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Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West
This book is written for anybody who cannot understand by Russia and its leaders behave as they do.
Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a "rational" Western nation--even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world--and its place in it--that the West can best meet the Russian challenge.
Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow's leaders think--not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors--will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.
Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a "rational" Western nation--even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world--and its place in it--that the West can best meet the Russian challenge.
Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow's leaders think--not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors--will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.
257 pages, Paperback
First published January 29, 2019
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396 people want to read
About the author
Keir Giles
40 books49 followersKEIR GILES has spent his career watching, studying and explaining Russia.
Keir works with Chatham House in London, and the Conflict Studies Research Centre, a small group of experts in defence and security. Outside the UK, he has provided advice, analysis and expertise on Russia across Europe and North America.
Keir works with Chatham House in London, and the Conflict Studies Research Centre, a small group of experts in defence and security. Outside the UK, he has provided advice, analysis and expertise on Russia across Europe and North America.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
February 21, 2019
A superb work of insight, clarity, analysis, and concision, by someone who has reflected profoundly on the matter. Keir Giles's work is ESSENTIAL reading to anyone (all of us) who are endlessly hopeful, baffled, then disappointed when Russia never behaves in accordance with wishful Western expectation. Simply put, Russia is not like us, and does not wish to be like us. Russian interests are incompatible with Western values. This book deserves a much wider and more popular readership than its rather textbookish prose (sorry!) is likely to reach.
This is a searing indictment of modern Russia, made all the more dismal and surprising by showing how little has changed since the time of Stalin, or, for that matter, 16th century Muscovy. Despite brief periods of crisis, upheaval, and reform, the country and its people invariably revert to type. Putin is no different, and we should place no high hopes in his successor. (The author warns us to be careful what we wish for: change in Russia is often not for the better). Like the tsars before him, red and royal, Putin presides over a medieval system of patriarchy, patronage, and paranoia, and shares with them an obsession with national security bordering on psychosis. Russia is only secure when its enemies are weak and unstable. Russia respects only brute strength and despises offers of compromise and accommodation.
To summarise: Russia is a Great Power (we're using the 19th century sense of the term here). The West is hostile to it, and covets its natural wealth. Great Powers are military powers, regardless of whether their economy has the size and health of a diseased chicken. Only Great Powers are entitled to sovereignty and independence. Smaller, neighbouring powers must fall within the Great Power's sphere of influence and defer to it on all things.
Laws are for the governed, not for those who govern. All wealth and privilege is in the gift of the state (rather, the supreme leader) and can be taken away at any time. Might is right. Injustice is a fact of life that has to be bourn. The foundation of society is the collective, not the individual, and the collective serves the state. Personal human rights, if they exist at all, are weak. This helplessness in the face of state power manifests itself in a depressing dog-eat-dog society where everyone, from the lowliest traffic cop to the head of the Moscow tax office tries to exploit everyone else even for the smallest advantage.
The state rewrites history to support the state's narrative, despite all historical evidence to the contrary, and the state will insist and demand that this false narrative is accepted by the world. (If the narrative were true, it wouldn't need protecting by Russian law). Currently this narrative takes the form of an aggressive religious triumphalist nationalism, defined in opposition to the failing, decadent, homosexual West. Criticism of the leader (e.g. for incompetence or personal corruption) is an attack on Mother Russia herself, and the critic can expect punishment.
The author stops short of saying we're at war with Russia, but since Russia clearly regards even the most innocent Western contact (charitable NGO's, etc) with deep and hostile suspicion, and is actively destabilising the West by election meddling, disinformation, and testing Nato's resolve – in reality, Russia is at war with us.
The author's one slender hope for change lies in the current millennial generation of youth who have known no one but Putin and have had enough of him; they are unusually bold (not having lived through the purges of the past); they're tech savvy, more likely to have online contact with Western viewpoints, and have no memory of the USSR or the chaos of the 1990s. However, whatever hope we can place in them is a long way off.
There were a few omissions I thought odd. No mention of the way Russia's main export – corruption – is undermining some of the institutions that could help resist Russia's influence in the West: the banks, law firms, and accountancy firms, and how this could be addressed. Also, no mention of the one area where co-operation and goodwill might be possible: with Soyuz and the space programme.
All in all. Are real eye opener. Five starts.
This is a searing indictment of modern Russia, made all the more dismal and surprising by showing how little has changed since the time of Stalin, or, for that matter, 16th century Muscovy. Despite brief periods of crisis, upheaval, and reform, the country and its people invariably revert to type. Putin is no different, and we should place no high hopes in his successor. (The author warns us to be careful what we wish for: change in Russia is often not for the better). Like the tsars before him, red and royal, Putin presides over a medieval system of patriarchy, patronage, and paranoia, and shares with them an obsession with national security bordering on psychosis. Russia is only secure when its enemies are weak and unstable. Russia respects only brute strength and despises offers of compromise and accommodation.
To summarise: Russia is a Great Power (we're using the 19th century sense of the term here). The West is hostile to it, and covets its natural wealth. Great Powers are military powers, regardless of whether their economy has the size and health of a diseased chicken. Only Great Powers are entitled to sovereignty and independence. Smaller, neighbouring powers must fall within the Great Power's sphere of influence and defer to it on all things.
Laws are for the governed, not for those who govern. All wealth and privilege is in the gift of the state (rather, the supreme leader) and can be taken away at any time. Might is right. Injustice is a fact of life that has to be bourn. The foundation of society is the collective, not the individual, and the collective serves the state. Personal human rights, if they exist at all, are weak. This helplessness in the face of state power manifests itself in a depressing dog-eat-dog society where everyone, from the lowliest traffic cop to the head of the Moscow tax office tries to exploit everyone else even for the smallest advantage.
The state rewrites history to support the state's narrative, despite all historical evidence to the contrary, and the state will insist and demand that this false narrative is accepted by the world. (If the narrative were true, it wouldn't need protecting by Russian law). Currently this narrative takes the form of an aggressive religious triumphalist nationalism, defined in opposition to the failing, decadent, homosexual West. Criticism of the leader (e.g. for incompetence or personal corruption) is an attack on Mother Russia herself, and the critic can expect punishment.
The author stops short of saying we're at war with Russia, but since Russia clearly regards even the most innocent Western contact (charitable NGO's, etc) with deep and hostile suspicion, and is actively destabilising the West by election meddling, disinformation, and testing Nato's resolve – in reality, Russia is at war with us.
The author's one slender hope for change lies in the current millennial generation of youth who have known no one but Putin and have had enough of him; they are unusually bold (not having lived through the purges of the past); they're tech savvy, more likely to have online contact with Western viewpoints, and have no memory of the USSR or the chaos of the 1990s. However, whatever hope we can place in them is a long way off.
There were a few omissions I thought odd. No mention of the way Russia's main export – corruption – is undermining some of the institutions that could help resist Russia's influence in the West: the banks, law firms, and accountancy firms, and how this could be addressed. Also, no mention of the one area where co-operation and goodwill might be possible: with Soyuz and the space programme.
All in all. Are real eye opener. Five starts.
May 14, 2022
The book you need to understand Russia in 2022
I’d been looking for some understanding of the Russian perspective and motives, after the invasion of Ukraine (and subsequent horrific cruelty and dismal performance of the Russian military). This is the book I needed. Written in 2019, it predicted current events, and matches everything we’re seeing.
I’d been looking for some understanding of the Russian perspective and motives, after the invasion of Ukraine (and subsequent horrific cruelty and dismal performance of the Russian military). This is the book I needed. Written in 2019, it predicted current events, and matches everything we’re seeing.
May 4, 2019
A truly excellent intellectual endeavour.
As an ex-native with a personal and professional interest in Russia, I found the book insightful and enjoyable. In my view, it comprehensively answers the essential question of what drives Russia's international behaviour, which is frequently aggressive and at times seemingly irrational, as Russian intellectuals themselves argue.
The answer is complex (what is it that Churchill said about Russia's behaviour - a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"?). The author disentangles these complexities to show that Russia's conduct is rooted in its history and its view of the world, which, while it is not thus recognised as any less of a challenge, can at least be comprehended.
Unlike what the review linked to elsewhere here suggests - one by a Prof Paul Robinson (his own review, I dare say, severely compromised by his endlessly relativistic assessment of this book and as it transpires on investigation, his peculiarly idiosyncratic (not to say peculiar) views on Russia-related subjects including the conflict in east Ukraine - in effect an apologism for Russia's policy) - the author is not at all unsympathetic to Russia in his search for how to build stable co-existence.
The author draws on Russia's history - and conclusions reached by observers over decades - to demonstrate that it is not the current, confrontational state of its relations with the West but the brief spell of post-perestroika detente that is an aberration; and that therefore Mr Putin is unlikely to be the lone culprit, as Russia's leaders go, in his obsessive pursuit of what the Kremlin sees and claims as the 'national' interest.
To me, the big question is to what extent the people of Russia themselves subscribe to these official attitudes, including for example the ceaseless brandishing of nuclear weapons or the near-racist abuse of for example Ukrainians in the Russian state media.
Anything, it seems, goes in the name of Russia's 'great-power' status. It is an attitude not unique, but it is an opportunity missed for Russia to lead by positive example, for which it is yet, it seems, to mature.
Through the four parts of the 175-page book, plus another 50 pages or so of references and notes, the author guides the reader through Russia's perception of its place in the world (you guessed it - unique and unsurpassed), its internal system, its historical heritage and the prospects for change.
It is frequently remarked that the Kremlin's threat perception is either false or artificial. The author is correct that from the Western perspective, these considerations are irrelevant. What matters is that in practice, Russia configures its behaviour according to this narrative - Russia under threat. The West must also tailor its responses accordingly.
Is it wrong of me to have enjoyed anecdotes in the book such as that, to a Russian, a secure border is one with a Russian soldier on both sides of it? Or this quote from another Russian scholar: "One good turn deserves another. Is not a Russian proverb."
