First let me say that I hated the first 11% of my kindle book. I almost gave up. DON'T! This is an extremely enjoyable book by a very likeable author whose love for the game is palpable in his stories and writing. He is also a humorist and a psychologist to boot. His purpose is to shed some light on the SHIFT or evolution in baseball thinking which has consumed the sport in the last decade. The Shift does not refer only to the explosion of the defensive shifts in the game, but rather the movement away from the human element to a more data driven game. As a psychologist, the author tries to reconcile them for the game and for the reader's perspective of how and why the game is played today as opposed to twenty years ago. (Think "The Trouble with the Curve" meets "Moneyball".
The concepts in the book are not all novel or ahead of the curve, but they are important for the fan to understand. Carleton does a very nice job explaining WAR and emergent value, expected value, and how General managers go about trying to add value to a team so that every possible advantage is gained. He offers proof in the form of statistics for his theories. t's not an easy read and it flies in the face of us old guys' beliefs in certain ideas (steals, bunts, when to run on a sac fly), but it is very thoughtfully written. I am amazed at how granular the saber metricians have become. They analyze every pitch, every outcome, every out, every hit, and come up with statistical proof to show why bunting a man over to second does not improve run producing percentages. Everything is examined for "what is the expected value of a play or non-act". The same is true of a steal. At what point is stealing second base worthwhile in increasing the chances of a run? For example, based on 2017 statistics, unless the runner has better than a 73.94 % of making it safely, it isn't worth trying. When should a runner tag on a sac fly from third base with one out? It turns out, he should go practically every time. One thing I thought was cool was the discussion of whether the KC third base coach should have sent Alex Gordon in the final game of the 2014 WS when there were two outs and Sal Perez was up. He makes a persuasive argument based on Perez' OBP during the season and the playoffs that there was a better chance of an errant throw or missed tag than the chance that Perez would drive him home. There is a lot here to digest, including leverage situations for relievers rather than just the bottom of the 9th (a concept used by Francona with Andrew Miller), and the expected extra runs attributable to catchers for good pitch framing based on stats of pitches. Carleton also makes a statistically driven case that defensive shifts may actually do more harm than good. Two other things I found fascinating. First, he produces evidence to show that there is little if no correlation between giving a pitcher three days' rest rather than four with a result of fewer injuries. Second, he did a computer simulated season of games to judge whether traditional notions of batting orders made a real difference. Surprise! Only 1.5 runs scored was the difference in the year. The use of bull-penning and high leverage usage of relievers, and the value added by player versatility are discussed, and he debunks some myths including the myth of momentum as an influence on games. So, this is a very helpful, funny and well explained (except for Cox regression) book about the evolution in thinking and the myths still viable in the game. Great job