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Introducing Social Theory: Third edition
This revised edition of this extremely popular introduction to social theory has been carefully and thoroughly updated with the latest developments in this continually changing field. Written in a refreshingly lucid and engaging style, Introducing Social Theory provides readers with a wide-ranging, well organized and thematic introduction to all the major thinkers, issues and debates in classical and contemporary social theory.
Introducing Social Theory traces the development of social theorizing from the classical ideas about modernity of Durkheim, Marx and Weber, right up to a uniquely accessible review of the contemporary theoretical controversies in sociology that surround post-colonialism, gender and feminist theories, and public sociology.
The ideal textbook for students of sociology at all levels, from A-level to undergraduates, Introducing Social Theory is remarkably easy to follow and understand. This new edition lives up to its predecessors' goal that students need never be intimidated by social theory again.
Introducing Social Theory traces the development of social theorizing from the classical ideas about modernity of Durkheim, Marx and Weber, right up to a uniquely accessible review of the contemporary theoretical controversies in sociology that surround post-colonialism, gender and feminist theories, and public sociology.
The ideal textbook for students of sociology at all levels, from A-level to undergraduates, Introducing Social Theory is remarkably easy to follow and understand. This new edition lives up to its predecessors' goal that students need never be intimidated by social theory again.
- GenresNonfictionSociology
258 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 28, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 3, 2024
THIS: Naked force is only necessary so long as people see themselves as oppressed. If they can be persuaded that they are not oppressed, or if they fail to see that they are, then they can be unwitting architects in the design of their own subordination (a process Pierre Bourdieu (1998) calls ‘symbolic violence’). The easiest way for the dominant to exercise power, and maintain their advantage as a result, is if the dominated are complicit in their own subordination.
Conflict theorists tell us, therefore, that rather than simply describe cultural rules in a society, we must carefully examine their content. We must ask: ‘Who benefits from the particular set of rules prevailing in this society, rather than some other set?’ Cultural rules cannot be neutral or all-benevolent. Of course, consensus theorists are right to say that people are socialized into pre-existing norms and values. But for conflict theorists this tells us only half the story. We must also find out whether some groups benefit more than others from the existence of a particular set of rules and have a greater say in their construction and interpretation. If they do, then the process of socialization into these is an instrument of their advantage – it is an instrument of their power. (pg 11, 12)
AND THIS: There is one final question to be asked about this theoretical approach. How does the exercise of force by means of socialization into particular ideas happen? Conflict theorists say it can be intentional or unintentional. The rulers of many societies in the world today deliberately employ propaganda to persuade the ruled of the legitimacy of this arrangement. They also often control and censor social and mass media in their countries, to ensure lack of opposition to this controlled socialization. The exercise of this kind of force can be less deliberate too. Take our example of the inequality between men and women in British society. To what extent does the image of women presented in advertising promote an acceptance of this inequality? Marketing strategies to make specific products appear desirable often deploy images of women but, as more recent research shows, a major source of revenue is now seen to lie in packaging idealized images of women’s bodies directly to women. Whether in ‘infommercials’ or overt promotion of cosmetic enhancements, conflict theorists argue that the ideal body image is that which emphasizes sexual attractiveness by appealing to a male gaze as a sexually desirable object.
Such advertising socializes both men and women, of course. The outcome is a stereotypical view of womanhood and of the place of women in society, a view Raewyn Connell summarizes as that of ‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell 1987), which is embraced not only by a significant number of those whom it disadvantages, but also by those who benefit from it. There is a consensus about such things. However, it is not the kind of consensus portrayed by the consensus theorist. It is a consensus that is managed by those who believe they benefit from the subordinate position of women in society, and one that is intended to make it harder for those who do not benefit from successfully opposing the status quo. (pg 15)
MARX: Despite these alterations to the nature of productive property in capitalist society, for Marxists the character of class relations between owners of property and non-owners of property is essentially the same as in the earlier class-based modes of production. Though the bourgeoisie do not make goods themselves, they nevertheless own the means of production. For this reason, they will always profit from the difference between the cost to them of the labour of the proletariat, and the value of the goods produced by the proletariat’s labour power. The important fact is that workers will always be paid less than the value of the goods they produce. If this did not happen, the system could not work; without this source of profit being available for reinvestment, the productive power of capitalism would not take place, and enterprises would wither and die in the face of competition. This surplus value costs the capitalist nothing, and is a tangible symbol of the exploitation of wage-earners’ labour power by employers. Though not as obvious as the exaction of tithes by feudal lords, or the ownership of people by slave-owners, the relationship between the capitalist and the wage-earner is of exactly the same kind. In Marx’s words, ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 1976 [1848]). (pg 40)
MORE MARX: While the compliance of the subordinate class in this arrangement can be secured by physical force, in the Marxist view the most effective way of ensuring that compliance is via prevalent beliefs and values. For Marxists, ideologies are systems of belief which:
• legitimate the class-based system of production by making it appear right and just, and/or
• obscure the reality of its consequences for those involved. (pg 41)
Marxists argue that although dominant classes can and do have to resort to naked force to maintain their power and supremacy, the absence of such obvious coercion should not be taken to signify an absence of exploitation. On the contrary, they suggest, all a lack of naked oppression can ever indicate is a lack of effective opposition, and the lack of any need to use force. It does not mean that domination is not taking place – only that the dominated are insufficiently aware of their condition or else lack the power to have their resistance registered. (pg 42)
Conflict theorists tell us, therefore, that rather than simply describe cultural rules in a society, we must carefully examine their content. We must ask: ‘Who benefits from the particular set of rules prevailing in this society, rather than some other set?’ Cultural rules cannot be neutral or all-benevolent. Of course, consensus theorists are right to say that people are socialized into pre-existing norms and values. But for conflict theorists this tells us only half the story. We must also find out whether some groups benefit more than others from the existence of a particular set of rules and have a greater say in their construction and interpretation. If they do, then the process of socialization into these is an instrument of their advantage – it is an instrument of their power. (pg 11, 12)
AND THIS: There is one final question to be asked about this theoretical approach. How does the exercise of force by means of socialization into particular ideas happen? Conflict theorists say it can be intentional or unintentional. The rulers of many societies in the world today deliberately employ propaganda to persuade the ruled of the legitimacy of this arrangement. They also often control and censor social and mass media in their countries, to ensure lack of opposition to this controlled socialization. The exercise of this kind of force can be less deliberate too. Take our example of the inequality between men and women in British society. To what extent does the image of women presented in advertising promote an acceptance of this inequality? Marketing strategies to make specific products appear desirable often deploy images of women but, as more recent research shows, a major source of revenue is now seen to lie in packaging idealized images of women’s bodies directly to women. Whether in ‘infommercials’ or overt promotion of cosmetic enhancements, conflict theorists argue that the ideal body image is that which emphasizes sexual attractiveness by appealing to a male gaze as a sexually desirable object.
Such advertising socializes both men and women, of course. The outcome is a stereotypical view of womanhood and of the place of women in society, a view Raewyn Connell summarizes as that of ‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell 1987), which is embraced not only by a significant number of those whom it disadvantages, but also by those who benefit from it. There is a consensus about such things. However, it is not the kind of consensus portrayed by the consensus theorist. It is a consensus that is managed by those who believe they benefit from the subordinate position of women in society, and one that is intended to make it harder for those who do not benefit from successfully opposing the status quo. (pg 15)
MARX: Despite these alterations to the nature of productive property in capitalist society, for Marxists the character of class relations between owners of property and non-owners of property is essentially the same as in the earlier class-based modes of production. Though the bourgeoisie do not make goods themselves, they nevertheless own the means of production. For this reason, they will always profit from the difference between the cost to them of the labour of the proletariat, and the value of the goods produced by the proletariat’s labour power. The important fact is that workers will always be paid less than the value of the goods they produce. If this did not happen, the system could not work; without this source of profit being available for reinvestment, the productive power of capitalism would not take place, and enterprises would wither and die in the face of competition. This surplus value costs the capitalist nothing, and is a tangible symbol of the exploitation of wage-earners’ labour power by employers. Though not as obvious as the exaction of tithes by feudal lords, or the ownership of people by slave-owners, the relationship between the capitalist and the wage-earner is of exactly the same kind. In Marx’s words, ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 1976 [1848]). (pg 40)
MORE MARX: While the compliance of the subordinate class in this arrangement can be secured by physical force, in the Marxist view the most effective way of ensuring that compliance is via prevalent beliefs and values. For Marxists, ideologies are systems of belief which:
• legitimate the class-based system of production by making it appear right and just, and/or
• obscure the reality of its consequences for those involved. (pg 41)
Marxists argue that although dominant classes can and do have to resort to naked force to maintain their power and supremacy, the absence of such obvious coercion should not be taken to signify an absence of exploitation. On the contrary, they suggest, all a lack of naked oppression can ever indicate is a lack of effective opposition, and the lack of any need to use force. It does not mean that domination is not taking place – only that the dominated are insufficiently aware of their condition or else lack the power to have their resistance registered. (pg 42)
August 17, 2018
Some books on sociology are sumptuous and sluggish; others are clear and cool. Jones and Bradbury’s most recent edition is of the second type. I cannot think of a better front cover – the title is print on t-shirts as if saying to the young reader, ‘I’m so like you. Read me!’ I wonder whether the choice of colours has something to add to the message.
Interpret how you will. Yet this being a book on theory, it is no one-sitting read. It requires approaching it in a way that the contents be chewed and digested. In this sense, it is no different from the TV series one could watch over and over again and still realise something new every time.Its accessible language eases the task. The main threads are smoothly connected throughout to give the reader a sense of progress while moving across chapters. Key terms are signalled in bolder characters, and each chapter concludes with suggestions for further reading.
Chapter 1 provides original examples, each designed to illustrate different explanatory schemes (i.e. social norms, social conflict, and interpretation). It also explains why sociological reasoning is different from natural sciences explanations and individual explanations.
Written about a million times, Marxian theory is brilliantly outlined in a separate chapter. It provides comprehensive definitions of class consciousness, superstructure, and ideology. Importantly, we are reminded that, although we may think it is Marx, the author we often read when studying Marxism is ‘the one that has been posthumously put together and pulled apart, by each subsequent generation of theories, philosophers, political analysts and activists’ (p. 32). Also useful is to read what has happened with Marxism after Marx, including concepts deriving from it, such as hegemony, reification, and instrumental reason.
For didactic purposes, Weber’s ideas (Chapter 3) are constantly contrasted to Marx’s, thus giving salience to either social action or social structure in explaining inequalities and power. The read moves forward smoothly to arrive to the rational bureaucracy argument. But that is not all; important as it goes in the pedagogical arena, we need not wait until some ‘contemporary theorists’ section to learn how this work relates to Foucault’s, Baumann’s, Ritzer’s, and Sennett’s. The same holds for Durkheim’s ideas (Chapter 4), entwined purposefully with Parsons’.
So far though, the sociologies of major figures have been sketched. Commonly known as ‘the founding fathers’, they are repeatedly taught as the reading canon. On an accuracy update, Jones and Bradbury warn us this is a Eurocentric creation narrative, which appears not so much as a map of early sociological thought, but as a glammed-out filtered ‘selfie’ of the global North. This, too, is welcome.
Action theories are lively illustrated in Chapter 5. For example, Blumer’s argument becomes clear through cases like identity formation and classroom interaction. Though comparatively less expository, a section is devoted to Goffman’s interest in the making of one’s self/selves. So on goes Goffman’s approach resumed soon after with abundance of examples of labelling theory and institutionalisation.
Conveniently, Habermas and Foucault are then treated as two contrasting ways to look at discourse and language (Chapter 6). However, I am unsure as to whether this chapter is as well-pitched as the previous ones.
In Chapter 7, we are back to structure and social action as rewritten, combined, and adapted to contemporary problems. Here, the basics of Bhaskar, Bourdieu, and Giddens are used to show us how sociology has attempted to challenge the ‘structuralist versus interpretivist’ orthodoxy of theory. Even though, according to some authors, such attempts are fated to fail.
Theories of gender and feminism are delineated on Chapter 8. This is a good summary of the evolution of theories, including their common ground and their different branches. However, it is more about feminism than about gender.
The last chapter is the novelty of this third edition. Its title, ‘Sociology and its Publics’, fleetingly reminds me of the role of the historian in public history. This is something different, though. It is concerned with contemporary capitalism, mass media, political discourse, cosmopolitanism, and the like. A great note to close this book with.
So do judge it by its cover. This is a cool, charming book students and lecturers will enjoy from cover to end.
(This Review appeared in Sociological Research Online).
Interpret how you will. Yet this being a book on theory, it is no one-sitting read. It requires approaching it in a way that the contents be chewed and digested. In this sense, it is no different from the TV series one could watch over and over again and still realise something new every time.Its accessible language eases the task. The main threads are smoothly connected throughout to give the reader a sense of progress while moving across chapters. Key terms are signalled in bolder characters, and each chapter concludes with suggestions for further reading.
Chapter 1 provides original examples, each designed to illustrate different explanatory schemes (i.e. social norms, social conflict, and interpretation). It also explains why sociological reasoning is different from natural sciences explanations and individual explanations.
Written about a million times, Marxian theory is brilliantly outlined in a separate chapter. It provides comprehensive definitions of class consciousness, superstructure, and ideology. Importantly, we are reminded that, although we may think it is Marx, the author we often read when studying Marxism is ‘the one that has been posthumously put together and pulled apart, by each subsequent generation of theories, philosophers, political analysts and activists’ (p. 32). Also useful is to read what has happened with Marxism after Marx, including concepts deriving from it, such as hegemony, reification, and instrumental reason.
For didactic purposes, Weber’s ideas (Chapter 3) are constantly contrasted to Marx’s, thus giving salience to either social action or social structure in explaining inequalities and power. The read moves forward smoothly to arrive to the rational bureaucracy argument. But that is not all; important as it goes in the pedagogical arena, we need not wait until some ‘contemporary theorists’ section to learn how this work relates to Foucault’s, Baumann’s, Ritzer’s, and Sennett’s. The same holds for Durkheim’s ideas (Chapter 4), entwined purposefully with Parsons’.
So far though, the sociologies of major figures have been sketched. Commonly known as ‘the founding fathers’, they are repeatedly taught as the reading canon. On an accuracy update, Jones and Bradbury warn us this is a Eurocentric creation narrative, which appears not so much as a map of early sociological thought, but as a glammed-out filtered ‘selfie’ of the global North. This, too, is welcome.
Action theories are lively illustrated in Chapter 5. For example, Blumer’s argument becomes clear through cases like identity formation and classroom interaction. Though comparatively less expository, a section is devoted to Goffman’s interest in the making of one’s self/selves. So on goes Goffman’s approach resumed soon after with abundance of examples of labelling theory and institutionalisation.
Conveniently, Habermas and Foucault are then treated as two contrasting ways to look at discourse and language (Chapter 6). However, I am unsure as to whether this chapter is as well-pitched as the previous ones.
In Chapter 7, we are back to structure and social action as rewritten, combined, and adapted to contemporary problems. Here, the basics of Bhaskar, Bourdieu, and Giddens are used to show us how sociology has attempted to challenge the ‘structuralist versus interpretivist’ orthodoxy of theory. Even though, according to some authors, such attempts are fated to fail.
Theories of gender and feminism are delineated on Chapter 8. This is a good summary of the evolution of theories, including their common ground and their different branches. However, it is more about feminism than about gender.
The last chapter is the novelty of this third edition. Its title, ‘Sociology and its Publics’, fleetingly reminds me of the role of the historian in public history. This is something different, though. It is concerned with contemporary capitalism, mass media, political discourse, cosmopolitanism, and the like. A great note to close this book with.
So do judge it by its cover. This is a cool, charming book students and lecturers will enjoy from cover to end.
(This Review appeared in Sociological Research Online).
July 6, 2023
read it for my cinema class! blessed to have had an interesting class for the first time in the history of bocconi, book was very interesting too
March 21, 2024
Well written and accessible introduction to some of the key theorists and debates within sociology, from Marx to Giddens. Rating purely reflects how much I enjoyed reading through it.
April 17, 2012
Not having read anything about Socialism, Marxism or Western feminism before, I picked up the book and was actually quite impressed. However I couldn't go past after half the book was finished because at times the language gets really technical and you will have to be acquainted with some previous philosophies at first. Overall: good one for prospective undergrads who want to try out Socialism courses.
July 16, 2012
I had to read this book for one of my courses at the uni - did not enjoy reading it... Luckily we had to read only a few chapters ;)
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews