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Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the "New Cold War"
The Ukrainian crisis that dominated headlines in fall 2013 was decades in the making. Two great schisms shaped one within Ukraine, its western and southeastern parts divided along cultural and political lines; the other was driven by geopolitical factors. Competition between Russia and the West exacerbated Ukraine's divisions.
This study focuses on the historical background and complex causality of the crisis, from the rise of mass demonstrations on Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) to the making of the post-revolt regime.
In the context of a "new cold war," the author sheds light on the role of radical Ukrainian nationalists and neofascists in the February 2014 snipers' massacre, the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, and Russia's seizure of Crimea and involvement in the civil war in the eastern region of Donbass.
This study focuses on the historical background and complex causality of the crisis, from the rise of mass demonstrations on Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) to the making of the post-revolt regime.
In the context of a "new cold war," the author sheds light on the role of radical Ukrainian nationalists and neofascists in the February 2014 snipers' massacre, the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, and Russia's seizure of Crimea and involvement in the civil war in the eastern region of Donbass.
- GenresRussia
368 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 14, 2018
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February 18, 2024
Так ли надёжен автор?
Точно ли есть война?
Всей не узнать нам правды
Всё не проверить нам
Всей не собрать нам воли
Слёз всех не перелить
Всех не забрать из поля
Всех не похоронить
Очередная попытка англоязычного автора оправдать действия Владимира Путина. Изначально книга мне напомнила другую похожую книгу – «How the West Brought War to Ukraine», ибо в обеих книгах главной причиной конфронтации России и Украины выступает, с точки зрения авторов, расширение НАТО на восток и то неуважение к интересам Российской Федерации (в плане её влияния на постсоветские страны), которое продемонстрировали политики из США и ЕС. Подобный нарратив появляется в каждой книге, в которой автор пытается найти оправдания действиям Владимира Путина. Собственно, это единственное оправдание, которое имеется у больших друзей В. В. Путина на Западе, ведь не могут же они позволить себе повторять весь тот бред про нацистов, которые засели в Киеве, который используют российские власти в качестве самооправдания. Но, разумеется, перед тем как включать заезженную пластинку про «расширение НАТО на восток» и про неуважение российских интересов, каждый такой автор видит необходимым дать короткий экскурс в истории совместного существования Украины и России. Особенно такие авторы любят акцентировать внимание читателей на том периоде истории, когда Украина была оккупирована Гитлером и когда члены УПА совершали военные преступления против евреев и поляков. Делается это с целью подчеркнуть воображаемую преемственность тогдашних действий граждан и политиков в Украине и сегодняшних действий политиков и граждан в Украине. Сравнение, конечно, неуместное, но оно ориентировано не на русскоязычную или украиноязычную аудиторию, которые как раз и понимают всю абсурдность подобного сравнения, а исключительно на англоязычную аудиторию, которой тяжело разобраться в этих тонких отношениях между русскими и украинцами которых у них имелись на протяжении веков. Это как раз та причина, почему я отрицаю и другую крайность, которая появляется у проукраинских спикеров – утверждать, что Россия всегда стремилась уничтожить Украину как таковую. Это тоже явное передёргивание, ибо если бы это действительно бы входило в планы России, то бунтов на территории Украины, когда она входила в состав России, было бы заметно больше. Что касается упразднения Екатериной украинского казачества (Запорожской сечи), то это сугубо политический жест направленный не на уничтожение Украины как таковой, а на упрочнение авторитаризма в самой России, ибо Запорожская сечь рассматривалась как конкуренция царской власти, а такого не могло быть в абсолютистской монархии в принципе. Чтобы убедиться в этом, достаточно посмотреть на то, как жили сами русские в то время. Они жили под такой же пятой царского авторитаризма, под которой жили и украинцы. Я хочу сказать, что все народы были заложниками авторитарной власти, и никто не имел больше прав и свободы. Но вернёмся к книге.
Однако в какой-то момент автор начинает более откровенно играть на стороне Путина. Не сразу, конечно, а шаг за шагом. Это, кстати, забавно наблюдать, как он медленно подводит читателя к идеи, что Россию спровоцировали. Тем не менее, начинается это довольно невинно. Но так как я прочитал уже десятки книг по нынешнему украино-российскому конфликту, я сразу заметил это едва уловимое изменение интонации.