Reading the book invites worrying thoughts about the future of the Russia-West relationship - and those others caught up in all this - where the differences indeed seem irreconcilable and the values incompatible between the two worlds. The author's thoughts about how to manage the relationship are both very welcome and very sound.
From my perspective, it is one thing to have an innate understanding - to oneself as it were - about how things work, in this case in Russia, but it is quite another to be able to analyse and articulate them comprehensively and constructively for the knowledge and use of others, as this book does very well indeed.
In a nutshell, thought-provoking and a good read!
As an ex-native with a personal and professional interest in Russia, I found the book insightful and enjoyable. In my view, it comprehensively answers the essential question of what drives Russia's international behaviour, which is frequently aggressive and at times seemingly irrational, as Russian intellectuals themselves argue.
The answer is complex (what is it that Churchill said about Russia's behaviour - a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"?). The author disentangles these complexities to show that Russia's conduct is rooted in its history and its view of the world, which, while it is not thus recognised as any less of a challenge, can at least be comprehended.
Unlike what the review linked to elsewhere here suggests - one by a Prof Paul Robinson (his own review, I dare say, severely compromised by his endlessly relativistic assessment of this book and as it transpires on investigation, his peculiarly idiosyncratic (not to say peculiar) views on Russia-related subjects including the conflict in east Ukraine - in effect an apologism for Russia's policy) - the author is not at all unsympathetic to Russia in his search for how to build stable co-existence.
The author draws on Russia's history - and conclusions reached by observers over decades - to demonstrate that it is not the current, confrontational state of its relations with the West but the brief spell of post-perestroika detente that is an aberration; and that therefore Mr Putin is unlikely to be the lone culprit, as Russia's leaders go, in his obsessive pursuit of what the Kremlin sees and claims as the 'national' interest.
To me, the big question is to what extent the people of Russia themselves subscribe to these official attitudes, including for example the ceaseless brandishing of nuclear weapons or the near-racist abuse of for example Ukrainians in the Russian state media.
Anything, it seems, goes in the name of Russia's 'great-power' status. It is an attitude not unique, but it is an opportunity missed for Russia to lead by positive example, for which it is yet, it seems, to mature.
Through the four parts of the 175-page book, plus another 50 pages or so of references and notes, the author guides the reader through Russia's perception of its place in the world (you guessed it - unique and unsurpassed), its internal system, its historical heritage and the prospects for change.
It is frequently remarked that the Kremlin's threat perception is either false or artificial. The author is correct that from the Western perspective, these considerations are irrelevant. What matters is that in practice, Russia configures its behaviour according to this narrative - Russia under threat. The West must also tailor its responses accordingly.
Is it wrong of me to have enjoyed anecdotes in the book such as that, to a Russian, a secure border is one with a Russian soldier on both sides of it? Or this quote from another Russian scholar: "One good turn deserves another. Is not a Russian proverb."
Reading the book invites worrying thoughts about the future of the Russia-West relationship - and those others caught up in all this - where the differences indeed seem irreconcilable and the values incompatible between the two worlds. The author's thoughts about how to manage the relationship are both very welcome and very sound.
From my perspective, it is one thing to have an innate understanding - to oneself as it were - about how things work, in this case in Russia, but it is quite another to be able to analyse and articulate them comprehensively and constructively for the knowledge and use of others, as this book does very well indeed.
In a nutshell, thought-provoking and a good read!
July 9, 2023
I am a new member of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London. On a recent visit, I made use of the vast resources of a very well-stocked library at Chatham House and this book is the first of the loans that I have finished reading. It is apt as Keir Giles is indeed a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. He is an expert on Russia and this was clear from the outset of this book, Moscow Rules.
I have read much material on Putin’s Russia in the last decade or so. I have also extensively studied the Cold War and beyond that into Tsarist Russia and the Revolution of 1917 and subsequent communism of the Soviet Union. I think that Keir Giles’ book stands out among many other titles in that he seeks to identify the difference between Russia, Russians, their leaders, and The West. Often, that there is a clear difference between Russia and ourselves, is glossed over. We see Russians as an extension of ourselves, with European, democratic, libertarian values. Russian commentators, who educate and inform Western readers on the subject of Russia, are indeed akin to us Europeans or North Americans and do in fact share our values. However, Giles is keen to point out that these Western-facing Russians are the minority, the tip of the iceberg and the extreme. Russians proper are not so European. As much as Peter the Great or Catherine the Great sought a European home for Mother Russia; that dream has never been achieved. Russia is such a vast continent spanning Europe and Asia and containing such vast isolated resources and diverse populations that, to consider it European. is just folly. Geographically, we are told of how the natural frontiers make defence an almost impossible task for Russian militaries to arrange conventionally. In Moscow they seek buffer states. ‘The only safe border is one with a Russian soldier on both sides’.
Giles identifies that strategically. Russia has changed little with regard to its foreign policy since Tsarist times, through Soviet Communism and into the post Soviet times of Yeltsin and now Putin. It always blows hot and cold in its foreign policy and relationship with The West. One of the biggest factors in Putin’s current stance is his concrete conviction about the fall of the Soviet Union as being the worst event in Russian history. The tumultuous topsy-turvy gangster capitalism that accompanied the Yeltsin era in a Russian flirtation with free market capitalism, brought the country to its knees. The people suffered a massive decline in living standards. Oligarchs got rich but the experiment with out and out capitalism just didn’t work. One of the main reasons for the fall of the USSR was a ‘betrayal’ by Ukraine in agreeing with Belarus to leave the Union after the Baltic States successfully seceded. In Russian, Ukraine means’ borderland’ and it is known as ‘Little Russia’ History with the ancient Rus capital of Kyiv in Putin and many Russian eyes does not separate Ukraine from the motherland. We have seen Ukrainian leaders of the USSR like Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It is the bread basket of Russia. One of the principal functions of the Ukraine borderland is to act as a territorial buffer to invading armies. This was the case when Napoleon came and also Hitler’s Nazi Invasion. It was clearly agreed at the end of the USSR, beforehand with Mikhail Gorbachev, that there be no further expansion of NATO into Russian imperial territory. This has proved a lie by The West. Whereas we see our export of Western democracy as a gift to Russia, the Russians see inequality, decadent and immoral sexual values, and an untrustworthy source of liars and values which simply are not native Russian. It's like Christian missionaries, Western ventures into Russia.
The Russian mentality of paranoia is justified. They do accept autocracy and it works. Yes, there is brutality and State oppression but also the Russians trust their leaders. The Tsar was holy, God’s representative on Earth. Although the horrors of Stalin are obvious, his personality cult was also very real indeed. What we see in our media’s depiction of Vladimir Putin, the Russians see exactly the opposite. He has genuine popularity and represents true Russian values. Propaganda and suppression of dissidents has a long history within Russia and is an accepted part of their culture.
The whole Russian language has its peculiarities and translation into and out of Russian is not straightforward. Giles identifies an example in the difference between Pravda and Istina. Pravda is a ‘tactical truth’ and Istina is the ‘real truth’. We don’t have equivalents in the English language. So often, Western ‘experts’ on Russia do not possess lived in experience of Russia and the cultural knowledge that accompanies native language skills. One has to think like a Russian in Russia in Russian to understand the country.
As the book draws to a conclusion, Giles doesn’t leave us with false hope that Putin will be ‘offski’ any time soon. And if he is, his replacement will have similar mentality and little will change; relationships between blocs could indeed disintegrate further. There is a certain stability and continuity in Vladimir Putin’s rule, as unpalatable as it might be at present. We seek rapprochement but we must recognise Russia’s point of view. NATO is encroaching and I personally see the argument being a double-edged sword regarding Ukraine. Both sides are equally guilty. It’s one thing Eastern European satellites signing up to NATO, but vast core areas of the Soviet Union adjacent to the Motherland signing up? It is unacceptable from a Russian perspective. You have to draw lines at some point. The whole Westphalian system is based on drawing borders and we know from other war experience that borders don’t necessarily export very well. Eg. The Middle East and Arab World. There needs to be some middle ground and it is important that politicians on both sides of the divide look at the psychology of their agreements and disputes and I think that by studying ‘Moscow Rules’, which is a very interesting, mainly psychological, exploration of the differences between Russia and us, any potential diplomat involved in international relationships, will be wiser and better armed in their ability to succeed in diffusing the ticking timebomb. I don’t think that there are many on the planet out there that wish for a full MAD Armageddon nuclear exchange between the old Cold War rivals.
It's the first book that I’ve read from Chatham House library: I’m off to a good start and it makes me hungry for more. The library there is alone worth the membership fee alone for anyone with just a vague interest in international geopolitics. Chatham House is a renowned think tank with leading global experts. Knowledge is the key to all survival and is the essence of civilization.
I have read much material on Putin’s Russia in the last decade or so. I have also extensively studied the Cold War and beyond that into Tsarist Russia and the Revolution of 1917 and subsequent communism of the Soviet Union. I think that Keir Giles’ book stands out among many other titles in that he seeks to identify the difference between Russia, Russians, their leaders, and The West. Often, that there is a clear difference between Russia and ourselves, is glossed over. We see Russians as an extension of ourselves, with European, democratic, libertarian values. Russian commentators, who educate and inform Western readers on the subject of Russia, are indeed akin to us Europeans or North Americans and do in fact share our values. However, Giles is keen to point out that these Western-facing Russians are the minority, the tip of the iceberg and the extreme. Russians proper are not so European. As much as Peter the Great or Catherine the Great sought a European home for Mother Russia; that dream has never been achieved. Russia is such a vast continent spanning Europe and Asia and containing such vast isolated resources and diverse populations that, to consider it European. is just folly. Geographically, we are told of how the natural frontiers make defence an almost impossible task for Russian militaries to arrange conventionally. In Moscow they seek buffer states. ‘The only safe border is one with a Russian soldier on both sides’.
