Secularization and Moral Change

by Alasdair MacIntyre

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76 pages, Hardcover

Published January 1, 1967

About the author

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was a British-American philosopher who contributed to moral and political philosophy as well as history of philosophy and theology. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) is one of the most important works of Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the 20th century. He was senior research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and permanent senior distinguished research fellow at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt University, and Boston University.

Reviews

[Caleb · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this book, published in 1967, MacIntyre anticipates and rejects the 'Benedict Option' and any other option that seeks to reestablish moral norms through the establishment of religious authority. That this is what the Benedict Option amounts to can hardly be disputed. Dreher laments (sexual) libertinism and has issues a clarion call to 'orthodox' Christians, which generally means conservative Christians, to rededicate themselves to the authoritative sources of the Christian tradition, for instance, scripture, liturgy, spirituality, (conservative) religious authorities, etc. This views seems to presuppose that immorality stems from the lack of religion, which does seem to be Dreher's view, or at least it presupposes that morality can be reestablished through the reestablishment of authoritative religious traditions.

MacIntyre rejects both of these assumptions. First, he argues in a manner that is indebted to Durkheim, that religious justifications of morality, like religion in general, presuppose and give expression to the cohesion and moral unity of the community. What does this mean? MacIntyre is not endorsing a reductivist view of religion but is merely claiming that particular expressions of religion, including sets of religious beliefs, only make sense within specific social contexts, contexts where communal norms can plausibly be seen to be giving expression to the divine. Second, MacIntyre argues that secularization and the loss of moral cohesion and coherence stem from the same causal factors, primarily the Industrial Revolution and its promotion of urbanization. This broke down the tradiitonal communities where shared moral norms could plausibly be understood as giving expression to divine law. (He is speaking here about England, a specifically Christian context.) Third, MacIntyre argues that after the fracture of English society into different classes, new expressions of Christianity, or secular surrogates, typically Marxism, took hold of different classes and portions of classes, but these new comprehensive doctrines (to use the Rawlsian term) failed to gain dominance because the classes needed to compromise and interact and similarly no new comprehensive doctrine could unite the country as a whole. This claim is arguably in need of greater analysis but for MacIntyre's argument it is sufficient to note the fact of this sustained fragmentation

In Chapter 2, MacIntyre argues that the reestablishment of religious authority is not adequate to reestablish a coherent morality. In making this argument, MacIntyre anticipates many of the arguments of After Virtue but the argument can be understood simply enough. MacIntyre first argues that morality presupposes a communal context. This means that morality cannot be a free-floating set of rules or norms. While, MacIntyre does not fully explain this claim here, it is clear from his later texts that on his view morality presupposes participation in social practices and traditions, where shared goals give point and purpose to moral norms. Absent this context, moral norms will be apt to be applied in a completely arbitrary fashion. Next, he makes the entirely plausible claim that religious authority presupposes moral authority, in the sense that insofar as a group recognizes religious authority they are essentially giving expression to a shared moral vision. This in itself raises questions about the Benedict Option. If religious belief - "small 'o' orthodoxy" - to use Dreher's terms, is the basis of community, how is it that Dreher is doing anything other than 'preaching to the choir'?

MacIntyre addresses this issue in the final chapter.He argues first that a fundamental tenant of traditional Christianity is that its theological vision can inform widely different social contexts. While, this can be denied, it seems to plausibly follow from the basic idea of one's identity in Christ as transcending particular ethnic identities (a fundamental theme in Paul's writings). In this sense, according to MacIntyre, inculturation is a criterion of theological truth. The problem is that in modernity, the breakdown of communities subsequent to the Industrial Revolution has lead to the marginalization of both coherent moral norms and the prominent Christian churches. Why? According to MacIntyre it has much to do with the fact theological doctrines have little to say to or to do with secular life, especially work. MacIntyre says that Christians have responded in two ways. The first manner is what we might think of as liberal Christianity. MacIntyre focuses on the limits of situation ethics - basically the fact that it is unable to establish ethical content - but rejects tliberal Christianity, more generally, because it ultimately evacuates the content of Christianity such that atheists could often agree with the claims of liberal Christianity. The second manner in which Christians have responded is in terms of what MacIntyre calls "enclave" Christianity. This describes people who want Christianity to become a sect isolated from society such that moral norms that have little relevance to secular life can be intransigently maintained regardless of their irrelevance to practical life. This is quite clearly, the ideal behind the Benedict Option. And it is clear why it will not work. If it succeeds, it only does so by becoming irrelevant to the world.

MacIntyre does not try to overcome this tension, the tension created by the fact that while a number of the traditional doctrines of Christianity seem problematic in different ways - MacIntyre discusses the doctrine of hell - such that at the very least they must be reinterpreted, no other comprehensive doctrine can replace Christianity in providing a language for discussing those aspects of life that cannot be easily understood, aspects like death and genuine achievement, what might be termed the transcendent aspects of life. But one wonders whether there is not a middle ground here. Vatican II was clearly an attempt, by the Catholic tradition, to come to grips with modernity. And while Francis has been heavily criticized by traditionalists like Dreher, in his pastoral vision, he is clearly trying to maintain a balance between commitment to orthodox beliefs and relevance to secular life. Is it not possible that more time will enable us to understand how to be modern and Christian? There are many important thinkers who have already charted this path, people like Newman, Rahner, Balthasar, Congar, Gutiérrez, and Pannenberg. Since liberal Christianity and the Benedict Option are dead ends, it seems that the only option left is to refocus on inculturating Christianity in modernity.

[Samuel Weiss · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting book. The ideas MacIntyre would discuss in After Virtue and later works are almost fully developed, even though MacIntyre was still a Marxist when he wrote a book and still a decade from converting to Catholicism.