More importantly, for both East and West the real or imagined geostrategic and civilizational fault line that separates Europe in the west of the World Island from Orthodox-led Eurasia in the east runs through Ukraine. At the same time, post–Soviet Ukraine’s real and imagined schism has carried with it a tectonic of tension, conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned.
Получается, сначала автор прочёл нам лекцию о совместной российско-украинской истории, потом напомнил про преступления УПА времён Второй Мировой, а теперь подводит читателя к идеи «conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned». Действительно, существование двух украин вело к конфликту, однако как показала блестящая работа по поводу истинных причин сепаратизма на Донбассе «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition», насилие вовсе не вело к сепаратизму, ибо в регионах, в которых взяли власть сепаратисты, было меньше всего насилия. Однако такие тонкости западный читатель не знает. Он знает лишь, что в тот момент там был хаос и насилие. И вот этим неведением и воспользовался автор. Конечно, это самое невинное утверждение автора. И только начиная середины, автор окончательно переходит на сторону путинской России.
Putin is a Russian patriot with moderate nationalist tendencies in foreign affairs and statist ones domestically; his chief goal is a secure and strong Russia. Domestically speaking, Putin is neither a democrat nor a dictator. He is a statist, authoritarian inclined “hybrid regime” ruler. His highest value is neither the sovereignty of the people over the state nor his personal power over the state and people. His strong inclination is to preserve order, stability and security. This leads him to err on the authoritarian side. Putin rejects totalitarianism and lofty ideology and is neither repelled nor impressed by democracy or authoritarianism.
<…>
However, the liberalization under his hand-picked inter-regent, Medvedev, from 2008 to 2012 shows that Putin is not averse to changes in course or democratic development, as long as stability is not threatened as a result. This suggests that Putin adopts authoritarian methods not because he sees them as inherently superior or conducive to Russian culture, but because they seem to serve the goal of a modern, globally competitive Russia.
Назвать Путина человеком, который думает не о собственном благополучии (замках, яхтах и дворцах), а о России, мог только пропагандист (или очень наивный человек, каких в политике не существует). Любой человек кто интересуется Россией, знает, какого уровня коррупции достигла страна при правлении президента Путина. А уж его внешнеполитические действия никак кроме как катастрофическими назвать не получается. Автор открыто льстит Путину и открыто обманывает читателя. Особо смешно читать, что Путин не является диктатором. Ну-ну.
Putin does not seek restoration of the USSR or any imperial project. Such claims derive from delusions, paranoia, and/or well-compensated stratcomm. Actions that have been perceived as aggressive and expansionist in the West, such as those in Georgia in 2008, were defensive in nature. Overall, he is a rational actor, but when provoked and especially when he perceives he has been betrayed, he tends to overreact, pushing the envelope of possible responses.
Вот и тут мы встречаем тот единственный тезис, которым и могут оправдывать действия Путина - это не он (виноват), его спровоцировали. Я согласен с тем, что Путин не пытается воссоздать СССР. Я считаю, что он пытается просто усидеть на троне столько сколько сможет. СССР всё же был более ответственным в этом смысле, хотя и там, у руля страны стояли кровопийцы...
Чтобы объяснить, почему против России была совершенна именно провокация, нужно объяснить, что все «Цветные революции» являются не результатом народного недовольства, а хорошо спланированной американской и европейской спецоперацией. Тут мы слышим знакомые нотки про НКО, т.е. что они занимаются вовсе не защитой прав людей, а подрывом «законно избранной власти».
Demonstrations convened in a heated political atmosphere of electoral politics and high levels of distrust or in a revolutionary situation are prone to violent turns. This is true regardless of the many lectures and lessons on methods of civil disobedience organized by Western NGOs under their democracy promotion efforts.
Ну и финальная стадия: объявить, что в ходе революции к власти пришли радикалы. Правда, если сравнить, сколько погибло тогда людей и сколько за два года военного конфликта сегодня, тогда красиво выстроенная картина автора моментально развалится. Я понимаю, на чём основывается автор. Действительно, в украинской политике начиная с 2004 года, значительно повысился уровень радикализма, но даже в этом случаи, разве он может служить оправданием военного вмешательства?
Some of the color revolutionary elements funded by USAID and its conduit organizations across the globe were initially, or at least during the revolution would become, allied with radicals, including communalist elements, whether ultranationalists in Tbilisi, neofascists in Ukraine, or Islamists in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. As color revolutions spread eastward, across Eurasia, first in Belgrade, then Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev, Moscow became more concerned. There was a growing sense and eventually clear evidence that Washington and Brussels were encouraging regime transformation, if not revolution itself.
Главная проблема этой книги в том, что автор сознательно исключил Россию и особенно Путина из числа лиц ответственных за то, что сегодня происходит на востоке Украины. Книга крайне необъективна и откровенно манипулирует читателем, раздувая одни факты до гигантских размеров в то же самое время умалчивая о других.
It's another attempt by an English-speaking author to justify Vladimir Putin's actions. Initially, the book reminded me of another similar book "How the West Brought War to Ukraine" because in both books the main reason for the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is, from the authors' point of view, the expansion of NATO to the east and the disrespect for the interests of the Russian Federation (in terms of its influence on post-Soviet countries), which was demonstrated by politicians from the U.S. and the EU. This narrative appears in every book in which the author tries to find justifications for Vladimir Putin's actions. This is the only justification that Vladimir Putin's big friends in the West have because they cannot afford to repeat all the nonsense about the Nazis in Kiev that the Russian authorities use as self-justification. But, of course, before turning on the hackneyed record about "NATO's eastward expansion" and about disrespect for Russian interests, each such author finds it necessary to give a brief excursion into the history of the joint existence of Ukraine and Russia. Especially such authors like to emphasize to readers the period of history when Ukraine was occupied by Hitler and when members of the UPA committed war crimes against Jews and Poles. The purpose of this is to emphasize the imaginary continuity between the actions of citizens and politicians in Ukraine then and the actions of politicians and citizens in Ukraine today. The comparison, of course, is inappropriate, but it is aimed not at the Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking audience, who understand the absurdity of such a comparison, but exclusively at the English-speaking audience, which has a hard time understanding these delicate relations between Russians and Ukrainians, which they have had for centuries. This is precisely the reason why I deny the other extreme that appears among pro-Ukrainian speakers - to claim that Russia has always sought to destroy Ukraine as such. This, too, is an obvious misrepresentation because if this had really been part of Russia's plans, there would have been far more riots in Ukraine when it was part of Russia. As for the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossacks (Zaporizhian Sich) by Catherine II, it is a purely political gesture aimed not at the destruction of Ukraine as such but at strengthening authoritarianism (in Russia) itself because the Zaporizhian Sich was seen as a competition to the tsar's power, and this could not be in an absolutist monarchy in principle. To be convinced of this, it is enough to look at how the Russians themselves lived at that time. They lived under the same heel of tsarist authoritarianism that the Ukrainians lived under. I mean that all nations were hostages of authoritarian power, and no one had more rights and freedom. But let's get back to the book.
However, at some point, the author starts to play more openly on Putin's side. Not immediately, of course, but step by step. This, by the way, is fun to watch as he slowly leads the reader to the idea that Russia was provoked. Nevertheless, it starts off innocently enough. But since I have read dozens of books on the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict, I immediately noticed this subtle change in tone.
More importantly, for both East and West the real or imagined geostrategic and civilizational fault line that separates Europe in the west of the World Island from Orthodox-led Eurasia in the east runs through Ukraine. At the same time, post–Soviet Ukraine’s real and imagined schism has carried with it a tectonic of tension, conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned.
It turns out that first, the author gave us a lecture about the joint Russian-Ukrainian history, then reminded us about the crimes of the UPA during World War II, and now leads the reader to the idea of "conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned". Indeed, the existence of two Ukraine led to conflict, but as a brilliant work on the true causes of separatism in Donbas, "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition," has shown, that violence did not lead to separatism at all, because the regions in which the separatists took power had the least violence. However, the Western reader does not know such subtleties. All he knows is that there was chaos and violence there (at that moment). And it was this unawareness that the author took advantage of. Of course, this is the author's most innocent assertion. It is only starting in the middle that the author finally switches to the side of Putin's Russia.
Putin is a Russian patriot with moderate nationalist tendencies in foreign affairs and statist ones domestically; his chief goal is a secure and strong Russia. Domestically speaking, Putin is neither a democrat nor a dictator. He is a statist, authoritarian inclined “hybrid regime” ruler. His highest value is neither the sovereignty of the people over the state nor his personal power over the state and people. His strong inclination is to preserve order, stability and security. This leads him to err on the authoritarian side. Putin rejects totalitarianism and lofty ideology and is neither repelled nor impressed by democracy or authoritarianism.
<…>
However, the liberalization under his hand-picked inter-regent, Medvedev, from 2008 to 2012 shows that Putin is not averse to changes in course or democratic development, as long as stability is not threatened as a result. This suggests that Putin adopts authoritarian methods not because he sees them as inherently superior or conducive to Russian culture, but because they seem to serve the goal of a modern, globally competitive Russia.
Only a propagandist (or a very naive person, which does not exist in politics) could call Putin a man who thinks not about his own well-being (castles, yachts, and palaces) but about Russia. Anyone who is interested in Russia knows what level of corruption the country has reached under President Putin's rule. And his foreign policy actions cannot be called anything but disastrous. The author openly flatters Putin and openly deceives the reader. It is especially funny to read that Putin is not a dictator. Well, well, well.
Putin does not seek restoration of the USSR or any imperial project. Such claims derive from delusions, paranoia, and/or well-compensated stratcomm. Actions that have been perceived as aggressive and expansionist in the West, such as those in Georgia in 2008, were defensive in nature. Overall, he is a rational actor, but when provoked and especially when he perceives he has been betrayed, he tends to overreact, pushing the envelope of possible responses.
Here, we meet the only thesis that can justify Putin's actions - he is not to blame because he was provoked. I agree that Putin is not trying to recreate the USSR. I think he is just trying to stay on the throne as long as possible. The USSR was more responsible in this sense, although there were bloodsuckers at the helm of the country, too.
To explain why it was a provocation against Russia, it is necessary to explain that all "Color Revolutions" are not the result of popular discontent but a well-planned American and European special operation (like "provocation"). Here, we hear familiar notes about NGOs, i.e., that they are not engaged in protecting people's rights but undermining the "legally elected government."
Demonstrations convened in a heated political atmosphere of electoral politics and high levels of distrust or in a revolutionary situation are prone to violent turns. This is true regardless of the many lectures and lessons on methods of civil disobedience organized by Western NGOs under their democracy promotion efforts.
The final stage is to declare that radicals came to power during the revolution. However, if we compare how many people died then and how many died in two years of military conflict today, then the author's beautifully constructed picture will instantly fall apart. I understand what the author is basing his argument on. The level of radicalism in Ukrainian politics has indeed increased significantly since 2004, but even so, can it justify military intervention?
Some of the color revolutionary elements funded by USAID and its conduit organizations across the globe were initially, or at least during the revolution would become, allied with radicals, including communalist elements, whether ultranationalists in Tbilisi, neofascists in Ukraine, or Islamists in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. As color revolutions spread eastward, across Eurasia, first in Belgrade, then Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev, Moscow became more concerned. There was a growing sense and eventually clear evidence that Washington and Brussels were encouraging regime transformation, if not revolution itself.
The main problem with this book is that the author deliberately excluded Russia and especially Putin from being responsible for what is happening in eastern Ukraine today. The book is biased and blatantly manipulates the reader, inflating some facts to gigantic proportions while omitting others.
Точно ли есть война?
Всей не узнать нам правды
Всё не проверить нам
Всей не собрать нам воли
Слёз всех не перелить
Всех не забрать из поля
Всех не похоронить
Очередная попытка англоязычного автора оправдать действия Владимира Путина. Изначально книга мне напомнила другую похожую книгу – «How the West Brought War to Ukraine», ибо в обеих книгах главной причиной конфронтации России и Украины выступает, с точки зрения авторов, расширение НАТО на восток и то неуважение к интересам Российской Федерации (в плане её влияния на постсоветские страны), которое продемонстрировали политики из США и ЕС. Подобный нарратив появляется в каждой книге, в которой автор пытается найти оправдания действиям Владимира Путина. Собственно, это единственное оправдание, которое имеется у больших друзей В. В. Путина на Западе, ведь не могут же они позволить себе повторять весь тот бред про нацистов, которые засели в Киеве, который используют российские власти в качестве самооправдания. Но, разумеется, перед тем как включать заезженную пластинку про «расширение НАТО на восток» и про неуважение российских интересов, каждый такой автор видит необходимым дать короткий экскурс в истории совместного существования Украины и России. Особенно такие авторы любят акцентировать внимание читателей на том периоде истории, когда Украина была оккупирована Гитлером и когда члены УПА совершали военные преступления против евреев и поляков. Делается это с целью подчеркнуть воображаемую преемственность тогдашних действий граждан и политиков в Украине и сегодняшних действий политиков и граждан в Украине. Сравнение, конечно, неуместное, но оно ориентировано не на русскоязычную или украиноязычную аудиторию, которые как раз и понимают всю абсурдность подобного сравнения, а исключительно на англоязычную аудиторию, которой тяжело разобраться в этих тонких отношениях между русскими и украинцами которых у них имелись на протяжении веков. Это как раз та причина, почему я отрицаю и другую крайность, которая появляется у проукраинских спикеров – утверждать, что Россия всегда стремилась уничтожить Украину как таковую. Это тоже явное передёргивание, ибо если бы это действительно бы входило в планы России, то бунтов на территории Украины, когда она входила в состав России, было бы заметно больше. Что касается упразднения Екатериной украинского казачества (Запорожской сечи), то это сугубо политический жест направленный не на уничтожение Украины как таковой, а на упрочнение авторитаризма в самой России, ибо Запорожская сечь рассматривалась как конкуренция царской власти, а такого не могло быть в абсолютистской монархии в принципе. Чтобы убедиться в этом, достаточно посмотреть на то, как жили сами русские в то время. Они жили под такой же пятой царского авторитаризма, под которой жили и украинцы. Я хочу сказать, что все народы были заложниками авторитарной власти, и никто не имел больше прав и свободы. Но вернёмся к книге.
Однако в какой-то момент автор начинает более откровенно играть на стороне Путина. Не сразу, конечно, а шаг за шагом. Это, кстати, забавно наблюдать, как он медленно подводит читателя к идеи, что Россию спровоцировали. Тем не менее, начинается это довольно невинно. Но так как я прочитал уже десятки книг по нынешнему украино-российскому конфликту, я сразу заметил это едва уловимое изменение интонации.
More importantly, for both East and West the real or imagined geostrategic and civilizational fault line that separates Europe in the west of the World Island from Orthodox-led Eurasia in the east runs through Ukraine. At the same time, post–Soviet Ukraine’s real and imagined schism has carried with it a tectonic of tension, conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned.
Получается, сначала автор прочёл нам лекцию о совместной российско-украинской истории, потом напомнил про преступления УПА времён Второй Мировой, а теперь подводит читателя к идеи «conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned». Действительно, существование двух украин вело к конфликту, однако как показала блестящая работа по поводу истинных причин сепаратизма на Донбассе «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition», насилие вовсе не вело к сепаратизму, ибо в регионах, в которых взяли власть сепаратисты, было меньше всего насилия. Однако такие тонкости западный читатель не знает. Он знает лишь, что в тот момент там был хаос и насилие. И вот этим неведением и воспользовался автор. Конечно, это самое невинное утверждение автора. И только начиная середины, автор окончательно переходит на сторону путинской России.
Putin is a Russian patriot with moderate nationalist tendencies in foreign affairs and statist ones domestically; his chief goal is a secure and strong Russia. Domestically speaking, Putin is neither a democrat nor a dictator. He is a statist, authoritarian inclined “hybrid regime” ruler. His highest value is neither the sovereignty of the people over the state nor his personal power over the state and people. His strong inclination is to preserve order, stability and security. This leads him to err on the authoritarian side. Putin rejects totalitarianism and lofty ideology and is neither repelled nor impressed by democracy or authoritarianism.
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However, the liberalization under his hand-picked inter-regent, Medvedev, from 2008 to 2012 shows that Putin is not averse to changes in course or democratic development, as long as stability is not threatened as a result. This suggests that Putin adopts authoritarian methods not because he sees them as inherently superior or conducive to Russian culture, but because they seem to serve the goal of a modern, globally competitive Russia.
Назвать Путина человеком, который думает не о собственном благополучии (замках, яхтах и дворцах), а о России, мог только пропагандист (или очень наивный человек, каких в политике не существует). Любой человек кто интересуется Россией, знает, какого уровня коррупции достигла страна при правлении президента Путина. А уж его внешнеполитические действия никак кроме как катастрофическими назвать не получается. Автор открыто льстит Путину и открыто обманывает читателя. Особо смешно читать, что Путин не является диктатором. Ну-ну.
Putin does not seek restoration of the USSR or any imperial project. Such claims derive from delusions, paranoia, and/or well-compensated stratcomm. Actions that have been perceived as aggressive and expansionist in the West, such as those in Georgia in 2008, were defensive in nature. Overall, he is a rational actor, but when provoked and especially when he perceives he has been betrayed, he tends to overreact, pushing the envelope of possible responses.
Вот и тут мы встречаем тот единственный тезис, которым и могут оправдывать действия Путина - это не он (виноват), его спровоцировали. Я согласен с тем, что Путин не пытается воссоздать СССР. Я считаю, что он пытается просто усидеть на троне столько сколько сможет. СССР всё же был более ответственным в этом смысле, хотя и там, у руля страны стояли кровопийцы...
Чтобы объяснить, почему против России была совершенна именно провокация, нужно объяснить, что все «Цветные революции» являются не результатом народного недовольства, а хорошо спланированной американской и европейской спецоперацией. Тут мы слышим знакомые нотки про НКО, т.е. что они занимаются вовсе не защитой прав людей, а подрывом «законно избранной власти».
Demonstrations convened in a heated political atmosphere of electoral politics and high levels of distrust or in a revolutionary situation are prone to violent turns. This is true regardless of the many lectures and lessons on methods of civil disobedience organized by Western NGOs under their democracy promotion efforts.
Ну и финальная стадия: объявить, что в ходе революции к власти пришли радикалы. Правда, если сравнить, сколько погибло тогда людей и сколько за два года военного конфликта сегодня, тогда красиво выстроенная картина автора моментально развалится. Я понимаю, на чём основывается автор. Действительно, в украинской политике начиная с 2004 года, значительно повысился уровень радикализма, но даже в этом случаи, разве он может служить оправданием военного вмешательства?
Some of the color revolutionary elements funded by USAID and its conduit organizations across the globe were initially, or at least during the revolution would become, allied with radicals, including communalist elements, whether ultranationalists in Tbilisi, neofascists in Ukraine, or Islamists in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. As color revolutions spread eastward, across Eurasia, first in Belgrade, then Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev, Moscow became more concerned. There was a growing sense and eventually clear evidence that Washington and Brussels were encouraging regime transformation, if not revolution itself.
Главная проблема этой книги в том, что автор сознательно исключил Россию и особенно Путина из числа лиц ответственных за то, что сегодня происходит на востоке Украины. Книга крайне необъективна и откровенно манипулирует читателем, раздувая одни факты до гигантских размеров в то же самое время умалчивая о других.
It's another attempt by an English-speaking author to justify Vladimir Putin's actions. Initially, the book reminded me of another similar book "How the West Brought War to Ukraine" because in both books the main reason for the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is, from the authors' point of view, the expansion of NATO to the east and the disrespect for the interests of the Russian Federation (in terms of its influence on post-Soviet countries), which was demonstrated by politicians from the U.S. and the EU. This narrative appears in every book in which the author tries to find justifications for Vladimir Putin's actions. This is the only justification that Vladimir Putin's big friends in the West have because they cannot afford to repeat all the nonsense about the Nazis in Kiev that the Russian authorities use as self-justification. But, of course, before turning on the hackneyed record about "NATO's eastward expansion" and about disrespect for Russian interests, each such author finds it necessary to give a brief excursion into the history of the joint existence of Ukraine and Russia. Especially such authors like to emphasize to readers the period of history when Ukraine was occupied by Hitler and when members of the UPA committed war crimes against Jews and Poles. The purpose of this is to emphasize the imaginary continuity between the actions of citizens and politicians in Ukraine then and the actions of politicians and citizens in Ukraine today. The comparison, of course, is inappropriate, but it is aimed not at the Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking audience, who understand the absurdity of such a comparison, but exclusively at the English-speaking audience, which has a hard time understanding these delicate relations between Russians and Ukrainians, which they have had for centuries. This is precisely the reason why I deny the other extreme that appears among pro-Ukrainian speakers - to claim that Russia has always sought to destroy Ukraine as such. This, too, is an obvious misrepresentation because if this had really been part of Russia's plans, there would have been far more riots in Ukraine when it was part of Russia. As for the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossacks (Zaporizhian Sich) by Catherine II, it is a purely political gesture aimed not at the destruction of Ukraine as such but at strengthening authoritarianism (in Russia) itself because the Zaporizhian Sich was seen as a competition to the tsar's power, and this could not be in an absolutist monarchy in principle. To be convinced of this, it is enough to look at how the Russians themselves lived at that time. They lived under the same heel of tsarist authoritarianism that the Ukrainians lived under. I mean that all nations were hostages of authoritarian power, and no one had more rights and freedom. But let's get back to the book.
However, at some point, the author starts to play more openly on Putin's side. Not immediately, of course, but step by step. This, by the way, is fun to watch as he slowly leads the reader to the idea that Russia was provoked. Nevertheless, it starts off innocently enough. But since I have read dozens of books on the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict, I immediately noticed this subtle change in tone.
More importantly, for both East and West the real or imagined geostrategic and civilizational fault line that separates Europe in the west of the World Island from Orthodox-led Eurasia in the east runs through Ukraine. At the same time, post–Soviet Ukraine’s real and imagined schism has carried with it a tectonic of tension, conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned.
It turns out that first, the author gave us a lecture about the joint Russian-Ukrainian history, then reminded us about the crimes of the UPA during World War II, and now leads the reader to the idea of "conflict and potential violence about which Putin and many others warned". Indeed, the existence of two Ukraine led to conflict, but as a brilliant work on the true causes of separatism in Donbas, "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition," has shown, that violence did not lead to separatism at all, because the regions in which the separatists took power had the least violence. However, the Western reader does not know such subtleties. All he knows is that there was chaos and violence there (at that moment). And it was this unawareness that the author took advantage of. Of course, this is the author's most innocent assertion. It is only starting in the middle that the author finally switches to the side of Putin's Russia.
Putin is a Russian patriot with moderate nationalist tendencies in foreign affairs and statist ones domestically; his chief goal is a secure and strong Russia. Domestically speaking, Putin is neither a democrat nor a dictator. He is a statist, authoritarian inclined “hybrid regime” ruler. His highest value is neither the sovereignty of the people over the state nor his personal power over the state and people. His strong inclination is to preserve order, stability and security. This leads him to err on the authoritarian side. Putin rejects totalitarianism and lofty ideology and is neither repelled nor impressed by democracy or authoritarianism.
<…>
However, the liberalization under his hand-picked inter-regent, Medvedev, from 2008 to 2012 shows that Putin is not averse to changes in course or democratic development, as long as stability is not threatened as a result. This suggests that Putin adopts authoritarian methods not because he sees them as inherently superior or conducive to Russian culture, but because they seem to serve the goal of a modern, globally competitive Russia.
Only a propagandist (or a very naive person, which does not exist in politics) could call Putin a man who thinks not about his own well-being (castles, yachts, and palaces) but about Russia. Anyone who is interested in Russia knows what level of corruption the country has reached under President Putin's rule. And his foreign policy actions cannot be called anything but disastrous. The author openly flatters Putin and openly deceives the reader. It is especially funny to read that Putin is not a dictator. Well, well, well.
Putin does not seek restoration of the USSR or any imperial project. Such claims derive from delusions, paranoia, and/or well-compensated stratcomm. Actions that have been perceived as aggressive and expansionist in the West, such as those in Georgia in 2008, were defensive in nature. Overall, he is a rational actor, but when provoked and especially when he perceives he has been betrayed, he tends to overreact, pushing the envelope of possible responses.
Here, we meet the only thesis that can justify Putin's actions - he is not to blame because he was provoked. I agree that Putin is not trying to recreate the USSR. I think he is just trying to stay on the throne as long as possible. The USSR was more responsible in this sense, although there were bloodsuckers at the helm of the country, too.
To explain why it was a provocation against Russia, it is necessary to explain that all "Color Revolutions" are not the result of popular discontent but a well-planned American and European special operation (like "provocation"). Here, we hear familiar notes about NGOs, i.e., that they are not engaged in protecting people's rights but undermining the "legally elected government."
Demonstrations convened in a heated political atmosphere of electoral politics and high levels of distrust or in a revolutionary situation are prone to violent turns. This is true regardless of the many lectures and lessons on methods of civil disobedience organized by Western NGOs under their democracy promotion efforts.
The final stage is to declare that radicals came to power during the revolution. However, if we compare how many people died then and how many died in two years of military conflict today, then the author's beautifully constructed picture will instantly fall apart. I understand what the author is basing his argument on. The level of radicalism in Ukrainian politics has indeed increased significantly since 2004, but even so, can it justify military intervention?
Some of the color revolutionary elements funded by USAID and its conduit organizations across the globe were initially, or at least during the revolution would become, allied with radicals, including communalist elements, whether ultranationalists in Tbilisi, neofascists in Ukraine, or Islamists in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. As color revolutions spread eastward, across Eurasia, first in Belgrade, then Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kiev, Moscow became more concerned. There was a growing sense and eventually clear evidence that Washington and Brussels were encouraging regime transformation, if not revolution itself.
The main problem with this book is that the author deliberately excluded Russia and especially Putin from being responsible for what is happening in eastern Ukraine today. The book is biased and blatantly manipulates the reader, inflating some facts to gigantic proportions while omitting others.
September 1, 2023
Gordon Hahn has written arguably the most complete, detailed, and well researched book on Ukraine history as pertains to today's conflict. It is spot on regarding Ukraine, Russia, and U.S. foreign policy, and is prescient in predicting the meltdown that occurred 4 years later. In it, he does an excellent job identifying just what is Ukraine, who lives there, it's varied cultures, religion, and history. He covers well the history of Crimea and why this has become a key issue today. Also he gives a cogent history of the U.S. and Russia relations, NATO expansion, the Minsk Accords, the vast differences between Yeltsin and Putin, the ABM and ICBM missile treaties, the conflict between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia, Chechnya hostage crisis and wars, how the Ukraine oblasts voted in elections and how they answered surveys. He brings out all the nuances of the Yanukovych election, and the pressures that came from the EU and EEU, the difference is the peaceful protests and the violent coup that took place in 2014. He gives a great amount of space to contrasting Lviv and Galicia to Donbass regions and between them and Kyiv.
If you are interested in understanding the above, and the current conflict, and the motives of the U.S., Russia, and the current government in Ukraine--this book is essential.
If you are interested in understanding the above, and the current conflict, and the motives of the U.S., Russia, and the current government in Ukraine--this book is essential.
October 20, 2022
The most comprehensive, detailed and balanced and the best-researched and -referenced book on the subject in my opinion. I've read "War With Russia? From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate" by Stephen F. Cohen;
"The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe" by George Beebe;
"Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War" by Paul D'Anieri;
"Russia Resurrected:Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order " by Kathryn E. Stoner;
"Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus" by Gerard Toal, Christopher Douyard, et al.;
"Weak Strongman" by Timothy Frye;
"Putin's Playbook: Russia's Secret Plan to Defeat America" by Rebekah Koffler.
"The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe" by George Beebe;
"Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War" by Paul D'Anieri;
"Russia Resurrected:Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order " by Kathryn E. Stoner;
"Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus" by Gerard Toal, Christopher Douyard, et al.;
"Weak Strongman" by Timothy Frye;
"Putin's Playbook: Russia's Secret Plan to Defeat America" by Rebekah Koffler.
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