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Singapore, 1941-1942: The Japanese version of the Malayan campaign of World War II
Seventy days that shook the Western world... that was the Malayan campaign of World War II. In book after book the sorry details of Britain’s defeat have been debated. One after another the witnesses for the defence—the generals, the war historians, the correspondents—have had their say.
Now, translated for the first time into English, comes the crushing evidence for the prosecution—the story, not of how Malaya was lost, but of how it was won. This book is by the key man—the brilliant strategist who led the research work for the campaign, and who, as Chief of the Operations and Planning Staff of the 25th Army under General Yamashita, initiated vital operations orders in the field from the landing at Singora to the surrender on Singapore Island.
How did the Japanese justify, how plan their amazing campaign? Why did they enter the war when they did? What was the strength of their forces, and what did they think of the troops on the British side whom they overran in ten weeks, all according to timetable? These are just some of the questions that this book answers.
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji’s story of how Malaya was conquered has exceptional authority and candour. As a major work of military history it compels close attention—for who can say he has learned a lesson of history unless he knows the whole story of what happened?—and as a narrative of personal experience it generates pure excitement: the reader actually finds himself advancing, not retreating, down the peninsula. The atmosphere of jungle pursuit and jungle fighting is created with great truth.
The fairness of Colonel Tsuji’s book is its most striking—and perhaps unexpected—quality. His comments about his enemies, whose resistance “lacked sincerity” are sometimes severe, yet there is a justice about them which it would be hard to challenge. Of his own side he writes with equal fairness. His book reveals the existence of fierce inter-Service jealousies, and it candidly describes the “petulance” of the officers of one of the three Japanese divisions in Malaya, who had to be “coaxed and cajoled like cross children”. Colonel Tsuji, though convinced of the superiority of Japanese youth, makes no attempt to conceal examples of cowardice that occurred in his Army. One of the most impressive things about his book is the way it illustrates the truth of his remark that “there is no difference in human nature between one’s own side and the enemy side”.
Masanobu Tsuji was born in 1903, became a professional soldier, and served in China and Manchuria. After the Malayan campaign he was in Burma, When the war ended he was ordered to disappear and preserve himself for his country’s reconstruction, and he spent some years wandering in disguise in China, Siam, and Indo-China. Early in the 1950s he was elected to the Japanese Parliament, and he is at present a member of the Parliament’s upper house—the House of Councillors—in Tokyo.
Now, translated for the first time into English, comes the crushing evidence for the prosecution—the story, not of how Malaya was lost, but of how it was won. This book is by the key man—the brilliant strategist who led the research work for the campaign, and who, as Chief of the Operations and Planning Staff of the 25th Army under General Yamashita, initiated vital operations orders in the field from the landing at Singora to the surrender on Singapore Island.
How did the Japanese justify, how plan their amazing campaign? Why did they enter the war when they did? What was the strength of their forces, and what did they think of the troops on the British side whom they overran in ten weeks, all according to timetable? These are just some of the questions that this book answers.
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji’s story of how Malaya was conquered has exceptional authority and candour. As a major work of military history it compels close attention—for who can say he has learned a lesson of history unless he knows the whole story of what happened?—and as a narrative of personal experience it generates pure excitement: the reader actually finds himself advancing, not retreating, down the peninsula. The atmosphere of jungle pursuit and jungle fighting is created with great truth.
The fairness of Colonel Tsuji’s book is its most striking—and perhaps unexpected—quality. His comments about his enemies, whose resistance “lacked sincerity” are sometimes severe, yet there is a justice about them which it would be hard to challenge. Of his own side he writes with equal fairness. His book reveals the existence of fierce inter-Service jealousies, and it candidly describes the “petulance” of the officers of one of the three Japanese divisions in Malaya, who had to be “coaxed and cajoled like cross children”. Colonel Tsuji, though convinced of the superiority of Japanese youth, makes no attempt to conceal examples of cowardice that occurred in his Army. One of the most impressive things about his book is the way it illustrates the truth of his remark that “there is no difference in human nature between one’s own side and the enemy side”.
Masanobu Tsuji was born in 1903, became a professional soldier, and served in China and Manchuria. After the Malayan campaign he was in Burma, When the war ended he was ordered to disappear and preserve himself for his country’s reconstruction, and he spent some years wandering in disguise in China, Siam, and Indo-China. Early in the 1950s he was elected to the Japanese Parliament, and he is at present a member of the Parliament’s upper house—the House of Councillors—in Tokyo.
358 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
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About the author
Masanobu Tsuji
4 books1 followerMasanobu Tsuji (Japanese: 辻 政信) was a Japanese army officer and politician. During World War II, he was an important tactical planner in the Imperial Japanese Army and developed the detailed plans for the successful Japanese invasion of Malaya at the start of the war. He also helped plan and lead the final Japanese offensive during the Guadalcanal Campaign.
A Pan-Asianist, Tsuji pressured Asian countries to support Japan in World War II, despite being involved in atrocities such as the Bataan Death March and Sook Ching. He meticulously planned the mass murders in Singapore and surrounding regions. He personally oversaw the Pantingan River massacre. He evaded prosecution for Japanese war crimes at the end of the war and hid in Thailand. He returned to Japan in 1949 and was elected to the Diet as an advocate of renewed militarism. Through the '50s he worked for American intelligence alongside Takushiro Hattori. In 1961, he disappeared on a trip to Laos.
Tsuji was among the most aggressive and influential Japanese militarists. He was a leading proponent of the concept of gekokujō, (literally "the bottom overthrowing the top") by acting without or contrary to authorization. He incited the 1939 border clash with the Soviet Union and was a vehement advocate of war against the United States.
A Pan-Asianist, Tsuji pressured Asian countries to support Japan in World War II, despite being involved in atrocities such as the Bataan Death March and Sook Ching. He meticulously planned the mass murders in Singapore and surrounding regions. He personally oversaw the Pantingan River massacre. He evaded prosecution for Japanese war crimes at the end of the war and hid in Thailand. He returned to Japan in 1949 and was elected to the Diet as an advocate of renewed militarism. Through the '50s he worked for American intelligence alongside Takushiro Hattori. In 1961, he disappeared on a trip to Laos.
Tsuji was among the most aggressive and influential Japanese militarists. He was a leading proponent of the concept of gekokujō, (literally "the bottom overthrowing the top") by acting without or contrary to authorization. He incited the 1939 border clash with the Soviet Union and was a vehement advocate of war against the United States.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 27, 2020
Pretty much the only authoritative account of the campaign from the Japanese side, so this would be a very important historical document in its own right. The English translation reads very smoothly and successfully conveyed the emotions of the author throughout from the planning stage in Indochina and Hainan to the surrender of Singapore.
I am surprised that the narrative by the victorious West today still perpetuates many myths from the war, such as that the Japs were experts at jungle warfare, had planned the attack for a long time and that they practically breezed their way down the Malayan peninsula. If this version is to be believed, and I do not see why Tsuji would be deceitful in his account, there was barely a month or two between the decision to invade Southeast Asia and the start of war on Dec 7/8. The soldiers had no prior experience of the tropics, having been deployed in China and Manchuria all along. Lastly, they faced tough resistance at many of the battles, from the landing at Kota Bahru, on to Jitra, Bakri and in the final battle for Singapore island itself.
This is not to excuse the lack of preparation by the British, but the outcome was all but guaranteed from the beginning with the situation back in Europe being dire, and lack of resources allocated to the Far East. The Japs simply seized the strategic initiative by taking out the Pacific fleet at Pearl before the land campaign.
I am surprised that the narrative by the victorious West today still perpetuates many myths from the war, such as that the Japs were experts at jungle warfare, had planned the attack for a long time and that they practically breezed their way down the Malayan peninsula. If this version is to be believed, and I do not see why Tsuji would be deceitful in his account, there was barely a month or two between the decision to invade Southeast Asia and the start of war on Dec 7/8. The soldiers had no prior experience of the tropics, having been deployed in China and Manchuria all along. Lastly, they faced tough resistance at many of the battles, from the landing at Kota Bahru, on to Jitra, Bakri and in the final battle for Singapore island itself.
This is not to excuse the lack of preparation by the British, but the outcome was all but guaranteed from the beginning with the situation back in Europe being dire, and lack of resources allocated to the Far East. The Japs simply seized the strategic initiative by taking out the Pacific fleet at Pearl before the land campaign.
January 13, 2019
An interesting account of the Malayan conquest by a senior Japanese officer's perspective. Good to read, but certain facts true or not is debatable.
February 23, 2016
This is revisionist history at its finest. The author, writing in the early 1950s, credits the Japanese for having “liberated†much of Asia from its colonial powers. There is some truth to that, as the colonial world did collapse after the Second World War, but Japan’s intention wasn’t so noble. The author makes a great deal about Asians being freed by the Japanese, but their freedom didn’t come about until after the fall of Japan. At best, Japan was just another colonizer that happened to be of a similar race. That said, I found this to be an enlightening book and would recommend it to anyone interested in the war in the South Pacific.
Colonel Tsuji had read Churchill’s account of the war before he began to write his own account and often, throughout the book, attempts to correct Churchill’s misunderstandings about the Malaya campaign. He gives the timetable for the planning of the campaign (less than a year from the point they began planning to their having captured Singapore). Also misunderstood by the British was the Japanese ability to fight in the jungle as most of the units who participated in the Malaya campaign had been fighting in the north of China prior to being deployed south. He is also openly critical of Japanese shortcomings, especially the jealously between the Army and Navy (although he notes that they worked together well in this campaign, such cooperation caused him and his commander grief from the powers back in Japan). Furthermore, at times, it seems that Colonel Tsuji saw all the action pivoting around him as he describes times he was in dangerous situations. While he may have inflated his own importance, I would expect that anyone who’d been in combat would perceive the battle primarily from their own position, which looms in their psyche.
Tsuji also gives some humorous credit to the British, crediting their good roads and cheap Japanese bikes for the outcome of the campaign. The bikes allowed the Japanese to out-run the “long-legged†British. He describes how the Japanese army constantly threatened to move behind the British lines, forcing the British to abandon defensive positions quickly and allowing the Japanese to capture key bridges and transportation systems before they could be destroyed. The Jitra Line, which the British thought they could hold for a month, while they reinforced Singapore’s defenses, was captured by the Japanese in five hours. By the time the Japanese army had moved down the peninsula, it was stronger than at the beginning from captured British goods. The operations portion of the campaign was also critical, as the Japanese worked quickly to rebuild bridges (when they captured sawmills, they’d put them immediately to work sawing bridge timbers).
The Japanese kept their eyes on Singapore. It was a city with strong defenses along the beaches, but the back of the island wasn’t heavily protected at all. The Japanese wasted no time pressing their objective, never allowing the British soldiers an opportunity to create a defensive position. When the battle was over, a much smaller Japanese army defeated a much larger British army. Tsuji also believes that the tough defenses on the seaward side of Singapore was a part of the reason for the war, along with the United States cutting Japanese oil imports in 1940, leaving the nation without fuel for her military.
One of the interested things in the book is Tsuji’s belief that discipline is necessary and that Japanese soldiers who broke discipline and raped and pillaged were treated harshly. I remember in reading the book on the fall of Singapore how the British, knowing what happened in other places where the Japanese army captured a city (such as Hong Kong), had all the alcohol destroyed before they surrendered, fearing a drunken rampage (which never happened in Singapore). He is critical of the breakdown of discipline that often occurred within other Japanese armies. Tsuji also grieves for the lost of friends and colleagues, including a British officer who died in as a POW and asked him to get a message to his wife in Singapore. He noted his attempt to find her after the capture of Singapore and learned that she’d fled the city on a ship that was sunk by the Japanese and was presumed dead.
The most amazing thing about this campaign is the timing and that it completely caught the Western powers by surprise. The Malaya campaign, along with the campaigns in the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and the attack on Pearl Harbor, all began within a few hours of each other. To be able to maintain such secrecy while mobilizing large armies and navies is truly remarkable.
Colonel Tsuji had read Churchill’s account of the war before he began to write his own account and often, throughout the book, attempts to correct Churchill’s misunderstandings about the Malaya campaign. He gives the timetable for the planning of the campaign (less than a year from the point they began planning to their having captured Singapore). Also misunderstood by the British was the Japanese ability to fight in the jungle as most of the units who participated in the Malaya campaign had been fighting in the north of China prior to being deployed south. He is also openly critical of Japanese shortcomings, especially the jealously between the Army and Navy (although he notes that they worked together well in this campaign, such cooperation caused him and his commander grief from the powers back in Japan). Furthermore, at times, it seems that Colonel Tsuji saw all the action pivoting around him as he describes times he was in dangerous situations. While he may have inflated his own importance, I would expect that anyone who’d been in combat would perceive the battle primarily from their own position, which looms in their psyche.