Giles identifies that strategically. Russia has changed little with regard to its foreign policy since Tsarist times, through Soviet Communism and into the post Soviet times of Yeltsin and now Putin. It always blows hot and cold in its foreign policy and relationship with The West. One of the biggest factors in Putin’s current stance is his concrete conviction about the fall of the Soviet Union as being the worst event in Russian history. The tumultuous topsy-turvy gangster capitalism that accompanied the Yeltsin era in a Russian flirtation with free market capitalism, brought the country to its knees. The people suffered a massive decline in living standards. Oligarchs got rich but the experiment with out and out capitalism just didn’t work. One of the main reasons for the fall of the USSR was a ‘betrayal’ by Ukraine in agreeing with Belarus to leave the Union after the Baltic States successfully seceded. In Russian, Ukraine means’ borderland’ and it is known as ‘Little Russia’ History with the ancient Rus capital of Kyiv in Putin and many Russian eyes does not separate Ukraine from the motherland. We have seen Ukrainian leaders of the USSR like Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It is the bread basket of Russia. One of the principal functions of the Ukraine borderland is to act as a territorial buffer to invading armies. This was the case when Napoleon came and also Hitler’s Nazi Invasion. It was clearly agreed at the end of the USSR, beforehand with Mikhail Gorbachev, that there be no further expansion of NATO into Russian imperial territory. This has proved a lie by The West. Whereas we see our export of Western democracy as a gift to Russia, the Russians see inequality, decadent and immoral sexual values, and an untrustworthy source of liars and values which simply are not native Russian. It's like Christian missionaries, Western ventures into Russia.
The Russian mentality of paranoia is justified. They do accept autocracy and it works. Yes, there is brutality and State oppression but also the Russians trust their leaders. The Tsar was holy, God’s representative on Earth. Although the horrors of Stalin are obvious, his personality cult was also very real indeed. What we see in our media’s depiction of Vladimir Putin, the Russians see exactly the opposite. He has genuine popularity and represents true Russian values. Propaganda and suppression of dissidents has a long history within Russia and is an accepted part of their culture.
The whole Russian language has its peculiarities and translation into and out of Russian is not straightforward. Giles identifies an example in the difference between Pravda and Istina. Pravda is a ‘tactical truth’ and Istina is the ‘real truth’. We don’t have equivalents in the English language. So often, Western ‘experts’ on Russia do not possess lived in experience of Russia and the cultural knowledge that accompanies native language skills. One has to think like a Russian in Russia in Russian to understand the country.
As the book draws to a conclusion, Giles doesn’t leave us with false hope that Putin will be ‘offski’ any time soon. And if he is, his replacement will have similar mentality and little will change; relationships between blocs could indeed disintegrate further. There is a certain stability and continuity in Vladimir Putin’s rule, as unpalatable as it might be at present. We seek rapprochement but we must recognise Russia’s point of view. NATO is encroaching and I personally see the argument being a double-edged sword regarding Ukraine. Both sides are equally guilty. It’s one thing Eastern European satellites signing up to NATO, but vast core areas of the Soviet Union adjacent to the Motherland signing up? It is unacceptable from a Russian perspective. You have to draw lines at some point. The whole Westphalian system is based on drawing borders and we know from other war experience that borders don’t necessarily export very well. Eg. The Middle East and Arab World. There needs to be some middle ground and it is important that politicians on both sides of the divide look at the psychology of their agreements and disputes and I think that by studying ‘Moscow Rules’, which is a very interesting, mainly psychological, exploration of the differences between Russia and us, any potential diplomat involved in international relationships, will be wiser and better armed in their ability to succeed in diffusing the ticking timebomb. I don’t think that there are many on the planet out there that wish for a full MAD Armageddon nuclear exchange between the old Cold War rivals.
It's the first book that I’ve read from Chatham House library: I’m off to a good start and it makes me hungry for more. The library there is alone worth the membership fee alone for anyone with just a vague interest in international geopolitics. Chatham House is a renowned think tank with leading global experts. Knowledge is the key to all survival and is the essence of civilization.
February 13, 2023
Jos olet kiinnostunut Martti J. Karin luennoista Venäjästä, niin tulet tykkäämään tästä! Asiasisällöltään tiivis ja helppolukuinen. Luin parissa päivässä, kun koukutti heti ekasta luvusta alkaen.
November 27, 2025
13 timmar av dötid innebär att man hinner läsa mycket.
Men otroligt bra bok! Väldigt informativ men på ett bra sätt, kan starkt rekommendera!!
Men otroligt bra bok! Väldigt informativ men på ett bra sätt, kan starkt rekommendera!!
July 23, 2019
The author (of British Chatham House) tries to make West look like having a moral superiority in terms of not telling lies or western freedoms etc. C'mon, Britain and U.S. are not much different - this is politics.
February 19, 2019
One of the best books on Russia I have read.
April 12, 2019
Most comprehensive, analytical and up to date book on contemporary Russia. Superb
August 30, 2023
A must read for everyone who wants to understand Russia from a westerner who knows Russia like its neighbours
December 7, 2024
really wish i had read this before feb 2022
February 6, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Эти сны
В полстраны
Пацаны
В полцены
Говорит Москва
И пьяны
В полвины
И дыра
В полведра
Говорит Москва
Говори ма!
Говори ма!
Очень скучная книга о том, почему Россия не является демократической страной. Несмотря на то, что я согласен с выводами автора, в плане авторитарности России, читать компиляцию разных источников довольно скучно. С моей точки зрения есть более интересные и глубокие книги, объясняющие, почему демократия в России после развала СССР так и не появилась.
У меня возникло такое чувство, что изначально у автора был лишь тезис – Россия как авторитарная страна – на который он, как на шампур, нанизывал различные события, которые бы подтверждали его тезис. Некоторые такие события или тезисы, которые используется автор, довольно странны как, например этот.
...now that funding is available to enable it, is an overall renewed militarism in Russian society. The armed forces are enjoying unprecedented prestige, popularity, and salaries. Russian children can, if desired, start military training in kindergarten.
Военные в России никогда не пользовались ни почётом, ни популярностью, ибо достаточно посмотреть, сколько было выпущено различных сюжетов и передач, связанных с жилищными проблемами военных. Военные никогда не жили в России особенно богато. Автор судит о России по заголовкам СМИ, а это всегда недостаточно для полного и объективного понимания страны.
Так же я не заметил в книге желания автора докопаться до истинных причин, почему в России не получилось построить демократию (ссылки на историческое прошло просто смешны, ибо у огромного количества стран было тоже сложное авторитарное прошлое, что не помешало им построить демократию). Впрочем, давайте не забывать, что полноценную демократию западного образца не удалось построить ни одной стране бывшего СССР, за исключением прибалтийских стран. Так что построить демократию не так-то и легко, и мало кому это удалось на постсоветском пространстве. Однако как я понял, автор этого не принимает в расчёт. Он просто указывает на то, что, уже начиная с Ельцина, проявились авторитарные нотки.
Короче, не возражая против итогов (Россия как авторитарная страна), я считаю, книга получилась скучной и не интересной. Плюс, слишком много ссылок и слишком широкий временной промежуток был взят автором, что означает, что в книге мало авторского взгляда. Автор слишком долго и слишком глубоко капается в истории России, ища ответ, почему Россия авторитарная. Это также выдаёт у автора желание найти «доказательства» своей теории.
Russia’s default view is that territory, political status, national prestige, and the requirements of hard security are valued more highly than the rights and quality of life of its citizens. This assumption is institutionalized in the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural realities and is unlikely to change soon.
In this as in so much else, the country is returning to the historical norm. History is important to Russia, and historical parallels do carry weight and meaning.
У Германии тоже была сложная история и тоже можно найти «доказательства», которые бы показывали невозможность демократии в Германии. К примеру, вот что говорил Томаса Манн по поводу перспективы превращения Германии в демократическое государство: Никогда механически-демократическое государство Запада не получит у нас прав гражданства. <…> Демократия в западном смысле и вкусе нам чужда и является у нас чем-то переводным, она существует только в прессе и никогда не сможет стать немецкой жизнью и немецкой правдой.
Ну и главное: автор не понял, что для нынешних политических элит главным является политический PR, благодаря которому они находятся у власти, начиная с 1991 года, а не идеология. В СССР главным была политика, т.е. идея. У нынешней России – бабло (возможность вести роскошный образ жизни). Как мне кажется, автор этого главного отличия нынешней РФ от СССР так и не осознал. Сравнивать РФ с СССР может только человек ничего не знающий или не понимающий о современной России.
It's a boring book about why Russia is not a democratic country. Even though I agree with the author's conclusions in terms of Russia's authoritarianism, it is boring to read a compilation of different sources. From my point of view, there are more interesting and in-depth books explaining why democracy in Russia after the collapse of the USSR never appeared.
I have the feeling that initially, the author had only a thesis - Russia as an authoritarian country - on which he, like on a skewer, strung various events that would confirm his thesis. Some of these events or theses, used by the author, are strange, such as this one.
...now that funding is available to enable it, is an overall renewed militarism in Russian society. The armed forces are enjoying unprecedented prestige, popularity, and salaries. Russian children can, if desired, start military training in kindergarten.
The military in Russia has never been honored or popular. It is enough to see how many different stories and programs have been produced related to the housing problems of the military. The military has never lived in Russia particularly richly. The author judges Russia by media headlines, which is never enough for a full and objective understanding of the country.
Also, I did not notice in the book the author's desire to get to the true reasons why Russia failed to build democracy (references to the historical past are ridiculous because a huge number of countries also had a complex authoritarian past, which did not prevent them from building democracy). However, let us not forget that not a single country of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states, has managed to build a full-fledged Western-style democracy. So, it is not so easy to build democracy, and few countries managed to do it in the post-Soviet space. However, as I understand it, the author does not take this into account. He simply points out that, starting with Yeltsin, authoritarian overtones have already manifested themselves.
In short, while I don't disagree with the bottom line (Russia as an authoritarian country), I found the book to be boring and not interesting. Plus, too many references and too wide a time period were taken by the author, which means there is little authorial perspective in the book. The author digs too long and too deep into Russian history, looking for an answer as to why Russia is authoritarian. This also gives away the author's desire to find "proof" of his theory.
Russia’s default view is that territory, political status, national prestige, and the requirements of hard security are valued more highly than the rights and quality of life of its citizens. This assumption is institutionalized in the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural realities and is unlikely to change soon.
In this as in so much else, the country is returning to the historical norm. History is important to Russia, and historical parallels do carry weight and meaning.
Germany, too, has had a complicated history and one can also find "proofs" that show the impossibility of democracy in Germany. For example, this is what Thomas Mann said about the prospect of Germany becoming a democratic state: Never will the mechanical-democratic state of the West be naturalized with us <...> Democracy in the Western sense and taste is alien to us, an imported creature that "only exists in the press," and can never become German life and German truth.
And the main thing. The author did not realize that the main thing for the current political elites is political PR, thanks to which they have been in power since 1991, and not ideology. In the USSR, the main thing was politics, i.e., the idea. In today's Russia, the main thing is money (the opportunity to lead a luxurious lifestyle). It seems to me that the author has not realized the main difference between the present Russia and the USSR. Only a person who does not know or understand anything about modern Russia can compare the Russian Federation with the USSR.
Эти сны
В полстраны
Пацаны
В полцены
Говорит Москва
И пьяны
В полвины
И дыра
В полведра
Говорит Москва
Говори ма!
Говори ма!
Очень скучная книга о том, почему Россия не является демократической страной. Несмотря на то, что я согласен с выводами автора, в плане авторитарности России, читать компиляцию разных источников довольно скучно. С моей точки зрения есть более интересные и глубокие книги, объясняющие, почему демократия в России после развала СССР так и не появилась.
У меня возникло такое чувство, что изначально у автора был лишь тезис – Россия как авторитарная страна – на который он, как на шампур, нанизывал различные события, которые бы подтверждали его тезис. Некоторые такие события или тезисы, которые используется автор, довольно странны как, например этот.
...now that funding is available to enable it, is an overall renewed militarism in Russian society. The armed forces are enjoying unprecedented prestige, popularity, and salaries. Russian children can, if desired, start military training in kindergarten.
Военные в России никогда не пользовались ни почётом, ни популярностью, ибо достаточно посмотреть, сколько было выпущено различных сюжетов и передач, связанных с жилищными проблемами военных. Военные никогда не жили в России особенно богато. Автор судит о России по заголовкам СМИ, а это всегда недостаточно для полного и объективного понимания страны.
Так же я не заметил в книге желания автора докопаться до истинных причин, почему в России не получилось построить демократию (ссылки на историческое прошло просто смешны, ибо у огромного количества стран было тоже сложное авторитарное прошлое, что не помешало им построить демократию). Впрочем, давайте не забывать, что полноценную демократию западного образца не удалось построить ни одной стране бывшего СССР, за исключением прибалтийских стран. Так что построить демократию не так-то и легко, и мало кому это удалось на постсоветском пространстве. Однако как я понял, автор этого не принимает в расчёт. Он просто указывает на то, что, уже начиная с Ельцина, проявились авторитарные нотки.
Короче, не возражая против итогов (Россия как авторитарная страна), я считаю, книга получилась скучной и не интересной. Плюс, слишком много ссылок и слишком широкий временной промежуток был взят автором, что означает, что в книге мало авторского взгляда. Автор слишком долго и слишком глубоко капается в истории России, ища ответ, почему Россия авторитарная. Это также выдаёт у автора желание найти «доказательства» своей теории.
Russia’s default view is that territory, political status, national prestige, and the requirements of hard security are valued more highly than the rights and quality of life of its citizens. This assumption is institutionalized in the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural realities and is unlikely to change soon.
In this as in so much else, the country is returning to the historical norm. History is important to Russia, and historical parallels do carry weight and meaning.
У Германии тоже была сложная история и тоже можно найти «доказательства», которые бы показывали невозможность демократии в Германии. К примеру, вот что говорил Томаса Манн по поводу перспективы превращения Германии в демократическое государство: Никогда механически-демократическое государство Запада не получит у нас прав гражданства. <…> Демократия в западном смысле и вкусе нам чужда и является у нас чем-то переводным, она существует только в прессе и никогда не сможет стать немецкой жизнью и немецкой правдой.
Ну и главное: автор не понял, что для нынешних политических элит главным является политический PR, благодаря которому они находятся у власти, начиная с 1991 года, а не идеология. В СССР главным была политика, т.е. идея. У нынешней России – бабло (возможность вести роскошный образ жизни). Как мне кажется, автор этого главного отличия нынешней РФ от СССР так и не осознал. Сравнивать РФ с СССР может только человек ничего не знающий или не понимающий о современной России.
It's a boring book about why Russia is not a democratic country. Even though I agree with the author's conclusions in terms of Russia's authoritarianism, it is boring to read a compilation of different sources. From my point of view, there are more interesting and in-depth books explaining why democracy in Russia after the collapse of the USSR never appeared.
I have the feeling that initially, the author had only a thesis - Russia as an authoritarian country - on which he, like on a skewer, strung various events that would confirm his thesis. Some of these events or theses, used by the author, are strange, such as this one.
...now that funding is available to enable it, is an overall renewed militarism in Russian society. The armed forces are enjoying unprecedented prestige, popularity, and salaries. Russian children can, if desired, start military training in kindergarten.
The military in Russia has never been honored or popular. It is enough to see how many different stories and programs have been produced related to the housing problems of the military. The military has never lived in Russia particularly richly. The author judges Russia by media headlines, which is never enough for a full and objective understanding of the country.
Also, I did not notice in the book the author's desire to get to the true reasons why Russia failed to build democracy (references to the historical past are ridiculous because a huge number of countries also had a complex authoritarian past, which did not prevent them from building democracy). However, let us not forget that not a single country of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states, has managed to build a full-fledged Western-style democracy. So, it is not so easy to build democracy, and few countries managed to do it in the post-Soviet space. However, as I understand it, the author does not take this into account. He simply points out that, starting with Yeltsin, authoritarian overtones have already manifested themselves.
In short, while I don't disagree with the bottom line (Russia as an authoritarian country), I found the book to be boring and not interesting. Plus, too many references and too wide a time period were taken by the author, which means there is little authorial perspective in the book. The author digs too long and too deep into Russian history, looking for an answer as to why Russia is authoritarian. This also gives away the author's desire to find "proof" of his theory.
Russia’s default view is that territory, political status, national prestige, and the requirements of hard security are valued more highly than the rights and quality of life of its citizens. This assumption is institutionalized in the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural realities and is unlikely to change soon.
In this as in so much else, the country is returning to the historical norm. History is important to Russia, and historical parallels do carry weight and meaning.
Germany, too, has had a complicated history and one can also find "proofs" that show the impossibility of democracy in Germany. For example, this is what Thomas Mann said about the prospect of Germany becoming a democratic state: Never will the mechanical-democratic state of the West be naturalized with us <...> Democracy in the Western sense and taste is alien to us, an imported creature that "only exists in the press," and can never become German life and German truth.
And the main thing. The author did not realize that the main thing for the current political elites is political PR, thanks to which they have been in power since 1991, and not ideology. In the USSR, the main thing was politics, i.e., the idea. In today's Russia, the main thing is money (the opportunity to lead a luxurious lifestyle). It seems to me that the author has not realized the main difference between the present Russia and the USSR. Only a person who does not know or understand anything about modern Russia can compare the Russian Federation with the USSR.
April 13, 2020
A very thorough description of the circular patterns that drive Russian confrontation with the West. It's an easy read and not very long, and gives a very good insight to the motivations and misunderstandings that constantly affect the relations between Russia and the West, and have done so for much longer than it may seem. Very interesting!
April 5, 2022
Erittäin hyvä kuvaus venäläisestä ajattelusta. Taustoittaa monipuolisesti Venäjän aggressiivista käytöstä ja auttaa ymmärtämään miksi erilaisuus on tunnustettava ja verhot silmiltä pudotettava täällä lännessä.
June 21, 2019
Misleading conclusions
Quite misleading and superficial book. Following recommendations and conclusions of the author is the way to fail in dealing with Russians.
Quite misleading and superficial book. Following recommendations and conclusions of the author is the way to fail in dealing with Russians.
September 19, 2022
Ennen hyökkäystä olisi varmaan pidetty pelonlietsontana ja liioitteluna.
November 27, 2021
Kerro Giles on selkeästi brittiläisen imperiumin edustaja, mikä valitettavasti johtaa varsin usein ylemmyydentuntoiseen paatokselliseen Venäjä-kritiikkiin. Näin kuuluisalta tutkijalta on lupa odottaa objektiivisempaa otetta. Kirjalla on silti ansionsa ja Gilesin ote paranee loppua kohti. Neljä tähteä.
March 31, 2025
First I did the audio version. That said I wanted this to be more. It came off kinda repetitive and just kind generalized and vague with bits of true insight in between. That said I have no idea the references for any of these observations or opinions of the Russian culture or if they exist. I'd like to see more research depth and perhaps it's in the print version I don't know.
June 29, 2025
"Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West" is a concise and clearly written book that will explain and clarify the complexities of Russian identity and political motivations to the uninitiated. Specialists are not likely to find much new material here, but they may be impressed at Keir Giles' ability to explain and clarify issues that are generally not well understood in the West.
October 15, 2021
A sobering analysis. The author argues that optimism about Russia and the Russian relationship with the West is misplaced and dangerous, even as cooperation with Russia on specific issues is possible.
November 20, 2024
a realistic and quite pessimistic outlook of what is yet to come
October 24, 2024
to quote someone else
"It seems to me that the author has not realized the main difference between the present Russia and the USSR. Only a person who does not know or understand anything about modern Russia can compare the Russian Federation with the USSR."
"It seems to me that the author has not realized the main difference between the present Russia and the USSR. Only a person who does not know or understand anything about modern Russia can compare the Russian Federation with the USSR."
Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews