Gorbachev: His Life and Times

by William Taubman

Finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award in Biography
Longlisted for the Andrew Carnegie Medal for Excellence in Nonfiction

The definitive biography of the transformational Russian leader by the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of Khrushchev .

"Essential reading for the twenty-first [century]." ―Radhika Jones, The New York Times Book Review When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, the USSR. was one of the world’s two superpowers. By 1989, his liberal policies of perestroika and glasnost had permanently transformed Soviet Communism, and had made enemies of radicals on the right and left. By 1990 he, more than anyone else, had ended the Cold War, and in 1991, after barely escaping from a coup attempt, he unintentionally presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union he had tried to save. In the first comprehensive biography of the final Soviet leader, William Taubman shows how a peasant boy became the Soviet system’s gravedigger, how he clambered to the top of a system designed to keep people like him down, how he found common ground with America’s arch-conservative president Ronald Reagan, and how he permitted the USSR and its East European empire to break apart without using force to preserve them. Throughout, Taubman portrays the many sides of Gorbachev’s unique character that, by Gorbachev’s own admission, make him "difficult to understand." Was he in fact a truly great leader, or was he brought low in the end by his own shortcomings, as well as by the unyielding forces he faced? Drawing on interviews with Gorbachev himself, transcripts and documents from the Russian archives, and interviews with Kremlin aides and adversaries, as well as foreign leaders, Taubman’s intensely personal portrait extends to Gorbachev’s remarkable marriage to a woman he deeply loved, and to the family that they raised together. Nuanced and poignant, yet unsparing and honest, this sweeping account has all the amplitude of a great Russian novel. 90 illustrations

Genres: Biography, History, Russia, Nonfiction, Politics, Russian History, Biography Memoir

880 pages, Paperback

First published September 5, 2017

Reviews

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

Taubman calls Gorbachev a “tragic hero”. In trying to create a free and open society he brought about the demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party he led. He freed the Eastern European client states from Soviet control and the former USSR republics became independent countries. Taubmen shows us the attributes that enabled this unique individual to navigate a dangerous and corrupt society to accomplish in a few years what would have seemed impossible when he came to power. But Gorbachev didn’t want the USSR dissolved. He wanted to unite the people around his policies of glasnost (openness and transparency) and perestroika (restructuring). Then events cascaded beyond his ability to control them. He fell far short of his goals and to his countrymen he looked like a failure. But he gave reformers a chance to pick up where he left off. Sadly corruption would still dominate Russia under Yeltsin and Russia would fall back into an authoritarian state under Putin. Other former USSR republics and client states met varying degrees of success. While this is primarily the story of the man, his personal life as well as his political career, it is also the story of the Soviet Union’s last days. Taubman details a critical piece of Soviet and Russian history helping us to understand this remarkable transition and the end of the cold war.

We get a full picture of Gorbachev. Taubman takes us through his childhood, his days at Moscow State University, his beginning roles in the Komsomol (the Young Communist league), and Communist Party. We see his rise up the ranks and the important influence of his strong, smart and educated wife Raisa. Both were born into poverty and both made the most of their studies and opportunities falling in love and getting married in college. Gorbachev grew up in the North Caucasus in a hut with several small rooms populated by his extended family. Born in 1931 he went through the famines, the Stalin purges and the occupation of the Germans in WWII. His father miraculously survived after fighting at the front and became a combine driver on a collective farm. Gorbachev understood farming, poverty and rural Russia at a fundamental level. He had a sharp mind combined with a winning personality. He excelled at school and in the Komsomol. Then at the best university in the country he learned about city life and the thinking of the sons and daughters of the Communist elite.

He returned to the region where he grew up. A good cultivator of relationships, he used his charm and ability to methodically move into ever higher positions first in the Komsomol then in the Party. In 1970 he became regional party boss. His focus was agriculture. He was a hard worker, faithful husband and caring father. He drank only as much as necessary in a society where drunkenness was endemic. He was honest in country where corruption was the norm. But despite his political success in the party he found that his policies were ineffective and he realized the problems were structural. He had been inspired by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin. But Khrushchev had been deposed and Brezhnev took over. Stagnation in the Soviet Union had set in. The country continued to be run by old hard liners with strict policies enforced by the KGB. Authoritarian top down policies were implemented by ministers with political skills but little understanding of their policies or their impact. In 1978 Gorbachev was promoted to Moscow and membership in the party’s Central Committee. He worked his way up to the Politburo. While he developed ideas about reform he was a loyal follower of the Party line. Like all the others he was very careful about what he said and to whom.

In March 1985 Gorbachev ascended to General Secretary of the Communist Party, the powerful ruler of the Soviet Union. He was full of ideas for reform but was careful not to go too far. His early efforts in 1985-86 did nothing. Old ways were firmly entrenched. He tried an anti-alcohol campaign which had been done before. It lost him support and hurt the economy which was in abysmal condition. He tried to energize people with his “accelerate” campaign, another worthless Communist feel good program. He realized his failures. In foreign policy his openness and competence impressed leaders in the West. But when he tried to negotiate arms reduction with Reagan, he ended up getting nowhere. Gorbachev realized he had to cut defense spending which was taking far too much of Soviet resources in order to build up industry and agriculture. He also still had to end a costly war in Afghanistan that he had inherited and he had no plan to handle the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe.

Still, significant changes were being made and they were evident to the public. Gorbachev was popular, reformers felt empowered and the conservative establishment felt threatened and worked to undermine him. In Gorbachev’s addresses to the Politburo and Central Committee he tried to expand on the idea of glasnost, a concept that had previously only gotten lip service. Gorbachev permitted the release of controversial films and books that challenged the Communist Party’s doctrinaire history revealing some of the party’s past crimes. He released dissident and father of the Soviet H-bomb, Andrei Sakharov, from exile. Gorbachev was replacing the concept of the class struggle with the need for cooperation and a peaceful world in the nuclear age. The accident at Chernobyl provided a small taste of what a nuclear war would mean. He started using the term perestroika more frequently. He said “’not just of the way people work but of the psychological makeup of people. Without a perestroika of minds, there will be no restructuring of practical behavior.’”

In 1987 Gorbachev went on the offensive for democratization, reforming the economy and picking up where Khrushchev left off, condemning Stalin’s atrocities. He got the Central Committee to vote to provide more freedom in party elections, but his proposal didn’t adequately lay out the specifics. Likewise his economic plans to allow state enterprises more freedom and workers more of a say didn’t amount to much. But these plans and his denunciation of Stalin polarized opinion. The old timers and hardliners were aghast. The people and the young reformers were hopeful. Boris Yeltsin, who Gorbachev had known for years, became outspokenly critical claiming Gorbachev was both over optimistic and his plans didn’t go far enough. Yeltsin, an impulsive populist, and Gorbachev became irreparably at odds.

In 1988 Gorbachev was able to push through specific legislation that required elections for many party officials in the coming year, essentially creating a national legislature. First he had to overcome fierce opposition from the conservatives who saw this as their last chance to derail perestroika. From the other side, he was criticized by his nemeses, Yeltsin. Gorbachev was able to go on and purge the Politburo of hardliners and reduce the size of the bureaucracy. It should be noted that Gorbachev’s reforms were only possible using his supreme power as General Secretary. Glasnost was in full swing. Journals took every point of view. Formerly forbidden books and films were now everywhere. But Gorbachev was overlooking the effect on non-Russians in the Soviet Union that wanted to go their own way, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Lithuanians and many more. He also left the Eastern Europe satellites to figure it out for themselves, some run by extreme hardliners, others looking for direction. While he found it difficult to engage East European leaders, he was very comfortable with West European leaders, particularly Margaret Thatcher. He took a difficult positive step admitting defeat in Afghanistan and began to pull out.

Between December 1987 and December 1988 Gorbachev and Reagan held three summits, the first in Washington, the second in Moscow and the third in New York where Gorbachev gave a UN speech. Gorbachev was looking for serious arms reductions. He needed to reduce the expense of his armed forces to focus on the civilian economy. Reagan was ostensibly willing but wouldn’t let go of his favorite SDI initiative, “Star Wars.” Gorbachev proposed an Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty which they settled on. Favorable to the US, Reagan still had a difficult time getting it ratified. The biggest outcome from the first summit was the historic reception for a Soviet Leader. Gorbachev appreciated the pomp and circumstance seeing that he was being treated with great respect allowing him to return home claiming success. Little of value transpired at the second, but again the visibility of the two leaders engaging seriously in Moscow was a takeaway for Gorbachev. At the UN, Gorbachev gave a rousing speech announcing the reduction of 500,000 men in the Soviet armed forces and a proportionately greater amount in Eastern Europe. He was met with prolonged cheers and applause. The NY Times called it “’Breathtaking,’ ‘Risky,’ ‘Bold,’ ‘Heroic…’”

In 1989 elections were held for the new Congress of People’s Deputies. While a number of seats were reserved for the Party and established institutions, most were freely elected. A mix of conservatives and reformers emerged. Gorbachev was elected chairman at the first meeting. His role in guiding the congress was essential. Members were free to speak their minds venting the pent up anger between the conservatives and reformers. The Congress was televised. People stayed home to watch this unprecedented assembly. Gorbachev was masterful maintaining order while avoiding harsh tactics but always trying to maintain a centrist position. Straddling, Gorbachev diminished his appeal to both groups as time went on. His popularity declined as he suffered attacks from the left and right. While perestroika was at its height, it did nothing for the economy which was still in shambles and now its dysfunction was widely reported. Only now, much too late, did Gorbachev embrace professional economists to look at possible market reforms. Labor unions formed and went on strike. Ethnic violence unfolded. People had no experience with democracy. By year’s end Gorbachev’s demeanor showed the strain. He even wondered if now was the time to resign. His wife and close aides thought it might be. In 1989 the Berlin wall came down and the Eastern European satellites began to go their own way. Gorbachev would not interfere. He had a summit with the cautious President Bush. No arms reduction or treaty talks took place, but Bush offered his support saying he would do nothing to undermine Gorbachev. Bush’s advisors, Scowcroft and Cheney, were less enamored with Gorbachev.

In 1990 the Soviet Union began falling apart and so did Gorbachev. Many of the Soviet republics were ready to leave. The largest Soviet state, Russia, formed its own people’s congress and Communist Party. Yeltsin left the party and became chairman of the Russian parliament. While Gorbachev continued to straddle between party hardliners and reformers, Yeltsin called out Gorbachev for his failures. Gorbachev worried that if he left the Party and his powerful General Secretary position, the hardliners would take over the USSR again. While he had given the people their first taste of democracy, he left the state to run the economy in its authoritarian top down corrupt way. Without economic reform, private property and private enterprise, even basic goods were unavailable. People remained in poverty. Their lives saw no improvement. Yet now they had a voice and Gorbachev caught the blame from all sides. He became overcome with tension and his constant dance trying to placate all sides was readily apparent.

In foreign policy he enjoyed great relations with Western leaders, but gave away all the cards that could have helped him get economic aid which he later asked for but received little. For example, he readily agreed that Germany could reunite and join NATO, doing so without consulting with his own experts. A tough negotiator could have gotten money to build bases with housing in Russia for departing Soviet troops, favorable trade agreements and other concessions in return from the West. Gorbachev, however, was immersed in his daily domestic battles and out of his element in diplomacy which he gave little serious thought to. He was satisfied with adulation from foreign crowds and dignitaries along with the pomp and circumstance instead of demanding meaningful help in return for his concessions.

In 1991 Gorbachev still hopelessly tacked between the right and left losing any remaining support from both sides. He could have abandoned the party and teamed up with the erratic reformer Yeltsin who now controlled the Russian Republic. Attempts between the two were made to establish a new union of the Soviet republics to replace the USSR, but a tepid Gorbachev and difficult Yeltsin could never agree. Suspicious of this effort, hardline party leaders attempted a coup. Ill planned and executed, it failed. Yeltsin sent his men to rescue Gorbachev from capture. Gorbachev thanked him but still resented him. Russia, Ukraine and the other republics ended up going their own way becoming independent countries leaving Gorbachev as the president of nothing. He resigned his position on December 25. Gorbachev ran in the Russian election of 1996 garnering less than 1% of the vote. Yeltsin won with the support of emerging oligarchs in a corrupt quid pro quo. In 2000 Putin became president. Gorbachev liked Putin at first but soured on his authoritarian rule. Still, true to form, Gorbachev mixed in praise with his criticism of Putin. Raisa died of Leukemia in 1999. Gorbachev never remarried and busied himself with his foundation and travels. Now at nearly ninety he continues to speak out on world affairs.

Gorbachev was a unique transitional figure. Only as an ardent believer and astute insider in the communist system could he bring about its demise. But as such he could never fully embrace the new open society he was creating. His lack of understanding of economics was a critical flaw. He couldn’t carry the people with him when they saw his policies brought no improvement in their lives. Increased transparency only increased their ire. Taubman details Gorbachev’s special qualities that enabled him to bring about the dramatic change that no one anticipated. We get a fascinating story of a world changing leader. We also learn about the inner workings of the Soviet leadership. Taubman’s book was an important addition to my readings in Russian history. For those with a similar interest, it is highly recommended

[Darya Silman · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Mikhail Gorbachev died on the 29th of August, 2022).

A definitive biography of Mikhail Gorbachev and his era.

In Gorbachev: His Life and Times, William Taubman introduces readers to the controversial figure of the stateman, hated at home and beloved abroad.

If we compare Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikita Khrushchev, they have a lot of similarities, like the peasant background and the unlooked-for rise to the highest post in the Soviet Union. Unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev recognized his shortcomings and tried to overcome them with meticulousness and hard work. His prime moments came from international relations with Western leaders, resulting in disarmament agreements and the peaceful unification of Germany. At the same time, at home, he lacked the insights of Deng Xiaoping, who first integrated the economy into the world market under the rule of the existing Communist structure and then transformed the party. Gorbachev chose the opposite approach, not seeing - or refusing to see - that the main flaw lay in the Soviet economy itself, not in how it was governed or who made the decisions. Glasnost and perestroika, his two primary brain children, brought closer the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The reasons to remove a star from my rating are subjective, and the issues with the book that made me cringe may leave other readers indifferent. The author, clearly sharing the foreigners' general admiration for Mikhail Gorbachev, depicts him positively, viewing his failures as inevitable. After all, who was capable of saving the Soviet Union that was rotting from the inside because of economic decline?

I don't know what caused the author to use the questions as the means to move the narrative further, but, combined, they would pile up to around ten pages in total. This trend is especially evident in the introduction: readers are bombarded with questions, answers to which will come much later in the book.

My rich imagination made me shatter when within the heart-breaking scene of dying Raisa Maksimovna, the author decided to explicitly describe Gorbachevs' sex life, with when, where, and in which circumstances. As Russians say, there is no sex in the USSR (the topic was taboo). The episode was taken from Gorbachev's memoir. Still, it struck me as inappropriate against that specific moment in the biography and the generally serious tone of the research.

If you want to have a complete picture of post-Stalin leaders, this is my recommended list of biographies (according to chronological order):
Nikita Khrushchev by William Taubman (my review https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...),
Brezhnev by Susanne Schattenberg (my review https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...),
Gorbachev by William Taubman,
and Yeltsin by Timothy Colton (the last one is on my TBR list).

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an authoritative biography of a man who changed the course of history towards the end of the 20th century.

It gave me a much greater understanding of who Gorbachev is and how he managed to change the contours of his country. For anyone who does not believe that people can alter the course of world events this biography surely disproves that.

He was born in 1931 in the Stalinist Soviet Union, came of age during the Khrushchev era, and became a bureaucratic apparatchik during the reign of Brezhnev. He was able to move upward in the communist regime, successfully camouflaging his liberal and moral leanings. At this time he still believed ardently that communism held the best hopes for mankind. Some of this began to fade or be questioned during the Prague Spring (1968) and when he travelled outside the Soviet Union.

The author points out to us that Gorbachev was overly optimistic when he took over as General Secretary in 1985 after the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov, and then Chernenko who were old and ineffectual. He was certainly superior and more energized than any of these previous leaders, but he did not realize the depth of the rot that they had plunged the Soviet Union into.

Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who did not speak in Marxist-Leninist dialectics. This caused a vast strategic shift within the Soviet Union, and then the world stage. Several events caused Gorbachev to start to function outside of the paradigm of communism – one was Chernobyl, another was the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

Page 428 (my book)

He [Gorbachev] was replacing the old political “game”, at which he excelled, with a new one that he never really mastered. He had devised the new rules of electoral and parliamentary politics, but their effect was to liberate his radical critics (who proved to be more adept at the new game than he was) while further alienating hard-liners. Gorbachev continued to play the old game to rein in his hard-line critics, but they now attacked him with a ferocity and impunity at party meetings previously characterized by at least the appearance of “monolith unanimity”.

Gorbachev unleashed forces which he could no longer control. He was not adroit within the new liberated system he had created. With so much to heal and change within his own country he did not foresee the breaking away of the Warsaw Pact countries, he could do nothing to prevent the re-unification of Germany. Break-a-way states were being formed within the Soviet Union – namely Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia... It should also be emphasised that Gorbachev had a strong moral code; unlike his predecessors, he was not going to use military force to keep the Soviet Empire together.

While all this increased his esteem in the outside world, his popularity within the Soviet Union (Russia) descended. Gorbachev was inept in dealing with the increasing poverty and corruption. There was more freedom – but Soviet (Russian) citizens were realizing more and more how far behind they were from the West. There was runaway inflation and basic consumer goods were unavailable.

This is a superb biography of a 20th century figure. Many significant personalities and events are well rendered – like Gorbachev’s wife Raisa , the intense rivalry with Yeltsin, and importantly how Gorbachev’s outlook changed over the years. His accomplishments - like devotion to truth and a liberal outlook; and his short-comings - long-winded speeches and an inability to be grateful to those close to him. This book wonderfully outlines the remarkable transformation from the Soviet Union to Russia.




The memorial grave in Moscow to Mikhail Gorbachev wife Raisa. They were a very devoted couple and she was a very strong influence on him. She died in 1999.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Until the end, Gorbachev reiterated his belief in socialism, insisting that it wasn't worthy of the name unless it was truly democratic. But the effect of trying to democratize the Soviet experiment was to break it apart. In this sense, Gorbachev helped bury the Soviet system by seeking to make it live up to what he saw as its original ideals."

When Werner Herzog asked Mikhail Gorbachev what he thought should be on his tombstone, Gorbachev replied, "we tried."

To some people, that will sound modest; to others, like a feeble excuse for having upset what they regarded as the stability of their lives. I don't think I begrudge Gorbachev that statement; although it so happens that, as I was working on this review, my friend Mike Robbins posted an Orwell quote: "saints should always be judged guilty until proven innocent." And Gorbachev did become something of a saint, didn't he? At least in my part of the world, he did. In his defense, there are also a lot of people who don't like him very much.

But let's backtrack for a moment. Gorbachev was born in 1931, to a peasant family in a village called Privolnoe, about ninety miles north of Stavropol, in the North Caucasus (about 800 miles south of Moscow). He and his parents lived through the war years, but two of his uncles and one of his aunts died in the famine of 1932-33, and both of his grandfathers were later arrested in Stalin's purges. His maternal grandfather, Pantelei, was arrested (in the middle of the night, as was customary during the Stalin years) and subsequently released in '37; when he returned to the family, he told them how he'd been tortured. Pantelei's thoughts on the matter testify to the existence of what Gorbacehv would later describe as a "psychological barrier" that he believed himself to have as well: Panteli concluded that Stalin couldn't know what the NKVD was doing to people- otherwise, he reasoned, Stalin would have put a stop to it. But even sharing the details of his experience, biographer Taubman says, was unusual for people of the time. His grandfather's recollection of what had happened to him, and the arbitrariness of it- why, grandfather had never even looked at a book of Trotsky's in his life- was just one of the details that stuck with Gorbachev from his childhood.

But Stalin died in '53, and Gorbachev's 20s mostly coincided with Khrushchev's "thaw." In '53, Gorbachev was a student at Moscow State University, where he met Raisa, his future wife, and also became friends with Zdenek Mlynar, a Czech student who, a little over a decade later, would serve as a close advisor to Alexander Dubcek, leader of the Prague Spring. Later, Mlynar remembered the atmosphere of the university and his friendship with Gorbachev:

When vodka appeared in the room, the poster of Stalin was turned to face the wall...and Mlynar heard war stories utterly at odds with what he had seen in Soviet films and literature. One student, a party member, told him how collective farmers had looked forward to the Germans' arrival, hoping they would dismantle the collective farms and give the land back to the peasants...

...Gorbachev's and Mlynar's doubts deepened as they confided them to each other. Together they watched the classic film Cossacks of the Kuban (1950), a Stalinist musical comedy. In the film, happy collective farmers joyfully bring in the harvest. "It's not true", Gorbachev whispered to his friend. "If the leader of a kolkhoz does not use brute force against the farmers, they would probably not work at all."

Despite the thaw, the Soviets crushed the Hungarian uprising in '56. A little over a decade later, in '68, under Brezhnev, they did the same to the Prague Spring, both events which gave the lie to the idea that the Warsaw Pact countries were happily united. If you lived in the west, it might have seemed obvious all along that they weren't, but to many Soviet people it wasn't (just as, a few years after Prague, it might have been clearer to Soviets than to Americans that, for example, Chileans clearly preferred a moderate socialist government to a capitalist military junta). You would think that Gorbachev, however, through his years of friendship with Mlynar, couldn't have been too surprised at what the Czechs eventually tried. I got the vague impression that Mlynar and Gorbachev remained friends throughout the following decades, but the specifics of their relationship sort of fade away over the course of the narrative. But maybe Taubman allowed Mlynar to fade away, because Gorbachev, at every stage of his life, seems to have had a Mlynar- a friend or ally he disappointed by not taking things further, faster, more boldly. In '67,

They spent two days hiking in the mountains...Mlynar said big changes were coming in Czechoslovakia, and "made no secret", Gorbachev recalls, "that he thought the political system there had to be democratized." When his friend asked what was happening in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev expressed a view he would later change- "in your country all that might be possible, but in our country it simply could not be done."

As Taubman suggests here, Gorbachev's views changed over time. In '67, he "still believed that the key to overcoming 'deformations' in Soviet socialism was to find and promote enterprising new 'cadres.'" He certainly didn't want to destroy the Soviet Union, as some of his critics have alleged (and as some of his fans have lauded him for), and it doesn't sound to me like he ever wanted to, not even in '91. But Gorbachev did grow up in an ideological bubble, and reading about the process of his becoming gradually aware of this (it's always easier to notice the conformity in some foreign society than it is to notice it in one's own) was for me one of the more interesting and even inspiring aspects of the biography.

Of course, at 693 pages this is a pretty exhaustive biography, and readers with only a casual interest in Gorbachev might find the level of detail excessive. If you desperately need to know how many eggs Gorbachev had for breakfast on the first morning of the 27th Party Congress, for example; and whether he had them poached, scrambled or sunny-side-up, and how well he digested them, then I guarantee you'll find it here. At the same time, some of the most dramatic moments of Gorbachev's life seem strangely truncated- the chapter about the '91 coup attempt for example, only lasts about twenty pages- but maybe Taubman made that choice because the story has been told so meticulously in other places (see Remnick's Lenin's Tomb for an account that tracks every bead of sweat down the participants' faces).

And to be fair, a great deal of time is spent, appropriately, on perestroika and glasnost. If anyone ever tries to tell you that Russians simply love tyranny and aren't interested in facing their history except through the mythology of national innocence, it would be worth reading over these chapters and considering the population's initial response to the cultural aspects of glasnost- the large numbers in which people bought and read new journals and articles challenging established historical narratives, as well as the publication of books like Children of the Arbat by Rybakov (about the era of Stalin's purges) and Bulgakov's satire of Bolshevism Heart of a Dog, not to mention absorbing all of the horrors contained in Solzhenitsyn's stuff. People were suddenly free of the Soviet censor, for the first time in nearly a century. It's a genuinely beautiful thing to look back on, and it's one reason I can't help admiring Gorbachev; he was the only Soviet leader, as far as I can tell, who advocated for freedom of speech and freedom of the press. We all know that Stalin sure as hell did not believe in those things, but it doesn't seem to me that Lenin did, either.

Even so, Gorbachev often expressed sentiments that could be interpreted as moderate, and continued to exasperate the Mlynar-doppelgangers in his life, such as his close aide Chernayev:

Gorbachev agreed (with Ligachev) on the need to respect ordinary people who "built the country, defended it against fascism, and fought for an idea", all the while "hungry and tattered, with only the shirt on their backs, with heads shaved against lice, without reserving for themselves the fruit of their hellish labors...are we so smart now that we can tar all of that, that we can say, 'you did it all wrong?' No, we must be careful. We must respect the people."

Chernayev "listened, steaming." Back in his office, he dictated five outraged pages about how Stalin "respected" the people, how he destroyed the most diligent part of the peasantry, how he sacrificed millions of Soviet soldiers by trying to appease Hitler, how he "liquidated everyone who made the revolution and started socialism in Russia." Chernayev sent his memo to Gorbachev. Gorbachev didn't reply.

But Chernayev was asking too much. The people Gorbachev described included his own parents and grandparents. How could he blame them? To be sure, Chernayev didn't either; rather, he blamed Stalin and the merciless system...but the fact was that many of them identified with the history they had suffered through, especially with the triumphs (industrialization of the country, victory in war) they achieved under Stalin. To demean the past (or to seem to do so) thus not only degraded their sacrifice but risked their wrath at a time when perestroika had as yet delivered very little.

Taubman's note that perestroika had "as yet delivered very little" echoes Yeltsin's persistent criticism that perestroika wasn't moving quickly or boldly enough, and wasn't making people's lives any easier materially. And broadly speaking, I think Yeltsin was right: the economy was cratering, and it was impossible for average people to get what they needed at the store. When people are struggling with the basics, they tend to stay attuned to the finer points of historiography for only so long. Gorbachev might have been a little out-of-touch with that reality- one thing that's very clear is that he liked (or likes, rather- he's got to be right up there with Kissinger and Cheney on most people's "wait, he's still alive?" power rankings; if you weren't aware that Gorbachev still draws breath, as of 2:42 EST on August 13th, anyway, please adjust your rankings accordingly) to orate. Throughout the course of this biography, in fact, it seems as if he's always bunkered down in a Black Sea dacha or a hunting lodge, preparing some big-time speech for the next Party Congress (I also got the impression, oddly, that the next Party Congress was always fast approaching, and needed urgently to be prepared for- even though they only had the dang things once every five years) that is going to communicate to the people his transcendent vision of society, the crystallization of his "new thinking." All well and good, but when did this guy actually govern?

Gorbachev was also clueless about how overwhelmingly popular the idea of independence from the Soviet Union was in the Baltics, and especially in Ukraine. He imagined up until December '91 that he would preserve some kind of...well...the plan seems to have kept changing, but the idea as I understand it was to create some kind of confederation not quite as centralized as the USSR had been up until that point, but that would still link the Soviet/Warsaw Pact countries politically, economically, ideologically, militarily- if that was, in fact, what the people of those countries wanted. It does seem to me that Gorbachev was sincere about that last part, even if he made certain assumptions about what those people would want. But of course he got a cold dose of reality when over 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence from the USSR, including 54% in Crimea and 77% in Donetsk, two places which are today occupied illegally by Russia. Ultimately, on December 8th, 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved by four people who didn't bother to inform Gorbachev of what they were doing, at a place called "Belovezhskaya Pushcha, a wooded resort area a few miles north of Brest on the Polish-Byelorussian border. Created as a habitat for the last descendants of European bison, it boasted a luxurious lodge where Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders used to gather for hunting (presumably not of the bison) and consultations." The consultations were presumably not with the bison, either. But to refresh all of our memories, just in case this shows up as a question on Jeopardy! next week, the four people who dissolved the Soviet Union were Leonid Kravchuk (the first president of Ukraine), Nursultan Nazarbayev (who would go on to lead Kazakhstan for the next thirty years, and has recently had the capital city, formerly Astana, renamed after himself- why not, right?), some Belarusian dude named Shushkevich, and Boris Yeltsin.

I initially worried that this biography would lionize Gorbachev, and I wasn't reassured when I noticed an approving (approving of both the book and its subject) blurb on the back from Max Boot- proponent of the Iraq War and of Israeli settlements, as well as author of an October 2001 article called "The Case for American Empire." If the blurb had been from someone slightly less morally objectionable- like let's say Vlad the Impaler, Varg "The Count" Vikernes, or Roman Polanski- I might have just looked the other way. But when a dumb piece of shit like Max Boot expresses approval, it gives me real pause. And it doesn't really amount to a substantive criticism of Gorbachev to demonstrate that, as Taubman isn't shy about doing, he could at times be a real dick (especially to Yeltsin), or that he and his wife tended to upbraid their "servants" (I don't like that they did that, by the way- but it still feels gossipy, and in the grand scheme of things not very important), leading a former Gorbachev bodyguard to comment that it's easier to lecture others on democracy than to live by its principles. On the world-historical level, Taubman lingers on a few unanswered (or at least oblique) questions. Did Gorbachev actually have something to do with the coup in '91? Did he approach KGB chief Kryuchkov in the months afterwards, just before the big four's meeting at Brest, suggesting that the military might want to step in and "stabilize" the situation? Taubman says: not out of the realm of possibility, and yes. And what about Vilnius, where fifteen protestors were killed in January '91? How to assess Gorbachev's culpability there? I suppose those are important questions, but they also feel ripe for conspiratorial obsessiveness. More relevantly still, perhaps, is that while Taubman certainly seems to admire Gorbachev to a degree, the book does allow for the interpretation that Gorbachev was (is, dammit, is) a pretty vain and condescending guy who was more interested in grand historical theories than in the living conditions of his people, or who at least found it easier to engage with ideas than with concrete realities, and might have been better off in another position- just concentrating on glasnost, for example.

Speaking of conspiracies, we find KGB chief Kryuchkov suggesting sometime in '91 that, because Gorbachev's close aide Yakovlev had once studied in the United States (back in the 50s), perhaps the ideas that were then destroying the Soviet Union "had not originated here." Scary thought. Yakovlev (whose name sounds very close to "apple" in Russian, by the way) really could not catch a break- when he was a student in the United States, during the McCarthy era, other students didn't want to associate with him, either because they thought he was a spy, or because they didn't want to be harassed by HUAC. Back in his home country, decades later, they suspected him of working for the west. 

I don't believe for a second that Gorbachev was an agent of the United States, but the suggestion does offer a chance to consider the tendency, when some leader we don't like comes along, to attribute that success to the machinations of a foreign power. That's not to say it never happens, of course. During the Cold War, for example, countries throughout the Third World saw their attempts at socialism decimated by interference from the United States. People who live in those countries (those who survived, anyway) would be quite justified in blaming the United States for decades of repression, torture and murder. But here's the thing about Gorbachev: there was nothing mysterious about a person like him coming along. In fact, what struck me while reading this biography (and admittedly, my sense of this may stem partly from Taubman's narrative craft) was the degree to which his life makes sense; it's very clear how his ideas were shaped by the milieu he grew up in, the experiences he had, and the societal contradictions he couldn't help becoming aware of. His conviction that the USSR needed to reform itself drastically made sense; even if you don't agree that it did, you can see how he (and millions of other Soviet people) reached that conclusion. There's no need to imagine some conspiracy. Except of course, for some people, there was a psychological need; that's because understanding what had shaped Gorbachev's politics would have forced them to see things about their country that they didn't want to, or at least to engage with ideas that they didn't want to. Maybe some of our conspiracies have the same root.

Overall, it seems clear that Gorbachev is no saint. But he does come across, in this biography anyway, as a basically decent, humane, reasonably intelligent and well-intentioned man, who should be credited with some great accomplishments- undermining totalitarianism in Russia, reducing the chances of nuclear holocaust, and granting (even if not quite intentionally) autonomy to the countries of eastern Europe. But he also set in motion events that spiraled out of control, leading to a pretty grim and miserable decade in Russia, which in turn led to the Putin backlash. Anyone who thinks that Gorbachev could lead some kind of democratic crusade against Putin, by the way, is living in dreamland. Gorbachev is 90 years old, he's obese, and he doesn't look in shape to be leading much of anything, except maybe the Tuesday night bingo game. But more importantly, most Russians these days dislike him, and don't care what he has to say. Of course, Gorbachev's brief time in power had an impact on people around the world, as well, and opinions vary widely; Werner Herzog, for his part, in his documentary Meeting Gorbachev, says that he will always love the man for having helped to bring about German re-unification.

[Brett C · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Gorbachev believed in socialism, the faith his beloved father and grandfather. Stalin's crimes and Brezhnev's "stagnation" mocked Marxist ideals, but Gorbachev thought Soviet socialism could be saved by being "reformed." It was "only after 1985," he recalls, "and not immediately then, that I ceased to believe this." pg 215

This was an excellent biography on the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. This was on par with William Taubman's biography of Nikita Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. It was a carefully crafted blend of biographical story, historical overview, and political climate from Soviet times up to the 2010s. Taubman gave life to the book and gave us a real-life person to learn about in all facets.

Gorbachev was loved, hated, respected, despised, and seen as a "serious" and "constructive" man who "firmly defended his views, but was ready to listen and even heed sensible arguments." (pg 474) His political life was a believing Party member while his personal life was a loving husband and father. He was a truly an intelligent man who climbed the Soviet ladder, inherited a broken system from Andropov and Chernenko, reconnected relations with the outside world, and attempted to bring reform and revitalization to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev succeeded in destroying what was left of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union; he brought freedom to speech, of assembly, and of conscience to people who had never known it, except perhaps for a few chaotic months in 1917. By introducing free elections and creating parliamentary institutions, he laid the groundwork for democracy. He reduced the threat of nuclear war, allowed Eastern Europe to become their own masters, and was the master politician when it came to consolidating power and using it to transform the Soviet system and end the Cold War. He became Gorbachev with the help of his own native gifts: innate optimism and self-confidence, substantial intellect, a fierce determination to prove himself, and his ability to maneuver to get what he wanted, charming people in the process. (pg 688-9)

I really enjoyed this one for the shear blend of biography and related history. I would highly recommend the author's book about Nikita Khrushchev as well if you're interested in Soviet political history. Thanks!

[Jean · Rating 5 out of 5]

William Taubman has written an excellent biography of Mikhail Gorbachev (1931- ). Taubman describes how MG went from the son of a peasant from a remote province to the leader of the Soviet Union.

The first third of the book is about MG’s early years. The next part of the book reveals his rise to power. Taubman reports that gradually MG saw that use of force had solved nothing. MG began to question the massive-over centralization of the Soviet system. In 1983 on a trip to Canada he discussed with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada Alexander Yakovlev (1923-2005), his concerns. Yakovlev would become an architect of MG’s new thinking. In 1985 when he became president he started making changes to the system. He allowed open debate and criticism and he pushed for nuclear disarmament. “The Soviet Union fell apart after MG weakened the State in an attempt to strengthen the individual” according to Taubman.

The book is well written and meticulously researched. I learned an enormous amount from the book. I lived through the events, but this book provided the inside information and a good review of the history. I highly recommend this book. Taubman won the Pulitzer Prize for his biography of Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971). Taubman is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Amherst College.

I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is long at almost thirty-three hours. Henry Strozier does an excellent job narrating the book. Strozier is an actor and an award-winning audiobook narrator. He won the Emmy Award for Outstanding Narrator in 2014 and 2015.

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Man of the Twentieth Century?

Mikhail Gorbachev is a divisive figure, loved in the West and loathed on his native Russia. There are few figures in history who are felt about this way. The reason is fairly simple, he ended the Cold War, reduced the threat of nuclear war drastically, freed Eastern Europe from the Soviet yoke and help to unite Germany. To Russians, he causes the collapse of the USSR, naturally weakening its position as a great power in the modern world and as such is seen almost like a western puppet.

William Taubman makes it clear he is a fan of Gorbachev and argues that without him things would have been much worse. Gorbachev managed to end the Cold War without shedding blood and his vision opened the doors for democracy within a modern Russia. If he had continued down the traditional authoritarian path, the USSR would have limped on, the country would have continued to decline economically with millions starving and perhaps a bloody civil war would have ensued. The communist party click and Kremlin masters could easily have been murdered like Nicholas II and his family or Nicolai Ceausescu in Romania. Ultimately Gorbachev faces an impossible task when he took power and worked towards his vision of ‘communism with a face’. Some of his dreams were realised, but not all.

For me Gorbachev: His Life and Times is excellent and I was pleasantly surprised. The writing is engaging, the focus is where it needs to be (mainly on politics) and there is a nice balance between public and private life. One will realise from reading this book that Gorbachev is all politics and could not have achieved it without his loyal, intelligent and supportive wife Raisa. So much so, Gorbachev blamed himself for her death from leukaemia as he continued to be politically active long after he lost power. As Taubman points out this relationship was unique for a man in Gorbachev’s position, especially at the top of Russian politics as he stayed loyal to her throughout his life. For this he must be admired.

If you want to come away from this book with an understanding of the man, this will be difficult. As Gorbachev himself states ‘Gorbachev is hard to understand.’ However Taubman does a great job in opening him up. The book was written in 2016, so doesn’t cover Gorbachev’s death in 2022. However, by this time he was slowing down and not very active. The book doesn’t miss much by it and I imagine a updated edition will cover this in a page or so. The reaction around the world and in Russia, I witnessed first hand.

He is undoubtedly one of the most important figures of the twentieth century and so should be studied. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR is a fascinating period. Time will only tell how Russians will feel about him in 50 years or so, will they reflect his work was mostly good or consider it to be a disaster? As Vladimir Putin says, in his opinion the two worse rulers in Russian History are Nicholas II and Gorbachev as they have up power. I have to disagree with this. I’ll leave it to you to read the book and form your opinion.

[Louise · Rating 5 out of 5]

William Taubman delivers a comprehensive biography covering Mikhail Gorbachev and his times and interprets his legacy in Russia and around the world. His leadership was before the internet and news sources in the US were not what they are today, so, for me, the book clarified how he came to power and how he fell on his sword.

He changed the world. Taubman shows the discipline and commitment it took to bring democracy to an authoritarian society, set the satellite countries free, end the Afghan war, create a generation free of nuclear fears and create the (voluntary) Russian Federation. He receives world-wide acclaim for this, but in Russia he is perceived as giving away the might of the country.

Taubman shows the complexity. While Gorbachev may be a celebrity in the West, he paid the price at home. Western leaders took credit for “tearing down the wall” then allowed a re-unified Germany to join NATO, leaving the Warsaw Pact with one less member. It is Gorbachev's persistence that led to a nuclear free generation.

After Gorbachev took all the foreign policy risks, he was not given the development package he needed from the west (which had financially supported the newly freed republics, and before that the Marshall Plan for Europe) to maintain the reform at home. This was a significant misunderstanding of the nature of Gorbachev’s domestic opposition by the Bush (1) administration. Taubman does not go there, but the reader can draw a bead from this decision to what we have today in Russia. (Taubman says Margaret Thatcher & Reagan - neither in power at this time - would have done provided the funds - Thatcher says so unequivocally aware of the consequences of not supporting Gorbachev in this way.)

Boris Yeltsin who had no plan, no organizational abilities and no discipline capitalized on the pain of change to attack Gorbachev – for years. Gorbachev had the power to eliminate him and other critics, but tried to set an example of how democracy worked and did not. It would seem Yeltsin would drown in alcohol and instability (i.e. the self-mutilation episode) but Gorbachev's economy was teetering and there was no help from the west. The unrelenting Yeltsin captured populist sentiment. Once in office he made risky moves to liberalize the economy creating inflation and entrenching the new “oligarch” class.

Once you understand Gorbachev’s roots and all he went through for his vision, you come to appreciate how extraordinary he was (actually “is” - he is alive as I write this). In the west we see Vladimir Putin pealing back on Gorbachev's reforms and moving in a Stalinist direction. There is some piecing together of Gorbachev’s statements on Putin, but none recent.

The highlights for me were
- Gorbachev’s youth and education particularly in showing life in agricultural regions and the impact of the Stalin and how people blamed others for their plight. Of particular interest is how how Gorbachev was able to go to Moscow University and meet Raisa, who had an equally improbable route to “Russian-Ivy” higher education.
- After years managing the agricultural region where he grew up, how he rose when assigned to Moscow. I was surprised that Gromyko was open to change and mentored Gorbachev.
- Negotiations with Reagan on nuclear weapons – there are great descriptions of the views of each side, their preparation and what was formally said. There are good descriptions of Raisa and Nancy’s relationship (what is this with Raisa and the chairs?) protocol and accommodations.
- The Foros (great description of this unexpected place) coup
- Gorbachev’s resignation, its terms and how he was treated by Yeltsin and the total contrast of what Yeltsin did on the day of the turn over.
- The author’s summary

This is not a casual read. If you are interested in Gorbachev and have time to devote to understanding him and his role in world affairs this is for you.

[Carol Douglas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mikhail Gorbachev is an extraordinary man, and this is an extraordinary book.

Gorbachev is in a sense too good for his times and his country. A man who grew up on a farm during the starving time of the German invasion of Russia, he became an excellent student and a leader when the war ended and he was able to go to school. He believed in Communism, but he loved to sing and act. He was able to attend Moscow State University, Russia's Harvard, where he met his adored wife and life companion, Raisa.

Gorbachev was hard working, and so squeaky clean by Soviet standards that top members of the Party hierarchy promoted him until he became its head. But in the years before that, he had a chance to travel to Europe, which stunned him. Democracy impressed him deeply, and he wanted to bring it to his country.

He faced incredible obstacles, not the least of which was an intractable bureaucracy. He hated violence and ended the Cold War. When Eastern Europe split away from Russia's orbit, he was disappointed but he seldom resorted to violence (there's a blemish on his record in Lithuania). He still wanted to hold the USSR together, but the momentum he had started was unstoppable.

He tried to deal with opposition from both hard-liners and reformers who wanted immediate change. The struggle wore him down, and he lost his post due to the democratic spirit he had promoted. He begged the administration of President George H.W. Bush to give his nation aid to keep it on an even keel, but the US declined.

Gorbachev was a victim of his own success.

Taubman, the history professor who wrote this excellent book, notes Gorbachev's faults -- his pride, his failure to fire his enemies, his endless belief in his own powers of persuasion. But in a country where rulers had become accustomed to killing their rivals -- a state that Russia has reverted to under Putin -- Gorbachev stands out.

Russians blame him for their economic troubles. Deng Xiaoping believed that Gorbachev was a fool for promoting democracy ahead of economic development. But what a glorious fool, like Dostoyevsky's Idiot.

[Heidi'sbooks · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an epic biography of the person and work of Gorbachev. I'm impressed by the research and amount of interviews this author did, research ten years in the making including multiple interviews with Gorbachev himself.

This was not an easy read. It takes discipline on the part of the reader. It was enjoyable though. I especially enjoyed the parts about his childhood, the coup attempt, and his wife Raisa. The coup account was frighteningly descriptive, and his relationship with his wife Raisa particularly touching. The difficult part for me was understanding Russian political systems. Thankfully, there is a glossary defining each political body. There are also 11 pages of characters listed (which is a must in any book covering Russia, biography or novel).

There were a couple of surprising things though. The discussion of Chernobyl lasted only 2 pages. I understand it is a huge subject, requiring its own book, but there was very limited discussion about how it shaped political sentiment either in Russia or in Ukraine or Eastern Europe. There was no discussion about leukemia rates or anything. This is particularly interesting since Raisa got leukemia and the Gorbachev Foundation worked on behalf of childhood leukemia. It was almost as if it was too sensitive to discuss. His work on getting rid of nuclear warheads is understandable in this context. Peace was the highest priority and his task was to stop the nuclear arms race. He was great in international affairs.

One other surprising thing was a passing mention of Gorbachev's biological warfare development. WHAT?! What to heck did that involve? None of it is described.

He is commended for opening up religious freedom, freedom of the press, and peaceful assembly. But, he is held accountable for not providing a path forward once the Soviet Union fell apart, either economically or politically. He took it for granted that once the people had freedom they would know what to do. He thought the West would provide aid to help move them to a market economy. None of that happened.

Shortages were extreme and included things like school notebooks and pencils. Only 11% of 989 consumer goods were actually available to the public. Coal miners couldn't even get soap to wash after coming out of the mines. There was a coal miners strike that involved 177,862 miners resulting in a coal shortage. There were grain shortages and Russia had to import tremendous amounts of grain just to feed its people. Five years into grappling with the economy, Gorbachev finally hired an economist. He had 2 different economic plans, one called the 500 Day plan which was aggressive market economics, the other was a much slower plan. In the end not much was done. He didn't know enough about economics to choose a plan. Plus, he had hard line opposition in the government and had to zig zag back and forth between hardliners and free market proponents.

There's lots more in this book. How he set up a parliament of sorts and a presidential position and council. Restructuring the communist party and allowing elections.

[victor harris · Rating 5 out of 5]

To understand the collapse of the Soviet Union, one must understand Gorbachev (at least to what extent he can be understood), and this magnificent biography makes great strides toward achieving that. To survive the political in-fighting so common in Soviet circles was an achievement itself for the rural-born future leader of the Soviet Union, to move the country in a new direction (Perestroika/Glasnost) despite resistance from the hard-liners and widespread skepticism was monumental. Tragically, he created bitter enemies such as Yeltsin who did not share Gorbachev's commitment to the grand vision of a genuinely reformed socialist state, and it would prove fatal to that vision. Ultimately it would be outside variables, such as the price of oil plummeting, that would send the Soviet Union into its final downward spiral and demise. A tottering fragile system that was ill-prepared for the transition to capitalism and democracy simply couldn't continue to absorb shocks. Add Gorbachev and his reluctance to use force to preserve the empire while maintaining a genuine commitment to openness and the superpower was rent asunder. Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics would break free, Gorbachev would be ousted, and new more unstable and potentially dangerous Russia would arise in the wake of the disintegration.
Fascinating, well-researched, and excellent use of data that reflected the shortcomings of the Stalin-Breshnev legacy that enabled Gorbachev to embark on his revolutionary path.

[Jonathan Brown · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent biography of Gorbachev. Especially clear and vivid in the earliest chapters; after his political career begins, it easily meanders into the morass of bureaucracy, which Taubman does not quite sufficiently untangle for the reader. Even so, with so much experience in interviewing Gorbachev and his associates, Taubman has produced a very high-quality book - sympathetic, but without glossing over Gorbachev's missteps; attentive to the logic and experiences that drove his decisions; and with a keen eye toward Gorbachev's relationships with other world leaders.

[Dmitry · Rating 4 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath Russian one)

Это действительно полная и всесторонняя биография Горбачёва, начиная с самого детства и заканчивая сегодняшними днями. Разумеется, сегодняшним дням будет посвящено меньше всего, ибо большая часть уйдёт на политическое становление, развитие и сам процесс, который ознаменуется началом перестройки. Тем не менее, я бы не стал советовать книгу тем, кто ждёт что-то интересное, увлекательное и лёгкое (хотя, книга всё же довольно лёгкая, в плане чтения). Если уж и начинать читать эту книгу, то определённо с наличием интереса к фигуре Горбачёва и к тем действиям, что были совершены в 1980-1990 гг. В ином случаи книга застопорится где-то на середине, да и то, в лучшем случаи. Так же стоит сказать, что автор не даёт оценок, не комментирует те или иные шаги (или делает это минимальном количестве), не занимается трактовкой или что либо ещё, что противоречило бы классической биографии, ибо это именно что классическая биография. Я думаю, автор специально выбрал такой стиль, давая читателю право решать или трактовать те или иные действия Горбачёва самостоятельно.
Начинается книга с самого детства главного героя, описания личности его родителей и близких родственников, а также той обстановки в которой происходило взросления. Однако если кто-то думает найти в этом р��зделе ответы на какие-либо вопросы, боюсь того ждёт разочарование, ибо с моей точки зрения автор ничего важного, что могло бы объяснить шаги Горбачёва в будущем, не обозначил. Детство, как детство и юношество как юношество, так сказать. Кстати, забавный момент. Несколько лет назад я читал адаптированный текст на английском, который был посвящён биографии Горбачёва. Так вот, прочитав уже в этой книге главу о детстве и юности Горбачёва, я отметил про себя, что фактически особой разницы между этими двумя текстами, нет. Я допускаю, что я мог быть невнимате��ьным и что-то упустить, однако у меня стойкое ощущение, что в ключевых моментах оба текста сходятся, а различаются только несущественными деталями.
Следующая и основная часть книги, в которой мы уже встречаем Горбачёва как политика, будет уже посвящена его деятельности в Ставрополе и дальнейшее повышение вплоть до генерального секретаря. В целом, тут очень и очень много диалогов. Не знаю, может это лично у меня возникло такое ощущение, ибо книга огромнейшая, и я частенько уставал её читать, но многие диалоги мне показались выматывающими. Однако с другой стороны, нет ничего лучше для человека который интересуется политикой того времени и не просто политикой, а что называется, до мышей, т.е. со всеми деталями и максимально подробно. Вот, возможно, этот человек найдёт середину книги и все эти диалоги, все эти разговоры о ядерном оружии, переговорах и пр., невероятно интересными. Я определённо не из этой когорты. Тем не менее, я нашёл то, что мне было интересно, а именно, общую картину. Заканчивая книгу, передо мной как бы открылась полная картина. Мы видим Горбачёва реформатора, который понимает, что «так дальше жить нельзя» и начинает реформировать страну пытаясь создать «социализм с человеческим лицом». Да, я думаю, Горбачёв был последним человеком в стране, кто искренне верил в социализм с человеческим лицом, что жизнь в СССР лучше, чем в США и Европе, что Союз эффективней по всем или большинству показателей. Поэтому когда он увидел, как на самом деле живут люди в Европе, он понял, что эту игру СССР проигрывает. Поэтому-то, как я думаю, он и решился на реформы. Т.е. не реформируй он страну и разрыв бы увеличился бы ещё больше. Дав свободу и выборы, он искренне думал, что люди будут «за» коммунистическую партию. Увы, тут он также просчитался, ибо весь Союз держался только на страхе (который нагнал т. Сталин) и больше ни на чём. Поэтому когда страх ушёл, всё начало разваливаться.
Как правильно сказал Эдвард Радзинский, «он как двуликий Янус. Одна голова смотрит вперёд, но вторая всегда смотрит назад». Это он сказал о царе-реформаторе Александре II, но мы можем применить её и к Горбачёву, ибо вторая часть этой драмы, это как раз взгляд в прошлое. Автор пишет, под каким впечатлением был Горбачёв от всемирового его – Горбачёва - обожания. Весь мир аплодировал ему и его реформам. Все ждали и надеялись на удачное завершение перестройки. Но «начинать реформы – опасно, но ещё опаснее их не доводить до конца», как правильно заметил Радзинский. И мы получаем замедление реформ. А возможно даже их остановку. И это самый драматический момент, когда Горбачёв оказывается между молотом и наковальней. Консерваторы (будущее ГКЧП, а до этого Нина Андреевна с её «Не могу поступаться принципами») его не поддерживают за то, что он начал менять всю систему, а либералы, за то, что он остановил процесс перестройки. И вот, потеря опоры. Наверно, самый трудный период в жизни любого крупного реформатора. Ну, и всё это на фоне катастроф, начиная с межэтнических кровавых междоусобиц и Чернобылем и заканчивая пустыми прилавками.

This is a really complete and comprehensive biography of Gorbachev, from childhood to today. However, most of the book will be devoted to the political formation, development and the process itself, which will be marked by the beginning of perestroika. Nevertheless, I would not advise the book to those who are expecting something interesting, exciting and easy (although the book is still quite easy, in terms of reading). If you are going to start reading this book, it is definitely due to the interest in Gorbachev's figure and the actions that took place in 1980-1990. Otherwise, the book will stall somewhere in the middle, and that at best. Also it is necessary to tell that the author does not give estimations, does not comment on those or those steps (or does it in the minimum quantity), is not engaged in interpretation or something else that would contradict the classical biography as it is the classical biography. I think the author has chosen this style on purpose, giving the reader the right to decide or interpret Gorbachev's actions independently.
The book begins with the childhood of the main character, description of the personality of his parents and close relatives, as well as the environment in which he grew up. However, if someone thinks to find answers to any questions in this section, he will be disappointed, because from my point of view, the author has not indicated anything important that could explain Gorbachev's steps in the future. Childhood, like childhood and youth, like youth, so to speak. By the way, it's a funny moment. A few years ago I read an adapted text in English, which was devoted to Gorbachev's biography. So, having already read the chapter about Gorbachev's childhood and youth in this book, I noted to myself that there is actually no special difference between these two texts. I admit that I could have been careless and missed something, but I have a strong feeling that in the key moments both texts converge, but differ only in insignificant details.
The next and the main part of the book, in which we already meet Gorbachev as a politician, will be devoted to his activities in Stavropol and further promotion up to the Secretary General. In general, there are a lot of dialogues here. I don't know, maybe only I got such a feeling (because the book is huge, and I was often tired of reading it), but many dialogues seemed to me exhausting. However, on the other hand, there is nothing better for a person who is interested in politics of that time with all the details. Perhaps this person will find the middle of the book and all these dialogues, all these conversations about nuclear weapons, negotiations, etc., incredibly interesting. I am definitely not from this cohort. Nevertheless, I found what I was interested in, namely, the overall picture. When I finished the book, it was as if I was getting the full picture. We see Gorbachev as a reformer who understands that "we can't go on living like this" and begins to reform the country trying to create "socialism with a human face". Yes, I think Gorbachev was the last person in the country who sincerely believed in "socialism with a human face", that life in the USSR is better than in the USA and Europe, that the Union is more effective in all or most respects. So when he saw how people really live in Europe, he realized that the USSR was losing this game. That's why, as I think, he decided to reform the country. That is, if he hadn't reformed the country, the gap would have widened even further. Having given freedom and elections, he sincerely thought that people would be in favor the Communist Party (Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)). Alas, he also made a miscalculation here, because the entire Union was held by fear only (which Stalin had established) and nothing else. So when the fear went away, everything began to fall apart.
As Edvard Radzinsky rightly said, "He's like a two-faced Janus. One head looks forward, but the other always looks back". He said that about the reformer Tsar Alexander II, but we can apply it to Gorbachev, because the second part of this drama is a look into the past. The author writes how much Gorbachev was impressed by his worldwide adoration. The whole world applauded him and his reforms. Everyone waited and hoped for a successful completion of perestroika. But "it is dangerous to start reforms, but it is even more dangerous not to bring them to an end," as Radzinsky correctly remarked. And we got slowdown reforms. And maybe even their stoppage. And this is the most dramatic moment when Gorbachev finds himself between a hammer and anvil. The conservatives (the future of GKChP, and before that Nina Andreyeva with her article "I Can t Give Up My Principles") don't support him because he started to change the whole system, and liberals, because he stopped the process of perestroika. And so, the loss of support. Probably the most difficult period in the life of any major reformer. Well, and all this against the background of catastrophes, starting with interethnic bloody strife and Chernobyl and ending with empty counters in shops.

[Aaron Ambrose · Rating 2 out of 5]

It took me six months to make it halfway through this one, and that’s enough. The first chapter is laughably overwrought - stretching two pages worth of musings and speculation into thirty. Taubman exercises comparatively greater restraint in subsequent chapters, but the ongoing problem is lack of discernment. He learned 100,000 details about Gorbachev’s life - and he was going to include them all, god damn it. The gossipy back-and-forth minutiae of backroom negotiations is like Sweet Valley High crossed with a Steelworkers 309 union contract. The guts of the 320 pages I ice-axed my way through could have been covered - sharply and engagingly - in about 100. Editor, where were you?!

[Antonio Nunez · Rating 5 out of 5]

Taubman’s biography of Mikhail Sergeievitch Gorbachev is up to the very high standards he set in his life of Kruschev, which won him a Pulitzer Prize. He has me convinced that the two most significant statesmen of the latter twentieth century were Deng Xiao Ping and Gorbachev. Both faced similar situations. Both had to lead a great or world power that struggled to overcome stagnation due to the poisoned inheritance of totalitarianism. Deng chose to liberalize the economy rather than the politics of China, thus setting the stage for the rise of China beyond regional power, but at the great risk that there will come a bloody reckoning when the rich and educated middle class he and his successors fostered demands political freedom and rule of law.

Gorbachev went down a different road. He tried to democratize the political system by dismantling the chokehold of the Communist Party and its institutions over Soviet society. His task was made unmeasurably harder than Deng’s by the fact that the Soviet Union had an empire in Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, and was in itself an empire of multiple nationalities. As Gorbachev disassembled the levers of the Soviet state, its individual constituents reasserted themselves, most notably where Russian assimilation was weakest (the Baltics), or where there were more historical resentments (Ukraine) or richer resources to leverage (Kazakhstan). Eventually great Russia led the way, under Yeltsin, to the burial of the USSR, at which point Gorbachev found himself out of a job. He saw Yeltsin liberalize the economy bringing inflation and unemployment and delegitimizing the market system in the eyes of many. Putin worked hard to put the state back together after the near dissolution of Yeltsin’s later years, but then decided to stick around and restart on the traditional authoritarian Russian model rather than continue to build up Gorbachev’s democratic foundations. The future is anybody’s guess.

Taubman shows that Gorbachev and his wife Raisa Maksimovna were the best that Soviet society could produce. Intelligent, hardworking, sober, honest, uxorious, they were a highly competent power couple. Their family stories were very moving to this reader. The part about Raisa’s death from leukemia brought tears to my eyes. Yet even these exceptional people and the team they created to advance their vision were unable to bring it to fruition.

Many people consider Gorbachev to have failed as a statesman and in a superficial way it is possible to agree with them. He attempted to modernize the Soviet polity while renouncing all centripetal powers. Wasn’t it foreseeable that the center would not hold? It was like trying to change the four tires on a car with the car running. It was impossible. He assumed that Western powers would agree to bankroll perestroika in exchange for a westernized, friendly Russian empire. He overestimated his “friends” Bush and Kohl. Once they saw the Soviet bear wasn’t what he used to be, they took advantage, the former by initiating a NATO expansion that would eventually reach the Russian border and the latter by unifying the two Germanys and keeping the resulting Federal Republic in NATO. Gorbachev’s attempts at disarmament of nuclear weapons were resisted by leaders whose global standing would be diminished if they had no nukes (Britain and France) and by the Americans, who didn’t want the MAD model to be superseded unless in their own terms (Reagan’s Star Wars). I believe Taubman is right: narrow self interest on the part of the West won out and the possibility of a new global arrangement in which Russia played a responsible, stabilizing part, was lost. No one can be surprised at Putin having ridden high on a wave of popular nationalism and indignation at the unmaking of the Russian empire (which mostly predated the Soviets). No one can be surprised at Putin’s attempts at pushing back American gains in what he regards as his sphere of influence. Also, he seems likely to succeed in his efforts to claw back the status Russia after the Soviet collapse.

If Gorbachev failed, he failed magnificently, for the right, not the wrong reasons. Yes, he could have held on to power by a bloodbath, like Deng did, and then what? Wouldn’t the system eventually have unraveled as China’s may yet do? In the end, of the statesmen that won the Nobel Peace Prize none deserved it more than he. This is a highly recommended book, very well written and very thorough. To understand Russia today one must understand the greatness and tragedy of Gorbachev.

[John Cooper · Rating 5 out of 5]

This excellent biography is an attempt to answer the question "How did Gorbachev become Communist party boss despite the most rigorous imaginable arrangement of checks and guarantees designed to guard against someone like him?" (From the Introduction.) "What made him think he could transform a dictatorship into a democracy, a command economy into a market economy, a super-centralized unitary state into a genuine Soviet federation, and a cold war into a new world order based on the renunciation of force—all at the same time, and by what he called 'evolutionary' means?"

Taubman draws on extensive interviews, not just with Gorbachev but with his inner political circle—some of whom have since become his bitter critics. The book is deeply researched, vivid, and yes, wonky—there is a lot of arcane detail here, particularly about the governmental workings of the USSR, and you're expected to have gained your own familiarity with it and to follow along, with the help of a long "Cast of Characters" list at the beginning and a very short glossary at the end. One thing that surprised me, and that may annoy American readers with a Reaganesque mindset, is how little editorializing Taubman does regarding the many defects of the Soviet system. He presents the system as Gorbachev experienced it—as sometimes capricious, occasionally corrupt, and all too often cruel, yes, but also as a working culture that could be navigated, as can our own, by a smart striver with a talent for networking and a great deal of luck. It's important for Americans to remember that to a Russian, the Soviet system wasn't an exception to the usual rules of government. It was the norm, and from the perspective of those living in it, the American system was the one that seemed exotically foreign, corrupt, and a potential threat. To me, this is one of the book's great strengths, essential to understanding its subject.

If Taubman doesn't completely answer the questions he poses in the book's introduction, he comes as close as anyone is likely to. In any case, the scenes inside the Politburo as Gorbachev balances the factions and holds off the hard-liners while securing the support of key allies are fascinating. And for those seeking more domestic drama, the days in the dacha during the coup, with Raisa approaching a complete breakdown wondering if and when the family will be killed, are gripping. All in all, this is a book to be read slowly, digested, and learned from.

[Annette · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fascinating story of an extremely interesting man. I remember Gorbachev's leadership of the USSR in the late 80's and early 90's, but this book provides lots of insights that I hadn't previously been aware of. Taubman quotes Gorbachev himself as saying that he's not easy to understand -- he led his country through confusing times and often behaved in contradictory ways. This book made me realize that the situation during the final years of the USSR was confusing and perhaps scary even for its leaders.

Taubman explains the chain of events very clearly. My only disappointment is that I had trouble keeping track of all the players, both individuals and organizations (the organizations were especially confusing -- the Party, the Politburo, the Duma, party conferences, congresses, plenums, etc.).

Anyway, having read this book, I now want to read Taubman's biography of Khruschev.

[Aafke Romeijn · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well researched biography that gives a nuanced insight into Russian politics and Gorbachevs character. It's very heavy on the political, so only read it when you're a politics nerd like me. Then it's very entertaining to read about private conversations between Gorbachev and other world leaders (Reagan, Thatcher, Bush sr.). The book tries to make sense of the very conflicted reputations Gorbachev had: the liberator of the totalitarian Soviet Union in the eyes of the West, and the destroyer of a Union in the eyes of most Russians. It's a difficult task Taubman set himself, and he is very forthcoming about the instances he just doesn't know why Gorbachev acted like he did. I like that not all questions get an answer.

[James]

What a fantastic biography! It doesn't seem likely that anyone will be able to top this, given that Taubman interviewed Gorbachev so many times, and the subject is now 86. A very good companion volume, also, to Odd Arne Westad's The Cold War that just came out. There are many touching moments describing Raisa that very much humanize him. Most interesting in the present is his relationship with Vladimir Putin.

[T · Rating 4 out of 5]

"[H]e neither foresaw nor wished the collapse of East European communism, what he was counting on to avoid it was utopian - the triumph of Perestroika without his intervening directly to promote that outcome" (382).

I won't write a long-form review of this biography because there's already plenty out there that are much better than anything that I could produce. However, I will say that this book has some fascinating tidbits about Gorbachev, and presents a much more sympathetic view of the man than the views that I was already acquainted with.

Here are some interesting tidbits that other reviewers may not have picked up on:

Gorbachev's interest in reading:
"Raisa (Gorbachev's wife) insisted on reading Hegel, Fichte, and Kant in the original German and recruited Mikhail to help her (90)"
Early on Mikhail became a voracious reader and immediately soared intellectually. It is during this period that he associated reading with success, and he continued his bibliophilia into his old age, with the Gorbachev house often being silent because everybody was reading. In fact, at key points in his premiership Gorbachev was reading works which reflected his innermost fears and desires (e.g. studying Lenin's work very seriously as a student, or Robert C. Tucker's biography of Stalin during the 1991 attempted coup, or locking himself in a basement to devour the American novel The Headless Horseman).
"Many years later, Gorbachev proudly asserted that he still kept some of these volumes on his shelves: Louis Aragon's A History of the USSR from Lenin to Kruschev [...] as well as books about [...] Palmiro Togliatti and the famous prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci" (127).


Gorbachev's relationship with his wife:
"Raisa (Gorbachev's wife) insisted on reading Hegel, Fichte, and Kant in the original German and recruited Mikhail to help her (66)"
When Raisa lectured on Kant, Hegel, and Lenin, Gorbachev's wife was challenged for not being a member of the Communist Party, to which Gorbachev challenged a local party official and reminded his wife to become a member (86)

How did Gorbachev go from peasant farmer to top student and Komsomol leader?
Growing up Gorbachev was awarded Red Banner of Labour for helping his father produce 8888 centners of grain, 888 centners over the requested amount. Gorbachev only received this because he could not share the Order of Lenin award with his father. It is this, combined with Gorbachev's impressive grades, despite his rural peasant background, that helped to catapult him to high office, even with some questionable remarks made as a student about Joseph Stalin on his record.

Gorbachev's on/off relationship to Putin
Towards the end of his life, despite being occasionally critical of Putin, Gorbachev believed that Putin was overall a positive development for Russia. For Gorbachev, he struggled with the fact that he was viewed a great man by other countries, but disliked by his fellow countrymen. Cheered on by Thatcher, Reagan, and Mitterand, he eventually felt betrayed by the West as the years followed the collapse of the Soviet empire. For Gorbachev, Putin's authoritarianism was needed to ease in a more liberal order, and the corruption brought about by Yeltsin needed to be stamped out with an iron fist, even if this style didn't match with Gorbachev's sensitive and social democratic reformist view.

The interesting tidbits were fascinating for me, but I can't help but wish the biography took a more a holistic view of Gorbachev's life, as the years 1988-1991 take up about half of this 800 page book (700 + notes and index), and the last 24 years of his life hit a mere 50 pages! Also, Gorbachev's disillusionment with the Soviet system isn't touched on nearly enough. Perhaps, this is due to political disillusionment being fascinating to me, but how did one of the few people who seemed to seriously study Lenin in the Soviet elite manage to become a social democrat? Gorbachev knew that the system needed reforming, and he saw the failure of the Liberman-Kosygin reforms, but why did he not take inspiration from China, or why did he not push Yeltsin to reform in a slower, more social-democratic manner, keeping the state institutions that people wanted (a health sector with one of the highest doctor:patient ratios, a lauded public education system, publishing firms that produced a literate culture with newspapers having huge readerships?). I don't feel that these questions were dealt with enough, but other than that, this is an excellent biography by somebody with a fantastic career in Russian history.

[Vicky]

Book frames Gorbachev as a shining beacon of neo-Leninist idealism, crushed by the stagnated old Soviet model and conservative reformers who couldn't catch up to his genius. I think Taubman greatly overestimates Gorbachev's intelligence. Total apologia for one of the worst decision makers of all time.

[Stefan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A remarkable account of the life of one of the greatest statesmen of the 20th century. A truly mammoth work, but one that in incredible detail outlines the story of Gorbachev’s youth, rise up the Communist Party apparatus, and subsequent leadership of the Soviet Union. An extremely enjoyable read, and one of the best (if not THE best) biographies I have ever read.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent biography of Gorbachev. Gorbachev was a hero to my generation, as he was a critical figure in removing the threat of global nuclear war. What I learned from the book was how differently he was viewed in Russia than in the west ... very enlightening.

[Jayaram Anandha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ever since I found some books of Lenin and Marx in my dad’s trunk, I was always trying to understand why communism failed. I know reading Gorbachev would help me to understand but never managed to read until his tragic death flashed in the news. I was glad that I could find a copy of this wonderful biography in the Bavarian Library, Munich.

Rest in peace Comrade!

[Richard · Rating 3 out of 5]

Frankly, I was disappointed by this volume. While it is certainly a good biography, if all one is interested in is that narrative, I had other hopes.

Gorbachev confronted seventy years of "Communist"/Stalinist constructs, a polity that developed out of many more years of authoritarian/Tsarist rule, a group of privileged Party officials, and more, yet he still managed to forge a way out from under that leaden yoke. How did he achieve what he managed to achieve? That is the ? that sustained me through the reading. But I still do not have a clear set of ideas.

Taubman offers an external view of Gorbachev's background, feelings, and actions, giving much attention to his wife Raisa's role as a sounding board and advisor/supporter, but he fails to give us the story of the plotting, exchanges, and chess game that the man had to play in order to achieve what he did achieve. Were he outrun by events, that situation needed clear demarcation. The push and pull of Yeltsin sketched here does not effectively indicate specifics as to the matters at issue, rather leaving one the impression that the conflict occurred because of Gorbachev's caution in realizing what was at stake and Yeltsin's erratic self-aggrandizement and overwhelming egotism.

Given the state of the Soviet peoples, this reads more like a US version of HNIC, Washington vs Du Bois, than a struggle to bring not one but several countries out of bondage, into a world dominated by the US.

I went through the footnotes at the end of the volume, but, out of hundreds, I found few that enriched the text or further enlightened the reader. I feel confident that Mr Taubman knows his subject and the art of biography, but I suspect that, to favor the latter, he shorted the former.

[Don Heiman · Rating 5 out of 5]

In 2017, William Taubman, published his book "Gorbachev: His Life and Times" in 2017. He spent 11 years writing this exceptional book. Gorbachev was a renown visionary and remarkable architect of social democratic reform. He influenced the principles for modern world order and economic advancement. Taubman's research is comprehensive and his writing engaging. I consider this book a treasure in my collection of biographies. Taubman is a Pulitizer Prize winner for his biography about Khrushchev. (L)

[Susan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’ve always been interested in Gorbachev. In the summer of 1990 a plane I was on circled San Francisco’s airport in order to allow Gorbachev's plane to land (maybe multiple planes since Taubman talked about the number of people and planes that often accompanied him). My flight had been from Seattle and before that from Copenhagen. I was tired and I think the occasion was another trade show, but the news that Gorbachev was in the same city inspired me if none of my colleagues. So I walked alone to the St. Francis (don’t know who told me he was stating there) at 11 PM. Saw nothing, but ....

This book was really worth reading (actually I listened to all of it). Even though the plethora of Russian names, many of which I didn’t know before, was a lot to take in (even the reader had some trouble). The intricacy of Soviet/Russian politics got too much also, but I persisted because I’d made a hero of this man and I was a little shaky explaining why. Well worth it. This book explained to me why I’d settled for Gorbachev the well intentioned failure without really understanding how extraordinary a man and a leader he was.

[Dеnnis]

«Сирия «начала диктовать нам... За наши же деньги. И получается, мы проводим не свою, а сирийскую политику». «Мы должны убираться оттуда», — заявил Горбачев на заседании Политбюро 2 июня 1986 года. «Как бы не потерять время! — заметил он 13 ноября. — Происходит привыкание. Ну что ж, мол, идет война» (про Афганистан). Кто мог подумать, что биографию политика невозможно будет отложить, но описания дуэли с Ельциным и «шахматных партий» саммитов с американскими президентами захватывают. Чернобыль, Афганистан, ГКЧП, восстания сепаратистов, конец СССР — семилетка власти для Михаила Сергеевича выдалась насыщенной. Таубману, получившему Пулитцеровскую премию за биографию другого противоречивого лидера, Хрущева, вновь удалась превосходная работа. Отдельный плюс — выдающийся перевод.

[Jim Reynolds]

I checked first with Michael McFaul (@McFaul) former ambassador to Russia during Obama's administration, and he was kind enough to respond, recommending it highly. I enjoyed it immensely: great detail on both Gorbechev and the USSR in the hinterlands (where Gorbachev grew up and about which I'd never read much). Fascinating accounts of inner workings of the Soviet system, obviously. I was surprised at Gorbachev's foresightedness. It's no hagiography, and Taubman does not shrink from recounting Gorbchev's insistence on control. This is an excellent book for anyone interested in the final days of the USSR and its initial, failed attempts to develop a Western-style market based economy with political openness.

[Mirek Jasinski · Rating 5 out of 5]

It took me some 10 months to read this biography. Not because it was boring, or difficult - it wasn't. Very well researched and written. It was a good read.

It took me so long because it inspired me to rethink the recent political history of Eastern Europe. Just pause and think - how different the political situation would have been today if Western leaders had extended economic help to Russia in the nineties and if they had invited Russia to join NATO?