I was so impressed with how down-to-earth and practical this book was. Aristotle begins pragmatically by breaking down a simple question (well not in these exact words, but in essence), what is the purpose of man? Or, What is the characteristic function of man? Everything in the world works according to it's function and everything seemingly fulfills it's function. You can't change the characteristic function of a rock to go upward instead of down no matter how many times you throw it into the air. The rock will not change. It just sits there doing it’s thing, being extremely rock-like. Aristotle didn’t know about the universal law of gravity, but you get the picture. What is that for man? What is man made for? What is man's function? According to our nature? Aristotle posits the idea that our function is to be virtuous. The ideal form of a man will be the man that is most virtuous, and the pursuit of a virtuous life is equated by Aristotle to the good life. Because it is what we are made to do. How do we know that the epicurean pursuit of happiness is not equated to the ultimate good? Because we also value temperance and self control as "good". If pleasure=happiness=good there would be no need for temperance. Yet we do value both temperance and the experience of pleasure as good! So, it seems that the virtuous good is in a sort of balancing act.
So how do we know what the virtuous good is? Well, according to Aristotle it is not so easily expressed as this or that specifically because it is found as a mean between two vices—one of excess and one of deficiency. So that in almost anything there is a balance where the virtue lies between two kinds of vices. For example the overindulgence of food is on the extreme end of excess what we call gluttony, yet the one who starves themselves for one reason or another would also be in a vice of deficiency, maybe even to the point of self harm, so that we find the truly virtuous man to be the mean between the two extremes. This example can be extrapolated to almost anything. Anger, action, sexual pleasure, thinking, talking, being a tough-guy, etc. Another example given by Aristotle is that of a courageous man. The excess vice being rashness, and the deficient vice that of cowardice, so that true virtue lies between the two extremes, i.e. courage. He extrapolates this idea with several more examples, pride, ambition, friendliness, truthfulness, etc. He even brings this idea into the realm of the arts and talks a bit about comedy, so that there is is the extreme comic who tries to always get a laugh in at the expense of anything and everything, versus the sort of guy who's a complete bore and can't take a joke even when it is executed wittily and at the precise time, and once again we find the virtuous man in the middle.
I have to say, I really love this way of looking at virtue as a sort of mean on a scale between vices, so that the truly virtuous man is one who we could call 'well-adjusted.' I think this also makes a lot of sense why some people would think differently about what virtue looks like, as if morality was relative, when it is not. If someone naturally finds themselves on one of the extreme sides of the scale they will interpret the truly virtuous as the extreme on the other side. For example, if we look at courage again, if I am naturally on the rash side acting before thinking always and basically being dumb in the name of courageous virtue when the truly virtuous man weighs out the situation before acting, I will likely call him a coward. Likewise if I am naturally a coward, and the virtuous man acts in confidence and is truly courageous, I would be apt to call him rash. Yet, true virtue is a mean between vices, despite what we think about it. The well-adjusted man is, according to Aristotle, the most virtuous.
Following this, Aristotle begins to speak about continence and incontinence. Which, as far as I can understand is that there are basically four types of people and only one of them is completely lost with no hope of redemption.
There is the virtuous man, the continent man, the incontinent man, and the irredeemable.
The virtuous man is someone who knows that something is wrong for him, DOESN'T desire to do it based on his knowledge, and does not do it.
The continent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, but lets his wisdom guide him, and does not do it.
The Incontinent man is someone who knows something is wrong, DOES desire to do it, and against his better judgement DOES it.
And the irredeemable man is someone who thinks that the wrong thing is right, DOES desire to do the thing, and does it according to his judgement and wishes.
He is considered irredeemable because his judgement is wrong, and in order to seek repentance from doing an evil act one would need to judge the thing as wrong to begin with. So this man will never be able to repent.
As a reformed protestant this break down was pretty eye-opening for me. I loved this way of thinking about the moral categories of sin, and I think this is similar to the Christian view of sin. The only truly virtuous man was Christ, the perfect man, the exemplar of virtue, the second Adam who was not corrupted by sin, but perfect in all ways. And Christians dealing with the battle of incontinence in their sin and straddling the line between continence and incontinence, and those who believe that evil is good are irredeemable not because their sins are graver, but because they see no need in repentance, because they find evil to be good, and they see no need for Jesus. Yet, the Christian would argue that if God opens this man's eyes to see his evil he then is granted the option to repent.
Following this, Aristotle speaks on friendship, and once again Aristotle is refreshingly pragmatic. He looks at all kinds of friendship, and differentiates between different types of friendships, including the relationships between people who are alike, or different, joyous, or sad, friends who are there for a sort of economic agreement where both receive an equal amount of benefit from the friendship, etc. He differentiates between these friendships and the friendship a lover shares with his or her spouse, or a father to his son, or a son to his father, or a brother to his brother, etc. And he explores what the best version of all of these friendships is. What the virtuous man should look for and find in a friendship. How many friends is too many? etc etc. He truly leaves no stones unturned.
He then looks at the parallels between different friendships and different government systems claiming that each government system is based on a different type of friendship. A timocracy is based on a brotherhood type of friendship in it's honor based ruling, where-as a democracy is based on a more economical type of friendship where the focus is equality, and the monarchy a sort of patriarchal friendship and so on and so forth. I found this part to be truly insightful, and it is the part of this book that I'm most excited to revisit, because he seems to be riffing on Plato's four types of government at the end of The Republic and the how they revolve endlessly from one to the next, yet Aristotle has a different idea about which governments evolve into others, and as far as I could tell (already wanting to re-read this part to clarify) Aristotle seems to be saying that all of these governments are flawed because they function within the framework of only one type of friendship, yet humans are diverse and different, so we need several types of relationships within a government to function correctly. There needs to be "mothers" and "fathers" and "sons" and "daughters" and "friendships on an equal standing" all together. A democracy fails because there is only one type of friendship, that between equals that is purely economical in nature. Yet, we don't respect the people who are authorities above us because we don't believe in authority we hammer everyone down to fit into the same hole, yet it is a fabrication created by the government that tells us that we are all equal when we are not. Likewise in the other forms of government they lack the full spectrum of human relations so that in the end they always fail. That is, if I understood him correctly.
Yet I think his point here, and in the whole book in general is once again unrelentingly pragmatic, wouldn't the perfect governance (just like virtue itself) be a sort of balancing act just like friendship in that it is concerned solely with the good, with the virtuous and by pursuing virtue all parties are benefitted and happy because of the good. One that promotes the self (not in a capitalist/materialist sense but in the sense that virtue is the ultimate good for the self, worth a million times more than material possessions) and by doing so promotes everyone else. One that pursues the happiness and the good of all people by the virtuous pursuit of each individual. It is not black or white. This or that. It is more of a mean between this, this, and that.