Internationalists

by Oona A. Hathaway, Scott Shapiro

'It will change the way you remember the 20th century and read the news in the 21st' Steven Pinker

'A clarion call to preserve law and order across our planet' Philippe Sands

'A fascinating and important book ... given the state of the world, The Internationalists has come along at the right moment' Margaret MacMillan, Financial Times

Since the end of the Second World War, we have moved from an international system in which war was legal, and accepted as the ultimate arbiter of disputes between nations, to one in which it was not. Nations that wage aggressive war have become outcasts and have almost always had to give up their territorial gains. How did this epochal transformation come about? This remarkable book, which combines political, legal, and intellectual history, traces the origins and course of one of the great shifts in the modern world.

'Sweeping and yet personable at the same time, The Internationalists explores the profound implications of the outlawry of war. Professors Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro enrich their analysis with vignettes of the many individuals (some unknown to most students of History) who played such important roles in this story. None have put it all together in the way that Hathaway and Shapiro have done in this book' Paul Kennedy

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Law, War, International Relations, Philosophy

528 pages, Paperback

First published September 12, 2017

About the author

Oona A. Hathaway is the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Counselor to the Dean at the Yale Law School. She is also Professor of International Law and Area Studies at the Yale University MacMillan Center, on the faculty at the Jackson Institute for International Affairs, and Professor of the Yale University Department of Political Science. She is a member of the Strategic Initiatives Committee of the American Society of International Law, Yale University’s Provost’s Committee on International Affairs, and the Advisory Committee on International Law for the Legal Adviser at the United States Department of State. In 2014-15, she took leave from Yale Law School to serve as Special Counsel to the General Counsel for National Security Law at the U.S. Department of Defense, where she was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence. Professor Hathaway earned her B.A. summa cum laude at Harvard University in 1994 and her J.D. at Yale Law School, where she was Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal, in 1997. She served as a Law Clerk for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and for D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald, held fellowships at Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and Center for the Ethics and the Professions, served as Associate Professor at Boston University School of Law, as Associate Professor at Yale Law School, and as Professor of Law at U.C. Berkeley. Her current research focuses on the foundations of modern international law, the intersection of U.S. constitutional law and international law, the enforcement of international law, and the law of armed conflict. She is a principal investigator on a recent grant awarded by Hewlett Foundation to study cyber conflict. She has published more than twenty-five law review articles, and she is the co-author of The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (with Scott Shapiro).

Reviews

[Adam · Rating 3 out of 5]

In 'The Internationalists,' Hathaway and Shapiro make an impassioned argument for the institutionalist school of thought on why there has been so little inter-state war since 1928. They argue that the often-overlooked or trivialized 1928 Kellogg-Briand, or 'peace' pact, is responsible for the long period of peace which we now enjoy. To paraphrase, war is now infrequent because we outlawed it.

The book is interesting, but Hathaway and Shapiro make their case a bit too vigorously, taking some aspects of their argument too far, and overlooking significant events during the period that they cover.

The early portions of the book are devoted to Hugo Grotius, who they contend was the forefather of international law in the old world. They also contend that he helped create a legal framework for war, and their scholarship on him really did change the perspective of the Dutch lawyer that I gained from the undergraduate international law. On the other hand, their contention that Grotius somehow 'saved' the legitimacy of war in his age, as opposed to being credited with attempting to circumscribe its bounds, seems somewhat far-fetched. Was war really under any particular threat in 17th century Europe?

Their treatment of WWII in eastern Europe was particularly problematic. Hathaway and Shapiro contend that the signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 is more important that more-often cited agreements between the allies in 1944 and 1945 because most of the territory that the Axis seized was returned to the states that held sovereignty in 1928.

They neglect however to explain how this squares with the Soviet Union's participation in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1938 in spite of their acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand pact. Whatismore, their contention that the Soviet Union took few gains from Eastern and Central Europe strains credulity.

Overall, I found this book to be very worth reading because it will likely drive the debate over international conflict for years to come and rightly so. At its best, 'The Internationalists' is an interesting exploration of how power shapes law, and the more novel subject of how law shapes power on the international stage.

[Lord_Humungus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Review in English and Spanish (below)

English

“The Internationalists” is a history of international laws on war. Steven Pinker recommended it as “one of the most important books on war”. I think Pinker is too honest an intellectual to say something like that about a book only because he is quoted in it, so I’ve read it.

The book’s provocative thesis is that the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 changed the world. Usually this treaty, also known as the Pact of Paris, is taken as a failed treaty in which the powers renounced to the use of war as a method to resolve disputes, and then, not much later, managed to tangle themselves in the Second World War. However, according to the authors, the Pact laid the seed for a slow revolution in international law, and brought about the change from the Old Order, systematized by Hugo Grotius, in which war was legal; conquest was legitimate; gunboat diplomacy was binding; and “neutrality” meant not to take sides even in commerce; to the New World Order in which we live now, and in which war is illegal; conquests are not recognized; and aggressions are fought with increasingly intelligent economic and trade sanctions. A system that is not perfect, but that works considerably better than the old one, as the authors prove quite convincingly.

Another idea of the book that seems important is that the dilemma is inescapable, and we have to choose. International law is a system. You can’t take a bit from here and a little from there and keep the better rules. War can either be legal or illegal. And each of the two alternatives inexorably leads to a different system, with all its sub-rules. The only alternative to the current system would be a world government, and that too has its risks and would also work imperfectly (although the authors do not dwell on that issue).

Also, the number of sovereign states is increasing, in part because with the New Order that the illegalization of war has brought, states no longer have to be big and powerful to be safe, and, contrary to what one would think, that leads to less INTERstate wars, but more INTRAstate wars (civil wars and secession processes).

The heroes of the story are the internationalists, lawyers and diplomats who acted behind the scenes for a better world, and that until now had kept themselves below my radar, but whom I have come to admire deeply: Salmon Levinson, James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, and Hersch Lauterpacht. They attained their objective in successive small steps and, notwithstanding their historical importance, it’s the first time I hear their names. One of the objectives of the authors is to rescue them from oblivion.

The book is very well written and enjoyable. The passages about Carl Schmitt, the nazis and the Nuremberg trials were amazing. At the end there are some statistical graphs about war. There are extensive references and bibliography, but no index.

A good book. Recommended to those who love history and are interested in international relations.

Español:

“The Internationalists” es una historia de las leyes internacionales sobre la guerra. Steven Pinker lo recomendó como “uno de los libros más importantes que se han escrito acerca de la guerra”. Creo que Pinker es un intelectual demasiado honesto como para decir algo así de un libro sólo porque le citen en él, así que me lo he leído.

La provocativa tesis del libro es que el pacto Kellogg-Briand de 1928 cambió el mundo. Habitualmente este tratado, también llamado Pacto de París, se toma como un tratado fallido en el que las potencias renunciaron al uso de la guerra como método para resolver disputas, para poco después meterse en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sin embargo, según los autores, el Pacto sentó la semilla para una lenta revolución en la legislación internacional, y provocó el cambio desde el Viejo Orden, sistematizado por Hugo Grotius, y en el cual la guerra era legal; la conquista era legítima; la diplomacia de trabuco era vinculante; y la “neutralidad” obligaba a no tomar partido ni siquiera en el comercio; hasta el Nuevo Orden en el que vivimos ahora, y en el que la guerra es ilegal, las conquistas no se reconocen; y las agresiones se combaten mediante sanciones económicas y comerciales cada vez más inteligentes. Un sistema que no es perfecto, pero que funciona considerablemente mejor que el antiguo, como los autores demuestran de manera bastante convincente.

Otra idea del libro que me parece importante es que el dilema es ineludible y hay que elegir. Las leyes internacionales son un sistema. No se puede coger un poco de aquí y un poco de allá y quedarse con lo mejor. O la guerra es legal o es ilegal. Y cada una de las dos alternativas lleva inexorablemente a un sistema distinto, con todas sus subreglas. La única alternativa a lo existente sería un gobierno mundial, y eso también tiene sus riesgos y también funcionaría de forma imperfecta (aunque los autores no se meten más en ese tema).

Además, el número de estados soberanos está aumentando, entre otras cosas porque con el Nuevo Orden que ha resultado de la ilegalización de la guerra, los estados ya no tienen que ser grandes y poderosos para estar a salvo, y, contrariamente a lo que podría pensarse, eso lleva a menos guerras INTERestatales, pero a más guerras INTRAestatales (guerras civiles y procesos de secesión).

Los héroes del relato son los internacionalistas, letrados y diplomáticos que actuaban entre bastidores en pro de un mundo mejor, y que hasta ahora habían permanecido por debajo del alcance de mi radar, pero a los que he acabado admirando profundamente: Salmon Levinson, James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, y Hersch Lauterpacht. Consiguieron su objetivo en pequeños pasos sucesivos, y pese a su importancia histórica, es la primera vez que oigo sus nombres. Uno de los objetivos de los autores es rescatarlos del olvido.

El libro está estupendamente escrito y es muy ameno. Los pasajes sobre Carl Schmitt, los nazis y el juicio de Nuremberg son impresionantes. Al final hay unas gráficas estadísticas sobre la guerra. Hay extensas notas y bibliografía, pero no tiene índice.

Un buen libro. Recomendado para aquellos a los que les guste la historia y estén interesados en las relaciones internacionales.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World by Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, is a fascinating look at the evolution of what the authors term "the New World Order." That is defined as an internationally accepted system of global norms related to waging warfare and diplomacy. The authors begin by examining the world of Hugo Grotius, a 17th Century legal scholar who largely began to define international norms on law, warfare, and interaction between states. Grotius is the father of the Old World Order, and subsequently all legal thought and innovation that followed in terms of international relations. The Old World Order legitimated the use of force to resolve ongoing disputes, regain money owed, and solve issues between nations. Gunboat diplomacy, and the threat of invasion were also tools used, as well as mercantilism economic policies. Basically, Grotius defined a Might makes Right principle in terms of relations. This sort of policy was useful in Grotius time, as his homeland, the Dutch Republic, began to build its Empire in Asia, off of spoils taken from Portuguese and Spanish holdings, as well as conquests of existing states. Many states, including the United Kingdom (Britain/England), France and the United States used these principles to build up massive Empires and holdings. The UK took large swathes of territory in Africa, Asia, and North America. Ditto for France. The US used these principles to declare war on Mexico over unresolved debts, seizing massive swathes of territory from them as compensation.

This form of international relations began to change slowly. Cynically, the author posit it could have been a tools to secure gains made by existing powers. The nations of the UK, US, and France, for example, benefited heavily off of the crumbling Empires that come before. They sought to hold these gains by excluding new powers (Japan, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, China) from expanding. This cynical definition may be partially correct, although it tells only a part of the story. A large portion of the discourse in this text revolves around ending war. In particular, the authors look at the the Paris Peace Pact of 1928 - an agreement originally between the United States, France and Germany, that attempted ideologically to "end war". This agreement collapsed a few years later with the Japanese invasion of China, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930's. Although the agreement, and the international organization of the League of Nations, were powerless to stop WWII, the discourse of peace, the rejection of aggressive war, and the movement toward free trade and global integration was unstoppable. The end of WWII saw the end of the Old World Order, according to the authors. Aggressive war has largely stopped, and the statistics on territorial annexations show a massive and marked decline in these geopolitical events. In the modern world, very few annexations have actually occurred, and the way states are formed and change has shifted.

Even so, peace does not necessarily reign. While external wars of aggression between states has stopped, internal wars remain prevalent, and indeed seem to have increased. The new geopolitical strategy for nations is internal meddling. States like the US, Russia and China use the sale of arms, economic sanctions, and logistical support to prop up or tear down regimes and rebel groups. Armed conflict between nations has certainly stagnated, with very few direct wars fought - outside of disputed regions like Kashmir, Palestine and Ukraine. However, the threat of war remains. Tensions between the US and USSR over their spheres of influence, and in modern times, the tensions over controversially claimed regions like the South China Sea - ignored in past treaties, and with all sides having spotty claims - seems to be increasing tensions, although the authors posit war seems unlikely.

This book is an interesting undertaking. Using the Paris Peace Pact of 1928 as its muse, and Hugo Grotius as its beginning, this book examines the alterations in international relations up to modern times, examining history and historical figures along the way. Grotius, Schmitt, Roosevelt, Lauberecht, Kelsen, and so on are all examined in great detail. Events like the British leaving Palestine, the Russian annexation of the Crimea, WWI, the Nuremberg Trials, and so on are also examined. The authors have written a comprehensive and quite original work on the development of the modern system of international relations. This book is well written, fascinating, well researched, and quite unique. I would easily recommend this book to history buffs and political aficionados everywhere as a great read.

[Joris van de Riet · Rating 5 out of 5]

De tweede keer nog beter dan de eerste

[Vheissu · Rating 5 out of 5]

I can't recommend this book to the general reader, and international legal specialists are already aware of the arguments presented by the authors. Those with an interest in international affairs and diplomatic history, on the other hand, will find the work fascinating and possibly revelatory. As for me, this is probably the most important book that I have read in the last decade.

The authors document the evolution of international affairs from the time of Grotius to today by focusing on the transformation of the laws of war. Simply put, war was legal and central to the relations of states before 1928, but has been "outlawed" thereafter, resulting in unanticipated and unintended changes to the entire body of international law. Before the often maligned and ridiculed Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, war was the basic organizing principle of world affairs and laws were derived therefrom. Conquest, "gunboat diplomacy," lawful mayhem, and the strictures of neutrality were derived from the privilege of states (and sometimes non-states) to use force (p. 97). Once states agreed to abandon the use of force as an instrument of national policy, however, conquest necessarily became illegal, aggression became a crime, coerced agreements were unenforceable, and the strictures of neutrality gave rise to the right to sanction states for illegal actions (p. 304). In other words, strong states were forbidden to prey on weak states, allowing a dramatic increase in the number of sovereign states since World War II.

The rise of new states helped achieve self-determination for billions of previously oppressed people, but it also created a few problems, notably "failed states," which serve as nurseries for transnational insurgencies and conflict (e.g., "terrorists"). It also generated new conflicts within states, even as it reduced conflicts between states. Indeterminate borders left by withdrawing imperialists and the achievement of statehood without authentic nationhood have produced extreme ethnic conflict and atrocities that perplex the world and strain the effectiveness of international organizations like the United Nations.

Part of these problems can be explained by the fact that the full legal implications of the post-Peace Pact world have yet to be understood and codified by the family of nations. It can also be explained by the reluctance of some strong states to honor the legal rights of weak states. In particular, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council have wielded their veto to protect themselves and their clients, reluctant to forgo their strength in cases where the rights of the weak are at stake, and undermining the purposes of the very institutions that they created in 1945. Although war is illegal, "self-defense" is not, creating a loophole that strong states have abused as a way of masking their lawless behavior (e.g., the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014, China's ongoing seizure of "islands" in the South China Sea).

The post-Peace Pact world also faces existential challenges from Islamism, which rejects the very notion of sovereignty based on the consent of the governed. In response, states have applied force instead of reaffirming and upholding territorial sovereignty as the organizing principle of the modern world. By so doing they have created martyrs and new recruits dedicated to abolishing the rights of individuals under law.

Hathaway and Shapiro ask whether the post-Peace Pact world is worth saving, given that the strong remain determined to trample on the rights of the weak. Donald Trump's "America First" makes no room for international organizations like the U.N., which his supporters view as a means by which the weak handcuff the strong. The framers of the U.N. Charter, fresh from the horror of Nazi Germany's aggression against the weak states in Europe, intended the organization to be a shield for those unable to defend themselves. Conservative complaints about the "failure" of the U.N. are actually complaints about its "successes," few in number and tepid though they may be.

The authors' answer, of course, is "Yes." Readers may come to their own conclusion. I, for one, believe in a world where the weak can flourish alongside the strong. Too many of my fellow Americans, however, clearly believe the answer is "No." What might replace the postwar world order seems beyond their imagination or even contemplation, as long as Trump "Makes America Great Again."

[Mehrsa · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a bold and interesting idea and a new way to view world history. The premise is that there was a law of war before this particular treaty and then a law of war afterwards and that the law actually mattered. There were obviously exceptions and some transition pains (i.e. WWII in which Germany violated the new rules and Japan believed the old rules to still be viable). The book really makes you see modern warfare differently. You can't just seize territory anymore though it is convenient that the two established empires got together after they were done taking land to decree the end of taking land. There is a fascinating coda in which they contextualize the recent Islamic state as a challenge to the established laws of war and describe the clash as not one of power, but of ideas. I am not sure I bought every audacious claim, but it was still fascinating to consider.

[Albert Rejas · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author's prose and story-telling is fascinating and simple, and I am literally hooked to read its entirety. At first, I thought this book is all about international laws and politics of war, but instead, it is full of interesting stories and historical journey on how the world transitioned from the Old World to the New World Order. Even when the latter parts and chapters divulge to the complex and often confusing politics of war; the authors already caught my focus and interest because in between those scholarly texts are different stories on how the interventionists and internationalists remade the world.

~

This book is a testament of Hathaway and Shapiro's both expertise in their own fields (international law and law). With a mixture of comprehensive research and story-telling, this book provides a masterfully crafted and organized argument on how the often-neglected outlawry of war in 1928 produced a tremendous change in the world order.

The book is divided into three chapters.

The first chapter describes the Old World Order, where war is legal, gunboat diplomacy is a norm, aggression is not a crime, neutrals must stay impartial, and agreements may be coerced. A period of empires and conquests. They started with the story of Hugo Grotius—the great apologist of war and the so-called "Father of International Law"—and his ingenious defense on Heemskerck's "private war". Through this starting point, the authors masterfully crafted the initial starting point on how war became a system and solution in settling disputes and obtaining powers, and how the legality of war shaped the Old World Order.

The second chapter focuses on the "transformation", the slow and long-term changes and recurrence of ideas and debates on the legality and illegality of war. "Interventionists" (in favor of the legality of war) and "Internationalists" (in favor of the illegality of war) perspectives are presented here thoroughly. This chapter provides a comprehensive and detailed emphasis that the absolute legality of war is counterproductive; while on the other hand, the immediate outlawry of war without a systematized and globalized policies is also inherently unstable as shown in between the period of 1928 Peace Pact and the close of the Second World War. Thus, Hathaway and Shapiro concludes that "falling between these two polar opposites is in many ways the worst of all" as it will "generate chaos and disorder until a new, stable equilibrium arises."

This second chapter is also the most interesting one. This is where the genius minds of the 19th-20th century emerged such as Carl Schmitt (interventionist) and Lauterpacht (internationalists) and others, who have fought in different polarities of war. The passages about the Nazis and Nuremberg trials are also written amazingly and in an interesting manner—it is like you are just reading a story.

The third chapter explores the present. In the New World Order, all state agree that war and territorial conquests is illegal, aggression is a crime, economic sanctions are an essential tool of statecraft, and agreements cannot be coerced. This is the period of globalization where global trade "plays an essential role not only as a source of beneficial collaboration but also as a collective tool for constraining illegal behavior." This chapter concludes that war in the present world order is absolutely counterproductive as the world already knows how to restrict illegality and promote the global legal order through world organizations and global cooperation.

This chapter also presented facts and figures on how wars and conquests decreased tremendously. Indeed, this is a period where war and conquest no longer makes states. But Hathaway and Shapiro does not end in the utopian conclusion that with the global cooperation in renunciation of war, we already achieved world peace. It is not. The postwar period has been far from peaceful, they acknowledged. But still, we should appreciate that we are far from what we are in the pre-1928 Peace Pact, and now, it is in our hands and of the world to keep and to work out the necessary steps to organize peace. The Internationalist has done their part, it is the responsibility of the present, and the future, to continue the struggle towards genuine peace and world without war.

~

Indeed, as the authors proclaimed, the Internationalists were transformative figures. "They were transformative because of their ideas—and because they were willing and able to use their ideas to change the world". I can confidently say that the authors effectively achieved their intended purpose to redeem these figures from the footnotes to the limelight of our history. Kudos!

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Това е твърде "нишова" книга. За да я оцени човек, трябва да е преминал поне базов курс по международно публично право (за предпочитане, не в България), както и по история на международните отншения. Фокус на цялото изследване е пактът "Бриан-Келог" от 1928 г., който забранява междудържавната война като средство за разрешаване на споровете. Авторите го определят като преломен момент в развитието на международните отношения, обяснявайки как се стига до него, както и последиците след неговото сключване в наши дни. Тезата е заявена още в самото начало - след 1928 г. се наблюдава отчетлив спад във войните между държави и в териториалните завоевания. Обяснението за това е, че класическата война бива забранена и тази забрана бива възприета като всеобща норма на международното право (след Пакта от 1928 г., забраната е записана и в Устава на ООН от 1945 г.). Авторите не отричат наличието на изключения - напр. анексирането на Крим от Русия - но според тях това е изключение, което върви срещу тенденцията на изчезване на междудържавните войни, обявявани с манифести и считани преди 1928 г. за напълно законно средство за разрешаване на спорове на международната сцена. Хатауей и Шапиро, разбира се, не падат от Луната и посочват набор от съвременни проблеми в международните отношения, на които "забраната на войната" не може да бъде лек. В нашето съвремие повечето конфликти, водещи до насилие, имат вътрешнодържавен, а не - международен, характер. Пактът от 1928 г. е практически безполезен в конфликти, като тези в Северна Африка (по време на Арабската пролет) или в бивша Югославия. И все пак, днес ни е трудно да повярваме, че някога, и то не съвсем отдавна, войната между държавите е била нещо съвсем нормално - средство на външната политика, използваемо напълно "законно" при спазването на определени обичайни правила (напр. да обявиш войната официално и да заявиш защо нападаш другата държава). Хатауей и Шапиро оставят на читателя да прецени каква заслуга има развитието на международното право за действителното опазване на мира в наши дни. Те не отричат т. нар. реалистки обяснения - че балансът между основните сили е този, който прави войната непечеливша опция. Тезата им обаче е доста солидно аргументирана с исторически и статистически данни, поради което не трябва да бъде отхвърляна prima faciae, без да бъде разбрана. Освен всичко друго авторите са се постарали да представят атрактивни биографични портрети на някои от най-големите имена в международното право - Хуго Гроций, Ханс Келзен, Херш Лаутерпахт, Карл Шмит и др. За мен лично това бяха едни от най-ценните моменти в книгата. В учебниците тези хора са свързвани със своите теории и критики, но тук те биват представени като хора, мислещи по глобални проблеми, но притискани от злободневни (съвсем човешки) дилеми - да си осигурят стабилна служба в някой университет, да оцелеят от Холокоста, да успеят да обяснят на политиците, които взимат реални решения, своите виждания и т. ��.

[John Mosman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Such an interesting book, would you believe war was actually outlawed in 1928? Neither would I, yet it happened. The Peace Pact as sign in that year. We we still have war, your might ask, WWII or Vietnam comes to mind. Prior to 1928, war was legal. If one country invaded another, it was legal and both sides, win or lose, were treated the same regardless of who the aggressor nation. The side who won the war gained legal title of the vanquished countries territory, resources and wealth, along with property and the people. After the Peace Pact that all changed. Countries defeating another are not internationally recognized to "own" the defeated country. How? I suggest you read this well researched and well written book.

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best written book I've read all year. I think it's a great history of the intellectual ideas surrounding interstate conflict between early modern Europe and now. I think its apparently claim that ideas matter more than power is unconvincing, and its analysis of the decline of interstate war is overly simplistic. It's very short discussion of the problems of terrorism doesn't fit well with the rest of the book and is underdeveloped. But it's still a superb read; I enjoyed it so much.

[Петър Стойков · Rating 3 out of 5]

Първата световна война тогава са я наричали Великата война и "войната, която ще приключи всички войни". До тогава човечеството не е виждало толкова агресивен и кървав конфликт и повечето хора са смятали, че това е достатъчно да сложи край на стремежите за завоевания и шовинизъм както на управляващата класа, така и на населението.

Дори през 1928 г. бива подписан от основните участници в ПСВ и други големи държави т.н. Парижки пакт, който цели да премахне войната като метод за преследване на държавни цели. Доколко този пакт има успех виждаме от последвалата малко след това Втора световна война, в която подписалите го успешно надминават рекорда от Първата по жертви, кръвопролития и издевателства.

Все пак, авторът на настоящата книга се опитва да ни убеди, че този пакт именно има решаващо значение за рязкото намаляване на военните конфликти в последния век, както и по-важно: промяна на философията и обществените нагласи спрямо идеята за война. Дотогава войната е била нещо нормално, метод за изясняване на международните отношения, а сега вече е нещо уникално зло, което трябва всячески да се избягва.

Имам своите резерви по отношения на тия твърдения, предвид факта, че насилието и войната така или иначе си намаляват от неолита насам и двете световни войни са може би нещо като грешка на растежа. Toeст не Парижкия пакт е променил нещо сериозно, то си е тенденция отдавна.

Въпреки това, The Internationalists е любопитна книга, описваща живота и делото на активистите, които стоят начело на усилията за подписване на пакта и като цяло за поставянето на войната извън закона доста години преди самото събитие.

[Julian Douglass · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic book on an unappreciated part in human history. Ms. Hathaway and Mr. Shapiro really did their research and laid out their argument in a wonderful way that has reshaped the global order. The first 2/3rds are history while the last 1/3rd is Political Science. An interesting book to read for sure, and when you understand the concepts that they lay out, you can really see the effects of what these brave men in 1928 did. Highly recommend reading. It can be a bit much at some points, but it is not a highly academic read so that only certain people can read this.

[Molly · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is utterly transformative. The level of detail with which Hathaway and Shapiro approached their task in writing The Internationalists is spellbinding. Not only did they produce a great deal of empirical data, but the book also is sprinkled with asides such as this: "As Nishi Amane would later explain, defending one's borders "is like riding in a third-class train; at first there is adequate space but as more passengers enter there is no space for them to sit."

I learned about how piracy by the Dutch East India Company accidentally led to the modern emergence of international law; how "gunboat diplomacy" wasn't always so metaphorical; how international legal scholars were responsible for many of the political decisions of the twentieth century; how the United Nations Headquarters is located on the former site of a slaughterhouse; and innumerable other curiosities of world history.

This book is not only fascinating in its academic detail, but it itself is a powerful tool for understanding the world in which we live and the international legal order. The authors make no secret of their views on international law and this book may be able to persuade international law sceptics the world over. By the end of The Internationalists, one is encouraged to follow Robert Jackson, a man who served as US Solicitor General, US Attorney General, Associate Justice of the SCOTUS and Chief US Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, who declared in 1945 that he was joining those who held an "inveterate belief that international law is an existing and indestructible reality ... in a timely and resolute confession of faith".

[Santiago · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is not a history book. It is a beautiful theory on international law or international relations. Easy to read and beautifully writen too, but untruthful in historic terms.
The main thesis states that the Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928 succeeded in the way war has been considered afterwards. After it, all wars have been considered to be illegal. If we just consider for a moment the 70 million of violent deaths that happened just a decade after and the cruelty of wars such as Korea, Vietnam of Irak in recent years, the whole point of the book does not hold.
It oversimplifies the distinction between the Old World Order (apparently based just on Hugo Grotius) and the New World Order created after the Kellogg-Briand Pact. After the New World Order, for example, wars of conquest have simply dissapeared. The book does not establish a logical casuality between facts and ideas (setting unfulfilled and forgotten laws as a revolutionary change in History). Based in contrafactual story, it denies reality.
Every fact in the book is used with the sole purpose of defending his thesis. But do not let History ruin a good Theory.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's rare that history books that deal with war cover international law, much less make it the main subject. The changing attitude towards wars of aggression as being the right of nations and the game of kings to being an illegal activity is shown via examples from prior to 1928 when aggressive war was outlawed to post treaty wars with punishment for transgressors like the Nuremberg war trials, economic sanctions, and other non-violent methods. A downside to removing the right of conquest is the rise of the modern failed state, countries with no effective government that create massive hardships for their citizens and fuel the international refugee problem. Also covered are future issues that may cause problems with the new world order, for example when evil and/or stupid leaders like Trump opt out of international agreements.

I found this book interesting, but a trifle long-winded, to be expected on a book about law.

[Toni · Rating 4 out of 5]

A concise, well researched, easy to read book on the history and current state of the international legal order regarding nations. The authors' general thesis is that the oft-overlooked Kellog Briand Pact (Paris Peace Pact) marked a significant sea change in the ideas and laws governing the relationship of nations -namely that pre-pact the relationship of nations was defined by the legality of war and post-past defined by the outlawing of war). As someone who has worked in international law and laws governing the prosecution of war crimes for many years, I didn't learn much new, but I found some of the anecdotal, back-room details very interesting. It was also nice to revisit so much of what I have learned in such a highly readable overview. It's a pretty quick and informative read.

[Aaron · Rating 4 out of 5]

“With the exception of Ireland, every one of the states that had gathered in Paris to renounce war was at war.”

War. Too many books are already written on it. Peace as well (in relation to war of course). What can one more offer? In fact, the one at hand is in many ways an odd duck that focuses on the Paris Peace Pact that, as quoted above, did not turn out too well. A conference few know about featuring names fewer know about and—why not—instead of really starting in the 20th century, we begin in the late 16th with a man by the name of Hugo Grotius. Random fire, rapid punch, curve-balls aplenty...but somehow way more interesting than I thought it’d be!

There almost (but not quite!) is a feeling of being swindled when working one’s way through The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World because a good chunk early on is on historical issues far and away from early 20th century politics. As noted, Grotius, but even that is just window dressing to an account of the history of “just war” over the centuries. Some may find this padding, but not me. The authors in spite of academic legal backgrounds were able to not only write engagingly, but covered unique cases of “just war” (or perhaps “legal war”) in history by focusing on various uses of it that even armchair historians may not know about.

And speaking of padding—and this again I mean in a positive way, while the book’s subtitle How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World is dead-on, one may go in getting a mistaken impression that the text mainly focuses on the time around the signing of the Paris Peace Pact and perhaps some philosophical musings on what went wrong/right. With the Grotius aside, this cannot be further from the truth. Almost a book with multiple angles, “The Internationalists” may keep the PPP as its anchor, but what we get in a way is a look across time from the 16th century through present day stopping every so often to cover some less-known events and even a unique spin on what made Japan so upset about a hundred years ago:

“Just as their nation was poised to claim its rightful place in a world governed by rules it had struggled to learn, the Americans and the Europeans had changed those rules. Conquest was no longer permitted.”

‘We’re at peace now, but it only begins today, OK? So yes, we conquered aplenty, but we did it when it was still OK. You, on the other hand, need to stay in your lane.’ (my paraphrase, not from the book which is written by a duo of authors considerably smarter than me) This does not excuse Japan’s actions leading up to and during WW2, but the above quote plus suddenly losing the ability to buy oil may add more backstory to why they acted the way they did.

Though even Japan can rest easy nowadays given its acceptance as a world power. The last part of the book lands us in present day affairs where “bizarro Grotius” (my phrasing) has taken hold due to organizations such as ISIS taking Grotius and essentially turning it on its head. Is a new PPP needed to make things right? After all, it’s almost been a hundred years...

[David H. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I took an international law course back in graduate school, but had mostly forgotten about it in the years since. Reading this book both reminded me of how interesting the field was, and expanded my own understandings (in fact, I wish I had this book back then, Hathaway & Shapiro explain things very well, especially in the "old world order" part. They start the book out talking about basically no one remembers the Kellogg-Briand Pact anymore or treat it like a joke, but they make a very convincing argument that it was the turning point into our "new world order" where aggressive war/conquest is illegal. The initial part of the book explains what the laws of war used to be like (with the help of Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius, who came up with some of the early just-war theories), but following the evolution of international law and the growing dissatisfaction with the "old way" of doing things led to attempting to make war itself illegal. Instead of just focusing on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, though, we swiftly move into the breakdown of the League of Nations (with Japanese and Italian invasions, and the rise of Nazi Germany), and the beginnings of the United Nations. The last several chapters focus on what's been happening since then as well as the challenges to our currently globally connected and intertwined system, and the weaknesses of trying to punish and persuade without war (i.e. nonrecognition, economic sanctions, etc.). At the time that this book was written (in 2017), Russia had occupied Crimea and ISIS was on the rise, and the authors discuss some of the issues and challenges with both (ISIS in particular, practically got a full chapter with a focus on Sayyid Qutb, whose writings inspired a lot of modern-day Islamism). All in all, very interesting, especially if you'd like to read more about the underpinnings of the geopolitical order, at least for now (I write this at the end of 2024, and things aren't looking great for stability).

[Nahomy Bermudez]

El orden internacional actual se ha construido a lo largo de los años por las interacciones entre los distintos actores internacionales, sin embargo, no han surgido solo por el Derecho internacional, sino que se trata de una estructura más compleja que ha mezclado ideas, principios (políticos, económicos y sociales) y disposiciones normativas, cuyas relaciones ha dado como resultado el orden internacional actual.
En “The Internationalists: How a radical plan to outlaw war remade the world”, Dona Hathaway y Scott Shapiro, abogados y profesores de la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad Yale, realizan una investigación rigurosa que no solamente retoma los distintos tratados y acuerdos legales internacionales que han propiciado el cambio a un nuevo sistema internacional, sino que incorporan las ideas de distintas generaciones de académicos, así como datos históricos exhaustivos, que permiten fundamentar su argumento.
La tesis que sostienen es que el Pacto Kellogg-Briand, también conocido como el Pacto de París, ha establecido un nuevo orden internacional al declarar la guerra ilegal, precepto que ha persistido hasta nuestros días. Sin embargo, también reconocen que la mayoría de los historiadores desprecian este Pacto y lo consideran sin trascendencia en años posteriores.

[Nathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wow. This was simply phenomenal. Intellectual history at its finest, with statistics to back up the documentary evidence. The authors are excellent writers and know how to tell a compelling story. I'm fully convinced of their thesis. It's particularly fascinating in light of the current war in Ukraine, as the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea features near the end of the book. I'd be really interested to hear the authors' thoughts on how things played out with ISIS and the response via sanctions of much of the world to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; I think the sanction response especially supports their thesis.

[Ransom Silliman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book about the international law of war, and the formation of the new world order and the outlawry of war. Quite dense, and pretty long, but still a good read, especially in the current context in which we are actively dismantling the world order which we ourselves built and maintained for the last 80 years. The Pax Americana certainly had its share of major injustices, but it was better than the period which came before it, and it was defined by ideals of peace and justice which are still worth fighting for. Recommended by my uncle

[Anjali · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely amazing book. So insightful about the complex legal system developed in order to preserve world peace post-WWI, as well as the radical shift we have undergone in our world order. Highly recommend for those interested in geopolitics or law. I seriously cannot stop recommending this book because of how interesting and comprehensive it is.

[sillypunk · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant and amazing.

[Denise · Rating 3 out of 5]

Highly interesting topic, though I was less engrossed than expected. The writers lay out and explore their theory in both breadth and depth while at times disregarding facts that don't quite fit it.

[Nadi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book in 2023 and somehow completely forgot I had drafted the following hefty review:

Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro’s controversial analysis of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (or the “Peace Pact”) is a stimulating read. The authors’ thesis is deliciously revisionist: in outlawing aggressive war as a tool with which states can resolve disputes, the K-B Pact drew the proverbial curtain on the Old War Order and birthed the New; today, H&S argue, intrastate conflict has replaced interstate war, territorial conquest has decreased considerably, and the Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ model, which once governed global affairs, has faded into irrelevance.

THE VIRTUES OF THE INTERNATIONALISTS

Accessibility. The Internationalists is one of the quickest academic reads I have ever attempted, no small feat for a 400+ page count. H&S adopt a Great Men of History approach, which — while out of favor with many contemporary historians (and for good reason) — I’ll admit, makes for a pretty thrilling narrative. Among such great men* are H. Grotius, N. Amane, C. Schmitt, and S. Qutb (who, together, comprise the pro-war “Interventionists” group) and S. Levinson, J. Shotwell, S. Welles, and H. Lauterpacht (the titular “Internationalists” inaugurating the New World Order via the criminalization of war). Although the book makes numerous chronological leaps, introducing historical figure after historical figure and theoretical framework after theoretical framework, its rhetorical progression proves surprisingly easy to follow, even humorous at times (for a good laugh, see “The French are Roosters” [p.38-39] or “Citizen Genêt goes to Washington” [p.82-89]).

*Note: To readers who recognize among these names C. Schmitt as the infamous Nazi and S. Qutb as the ideological founder of the Islamic State, the authors include the following explanation:

These historically and geographically disparate men did not invent their ideas about war ex nihilo. Each in his own way built on the work of those who came before him. But each one introduced remarkable innovations that transformed world history. [...] A key theme of this book, then, is that ideas matter, and people with ideas matter. In that respect, the book is both a history of ideas about war and a history of how these ideas found their way into practice. It is a story of how ideas emerged, clashed, and evolved. It is a story, too, of how ideas became embedded in institutions that restructured human relations, and in the process reshaped the world. (p.xxi)

The World Wars. I would recommend the first two-thirds of this book to anyone who studied the World Wars in a classroom and who now struggles to contemplate those subjects unmolested by the memory of exams and textbooks. I would especially recommend this book to anyone interested in international affairs. Reading The Internationalists reminded me of such themes I had long forgotten from my introductory courses in undergrad as the debate between realism, constructivism, and liberal institutionalism; the role of pirates in the development of international law; and the influence of Enlightenment thinking on the perception of the individual (and, thus, the state) as sovereign. Ultimately, one of The Internationalists’ greatest successes is that, in constructing an intellectual argument about the interwar years, its authors do not simply recount the passing of relevant events, but frame them within a broader political context. This narrative begins when Hugo Grotius (considered the father of international law) penned his theories in the seventeenth century and encompasses critical transformations in global war, economics, and philosophy that have since taken place.

Political Theory. One of my favorite parts of The Internationalists is the opening to Chapter Ten: Friend and Enemy (p.215-223). Across a series of stimulating, albeit disturbing, paragraphs, H&S chronicle the intellectual contributions of C. Schmitt (introduced above as a member of the “Interventionists” clan) to the defense of the legality of aggressive war broadly and of the crimes of the Nazi regime specifically. Described as “Germany’s leading political scientist” at the time, Schmitt’s alleged genius would eventually land him in an interrogation room at Nuremberg not long after the trials of 1945. However, H&S begin Schmitt’s story 20 years prior, in a Berlin lecture hall headed by J. Shotwell (one of our heroic “Internationalists”). On this day, Shotwell introduced Schmitt to the then-revolutionary concept of the outlawry of war, which the latter found difficult to accept:

States must always be prepared to go to war because there are some conflicts—conflicts that threaten the state’s very existence—that only war can resolve. Thus, the awful prospect of homicide looms over all political action. It must serve as an option—a drastic option, but still an option.

Because the function of the state is to regulate political conflicts, Schmitt concluded, it is impossible for the state to outlaw war. If a state were to try, it would prevent itself from distinguishing friend from enemy. That would end politics and, in turn, the state as well, for the state is by definition the entity that resolves intense conflicts by any means necessary. Schmitt explained: ‘A people which exists in the sphere of the political cannot in case of need renounce the right to determine by itself the friend-and-enemy distinction…Were this distinction to vanish then political life would vanish altogether.’ In Schmitt’s view, Shotwell was not proposing that Germany outlaw war—Shotwell was asking Germany, and every other state that listened to him, to commit suicide. (p.219)

Shortly thereafter, H&S paint a picture of Schmitt’s childhood in Plettenberg, Germany — an upbringing rife with class animosity, sectarian violence, geopolitical tension, and domestic hostility. It’s no wonder, the authors argue, that such a man should endorse the legality of war, particularly in the aftermath of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, which pinned full blame for the First World War on his home country.

Schmitt’s theories took a turn for the unsettling in 1932, the year the second edition of his own lecture series was published and four years after the Peace Pact was signed. “That wars are waged in the name of humanity,” Schmitt claimed, “has an especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent.” (p.222) According to Schmitt, H&S reveal, the true danger of the criminalization of aggressive war is that it can never truly eliminate war: belligerents need only invoke the “name of humanity” to justify their aggression and, in doing so, grant themselves permission to “regard the enemy as less than human, [denying said enemy] the legal protections that all humans deserve.” (p.223) In a moment of striking dramatic irony, a soon-to-be Nazi expresses concern that the outlawry of war could result in genocide.

Throughout the book, Schmitt’s political theories accompany those of C. Tilly, M. Weber, A. Smith, and more, though few are analyzed in comparable depth.

Neutrality. One of The Internationalists’ most exciting revelations is its in-depth exploration of the way neutrality has transformed conceptually over the past two centuries, particularly in international law. Across 200-or-so pages, H&S demonstrate how H. Lauterpacht’s revolutionary interpretation of the Peace Pact eventually produced a tool of foreign policy that has become emblematic of our contemporary international order: economic sanctions. Under the Old World Order, the authors argue, the legality of war disincentivized states from acting in any way that could jeopardize their neutrality unless they were willing to risk facing a (fully legal) declaration of war by a belligerent party. Such acts included preferential economic treatment. In other words, pre-1928, non-warring states were prohibited from discriminating between belligerent actors and the victims by, say, refusing to trade with the former or sending munitions and resources to the latter.

In the absence of a global government, it was believed that no state had the capacity to determine just how ‘valid’ a declaration of war was, meaning the legality of war had to be applied universally (that is, to both attacker and attacked). To do otherwise would mean to risk a) global financial crisis as states felt compelled/coerced to ‘vote with their dollar’ and/or b) global war as states would be unable to respond to a belligerent’s actions without recourse to force. Following the K-B Pact, however, the across-the-board criminalization of aggressive war rendered economic penalties not merely permissible but the preferable method of maintaining world order, as states that broke the law by declaring war would be (at least in theory) “outcasted” from the international system through sanctions.

CRITICISM OF THE INTERNATIONALISTS

The Cold War. No singular text can (or should) address all its relevant subjects. But a book chronicling the history of international law and the challenges facing world peace in the contemporary era should, in my opinion, provide at least some commentary on the Cold War. Unfortunately, The Internationalists fails on this account. H&S dismiss S. Qutb’s interpretation of the Cold War as a “spiritual crisis” (p.405), yet provide no alternative analysis beyond the claim that proof of the K-B Pact’s success is the fact that no state ever threatened to use nuclear weapons in order to acquire the territory of another state (p.332). I can’t help but doubt this theory. Did states refrain from annexing sovereign territory during the Cold War because the Peace Pact criminalized conquest? Or, more likely, have states made fewer land-grabs in the post-WWII era thanks to the threat of mutually-assured destruction? Is any territory worth claiming if it risks your own annihilation?

Moreover, The Internationalists hardly references NATO except to suggest, again, that its existence proves the K-B Pact succeeded after all (because “yay, institutions!”), but I cannot accept this all-too-neat portrayal of what is ultimately a military alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization effectively eliminates legal neutrality for NATO’s 30+ member states via a collective defense clause (p.160). Neutrality was so thoroughly analyzed in this book, and yet H&S make scant reference to Article 5 or to the fact that NATO has remained active — expanded, actually — since the fall of the Soviet Union. Coming to a head in the chapter on “Outcasting” (p.371-395), the suggestion throughout the book that military alliances (like those that propelled the First World War’s unprecedented geographical scope) are unnecessary/unfavorable today is a bold claim against the fact that such military alliances still exist, even when their very raison d'etre no longer does. The most foundational liberal argument that NATO remains to promote cooperation among member states reveals an unspoken admission: that the Peace Pact failed to do just that.

China and Taiwan. To my understanding, Taiwan was annexed by China in 1683 and then ceded to Japan in 1895. Between Japan’s surrender in 1945 and Japan’s renouncing sovereignty over Taiwan in 1952, the Republic of China claimed ownership of Taiwan. If The Internationalists is correct that, following WWII, states that were independent in 1928 were restored to independence at the behest of the international community (p.324), would not Washington’s recognition in 1979 of the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China and Taiwan undermine this claim? While H&S do label China’s claim to Taiwan an “unrecognized transfer” in the pre-1948 era (p.316), the authors acknowledge only that China has not recognized Taiwan’s independence since, overlooking the numerous states that have allied with China on this issue. There seems to be a missed opportunity here for some interesting analysis.

War today. I remain skeptical of much of the analysis offered in Part III: New World Order, especially that of the latter chapters, which seek to predict what shape future global conflict may take in light of technological, political, and economic changes to come. For one, H&S scarcely acknowledge the way the language of war has evolved and is used today. The US’s “war on terror” and “war on drugs” have manufactured consent for myriad international interventions, and it feels reductive for a text that repeatedly asserts just how much words and ideas “matter” to ignore these phenomena. 

Moreover, H&S find it appropriate in Chapter 17: Seeing Like an Islamic State to diverge from their political, historical, and theoretical analysis of the past 390+ pages and embark on a theological examination of Islamic violence. In an approach that felt disconcertingly reminiscent of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, H&S seem to suggest the United States’ primary concern in the realm of global conflict is and will remain Islamic terrorism. 8 years after The Internationalists’ publication, this argument has aged like milk. To a world witnessing Israeli genocide in Palestine, Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, the strengthening of the military-industrial complex, predictions of global clashes due to climate change, and the violence of late-stage capitalism, H&S’ conjectures require heavy revision to be worthy of study. (Future me interjecting: in the meantime, I recommend Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine for a harrowing yet required read on the subject.)

Global Policeman. After 400 pages claiming the world has finally embraced peace thanks to laws, norms, and ideas, The Internationalists concludes that “the success of the system depends on the willingness of the United States to continue to play a central role in maintaining the legal order in the face of [its] many challenges” (p.419). This final note feels jarring and unsubstantiated. Granted, the book was published in 2017 and indeed makes note of Trump’s then-recent election. Perhaps H&S felt it necessary to part with a call to action, but an admission of American Exceptionalism shoots the authors’ argument in the foot. How effective was the Peace Pact if its legacy relies upon the efforts of a single Great Power to sustain it?

FINAL NOTE

I remain unconvinced by The Internationalists’ overarching thesis, but I appreciate how compelling Hathaway and Shapiro’s writing is. In the two years since I’ve read this book, I’ve recalled especially enjoying the segments on Napoleon and Matthew Perry in Japan, though I did not make note of them in the above review. I’d be open to rereading at least the first two-thirds of this text sometime.

[Aggrey Odera · Rating 3 out of 5]

The key idea behind the book is that ideas shape law, and that law informs power, ergo ideas matter. Hathaway and Shapiro tell the story of international law, starting from 1603, when Hugo Grotius, then only twenty two, was brought forward to write a defense for his cousin, Jacob van Heemskerck, who had seized the Portuguese frigate Santa Catarina. International law, they contend, has had two timelines, the first beginning in 1625 when Grotius published his “Laws of War and Peace”, ideas about which he’d started thinking about during his defense of Van Heemskerck (they term this the old world order) and the other beginning in August 1928, when the Briand-Kellog pact to outlaw war was signed in Paris (New world order).

According to Grotius’ old international order, war between states was completely legal; a general tool to right wrongs. But since it could never actually be determined whose side justice was on, might always made right. What was a crime, in this old order, was neutrals getting involved. Thus modern means of acting against aggressors by neutrals, means such as economic sanctions, were illegal - and were in fact taken as declarations of war. The men (they were always men) who typified this world order, the “Interventionists” according to Hathaway and Shapiro, were Grotius himself (the father of international law), Nishi Amade (the Japanese scholar and advisor to emperor Meiji after the fall of the shogunate and the subsequent restoration, under whom, after two centuries of isolation, Japan rose to become a global power in less than fifty years), Carl Schmitt (the German intellectual whose view of Großraum - a German take on the Monroe doctrine- Hitler and the Nazis made use of to legitimize their war - Lebensraum) and finally Said Qutb (the Egyptian thinker and member of the Muslim brotherhood whose book, Milestones, and whose execution in 1966 by Gamal Abdel Nasser, made him a prophet and a martyr to fundamental Muslims all over the world intent on using war not just to get rid of imperialism by western states, but to form a global Ummah of all Muslims).

According to the new international order brought forth in 1928 that Hathaway and Shapiro describe, all war was illegal, and conquest by war was not, even when the mighty were in charge, recognized by the international system (thus the 1931 Japanese annexation of Manchuria to form “Manchukuo”, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, or the Chinese occupation of several islands in the South China Sea, were and are not acknowledged by this international system). In the same vein therefore, since war was no longer a recourse to righting wrongs - “an instrument of policy”, to quote Clausewitz, the main tool, by neutrals mostly, became outcasting- typified by economic sanctions.

Unlike the zero sum nature of the old order - where one state’s gain in territory through war was another’s loss, in the new world order, positive-sum trade, which not only serves as an important tool of international collaboration, but also as a guard against illegal behavior (outcasting again) is the essential mechanism. The men who typified this order, the “Internationalists”, are largely forgotten in popular history, but Shapiro and Hathaway insist that the ideas of these men quite literally changed the word. These men are Salmon Levinson, James Shortwell, Sumner Welles, Hans Kelsing, and Hersh Lauterpacht - the father (according to Hathaway and Shapiro at least) of the new international order.

This is a great work of intellectual history, and though Hathaway and Shapiro make big claim after big claim, they mostly back them up very well. No one will probably agree with everything written here, but reading it will definitely change how most of us view the 20th century, and the broader history of international law.

[Andre Rodriguez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Los internacionalistas que cambiaron las reglas del juego
The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World es una obra de los profesores Oona A. Hathaway y Scott J. Shapiro que revela la trascendencia histórica que tuvieron las acciones e ideas de los juristas encargados de la formulación del Pacto de París de 1928. Hathaway es abogada y Profesora Gerard C. y Bernice Latrobe Smith de derecho internacional en la Universidad Yale. Shapiro es Doctor en filosofía y Profesor Charles F. Southmayd de derecho y filosofía. A pesar de la formación jurídica de los autores, la obra es un texto mayormente histórico y crítico. La tesis principal busca refutar la creencia de que el Pacto Briand-Kellog representó un acto absurdo por los internacionalistas de principios del siglo XX y, por el contrario, reconocerlo como uno de los pilares del sistema internacional actual.
La obra de Hathaway y Shapiro se enfoca en contextualizar tanto los eventos como las ideologías que impulsaron la firma del Pacto de París en 1928. Por ello, The Internationalists está dividido en tres partes que hacen un recorrido histórico desde el siglo XVII, siendo el principal enfoque de esta reseña los capítulos 10-12 y la tercera parte. Estos primeros capítulos, titulados “Friend and Enemy”,”God Save Us from Professors!” y “Nazi Circus Town” respectivamente, se concentran en presentar a los principales arquitectos del Pacto Briand-Kellog, resaltando detalles y datos briográficos. Los autores hacen especial hincapié en el debate teórico y jurídico que se había suscitado entre filósofos juristas como Carl Schmitt, notorio defensor del régimen Nazi y fuerte crítico de las nuevas corrientes internacionalistas provenientes de juristas como Hans Kelsen. No se puede subestimar el impacto de este debate pues, como menciona Karl Lowenstein, padre del constitucionalismo moderno, la capacidad intelectual de Schmitt era tal que era “capaz de hacer que lo irracional parezca racional”.
Después, el primer capítulo incluido en la tercera parte de The Internationalists, titulado “The End of Conquest”, es una de las primeras refutaciones directas por parte de los autores en contra del escepticismo académico hacia el Pacto de 1928. Gran parte del capítulo consiste en una recopilación de datos estadísticos acerca de la disminución de conquistas entre Estados, las transformaciones del espacio geográfico tras la devolución de territorios conquistados, y la desaparición de los conflictos interestatales. Si bien es cierto que la obra reconoce la vigencia de algunas conquistas, situación que los autores denominan “sticky conquests”, los datos y mapas analizados demuestran que los Estados han reafirmado la visión de los internacionalistas, transformando drásticamente su comportamiento y haciendo con esto que los conflictos que se susciten sean una excepción a las nuevas normas establecidas.
A partir del capítulo catorce, “War No Longer Makes States”, los autores extienden sus hallazgos al fenómeno de los Estados emergentes y los Estados sucesores. Hathaway y Shapiro comienzan reconociendo el libre comercio y cooperación entre Estados como uno de los cimientos para la expansión de las ideas de autodeterminación de los pueblos debido a que redujeron las sospechas de conquista entre Estados grandes y pequeños. De acuerdo a la obra, tales condiciones, en combinación con la desaparición de los imperios y la prohibición de la guerra, son suficientes para explicar fenómenos como las oleadas de descolonización de 1940-70 o el surgimiento de Estados sucesores tras la desintegración de entidades como la Unión Soviética y Yugoslavia.
Los autores abordan la cuestión de los conflictos bélicos vigentes a pesar de la prohibición explícita de la guerra en el capítulo “Why Is There Still So Much Conflict?”. No es casualidad que hayan evitado el uso de un concepto como “conflicto internacional” en los capítulos anteriores y en su lugar enfocarse en las “conquistas territoriales”. De acuerdo a esta argumentación, el Pacto Briand-Kellog no contempló la nueva clase de conflictos que se suscitaron al finalizar la Segunda Guerra Mundial: los conflictos intraestatales. La principal problemática planteada a lo largo del capítulo no es solamente que las causas de estos nuevos enfrentamientos se deben a las demarcaciones territoriales arbitrarias y a las transferencias “mal hechas” de los antiguos imperios, sino que los conflictos intraestatales son esencialmente difíciles de solucionar debido a sus vínculos vigentes con el viejo orden mundial; véase el caso de Israel-Palestina o China-Taiwan.
“¿Cómo fue posible que una superpotencia como Estados Unidos se subordinara a los acuerdos de la Organización Mundial del Comercio?” es la pregunta rectora del capítulo dieciséis. Con referencia a lo observado en los capítulos pasados, no es de extrañar que los autores atribuyeran nuevamente estos logros a las ramificaciones del Pacto Briand-Kellog. En específico, consideran la marginalización de potencias como el mecanismo principal de la aplicación de los tratados internacionales. Como se menciona en la obra, a pesar de que los organismos internacionales tienen por objetivo regular las diversas tareas que resultan de la cooperación entre Estados, se enfrentan a su vez con numerosos obstáculos debido a que los contenidos de sus tratados no son jurídicamente vinculantes. Al prohibirse la guerra como medio legítimo para solucionar disputas interestatales, el nuevo sistema internacional recurrió a la marginalización de los Estados infractores como una posible solución. Los autores depositan gran confianza en esta aplicación de la ley ya que, como ejemplifica el caso de Crimea, dejar de reconocer a los Estados rebeldes implica fuertes sanciones indirectas: Se interrumpen sus espacios aéreos, servicios financieros, flujos de bienes y servicios y demás.
Finalmente, la obra explica en el capítulo diecisiete el desarrollo histórico de organizaciones no estatales y subversivas como el Estado Islámico. En este apartado se demuestra cómo gran parte de las motivaciones ideológicas del grupo derivan de las demarcaciones arbitrarias del acuerdo Sykes-Picot. Debido a que su origen se debe principalmente a la inconformidad con los antiguos arreglos geográficos, grupos como el Estado Islámico buscan eliminar el sistema moderno basado en la soberanía de los Estados. El caso de ISIS es particularmente relevante para la conclusión del libro, ya que es uno de los numerosos frentes irrumpiendo el nuevo orden mundial. Los autores terminan la obra advirtiendo contra estos ataques hacia el consenso de la posguerra, que nunca han sido tan grandes y frecuentes como hoy en día.
Es por esto que The Internationalists demuestra ser una obra esencial para historiadores, internacionalistas y juristas. Además de los datos y gráficas recopilados por los autores, la obra tiene la fortaleza de hacer accesible esta información a través de las explicaciones e interpretaciones de Hathaway y Shapiro. Ambos autores también han rendido un justo tributo a aquellos internacionalistas que impulsaron un desarrollo más pacífico y cooperativo en la diplomacia. Sin embargo, no es posible ignorar la colosal y ambiciosa tarea planteada en la obra. Después de todo, no sólo están revitalizando la importancia del Pacto de París de 1928, sino que además promueven la idea de que el derecho, por sí solo, es capaz de transformar el sistema internacional. Este último planteamiento es una de las principales limitantes de la obra. Como menciona el historiador Max Boot, el fuerte optimismo de los autores con respecto al Pacto Kellog-Briand sobreestima su alcance e implicaciones. Sus hallazgos acerca de la disminución de conquistas y conflictos tras la firma del pacto en 1928 parece describir un sistema internacional cooperativo, pacífico y libre de competencias militares. Tal representación no da cabida al estudio de momentos decisivos en las relaciones internacionales como la Guerra Fría, período apenas mencionado a lo largo del libro. A pesar de lo anterior, las advertencias de Hathaway y Shapiro son más relevantes que nunca, y la obra acierta en sonar la alarma ante la decadencia del nuevo orden mundial.
Palabras: 1254
Boot, Max. “When the Governments of the World Agreed to Banish War.” The New York Times, 21 de septiembre de 2013. Consultado el 5 de octubre de 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/bo...
Hathaway, Oona A., Shapiro, Scott J. The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World. (Nueva York: Simon & Schuster, 2018)

[Lucas Machado · Rating 5 out of 5]

a must read for anyone who wants to understand the world we live in

[Chris Damon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Growing up in the 1950s and 60s, I recall the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact to Outlaw War was almost universally viewed derisively as the ultimate in fanciful wishful thinking undertaken by hopelessly idealistic striped-pants diplomats living in denial of the world’s harsh realities and engaging in a fantasy, of a piece with Neville Chamberlain’s naivete. What more proof is needed of the treaty’s absurdity than that a decade later the most destructive war in human history broke out?

Yet this very interesting and thought-provoking book begs to differ, and seeks to resuscitate the 1928 treaty as a critically important crossroads in international law. I would say that the authors make some compelling arguments, including the treaty’s basis for certain of the war crimes charges after World War II and even some statistical analysis from The Correlates of War project indicating stark differences in pre- and post-1928 international border changes due to conquest.

The book attempts to do a number of things simultaneously. In addition to its effort to rehabilitate the historical importance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it also gives a brief survey of international law as it relates to war and its consequences going back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), on whom they spend a fair amount of time. The book also delves into the biographies of various of the eponymous “internationalists:” international lawyers and academics who, during the 1910s and 1920s, had a hand in influencing the philosophies underlying the Kellogg-Briand pact, and also some of their intellectual antagonists. The book takes us all the way to the present, including a discussion I found interesting of some of the philosophic views of the Islamic State: basically, they don’t buy-into the modern order of independent nation states but see nations as just arbitrary man-made entities and that instead we should all be under God.

One regret I have with the book is that it does not directly address the continued heavy investment in defense spending by the major nations of the world, particularly the United States. If, thanks in part to the 1928 pact, countries are much less likely now than in the past to be invaded and conquered by a neighbor, then why do so many countries still find it necessary to devote large portions of their budget to military weaponry?

[Emilio Contreras · Rating 4 out of 5]

El porqué del Derecho en materia Internacional


“Si quieres ser dueño de una casa que admiras, no puedes simplemente tomarla por la fuerza. Si vas a la casa y echas al dueño, no adquieres el título de propiedad. El propietario llamará a la policía, que lo arrestará por allanamiento de morada. Pero incluso si no hubiera policía, nadie que supiera lo que había hecho tocaría la propiedad. Ningún banco aceptaría la casa como garantía de un préstamo. Nadie lo compraría. Es posible que los amigos ni siquiera te visiten. En cambio, para adquirir el derecho a la propiedad, tienes que comprarlo (o que te lo regale) el verdadero poder.” (Oona A. Hathaway y Scott J. Shapiro, pp.372) Con esta analogía O.A. Hathaway y Scott J. Shapiro explican cómo es que sirve el nuevo orden internacional, uno institucionalizado, más pacífico a comparación del anterior y con un marco legal que permite que los Estados, legítimamente, puedan reclamar lo que es suyo. Sin embargo, para poder llegar a este punto, antes pasamos por guerras, tratados, conferencias y otros procesos que no solo hicieron el nuevo orden internacional con el que nos manejamos día a día, sino que, también uno viejo que legitimaba la violencia como medio para obtener territorios, conocido mejor como el viejo orden internacional; todo esto a través del derecho internacional.

El libro fue escrito por dos académicos: Oona A. Hathaway, una doctora en derecho, académica y abogada americana, directora fundadora del “Center for Global Legal Challenges” en la escuela de derecho de Yale; tiene otros libros sobre temas de seguridad y relaciones internacionales como “National Security Lawyering in the Post-War Era: Can Law Constrain Power?”. El segundo escritor es Scott J. Shapiro, actual profesor de Derecho y Filosofía en la Escuela de Derecho del Yale. Cabe recalcar que entre los dos autores, inventaron el término de “Outcasting” que al español se traduciría como marginado o marginada.

The internationalist: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw Was Remade the World relata cronológicamente la evolución del Derecho Internacional y su evolución junto con el orden internacional. Desde el siglo XVI con el jurista Hugo Grocio y el orden internacional viejo que permitía y legitimaba la conquista de territorios a través de medios bélicos y la guerra por vías comerciales; luego la primera guerra mundial y su fin con el tratado de París de 1928 que inicia el derrumbe del viejo orden internacional, pues este hacía ilegal el uso de la violencia, algo que nunca antes se había acordado entre un número tan grande de países. Después de la segunda guerra mundial, con un nuevo tratado de París y la creación de la ONU, se logra institucionalizar y criminalizar la guerra como un medio para conquistar o incluso hacer “diplomacia” (como el “Gunboat diplomacy”).
El nuevo orden internacional abrió las puertas y revolucionó la diplomacia, pues ahora ya no era viable el invadir un país y luego hacer negocios. La criminalización de la violencia entre Estados y la falta de reconocimiento de territorio a nivel internacional hicieron que se encontraran nuevas vías por las cuales un país pudiera incrementar su economía y su seguridad nacional, por ejemplo, el surgimiento del Neoliberalismo y la idea que el mercado regulara el balance de poder entre naciones; otro ejemplo serían las organizaciones como el GATT o la OMC que vinculan mutuamente a varios países, impulsándolos a cooperar y evitar el conflicto bélico.
Un capítulo a resaltar es el número 14, War No Longer Makes States, el cual ejemplifica muy bien el impacto que tuvo el pacto Kellogg-Briand de 1928 y la Paz de París de 1947 en la cantidad de Estados reconocidos a nivel internacional y la correlación inversa entre conquistas y estos tratados. Hathaway y Shapiro parten analizando como en el siglo XVI había pocos Estados con mucho territorio gracias a las conquistas, para después mostrar que con la prohibición de la conquista, la violencia a nivel internacional y permitiendo sanciones a países que no cumplan los lineamientos, más y más países fueron siendo creados.
La gráficas dentro del libro son una excelente herramienta que ayuda a ejemplificar este proceso: la gráfica en la página 356 muestra el número de Estados existente alrededor del mundo, en ella se puede ver un cambio a incrementar en gran medida la cantidad de países a partir del año 1928, tendencia que sigue e incluso incrementa al finalizar la segunda guerra mundial; en la página 366 hay una gráfica de barras que muestra el número de independencias que hay por década, en ella se puede ver que las barras más grandes están después de los 1930`s, y la explicación de esto es que después de la segunda guerra mundial, con la creación de la ONU, se exigen a países, mayormente europeos, retirar sus colonias, lo que residen en un aumento en la cantidad de países y de indenpendencias.


Dentro de los temas a resaltar del libro, está el uso del derecho para legitimar acciones; puede que suene obvio pero los autores lo explican como el arma con la que se logran llevar a cabo todas las guerras que ha habido en la historia pero también la herramienta con la que han podido apaciguar la violencia entre países.
Por un lado, en la primera parte del libro, el derecho ,a como lo explica Hugo Grocio, permite a los Estados conquistar otros con el propósito de salvarlos; esto a lo largo de la historia toma desviaciones como la legitimación de Hitler como tirano, la cual fue abogada y planeada por Carl Schmitt, quien argumentó que en tiempos extremos, cosas como la tiranía y una dictadura podían ser la respuesta a los problemas; también aplicó la doctrina Monroe a Europa, alegando que Alemania era el protector de Europa y nadie debía de intervenir.
Por otro lado, en la tercera y última parte, con un orden internacional nuevo que prohíbe la guerra entre países, el derecho es utilizado para mantener a los países conectados unos con otros para así evitar conflictos, por ejemplo: en el GATT, si un país hacía algo fuera de lo acordado a otro país, la victima, legalmente podía hacer algo igual o peor en contra del primer Estado; otro ejemplo es la implementación de marginar un país fuera de acuerdos con otros, excluyéndolos de beneficios e interacciones con el resto del mundo.


Como estudiante de la licenciatura Relaciones Internacionales, muchas veces al leer ensayos, artículos o libros de académicos uno se encuentra con terminología que no termina de entender, lo que hace que muchas lecturas se hagan confusas y hasta un poco tediosas. Pero este libro es la excepción, habiendo sido escrito por académicos con altos estudios y especializaciones, el libro lleva de la mano al lector con definiciones, ejemplos y metáforas que le facilitará comprender los términos que se encontrará. Esto, permitirá que el lector pueda nadar entre cada capítulo sin el miedo a ahogarse y perder el interés por el libro.

El libro brinda mucha información, bien estructurada y presentada respecto a los distintos ordenes internacionales que han existido, sus características y consecuencias, es un estudio muy bien hecho y con suma profundidad. Sin embargo, para haber hablado de lo importante que es tener instituciones que regules y organicen, creo que hay ejemplos históricos que contradicen su tesis principal o por lo menos la de la tercera parte, por ejemplo: las múltiples inconsistencias entre las acciones de EE.UU y los mandatos de la ONU, como que Estados Unidos entrara en guerra con Irak cuando había estado prohibida. Lo que no termina por esclarecer o mostrar consistencia en lo que la ONU declara; las múltiples guerras que EE.UU ha hecho en el siglo XX contradicen todo lo que propone el nuevo orden internacional.




Conteo de palabras: 1285
Hathaway, Oona A., Shapiro, Scott J. The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to
Outlaw War Remade the World. (Nueva York: Simon & Schuster, 2018)