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The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory
In The Evolution of Moral Progress , Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell resurrect the project of explaining moral progress. They avoid the errors of earlier attempts by drawing on a wide range of disciplines including moral and political philosophy, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, history, and sociology.
Their focus is on one especially important type of moral gains in inclusivity. They develop a framework to explain progress in inclusivity to also illuminate moral regression--the return to exclusivist and "tribalistic" moral beliefs and attitudes. Buchanan and Powell argue those tribalistic moral responses are not hard-wired by evolution in human nature. Rather, human beings have an evolved "adaptively plastic" capacity for both inclusion and exclusion, depending on environmental conditions. Moral progress in the dimension of inclusivity is possible, but only to the extent that human beings can create environments conducive to extending moral standing to all human beings and even to some animals. Buchanan and Powell take biological evolution seriously, but with a critical eye, while simultaneously recognizing the crucial role of culture in creating environments in which moral progress can occur. The book avoids both biological and cultural determinism. Unlike earlier
theories of moral progress, their theory provides a naturalistic account that is grounded in the best empirical work, and unlike earlier theories it does not present moral progress as inevitable or as occurring in definite stages; but rather it recognizes the highly contingent and fragile character of moral improvement.
Their focus is on one especially important type of moral gains in inclusivity. They develop a framework to explain progress in inclusivity to also illuminate moral regression--the return to exclusivist and "tribalistic" moral beliefs and attitudes. Buchanan and Powell argue those tribalistic moral responses are not hard-wired by evolution in human nature. Rather, human beings have an evolved "adaptively plastic" capacity for both inclusion and exclusion, depending on environmental conditions. Moral progress in the dimension of inclusivity is possible, but only to the extent that human beings can create environments conducive to extending moral standing to all human beings and even to some animals. Buchanan and Powell take biological evolution seriously, but with a critical eye, while simultaneously recognizing the crucial role of culture in creating environments in which moral progress can occur. The book avoids both biological and cultural determinism. Unlike earlier
theories of moral progress, their theory provides a naturalistic account that is grounded in the best empirical work, and unlike earlier theories it does not present moral progress as inevitable or as occurring in definite stages; but rather it recognizes the highly contingent and fragile character of moral improvement.
440 pages, Hardcover
Published July 9, 2018
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About the author
Allen Buchanan
26 books15 followersAllen Edward Buchanan is the James B. Duke Professor of philosophy at Duke University and also professor of the Philosophy of International Law at the Dickson Poon School of Law at King's College, London. He received his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1975. He taught at the University of Arizona, the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and the University of Minnesota before joining Duke's faculty in 2002 as professor of public policy and philosophy. He has written six books covering such topics as Marx, applied ethics (especially bio-medical ethics), social justice, and international justice, including the foundations of international law. Buchanan served as staff philosopher for the President's Commission on Medical Ethics in 1983. From 1996 to 2000 he served on the Advisory Council for the National Human Genome Research Institute. He is a fellow of the Hastings Center, an independent bioethics research institution.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 9, 2021
(...)
In the rest of the review, some thoughts on the book, an intermezzo on the supposed power of literature, and, as usual in my non-fiction reviews, I’ll end with a collection of interesting information tidbits I want to keep an account of.
What maybe needs addressing first is the mention of the world ‘liberal’ above. Let me quote Hopster:
“In taking this stance they rely on substantive ethical assumptions, of a broadly liberal moral outlook. This might make for some queasy among readers who do not share the same moral outlook. However, these readers can still appreciate what I take to be the book’s key contribution: to analyse and explain under which conditions a move towards more or less inclusivism is likely to occur.”
What is meant by a “broadly liberal moral outlook”? Basically just the idea that the authors think that the abolishing of slavery, advances in women’s rights, rights of disabled people, general human rights, protection against cruel punishment, animal rights, etc. are all instances of moral progress. Mind you, they don’t try to argue the philosophical foundations of such a statement, they “do not offer a normative ethical theory”. But they are not moral nihilists either: they just assume these advances as good, and it’s hard to deny these societal developments of the last 250 years have decreased human suffering. While this all may sound as truisms to many people, some conservative readers might be of the conviction our modern Western society is in a state of moral degeneration or moral regression. Buchanan and Powell spend quite a few tightly argued pages wherein they point at faults in the reasoning of such thinkers, most notably Alastair MacIntyre.
To me this approach was quite refreshing. Instead of spending too much time on trying to build up a theoretical definition of what constitutes ‘moral progress’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the authors start from the idea that advancements in equal rights and inclusion is moral progress. What the authors do not claim is that this progress is universal and set in stone. They very much acknowledge such progress is local and not evenly distributed across the planet, and an important part of the book is devoted to trying to understand why regressions of inclusivity occur – for instance during World War 2. “Exclusivist moral response is a conditionally expressed trait that develops only when cues that were in the past reliably correlated with outgroup predation, exploitation, competition for resources, and disease transmission are detected.” Crucial to understand demagogues is that these cues don’t need to be cues to real threats – if people believe or are made to believe threatening cues exists that belief is enough for exclusivist tendencies to gain hold again.
(...)
Full review on Weighing A Pig Doesn't Fatten It
In the rest of the review, some thoughts on the book, an intermezzo on the supposed power of literature, and, as usual in my non-fiction reviews, I’ll end with a collection of interesting information tidbits I want to keep an account of.
What maybe needs addressing first is the mention of the world ‘liberal’ above. Let me quote Hopster:
“In taking this stance they rely on substantive ethical assumptions, of a broadly liberal moral outlook. This might make for some queasy among readers who do not share the same moral outlook. However, these readers can still appreciate what I take to be the book’s key contribution: to analyse and explain under which conditions a move towards more or less inclusivism is likely to occur.”
What is meant by a “broadly liberal moral outlook”? Basically just the idea that the authors think that the abolishing of slavery, advances in women’s rights, rights of disabled people, general human rights, protection against cruel punishment, animal rights, etc. are all instances of moral progress. Mind you, they don’t try to argue the philosophical foundations of such a statement, they “do not offer a normative ethical theory”. But they are not moral nihilists either: they just assume these advances as good, and it’s hard to deny these societal developments of the last 250 years have decreased human suffering. While this all may sound as truisms to many people, some conservative readers might be of the conviction our modern Western society is in a state of moral degeneration or moral regression. Buchanan and Powell spend quite a few tightly argued pages wherein they point at faults in the reasoning of such thinkers, most notably Alastair MacIntyre.
To me this approach was quite refreshing. Instead of spending too much time on trying to build up a theoretical definition of what constitutes ‘moral progress’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the authors start from the idea that advancements in equal rights and inclusion is moral progress. What the authors do not claim is that this progress is universal and set in stone. They very much acknowledge such progress is local and not evenly distributed across the planet, and an important part of the book is devoted to trying to understand why regressions of inclusivity occur – for instance during World War 2. “Exclusivist moral response is a conditionally expressed trait that develops only when cues that were in the past reliably correlated with outgroup predation, exploitation, competition for resources, and disease transmission are detected.” Crucial to understand demagogues is that these cues don’t need to be cues to real threats – if people believe or are made to believe threatening cues exists that belief is enough for exclusivist tendencies to gain hold again.
(...)
Full review on Weighing A Pig Doesn't Fatten It
May 1, 2022
Aims to move what was once the queen area of philosophy -"moral progress"- back to center stage from its current obscurity/irrelevancy. And does an excellent job of that.
There are three main sections of the book. The first part defines a whole bunch of terms and postulates, so clearly that philosophers/logicians and even amateurs shouldn't have any problem at all understanding exactly what the rest of the book is saying. The second part proposes a new theory of morality which is heavily influenced by the biological sciences, especially evolution and sociology. The third part is a bunch of more-or-less miscellaneous comments on the state of the field of "moral progress" and some suggestions for future directions.
For the second part, the authors had to become quite familiar with the field of evolutionary theory, and it seems to me they've done an excellent job. They describe clearly some obscure areas that even some biologists don't get right.
Their proposed theory is that rather than setting hard limits on cooperation with strangers (i.e. "reciprocal altruism") genetics has provided a very flexible (i.e. "plastic") behavior which is quite sensitive to the surrounding environment. As a specific example, one's attitude toward strangers might be quite different if they were competing for the same food source or if they were potential allies in a future fight against some third party.
This makes great sense, seems to be consistent with current research, and gets the field of "moral progress" un-stuck from its current hopelessness. So far so good ...but here's where the authors and I part ways: to them, as philosophers/logicians, and given the rather pinched history of their field, saying "not fully dictated by DNA" is so freeing it's easy for readers (and perhaps even authors?) to jump to the conclusion "infinitely plastic according to the situation". But for me, thinking much more like a show-me hands-on researcher, I would immediately start doing experiments to find out just exactly where the limits of such plasticity were, expecting them to not be "infinite" (only "broader than expected"). Do the limits vary a lot from one society to the next, or one individual to the next? Are the current limits very different than they were originally in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation)? Can the set-point be changed in adulthood, or is it set once and for all in childhood? Can the set-point change from one interaction to the next in just a few days, or is it semi-fixed over a period of years?
I find the authors' idea very intriguing - in fact that's why I read the book. But unfortunately the book currently seems to be an outlier, and most sociological research in the field seems to be several years old.
In summary: a tour-de-force in the field of philosophy; an accurate and intriguing but ultimately thin and disappointing foray into the field of evolutionary behavior by very perceptive outsiders.
There are three main sections of the book. The first part defines a whole bunch of terms and postulates, so clearly that philosophers/logicians and even amateurs shouldn't have any problem at all understanding exactly what the rest of the book is saying. The second part proposes a new theory of morality which is heavily influenced by the biological sciences, especially evolution and sociology. The third part is a bunch of more-or-less miscellaneous comments on the state of the field of "moral progress" and some suggestions for future directions.
For the second part, the authors had to become quite familiar with the field of evolutionary theory, and it seems to me they've done an excellent job. They describe clearly some obscure areas that even some biologists don't get right.
Their proposed theory is that rather than setting hard limits on cooperation with strangers (i.e. "reciprocal altruism") genetics has provided a very flexible (i.e. "plastic") behavior which is quite sensitive to the surrounding environment. As a specific example, one's attitude toward strangers might be quite different if they were competing for the same food source or if they were potential allies in a future fight against some third party.
This makes great sense, seems to be consistent with current research, and gets the field of "moral progress" un-stuck from its current hopelessness. So far so good ...but here's where the authors and I part ways: to them, as philosophers/logicians, and given the rather pinched history of their field, saying "not fully dictated by DNA" is so freeing it's easy for readers (and perhaps even authors?) to jump to the conclusion "infinitely plastic according to the situation". But for me, thinking much more like a show-me hands-on researcher, I would immediately start doing experiments to find out just exactly where the limits of such plasticity were, expecting them to not be "infinite" (only "broader than expected"). Do the limits vary a lot from one society to the next, or one individual to the next? Are the current limits very different than they were originally in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation)? Can the set-point be changed in adulthood, or is it set once and for all in childhood? Can the set-point change from one interaction to the next in just a few days, or is it semi-fixed over a period of years?
I find the authors' idea very intriguing - in fact that's why I read the book. But unfortunately the book currently seems to be an outlier, and most sociological research in the field seems to be several years old.
In summary: a tour-de-force in the field of philosophy; an accurate and intriguing but ultimately thin and disappointing foray into the field of evolutionary behavior by very perceptive outsiders.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 16, 2022
A well-written and well-argued account of a theory of moral progress. The writing is lucid, albeit a little too often rehashing the same points several times.
Starting with a morality based on reciprocity and cooperation in groups, the idea is that morality can expand from in-group/out-group thinking to include others as well, if certain conditions hold. The authors consider different examples and kinds of moral progress, but concentrate on the inclusion of additional moral agents, such as the argument of the 19th century abolitionists working against slavery that Africans have moral standing. The book uses human rights thinking as the main example.
The authors argue against what they call the evoconservative position: that humans are incorrigibly group-centered and that any attempts to greater inclusivity is an aberration which cannot be sustained. Importantly, the authors make the case that human moral psychology must be viewed in the light of the concept of plasticity, i.e. that the humans (and other organisms) have a range of possible behaviors which are activated depending on the concrete environment they encounter. If humans live in an environment of strife and strong competition, then in-group/out-group thinking becomes more dominant. When conditions favor cooperation and win-win scenarios, moral psychology can become more inclusive. Moral progress has a material, or naturalistic, foundation.
There are a few confusing points. In some places, the authors seem to argue that progress in moral thinking, e.g. arguments and debates about consistency in moral views, are insufficient to explain moral progress in general. Other times, the authors seem to suggest that it is exactly these debates that are being made possible by social developments. They say that their view is biological and naturalistic, and criticize cultural evolution as a concept. But if the logical content of moral argument has any force at all, then there must be cultural innovation and evolution, it seems to me.
One of the most interesting points of the book is that moral progress must entail epistemic humility. We should not try to formulate the ultimate morality, since we cannot know what innovations in morality might happen in the future. If we look back in history, there are many cases of social features that were considered moral, or non-moral, which we have now completely re-evaluated. Examples of features that have undergone fundamental changes in moral reasoning include slavery, dueling, sexual minorities, and the roles of men and women. We cannot presume to know what changes may occur in the future, so instead of trying to formulate the ultimate good, we should focus on improving morality, both the views of morality and its implementation.
Starting with a morality based on reciprocity and cooperation in groups, the idea is that morality can expand from in-group/out-group thinking to include others as well, if certain conditions hold. The authors consider different examples and kinds of moral progress, but concentrate on the inclusion of additional moral agents, such as the argument of the 19th century abolitionists working against slavery that Africans have moral standing. The book uses human rights thinking as the main example.
The authors argue against what they call the evoconservative position: that humans are incorrigibly group-centered and that any attempts to greater inclusivity is an aberration which cannot be sustained. Importantly, the authors make the case that human moral psychology must be viewed in the light of the concept of plasticity, i.e. that the humans (and other organisms) have a range of possible behaviors which are activated depending on the concrete environment they encounter. If humans live in an environment of strife and strong competition, then in-group/out-group thinking becomes more dominant. When conditions favor cooperation and win-win scenarios, moral psychology can become more inclusive. Moral progress has a material, or naturalistic, foundation.
There are a few confusing points. In some places, the authors seem to argue that progress in moral thinking, e.g. arguments and debates about consistency in moral views, are insufficient to explain moral progress in general. Other times, the authors seem to suggest that it is exactly these debates that are being made possible by social developments. They say that their view is biological and naturalistic, and criticize cultural evolution as a concept. But if the logical content of moral argument has any force at all, then there must be cultural innovation and evolution, it seems to me.
One of the most interesting points of the book is that moral progress must entail epistemic humility. We should not try to formulate the ultimate morality, since we cannot know what innovations in morality might happen in the future. If we look back in history, there are many cases of social features that were considered moral, or non-moral, which we have now completely re-evaluated. Examples of features that have undergone fundamental changes in moral reasoning include slavery, dueling, sexual minorities, and the roles of men and women. We cannot presume to know what changes may occur in the future, so instead of trying to formulate the ultimate good, we should focus on improving morality, both the views of morality and its implementation.
July 12, 2020
A bit repetitive and longer than it needs to be, but the main thesis is innovative, interesting and very well defended. It takes a lot of the assumptions of evolutionary psychology and turns them on its head, allowing for a much richer conception of morality and its origins.
January 11, 2022
I gave up on this one. To me it seemed very much like philosophy department academics writing for philosophy department academics.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews