and constructing a false narrative, the men that fought and died were real. So it goes.
Favorite quotes:
“A soldier’s destiny, which few escape, is to suffer…”
“Only those who have never learned self-restraint fear reasonable discipline.”
“Crusades, even when failures, are emotionally satisfying. Wars of containment, wars of policy, are not.”
“From the time of Athens and Republican Rome, no representative parliament has ever had much success with dealings beyond the water. There have been historians who claim that continued involvement of a people beyond its own frontiers inevitably produces Caesarism.” (Caesarism in this instance is alluding to the potential for MacArthur and his reckless provocations to eventually “cross the Rubicon.”)
“…wars fought for a higher purpose must always be the most hideous of all. It is desperately hard for men to accept that there is a direct path from the highest ideals to the torture chamber; for no man who accepts with his whole heart can fail equally to reject with his whole being… war was to be entered upon with sadness, with regret, but also, with ferocity.”
“A competent, adequately trained basic rifleman could be made in eleven months. Competent, well-schooled commanders and staffs could not.”
“Americans… inevitably tend to think in terms of holy war: against militarism, against fascism, against Bolshevism…” (against terrorism 👀)
“…we’re saying goodbye to them all, we’re Harry’s police force on call…”
The book does an excellent job at dodging propagandist narratives and evaluating the US Army objectively: we are not and have never been tactically superior, we are good strategically, we have ample logistical assets, we enter wars soft and learn quickly; it is very conceivable in a deadlier conflict that the big first loss could be insurmountable. We have a chip on our shoulder (the level of spite and pettiness of Chinook crewmembers will never fail to astound me). I appreciated these critiques.
A lot of Army officers read this book, specifically focusing solely on Chapter 6: Task Force Smith. It seems they often somehow only come away with the idea: ‘if these soldiers don’t salute me we’re going to lose the next war.’ In reality the message should be: ‘if I can’t foster a fighting culture - within a system that lets us exclusively train to fight - we’re going to lose the next war.’
Last, the Korean War labeled as the ‘forgotten war’ is misleading because it implies the American people experienced the war and then forgot it. This book illuminates more appropriate phrasing and sequencing for the conflict: the hidden war. The American people barely knew there was a war occurring due to government censorship of the media and an overall lack of governmental transparency. Regardless of the government’s success in obstructing the flow of information and constructing a false narrative, the men that fought and died were real. So it goes.
Favorite quotes:
“A soldier’s destiny, which few escape, is to suffer…”
“Only those who have never learned self-restraint fear reasonable discipline.”
“Crusades, even when failures, are emotionally satisfying. Wars of containment, wars of policy, are not.”
“From the time of Athens and Republican Rome, no representative parliament has ever had much success with dealings beyond the water. There have been historians who claim that continued involvement of a people beyond its own frontiers inevitably produces Caesarism.” (Caesarism in this instance is alluding to the potential for MacArthur and his reckless provocations to eventually “cross the Rubicon.”)
“…wars fought for a higher purpose must always be the most hideous of all. It is desperately hard for men to accept that there is a direct path from the highest ideals to the torture chamber; for no man who accepts with his whole heart can fail equally to reject with his whole being… war was to be entered upon with sadness, with regret, but also, with ferocity.”
“A competent, adequately trained basic rifleman could be made in eleven months. Competent, well-schooled commanders and staffs could not.”
“Americans… inevitably tend to think in terms of holy war: against militarism, against fascism, against Bolshevism…” (against terrorism 👀)
“…we’re saying goodbye to them all, we’re Harry’s police force on call…”
April 3, 2025
Listened to the audio version read by Kevin Foley.
For some reason he decided to do "accents" which seemed pulled at random and reside in the range of Looney Tunes racial stereotypes. While a little distracting at first (and unintentionally hilarious) it actually was a helpful audio cue to know who was speaking.
I very much appreciated the shifting frames of reference Fehrenbach would drift in and out of (i.e. one moment describing frontline action, the next- consternation at the executive level, and then American public opinion). He did a good job of generalizing American attitudes, prejudices, shortcomings, and strengths over and against similar generalizations of our opponents and co-belligerents. While academic historians probably hiss and boo at his generalizations, I personally think it's the duty of any author to tell you their opinion of a thing. Fehrenbach was an officer in the war and writes in a style frankly not that different from Thucydides in chronicling the Peloponnesian War (which he, likewise participated in-- while not making the narrative all about himself).
If he has a "moral" to the story, it's that America needs to make up its mind if it wants to have a "Legion" (a professional warrior caste that will implement American foreign policy with an iron will, anywher ein the world) or not. He posits that America at the moment (he wrote in 1963) was trying to have its cake and eat it too-- privileging peacetime occupations/business for its citizens, while also trying to play world-police-- all while relying on a (mostly) volunteer military.
Personally, I disagree with him. I think the answer is that there needs to be a social expectation that every man be war-ready up to a certain age. I think unpaid military drill for men from 15-35 would be ideal. No contracts. No compensation. Just basic weapon competency, order following, and physical fitness. Additionally an assigned "competency" (plumber, electrician, medical, white collar) that would be seen as an additional duty to "combatant." Not only would this be a massive force for good in shaping the young men of America (if done well)- to include massive health benefits, it could greatly reduce the money spent on national defense. I'm sure you're thinking right now, "Oh no-- if we don't have 'professionals,' we'll be unprepared!"
Well, let me tell you right now, I spent over a decade in the military and I can tell you that the best coders aren't in uniform, the best drone operators aren't in uniform, in short, if we got into a real, existential war, we'd need to "brain-drain" the civilian sector anyway, so why not already keep tabs on where all the skillsets are we'd need to use and make every American male conscious of his duty to his country? It would have the added benefit of making the average citizen MUCH more conscientious about who he voted for!
Anyway, great book. Highly recommend. More than just a chronicling of the tik-tok of the war's progression, but insights into the American character.
For some reason he decided to do "accents" which seemed pulled at random and reside in the range of Looney Tunes racial stereotypes. While a little distracting at first (and unintentionally hilarious) it actually was a helpful audio cue to know who was speaking.
I very much appreciated the shifting frames of reference Fehrenbach would drift in and out of (i.e. one moment describing frontline action, the next- consternation at the executive level, and then American public opinion). He did a good job of generalizing American attitudes, prejudices, shortcomings, and strengths over and against similar generalizations of our opponents and co-belligerents. While academic historians probably hiss and boo at his generalizations, I personally think it's the duty of any author to tell you their opinion of a thing. Fehrenbach was an officer in the war and writes in a style frankly not that different from Thucydides in chronicling the Peloponnesian War (which he, likewise participated in-- while not making the narrative all about himself).
If he has a "moral" to the story, it's that America needs to make up its mind if it wants to have a "Legion" (a professional warrior caste that will implement American foreign policy with an iron will, anywher ein the world) or not. He posits that America at the moment (he wrote in 1963) was trying to have its cake and eat it too-- privileging peacetime occupations/business for its citizens, while also trying to play world-police-- all while relying on a (mostly) volunteer military.
Personally, I disagree with him. I think the answer is that there needs to be a social expectation that every man be war-ready up to a certain age. I think unpaid military drill for men from 15-35 would be ideal. No contracts. No compensation. Just basic weapon competency, order following, and physical fitness. Additionally an assigned "competency" (plumber, electrician, medical, white collar) that would be seen as an additional duty to "combatant." Not only would this be a massive force for good in shaping the young men of America (if done well)- to include massive health benefits, it could greatly reduce the money spent on national defense. I'm sure you're thinking right now, "Oh no-- if we don't have 'professionals,' we'll be unprepared!"
Well, let me tell you right now, I spent over a decade in the military and I can tell you that the best coders aren't in uniform, the best drone operators aren't in uniform, in short, if we got into a real, existential war, we'd need to "brain-drain" the civilian sector anyway, so why not already keep tabs on where all the skillsets are we'd need to use and make every American male conscious of his duty to his country? It would have the added benefit of making the average citizen MUCH more conscientious about who he voted for!
Anyway, great book. Highly recommend. More than just a chronicling of the tik-tok of the war's progression, but insights into the American character.
February 9, 2025
Excellent book. Greatly increased my understanding of the Korean War. Predominantly focused on the ground war with some focus on the eventual and slow moving cease fire talks, limited discussion on the air war.
January 24, 2024
This was really good, a little dated but very informative and engaging!
February 25, 2015
Wish I knew all this sooner.
I knew very little about the Korean War. I've studied both World Wars, Vietnam, and the Cold War in general, but Korea hardly ever comes up. I never realized how strong an effect Korea had on American policy until now. If you are interested in Foreign policy and the Cold War, I highly recommend learning about this chapter in history (if not from Fehrenbach, then from somewhere).
The writing itself is somewhat heavy on military details and will likely be difficult for someone unfamiliar with that sort of terminology. Fehrenbach also occasionally gives grand descriptions to events and players, with 'legions on the far frontier' coming fairly often in various arrangements. Having served in the military myself, I can appreciate themes like this. Given Fehrenbach's own service, it is hardly surprising to see, though I imagine others might have a lesser view of such things.
The greatest strength of the book is the ease with which Fehrenbach transitions from macro level strategic and political concerns (written in an easy to follow manner) to the micro level experiences of individual men, who are used to illuminate the struggles faced by men in all areas of the war. Having completed the book, I can see the frustration of the men in the field, unable to understand why Washington and the UN was tying their hands partway into the war; I can see why the U.S. and UN leaders were trying to hold back, hoping to avoid a general war with the Soviets; and I think I understand a little bit better what the Communists were trying to do in Korea, though I despise their leaders actions.
Personally, I reacted with a bit more emotion to this book than I expected. The events of the Korean War seem like some sort of tragic, pointless fiction rather than reality. I can understand why no one wants to dwell on it. But I think it is history that, bitter as it tastes, should be better known. I saw faint reflections of modern times reflected in this history of the Korean War, and I think there are lessons in it which should not be tossed aside.
In summary, I give 'This Kind of War' 4 stars. It is an excellent book which is perhaps a bit heavy on military maneuvering. I think some might get bogged down in these details, but it is worth pressing through. It is also far less dry than you might expect.
Note: The Kindle edition is riddled with a huge number of typos, to the point that I almost rated this three stars instead of four. Some were so baffling that I had to come to a dead stop just to figure out what I was looking at. It's still very readable as a whole, but whoever is responsible for this version should be embarrassed.
I knew very little about the Korean War. I've studied both World Wars, Vietnam, and the Cold War in general, but Korea hardly ever comes up. I never realized how strong an effect Korea had on American policy until now. If you are interested in Foreign policy and the Cold War, I highly recommend learning about this chapter in history (if not from Fehrenbach, then from somewhere).
The writing itself is somewhat heavy on military details and will likely be difficult for someone unfamiliar with that sort of terminology. Fehrenbach also occasionally gives grand descriptions to events and players, with 'legions on the far frontier' coming fairly often in various arrangements. Having served in the military myself, I can appreciate themes like this. Given Fehrenbach's own service, it is hardly surprising to see, though I imagine others might have a lesser view of such things.
The greatest strength of the book is the ease with which Fehrenbach transitions from macro level strategic and political concerns (written in an easy to follow manner) to the micro level experiences of individual men, who are used to illuminate the struggles faced by men in all areas of the war. Having completed the book, I can see the frustration of the men in the field, unable to understand why Washington and the UN was tying their hands partway into the war; I can see why the U.S. and UN leaders were trying to hold back, hoping to avoid a general war with the Soviets; and I think I understand a little bit better what the Communists were trying to do in Korea, though I despise their leaders actions.
Personally, I reacted with a bit more emotion to this book than I expected. The events of the Korean War seem like some sort of tragic, pointless fiction rather than reality. I can understand why no one wants to dwell on it. But I think it is history that, bitter as it tastes, should be better known. I saw faint reflections of modern times reflected in this history of the Korean War, and I think there are lessons in it which should not be tossed aside.
In summary, I give 'This Kind of War' 4 stars. It is an excellent book which is perhaps a bit heavy on military maneuvering. I think some might get bogged down in these details, but it is worth pressing through. It is also far less dry than you might expect.
Note: The Kindle edition is riddled with a huge number of typos, to the point that I almost rated this three stars instead of four. Some were so baffling that I had to come to a dead stop just to figure out what I was looking at. It's still very readable as a whole, but whoever is responsible for this version should be embarrassed.
February 23, 2019
Work of Flawed Opinion Rather Than History
This book is widely viewed as the best book on the Korean War by military professionals and national security policy makers alike. However, there are significant issues with Fehrenbach’s assessments, conclusions, and sourcing. Throughout the book, Fehrenbach’s confirmation bias and mirror imaging of his perceived experience in the war are so strong that I could not see how this is accepted as a respectable work of history. It is dangerous that this book is universally praised by military leaders.
The lessons of Task Force Smith for readiness, hubris leading to intelligence failures, and the sacrifice of tactical and operational success for strategic gain are very real. However, Fehrenbach consistently draws the conclusion that softness and liberalism led to the death of thousands whereas as a professional legion would have saved the day. Nothing further from the truth could be stated. In all wars and in all nations, cowardice and lack of skill and training are perpetually present. It is especially nothing new for American war fighting.
What was new for American war fighting, in regards to the Korean War, was the lack of mental agility of American leadership to understand the strategic, operational, as tactical concepts employed by the CCF. Sun Tzu first wrote, and Mao leveraged, the need to erase battle lines from the concept of warfare. Americans forgot the lessons of the Revolution by always focusing on Jomini style warfare with clean lines of battle. The US military has yet to adjust to this shortcoming to this day and continues to pay the price in low intensity conflict across the globe. This book fits nicely into American military leaderships fantasized view of what warfare should look like. It gives operational and strategic leaders an out by essentially stating “well if these liberal wussies that are getting raised now weren’t such cowards, the war would have been over by Christmas.”
The only reason I gave this two stars is because of the chapter on BG Boatner’s successful operation to fix the systemic issues at Koje-do Island.
This book is widely viewed as the best book on the Korean War by military professionals and national security policy makers alike. However, there are significant issues with Fehrenbach’s assessments, conclusions, and sourcing. Throughout the book, Fehrenbach’s confirmation bias and mirror imaging of his perceived experience in the war are so strong that I could not see how this is accepted as a respectable work of history. It is dangerous that this book is universally praised by military leaders.
The lessons of Task Force Smith for readiness, hubris leading to intelligence failures, and the sacrifice of tactical and operational success for strategic gain are very real. However, Fehrenbach consistently draws the conclusion that softness and liberalism led to the death of thousands whereas as a professional legion would have saved the day. Nothing further from the truth could be stated. In all wars and in all nations, cowardice and lack of skill and training are perpetually present. It is especially nothing new for American war fighting.
What was new for American war fighting, in regards to the Korean War, was the lack of mental agility of American leadership to understand the strategic, operational, as tactical concepts employed by the CCF. Sun Tzu first wrote, and Mao leveraged, the need to erase battle lines from the concept of warfare. Americans forgot the lessons of the Revolution by always focusing on Jomini style warfare with clean lines of battle. The US military has yet to adjust to this shortcoming to this day and continues to pay the price in low intensity conflict across the globe. This book fits nicely into American military leaderships fantasized view of what warfare should look like. It gives operational and strategic leaders an out by essentially stating “well if these liberal wussies that are getting raised now weren’t such cowards, the war would have been over by Christmas.”
The only reason I gave this two stars is because of the chapter on BG Boatner’s successful operation to fix the systemic issues at Koje-do Island.
September 6, 2017
Appears daunting when first picked up off the shelf, but the author does a good job of keeping the historical narrative flowing. My primary criticism of the book is that it does not include helpful visual aids like battle maps, etc. While there is a source packet at the beginning of the book containing various maps as referenced throughout the writing, I did not find them very helpful or detailed. However, the amount of content covered in this book (Korean war, start to finish) certainly requires the author to maintain a broad-brush stroke distance from actual engagements and battles. Would recommend for the inexperienced history reader looking to build a foundation for future edification on the Korean War/Cold War History.
April 27, 2019
I have machinated for a feed days on how I can write any review that does this book justice. Written in 1963, this work is much more than a discussion of the Korean War on a tactical or operational level. On the eve of large scale US intervention in Vietnam, the author delves into the problems faced by liberal societies in engaging in limited wars. Fehrenbach describes how American’s are prone to throw their weight behind large crusades, but are less inclined to support limited wars as extensions of policy decisions. I also was fascinated by the discussion of the state of the conflict during peace negotiations, and the risk aversion centered around the Presidential election of 1952.
I believe this book is essential to anyone involved in any aspect of the CIVMIL apparatus.
I believe this book is essential to anyone involved in any aspect of the CIVMIL apparatus.
November 5, 2022
Wow for an older history, wow a five star read. T.R. Fehrenbach’s, This Kind of War The Classic Korean War History is an outstanding history of the long under studied war A classic small unit history that doesn’t fail to address high level leaders both civilian and military.
A full war history from the origins to the final outcome and analysis. Fehrenbach touches those who fought and died in the war in numerous small unit engagements at the platoon, company, regimental and division level. He paints a picture of war entered by a nation that neither wanted or was prepared for war either emotionally nor politically with soldiers ill trained to fight a war.
I would definitely recommend this to all interested in the study the war.
A full war history from the origins to the final outcome and analysis. Fehrenbach touches those who fought and died in the war in numerous small unit engagements at the platoon, company, regimental and division level. He paints a picture of war entered by a nation that neither wanted or was prepared for war either emotionally nor politically with soldiers ill trained to fight a war.
I would definitely recommend this to all interested in the study the war.
April 28, 2014
It's what they didn't teach us
As a child of the 60s, you would think that I would have learned about the Korean War in school. It wasn't that long ago and the lessons would have been very useful, especially in light of the wars to come afterwards. Sadly, it wasn't. I really liked this book. It seemed to present a balanced view of the events. It also didn't hold back when talking about the dying and maiming that took place. I could go on about the waste of lives that comes from war, but this is a review of the book. I learned a lot. I was glad I read it. I recommend it to anyone who wants to learn about the Korean War.
As a child of the 60s, you would think that I would have learned about the Korean War in school. It wasn't that long ago and the lessons would have been very useful, especially in light of the wars to come afterwards. Sadly, it wasn't. I really liked this book. It seemed to present a balanced view of the events. It also didn't hold back when talking about the dying and maiming that took place. I could go on about the waste of lives that comes from war, but this is a review of the book. I learned a lot. I was glad I read it. I recommend it to anyone who wants to learn about the Korean War.
October 16, 2019
Perhaps too much inspiration from Thucydides, but that can make the reading more enjoyable. Good military overview of the conflict with lots of individual stories and details. But also a fair bit of post-war analysis by someone who fought in the conflict. At times a bit bitter, but the political analysis rings true. A war on the empire's frontier requires a very different kind of army.
January 24, 2019
If you want to know what happened during the Korean War, this is the book you should read. Yes, yes, there are more recent ones with probably better access to newly declassified records but Fehrenbach’s is more contemporary, written in 1962, when the memories, the nightmares, were fresher. And it is nightmare reading. My God, what the troops, on both sides, went through. What the South Korean people went through. It’s like Mordor. All because, a mere five years after winning WW2, America was gone.
Oh, not in the sense of the Third Reich or Imperial Japan, ruins and death and wreckage, but spiritually, morally, its national zeitgeist. By the beginning of the 50’s, the no-nonsense, tough, realistic America that rolled up its sleeves, took up arms, and broke the back of fascism was over. Instead, we became an America of hesitation, complication, and overly sophisticated political nuance. No more good and evil, no more right and wrong and simple choices; nuclear weapons had made war unthinkable. Unfortunately for us, not everyone believed that, and we were caught in a trap of our own making. We had the nukes but not the Army, and no one, except the true crazies, were willing to irradiate the world over a border dispute. We were the victims of our own success.
Americans have never trusted nor wanted a standing Army. We don’t like armies. We don’t see them as an instrument of national policy, like the Brits did. We had a small Army that chased Apaches, and we didn’t call up young men and march Over There unless we had to. As we had already done. Twice. That’s it, we’re finished, let the malcontents and misfits chase Apaches, we’ve got a Madison Avenue and Wall Street to build, as was our due for winning the Last Big One. So while Americans became Mad Men, safe behind our nuclear umbrella, the Army was left to rot. Here, kids, use these surplus rifles and tanks for your silly war game playing soldier exercises you like so much. And, you officers and sergeants, stop yelling at the recruits and making them feel bad about themselves. Stop all the tough training, too, because that also hurts their feelings. Be more like civilians, you warmongers.
And we did. Sergeants asked pretty please. Barracks weren’t GI’d anymore; sports days replaced marching. And trucks and transports rusted and broke. Oh sure, we had occupation duties, but the Axis was chastened and Japan was outstanding duty with houseboys (and girls) to do your bidding and shine your shoes and, really, why waste taxpayer money on all those annoying and noisy exercises?
And all that time, some rough beast slouched towards Seoul.
Fehrenbach’s description and analysis of the North Korean Army will chill you to the bone. Those guys were good. They were were well organized. They were well equipped. And they had purpose. Yeah, you say, then why’d they lose?
Who said they did?
Because, when all said and done and hundreds of thousands of Koreans were dead and their towns and villages nothing but blackened ruins, the North Koreans were still there. And still are. The US got the crap kicked out of it. There is simply no other way to put it. A peasant Army with no air support and very little armor pushed the greatest fighting force in the world almost into the sea. What prevented that final push is something that Rommel observed: Americans are badly prepared for war, but learn quickly. And it took the destruction of Task Force Smith and tens of thousands of US casualties before we finally learned that the best way to fight, first the North, and then the Chinese, was the same way we fought the Apaches: stay in the field, live out of your saddle, and hit and run. Wear them down. Choke them off. Starve them. But it cost. Oh, did it cost. Our invincibility, and, most importantly, our reputation.
And our confidence. It’s the Forgotten War because we don’t want the reminder that maybe, just maybe, we’re not all that. TVs and refrigerators and little boxes on the hillside and Mom’s new Amana kitchen and all the fifties and sixties good life had a cancer gnawing at its bones. Bustling cities and corporations and experts and Dr. Spock and commissions replaced the common sense and homespun knowledge that defined a pioneering, self-contained, independent person…you know, the average American. This was the atomic age, the modern age, and we have no time for that quaint Pilgrim way of thinking anymore. There’s a world to govern. There’s a New Modern Man to build.
All that time I rode my Spyder bike up and down streets well past dark, running with my friends in an American neighborhood of peace and security and assurance, doors left unlocked, Swanson’s TV dinners and Ed Sullivan and everything good. And a classmate was murdered by his mother, and my family split up, and Presidents and preachers were shot and cities burned and it had to be those dirty Commies, the same ones who crashed through the 38th parallel but no, it wasn’t.
It was us.
I didn’t really know that until recently. I blamed hippies and drugs and Democrats, but all that is mere symptom. Fehrenback spotted it early on. We had forgotten who we are and what we should be and the costs of remaining independent in the face of the envies and the lusts for power and control which are the true motives of mankind. We were Americans. Why, when those Norks find out its Task Force Smith on this ridge waiting for them, they’ll turn tail and run.
When those Cong find out it’s the Seventh Cavalry landing here in the Little Bighorn…er, Ia Drang Valley, why they’ll just turn tail and run.
We learn nothing.
Oh, not in the sense of the Third Reich or Imperial Japan, ruins and death and wreckage, but spiritually, morally, its national zeitgeist. By the beginning of the 50’s, the no-nonsense, tough, realistic America that rolled up its sleeves, took up arms, and broke the back of fascism was over. Instead, we became an America of hesitation, complication, and overly sophisticated political nuance. No more good and evil, no more right and wrong and simple choices; nuclear weapons had made war unthinkable. Unfortunately for us, not everyone believed that, and we were caught in a trap of our own making. We had the nukes but not the Army, and no one, except the true crazies, were willing to irradiate the world over a border dispute. We were the victims of our own success.
Americans have never trusted nor wanted a standing Army. We don’t like armies. We don’t see them as an instrument of national policy, like the Brits did. We had a small Army that chased Apaches, and we didn’t call up young men and march Over There unless we had to. As we had already done. Twice. That’s it, we’re finished, let the malcontents and misfits chase Apaches, we’ve got a Madison Avenue and Wall Street to build, as was our due for winning the Last Big One. So while Americans became Mad Men, safe behind our nuclear umbrella, the Army was left to rot. Here, kids, use these surplus rifles and tanks for your silly war game playing soldier exercises you like so much. And, you officers and sergeants, stop yelling at the recruits and making them feel bad about themselves. Stop all the tough training, too, because that also hurts their feelings. Be more like civilians, you warmongers.
And we did. Sergeants asked pretty please. Barracks weren’t GI’d anymore; sports days replaced marching. And trucks and transports rusted and broke. Oh sure, we had occupation duties, but the Axis was chastened and Japan was outstanding duty with houseboys (and girls) to do your bidding and shine your shoes and, really, why waste taxpayer money on all those annoying and noisy exercises?
And all that time, some rough beast slouched towards Seoul.
Fehrenbach’s description and analysis of the North Korean Army will chill you to the bone. Those guys were good. They were were well organized. They were well equipped. And they had purpose. Yeah, you say, then why’d they lose?
Who said they did?
Because, when all said and done and hundreds of thousands of Koreans were dead and their towns and villages nothing but blackened ruins, the North Koreans were still there. And still are. The US got the crap kicked out of it. There is simply no other way to put it. A peasant Army with no air support and very little armor pushed the greatest fighting force in the world almost into the sea. What prevented that final push is something that Rommel observed: Americans are badly prepared for war, but learn quickly. And it took the destruction of Task Force Smith and tens of thousands of US casualties before we finally learned that the best way to fight, first the North, and then the Chinese, was the same way we fought the Apaches: stay in the field, live out of your saddle, and hit and run. Wear them down. Choke them off. Starve them. But it cost. Oh, did it cost. Our invincibility, and, most importantly, our reputation.
And our confidence. It’s the Forgotten War because we don’t want the reminder that maybe, just maybe, we’re not all that. TVs and refrigerators and little boxes on the hillside and Mom’s new Amana kitchen and all the fifties and sixties good life had a cancer gnawing at its bones. Bustling cities and corporations and experts and Dr. Spock and commissions replaced the common sense and homespun knowledge that defined a pioneering, self-contained, independent person…you know, the average American. This was the atomic age, the modern age, and we have no time for that quaint Pilgrim way of thinking anymore. There’s a world to govern. There’s a New Modern Man to build.
All that time I rode my Spyder bike up and down streets well past dark, running with my friends in an American neighborhood of peace and security and assurance, doors left unlocked, Swanson’s TV dinners and Ed Sullivan and everything good. And a classmate was murdered by his mother, and my family split up, and Presidents and preachers were shot and cities burned and it had to be those dirty Commies, the same ones who crashed through the 38th parallel but no, it wasn’t.
It was us.
I didn’t really know that until recently. I blamed hippies and drugs and Democrats, but all that is mere symptom. Fehrenback spotted it early on. We had forgotten who we are and what we should be and the costs of remaining independent in the face of the envies and the lusts for power and control which are the true motives of mankind. We were Americans. Why, when those Norks find out its Task Force Smith on this ridge waiting for them, they’ll turn tail and run.
When those Cong find out it’s the Seventh Cavalry landing here in the Little Bighorn…er, Ia Drang Valley, why they’ll just turn tail and run.
We learn nothing.
June 7, 2023
Where the Frozen Chosin is a deep dive into one battle, this is a great overview of the Korean Conflict (wasn't called a War until later).
The book jumps around trying to provide highlights of each of the different parts of the war to include broad overviews, and specific details.
Some of the parts I liked is the contrast between Chinese and N. Korean POW camps and American/UN POW camps.
The book also went into more detail then I have read elsewhere about the use of negotiations to manipulate the terms that the adversary was fighting on. The UN forces seeking to limit fighting, while communist forces sought to exploit that view.
It was a good book to give an overview and total understanding of the Korean War. I would recommend it to anyone interested in military history.
The book jumps around trying to provide highlights of each of the different parts of the war to include broad overviews, and specific details.
Some of the parts I liked is the contrast between Chinese and N. Korean POW camps and American/UN POW camps.
The book also went into more detail then I have read elsewhere about the use of negotiations to manipulate the terms that the adversary was fighting on. The UN forces seeking to limit fighting, while communist forces sought to exploit that view.
It was a good book to give an overview and total understanding of the Korean War. I would recommend it to anyone interested in military history.
August 15, 2023
The best and worst parts of this book is its strict loyalty and dogged to the American people. Fehrenbach has a clear understanding of the culture that led to the deployment in Korea and offers real insight into the minds of the american commanders. But you often get a sense that he skates delicately around criticising anything about America's actions overseas -- except when the victims are also American.
April 19, 2025
Excellent complete history of the Korean War. Cannot recommend this book enough for anyone ready to begin learning about the Korean War. The book was authored in 1963 and I quite liked the authors take on events of the time. There are several parallels between the army of 1950 and current day. We would be wise to heed the authors advice.
I had a small issue with the binding of this book which fell apart by the conclusion of my reading.
I had a small issue with the binding of this book which fell apart by the conclusion of my reading.
October 12, 2018
Difficult conflict, difficult book
If my Dad had not fought in this war, I don’t think I would have finished reading this book. The major shortcoming was that no maps were included.
If my Dad had not fought in this war, I don’t think I would have finished reading this book. The major shortcoming was that no maps were included.
June 10, 2021
I'm in the middle of reading this. I keep putting it down because I want to reach back in time and slap a bunch of officers, politicians, and journalists.
The incidents between MacArthur and Truman were known to me but not the depth of the General's disregard of the chain of command and disrespect of the office of the president.
This book is important.
The incidents between MacArthur and Truman were known to me but not the depth of the General's disregard of the chain of command and disrespect of the office of the president.
This book is important.
January 28, 2018
Mad Dog Mattis recommended this in light of the Korean missile testing. Fehrenbach takes an objective look at the Korean War identifying helpful lessons learned to improve readiness of the American forces in future conflicts.
August 11, 2021
Although interesting to read propaganda from the 1960s this book was only slightly better than information I could have received from Wikipedia. Battles, although well captured, were confusing and so much of the focus was on this concept that civilians had ruined US warfare. Worth a read for historical reasons primarily because the literature on this topic is minimal.
March 17, 2025
Written in 1963 but you would never know it.
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