Tsuji also gives some humorous credit to the British, crediting their good roads and cheap Japanese bikes for the outcome of the campaign. The bikes allowed the Japanese to out-run the “long-legged†British. He describes how the Japanese army constantly threatened to move behind the British lines, forcing the British to abandon defensive positions quickly and allowing the Japanese to capture key bridges and transportation systems before they could be destroyed. The Jitra Line, which the British thought they could hold for a month, while they reinforced Singapore’s defenses, was captured by the Japanese in five hours. By the time the Japanese army had moved down the peninsula, it was stronger than at the beginning from captured British goods. The operations portion of the campaign was also critical, as the Japanese worked quickly to rebuild bridges (when they captured sawmills, they’d put them immediately to work sawing bridge timbers).
The Japanese kept their eyes on Singapore. It was a city with strong defenses along the beaches, but the back of the island wasn’t heavily protected at all. The Japanese wasted no time pressing their objective, never allowing the British soldiers an opportunity to create a defensive position. When the battle was over, a much smaller Japanese army defeated a much larger British army. Tsuji also believes that the tough defenses on the seaward side of Singapore was a part of the reason for the war, along with the United States cutting Japanese oil imports in 1940, leaving the nation without fuel for her military.
One of the interested things in the book is Tsuji’s belief that discipline is necessary and that Japanese soldiers who broke discipline and raped and pillaged were treated harshly. I remember in reading the book on the fall of Singapore how the British, knowing what happened in other places where the Japanese army captured a city (such as Hong Kong), had all the alcohol destroyed before they surrendered, fearing a drunken rampage (which never happened in Singapore). He is critical of the breakdown of discipline that often occurred within other Japanese armies. Tsuji also grieves for the lost of friends and colleagues, including a British officer who died in as a POW and asked him to get a message to his wife in Singapore. He noted his attempt to find her after the capture of Singapore and learned that she’d fled the city on a ship that was sunk by the Japanese and was presumed dead.
The most amazing thing about this campaign is the timing and that it completely caught the Western powers by surprise. The Malaya campaign, along with the campaigns in the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and the attack on Pearl Harbor, all began within a few hours of each other. To be able to maintain such secrecy while mobilizing large armies and navies is truly remarkable.
September 21, 2015
Rarely are students of history allowed to view the war from a Japanese perspective that hasn't been edited or influenced by either an anachronism or presentism view. The 1961 Australian version of Singapore 1941is one of those rare books at a period in time when a balanced scholarship on the Asian theater in WWII was emerging. Japanese versions were published, and in this case, footnotes by the Australian General and appendixes by the Australian Secretary to the Minister of the Army during WWII add perspectives normally not seen. The end result is a greater understanding of the campaign in Malaysia that is rare from the Japanese side.
For strictly military historians or students in Military Leadership, Tsuji's book presents insights into what the American military calls the Military Decision Making Process, and Staff Planning processes, etc. Every leadership process for individuals and staffs is mirrored in the book, overlaid with the campaign. Planning assumptions are included along with the processes and then the actual outcome of the battle measured against the ledger to see how the leadership did. Each section can be taken on it's own to be a block of instruction in leadership and staff planning. Many of the examples are more direct and illustrative than the ones included in some of the leadership development courses currently. When taken as a whole it is easy to use the book as a framework for military campaign planning and implementation.
For students of the "Beijing School" of history post 1995, this book will be infuriating as it is a basic military historical narrative. But for those that are interested in understanding the campaigns of WWII, especially in South East Asia which are often overlooked, I would recommend Singapore 1941 by Tsuji.
For strictly military historians or students in Military Leadership, Tsuji's book presents insights into what the American military calls the Military Decision Making Process, and Staff Planning processes, etc. Every leadership process for individuals and staffs is mirrored in the book, overlaid with the campaign. Planning assumptions are included along with the processes and then the actual outcome of the battle measured against the ledger to see how the leadership did. Each section can be taken on it's own to be a block of instruction in leadership and staff planning. Many of the examples are more direct and illustrative than the ones included in some of the leadership development courses currently. When taken as a whole it is easy to use the book as a framework for military campaign planning and implementation.
For students of the "Beijing School" of history post 1995, this book will be infuriating as it is a basic military historical narrative. But for those that are interested in understanding the campaigns of WWII, especially in South East Asia which are often overlooked, I would recommend Singapore 1941 by Tsuji.
August 4, 2024
Col Tusji was was Japanese officer involved in the planning and execution of the 1941-42 Malayan campaign, and this the main interest of the book given the lack of narratives form the Japanase side.
I had conflicting feelings when reading the book because, on the one hand, I was truly interested in understanding the percepcction from the "other side of the hill"; and the text provides a lot of details and views poorly covered by anglo-saxon works on the theme. But at the same time there's a clear attempt to justify or minimize many deplorable actions undertaken by the Japanese forces that don't stand a minimum of fact-checking; as well as to overstate the capabilities and resources of the British army as a way to magnify the Japanese feat of arms in Malaya.
Is it worth reading? Yes it is; but the reader should put himself in the feet and understand the mindset of the writer at the time he did this book. I also recommend to read other modern and better documented books of the campaign, getting to know the facts and then get into this book.
I had conflicting feelings when reading the book because, on the one hand, I was truly interested in understanding the percepcction from the "other side of the hill"; and the text provides a lot of details and views poorly covered by anglo-saxon works on the theme. But at the same time there's a clear attempt to justify or minimize many deplorable actions undertaken by the Japanese forces that don't stand a minimum of fact-checking; as well as to overstate the capabilities and resources of the British army as a way to magnify the Japanese feat of arms in Malaya.
Is it worth reading? Yes it is; but the reader should put himself in the feet and understand the mindset of the writer at the time he did this book. I also recommend to read other modern and better documented books of the campaign, getting to know the facts and then get into this book.
January 2, 2022
Critical reading for anyone interested in the WW2 Battle of Malaya. This is an insightful Japanese perspective published for a Japanese audience in 1952. Tsuji was persuaded by the Aussies to allow an English translation in 1960, and he is able to comment on Churchill’s account by this time.
Tsuji was responsible for planning the battle and ensuring troops were prepared. During the battle, he visited various battlefronts as a staff officer, reporting back to Lt. General Yamashita the 25th Army HQ. So it is that big picture which he shares which is illuminative. It was good to read it directly, as various historians reference the text.
His writing is clear and not overburdened with jargon. For the more few complicated battles, do consult a relevant YouTube video, that will better realise his account. It was a good idea to include the pamphlet, “Read This Alone - And the War Can Abe Won” in the Appendix.
Tsuji was considered a war criminal responsible for Sook Ching but escaped on orders, disguised, back to Japan, where he would be nominated to the Diet. He would disappear in Laos in 1961.
This was an ebook from NLB, read on Libby.
Tsuji was responsible for planning the battle and ensuring troops were prepared. During the battle, he visited various battlefronts as a staff officer, reporting back to Lt. General Yamashita the 25th Army HQ. So it is that big picture which he shares which is illuminative. It was good to read it directly, as various historians reference the text.
His writing is clear and not overburdened with jargon. For the more few complicated battles, do consult a relevant YouTube video, that will better realise his account. It was a good idea to include the pamphlet, “Read This Alone - And the War Can Abe Won” in the Appendix.
Tsuji was considered a war criminal responsible for Sook Ching but escaped on orders, disguised, back to Japan, where he would be nominated to the Diet. He would disappear in Laos in 1961.
This was an ebook from NLB, read on Libby.
April 20, 2009
If you like books on war and are tired of hearing the winning side of history, then check this book out. You will get the full-frontal cultural orientation in Japanese military thinking. Everything from "death by shooting" to failure to recon properly = hari-kari.
May 18, 2011
The fall of Singapore from the Japanese Imperial Army perspectives.
June 25, 2011
Japanese version of the fall of Malaya and Singapore. Interesting their opinions of the British and Australian defence. Fascinating book.
May 9, 2015
A one sided biased account of the Malayan Campaign, but extremely valuable in understanding the Japanese perspective of their unexpected success
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews