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Lost Kingdom
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398 pages, Paperback
First published October 10, 2017
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May 12, 2022
In Putin’s visit to Kyiv in 2013, he publicly stated that Ukrainians and Russians were one people. “We understand today’s realities: We have the Ukrainian people and the Belarusian people and other peoples, and we are respectful of that whole legacy, but at the foundation there lie, unquestionably, our common spiritual values, which make us one people.” In 2014 to unite his “one people” Putin sent his army into Ukraine taking Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine. Plokhy, a Harvard professor of Ukrainian history, explores what constitutes a Russian people and a Russian nation. He goes into great detail, tracing the concept from the fifteenth century to the present. It’s a constantly shifting idea often depending on the political needs of those in power. But for empire building it is a necessary idea. There has to be an underlying ideology, a reason for the people to feel united in their support of their leader. The claim of a common identity can be based on a shared language, a shared history, a shared culture, a shared religion, a shared ethnicity, or a shared community. The book, published in 2017, does not take in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, although it is pertinent and predictive. Unfortunately, I found much of it to be a slow read, particularly for the period prior to the twentieth century, as I was unfamiliar with the many architects of cultural identity in Russia, Ukraine and nearby counties. My notes follow.
Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan III began building his claims of dynastic heritage by marrying the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor in 1472. Not satisfied with just a Roman heritage, Ivan also claimed descent from the Scandinavian Rurikid dynasty that had ruled the Kyivan Rus’ people until the thirteenth century. Ivan leveraged this “heritage” claiming a common Rus’ identity and using it to legitimize his rule over the neighboring territories he conquered. Ivan declared himself “Tsar” and ruler of “all Rus’.” Ivan began what would become the Russian empire or nation. The distinction is problematic. Plokhy notes “The traditional view holds that Russia’s problem with self-identification derives from the fact it acquired an empire before it acquired a nation.” Britain, for example, could easily distinguish itself from its colonies, but this distinction in Russia is not at all clear, and viewed quite differently by the different peoples that are or have been part of the Russian empire. Plokhy notes “It was the Kyivan myth of origins that became the cornerstone of Muscovy’s ideology as the polity evolved from a Mongol dependency to a sovereign state and then an empire.”
1492 was the year 7,000 on the Orthodox calendar, the year Orthodox believers held the world was to end. Muscovites, looking forward to being with God, were disappointed. Regrouping, Moscow Metropolitan Zosima proclaimed that God had made Ivan III “a new Tsar Constantine for the new city of Constantine, sovereign of Moscow and the whole Rus’ land and many other lands.” The idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” gained currency in Moscow, particularly after the Metropolitan of Moscow became the first Patriarch of Moscow in 1589. The other Orthodox Patriarchs approved realizing their dependency on continued financial support from the tsar. This perception of Moscow as the Third Rome “was elastic enough to accommodate major changes in Muscovites’ thinking about themselves and the world during the first half of the seventeenth century. At its core was the notion of the tsar’s status as the only remaining Orthodox emperor after the fall of Byzantium.” “Moscow as the Third Rome was switching from a defensive to an offensive strategy, of which there would be a great deal more in the decades and centuries to come.” In 1721 Peter I, after defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War, was declared “All-Russian Emperor” and “Father of the Fatherland.” The Fatherland connoted the idea of a Russian nation and a Russian people who inherited its patrimony along with the tsar. In the mid-eighteenth-century Moscow elites began promulgating an “All-Russian” historical narrative and creating an “All-Russian” language.
Catherine II ruled Russia for 35 years beginning in 1762. She continued expanding the imperial Russia Peter I began. Through a series of wars, Russia, Prussia and Austria divided Poland up between them. Russia now encompassed most of what is today Ukraine and Belorussia. Catherine expected all those conquered to conform to Russian norms, convert to the Russian Orthodox church, and be part of the Russian nation. Easier said than done. Many were Uniates, a Catholic church with Orthodox traditions. Poles were Roman Catholic, viewed as an enemy by the Russian elite. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia brought a resurgence of Polish nationalism. It manifested in the Polish revolt in 1830, bringing into question the identity of a Russian in the new multi-ethnic empire. Moscow elites under Nicholas I saw rewriting history and reeducation as the key. An official history was adopted to show that the Western provinces had originally been Russian, but taken from them, and now all Russians were reunited. The Muscovite point of view was expounded at a new university set up in Kyiv with Russian as the official language. The Uniate Church was integrated into the Russian Orthodox in 1839. But the Russian efforts created a backlash of Kyivan intellectuals and leaders who envisioned an independent Ukrainian nation, not under the domination of Russia or Poland. The idea of Poland as an independent nation raised the idea of Ukraine as an independent nation which by the 1860s was being discussed by intellectuals in Kyiv and Moscow. Moscow reacted with measures to stop the Ukrainophile movement, with a priority to severely restrict the use of the Ukrainian language. Publications and even songs in theater had to be in Russian not Ukrainian. Attempts to latinize the Ukrainian alphabet were regarded by Moscow as polonization and forbidden. By the 1880s an independent Ukraine was an idea that wouldn’t go away.
Much changed in Russia in 1905, the Bloody Sunday massacre, the formation of the Duma, the Russo-Japanese war, and a Polish uprising. The uprising was crushed but it made all involved consider where borders would be drawn if an independent Poland was formed. This led people to want to define Ukrainian borders. Also, in 1905 came the end of the formal restrictions on Local or “dialect” language publications. Not only Ukrainian but Belorussian newspapers and books proliferated. Ukrainian was still not allowed in classrooms. Many Ukrainophiles just wanted cultural autonomy rather than full-fledged independence. Strident Russian nationalists also pushed their agenda of land reform targeting Polish landowners and Jewish middlemen who bought the crops from the peasants. With the outbreak of WWI and early Russian victories in Galicia against the Austrians, Russian nationalism was at its peak. Nationalists targeted what they called a German-Polish-Jewish alliance in Ukraine and sent activists packing or underground. But the quick turn of the war and the tsar’s loss of power led activists to demand cultural autonomy.
With the first (March) 1917 Russian revolution Ukrainian activists formed a Central Council or Central Rada which in June declared Ukraine’s territorial autonomy. The Bolsheviks claimed to support the Rada and autonomy. But after taking power in the October revolution the Bolsheviks cracked down on the Rada not accepting any thinking independent of the Party line. In 1918 still under German occupation, a Belarusian Rada proclaimed Belarus independent of Russia. The German’s helped activists start a newspaper in the Belarusian language, a first. Ukraine’s Rada next step to promote its language was to get the Ukrainian language taught in its schools, while for the Belarusian Rada just getting a newspaper and some publications in Belarusian was a major step forward.
On December 30, 1922 the Soviet Union was created. The old empire now consisted of four “independent” republics: the Russian federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Despite the independent designation, the Party dominated by Russia was firmly in control. Still, leaving Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus out of the Russian Federation fostered an independent identity in the people. Stalin wanted political support from the independent republics and promoted a policy called indigenization. This encouraged recruiting local peoples to Party positions along with their language and culture. Stalin wanted support from the republics to offset his Politburo rivals. In 1927 after Trotsky and others were driven from the Party cementing Stalin’s control, indigenization was dropped. Another reason, at that time, Stalin feared renewed war with the West and wanted ethnic Russians in control of the Republics, not trusting their loyalty. He would continue to crack down on cultural autonomy through the 1930s. Concerned with the threat of war from Germany and Japan, in the 1930s Stalin doubled down on the patriotism of ethnic Russians. Even historical figures such as the tsars were treated with respect and pride in official publications. Conversely, people of different ethnicities, particularly German and Polish, but also Ukrainian and Belarusian, were automatically deemed suspicious, potential turncoats should there be war. Non-Russians were quickly singled out in the purges of the late thirties. The idea of one Russian people across the empire was forgotten.
As WWII approached, Stalin reversed his approach to Ukraine and encouraged recognition of Ukrainian heroes and culture. Then with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin quickly dropped the policy of emphasizing a separate Ukrainian culture. It was one Russian people again. Then Stalin would embrace Ukrainian identity again in 1943 when Red Army brigades were designated Ukrainian to lead the offensive west. Whether Ukrainians were treated as a separate or significant nationality depended on the perceptions of Stalin as to how much he needed their support. Khrushchev took over in 1953 and continued Stalin’s dance. Intimately familiar with Ukraine, at first, he promoted ethnic Ukrainians and encouraged the Ukrainian language and arts. By 1957 firmly in power, just like Stalin he switched to Russification, prohibiting teaching Ukrainian in public schools. By the 1980’s the effects of Russification were giving results with 20% of Belarusian’s and slightly less in Ukraine saying they were Russian. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Soviet republics declared independence. Interestingly, Russian president Yeltsin, used the term Russian Federation in his speeches rather than the Russian nation, de-emphasizing ethnicity as the tie that binds.
Putin succeeded Yeltsin on New Year’s Eve 1999. Trying to reestablish Russian control over the former republics of the Soviet Union, he was dismayed by the 2004 Ukrainian election defeating his pick for president with a pro-Western leader. A similar situation took place in Georgia which Putin invaded in 2008. Ukraine wanted NATO membership, but NATO kept putting it off. Putin looked at Russian nationalist writers from the past and adopted a new theme to highlight Russian culture and enhance Russian influence. He set up a foundation, Russian World, which had a stated goal of promoting Russian language and culture abroad. The focus was the “near abroad”, countries like Ukraine, Latvia, Moldova, Kazakhstan. Ukraine responded with plans to sign an association agreement with the EU which would dash Putin’s plan for a greater Russian World, the rebirth of the Russian empire. Ukraine was essential to that vision. The parallels to Hitler’s partition of Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Anschluss were obvious, using the trope of ethnic Russians deprived of their identity in Ukraine to take over the territory. Putin, for this purpose, considered all Russian speakers to be Russian, regardless of ethnicity, heritage or loyalty. However, as we have seen, just because a Ukrainian speaks Russian does not mean they want to be part of Putin’s empire.
Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan III began building his claims of dynastic heritage by marrying the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor in 1472. Not satisfied with just a Roman heritage, Ivan also claimed descent from the Scandinavian Rurikid dynasty that had ruled the Kyivan Rus’ people until the thirteenth century. Ivan leveraged this “heritage” claiming a common Rus’ identity and using it to legitimize his rule over the neighboring territories he conquered. Ivan declared himself “Tsar” and ruler of “all Rus’.” Ivan began what would become the Russian empire or nation. The distinction is problematic. Plokhy notes “The traditional view holds that Russia’s problem with self-identification derives from the fact it acquired an empire before it acquired a nation.” Britain, for example, could easily distinguish itself from its colonies, but this distinction in Russia is not at all clear, and viewed quite differently by the different peoples that are or have been part of the Russian empire. Plokhy notes “It was the Kyivan myth of origins that became the cornerstone of Muscovy’s ideology as the polity evolved from a Mongol dependency to a sovereign state and then an empire.”
1492 was the year 7,000 on the Orthodox calendar, the year Orthodox believers held the world was to end. Muscovites, looking forward to being with God, were disappointed. Regrouping, Moscow Metropolitan Zosima proclaimed that God had made Ivan III “a new Tsar Constantine for the new city of Constantine, sovereign of Moscow and the whole Rus’ land and many other lands.” The idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” gained currency in Moscow, particularly after the Metropolitan of Moscow became the first Patriarch of Moscow in 1589. The other Orthodox Patriarchs approved realizing their dependency on continued financial support from the tsar. This perception of Moscow as the Third Rome “was elastic enough to accommodate major changes in Muscovites’ thinking about themselves and the world during the first half of the seventeenth century. At its core was the notion of the tsar’s status as the only remaining Orthodox emperor after the fall of Byzantium.” “Moscow as the Third Rome was switching from a defensive to an offensive strategy, of which there would be a great deal more in the decades and centuries to come.” In 1721 Peter I, after defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War, was declared “All-Russian Emperor” and “Father of the Fatherland.” The Fatherland connoted the idea of a Russian nation and a Russian people who inherited its patrimony along with the tsar. In the mid-eighteenth-century Moscow elites began promulgating an “All-Russian” historical narrative and creating an “All-Russian” language.
Catherine II ruled Russia for 35 years beginning in 1762. She continued expanding the imperial Russia Peter I began. Through a series of wars, Russia, Prussia and Austria divided Poland up between them. Russia now encompassed most of what is today Ukraine and Belorussia. Catherine expected all those conquered to conform to Russian norms, convert to the Russian Orthodox church, and be part of the Russian nation. Easier said than done. Many were Uniates, a Catholic church with Orthodox traditions. Poles were Roman Catholic, viewed as an enemy by the Russian elite. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia brought a resurgence of Polish nationalism. It manifested in the Polish revolt in 1830, bringing into question the identity of a Russian in the new multi-ethnic empire. Moscow elites under Nicholas I saw rewriting history and reeducation as the key. An official history was adopted to show that the Western provinces had originally been Russian, but taken from them, and now all Russians were reunited. The Muscovite point of view was expounded at a new university set up in Kyiv with Russian as the official language. The Uniate Church was integrated into the Russian Orthodox in 1839. But the Russian efforts created a backlash of Kyivan intellectuals and leaders who envisioned an independent Ukrainian nation, not under the domination of Russia or Poland. The idea of Poland as an independent nation raised the idea of Ukraine as an independent nation which by the 1860s was being discussed by intellectuals in Kyiv and Moscow. Moscow reacted with measures to stop the Ukrainophile movement, with a priority to severely restrict the use of the Ukrainian language. Publications and even songs in theater had to be in Russian not Ukrainian. Attempts to latinize the Ukrainian alphabet were regarded by Moscow as polonization and forbidden. By the 1880s an independent Ukraine was an idea that wouldn’t go away.
Much changed in Russia in 1905, the Bloody Sunday massacre, the formation of the Duma, the Russo-Japanese war, and a Polish uprising. The uprising was crushed but it made all involved consider where borders would be drawn if an independent Poland was formed. This led people to want to define Ukrainian borders. Also, in 1905 came the end of the formal restrictions on Local or “dialect” language publications. Not only Ukrainian but Belorussian newspapers and books proliferated. Ukrainian was still not allowed in classrooms. Many Ukrainophiles just wanted cultural autonomy rather than full-fledged independence. Strident Russian nationalists also pushed their agenda of land reform targeting Polish landowners and Jewish middlemen who bought the crops from the peasants. With the outbreak of WWI and early Russian victories in Galicia against the Austrians, Russian nationalism was at its peak. Nationalists targeted what they called a German-Polish-Jewish alliance in Ukraine and sent activists packing or underground. But the quick turn of the war and the tsar’s loss of power led activists to demand cultural autonomy.
With the first (March) 1917 Russian revolution Ukrainian activists formed a Central Council or Central Rada which in June declared Ukraine’s territorial autonomy. The Bolsheviks claimed to support the Rada and autonomy. But after taking power in the October revolution the Bolsheviks cracked down on the Rada not accepting any thinking independent of the Party line. In 1918 still under German occupation, a Belarusian Rada proclaimed Belarus independent of Russia. The German’s helped activists start a newspaper in the Belarusian language, a first. Ukraine’s Rada next step to promote its language was to get the Ukrainian language taught in its schools, while for the Belarusian Rada just getting a newspaper and some publications in Belarusian was a major step forward.
On December 30, 1922 the Soviet Union was created. The old empire now consisted of four “independent” republics: the Russian federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Despite the independent designation, the Party dominated by Russia was firmly in control. Still, leaving Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus out of the Russian Federation fostered an independent identity in the people. Stalin wanted political support from the independent republics and promoted a policy called indigenization. This encouraged recruiting local peoples to Party positions along with their language and culture. Stalin wanted support from the republics to offset his Politburo rivals. In 1927 after Trotsky and others were driven from the Party cementing Stalin’s control, indigenization was dropped. Another reason, at that time, Stalin feared renewed war with the West and wanted ethnic Russians in control of the Republics, not trusting their loyalty. He would continue to crack down on cultural autonomy through the 1930s. Concerned with the threat of war from Germany and Japan, in the 1930s Stalin doubled down on the patriotism of ethnic Russians. Even historical figures such as the tsars were treated with respect and pride in official publications. Conversely, people of different ethnicities, particularly German and Polish, but also Ukrainian and Belarusian, were automatically deemed suspicious, potential turncoats should there be war. Non-Russians were quickly singled out in the purges of the late thirties. The idea of one Russian people across the empire was forgotten.
As WWII approached, Stalin reversed his approach to Ukraine and encouraged recognition of Ukrainian heroes and culture. Then with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin quickly dropped the policy of emphasizing a separate Ukrainian culture. It was one Russian people again. Then Stalin would embrace Ukrainian identity again in 1943 when Red Army brigades were designated Ukrainian to lead the offensive west. Whether Ukrainians were treated as a separate or significant nationality depended on the perceptions of Stalin as to how much he needed their support. Khrushchev took over in 1953 and continued Stalin’s dance. Intimately familiar with Ukraine, at first, he promoted ethnic Ukrainians and encouraged the Ukrainian language and arts. By 1957 firmly in power, just like Stalin he switched to Russification, prohibiting teaching Ukrainian in public schools. By the 1980’s the effects of Russification were giving results with 20% of Belarusian’s and slightly less in Ukraine saying they were Russian. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Soviet republics declared independence. Interestingly, Russian president Yeltsin, used the term Russian Federation in his speeches rather than the Russian nation, de-emphasizing ethnicity as the tie that binds.
Putin succeeded Yeltsin on New Year’s Eve 1999. Trying to reestablish Russian control over the former republics of the Soviet Union, he was dismayed by the 2004 Ukrainian election defeating his pick for president with a pro-Western leader. A similar situation took place in Georgia which Putin invaded in 2008. Ukraine wanted NATO membership, but NATO kept putting it off. Putin looked at Russian nationalist writers from the past and adopted a new theme to highlight Russian culture and enhance Russian influence. He set up a foundation, Russian World, which had a stated goal of promoting Russian language and culture abroad. The focus was the “near abroad”, countries like Ukraine, Latvia, Moldova, Kazakhstan. Ukraine responded with plans to sign an association agreement with the EU which would dash Putin’s plan for a greater Russian World, the rebirth of the Russian empire. Ukraine was essential to that vision. The parallels to Hitler’s partition of Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Anschluss were obvious, using the trope of ethnic Russians deprived of their identity in Ukraine to take over the territory. Putin, for this purpose, considered all Russian speakers to be Russian, regardless of ethnicity, heritage or loyalty. However, as we have seen, just because a Ukrainian speaks Russian does not mean they want to be part of Putin’s empire.
January 7, 2022
The Lost Kingdom, as it turns out, is the medieval Kyivan/Kievan Rus. By Plokhy's own description, the aim of this book is to ask several age-old questions: What is Russia, what is Russian nationalism, and what is Russian imperialism?
The first six or so chapters follow a standard narrative - the "gathering of the lands of Rus'" in the 9th-11th centuries, then the conquests of Novgorod, Kazan, and Astrakhan, the Empire of Russia's acquisition of western territories through the partitions of Poland, and the Soviet Union's commitment to "internationalism" - I'm of course skipping a lot. This book isn't aiming to replace traditional summaries of Russian history, but instead approaches it from a history of the western frontier.
The question is that that the borders of successive Russian states - everything after the fall of the Mongol yoke, really - did not align with the people that, broadly defined, were considered at one time another to be 'part' of a Russian nationality. According to Plokhy, modern Russian identity took its more recognizable form in the 19th century, partly in rivalry to and in competition with the other nationalist project of Poland. Successive revolts led some Russian elites and intellectuals to state that there was a 'single Russian people', albeit with regional variants.
Chapters on the Soviet Union describe an ambivalent relationship on ethnic nationalism; on the one hand, official policies tended towards promotion of languages, cultures, and administrative figures as part of a policy of "indigenization" in the early years; but this was again subordinate to "Russification" by the Stalinist period, and each Soviet republic was still subordinate to the center in terms of economic policy and resource outputs.
Much of the book is analytical, although the last chapters are more explicitly opinionated on current events: Plokhy outlines the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass conflict starting in 2014, and he cautions about finding an alternate role for Russian nationhood, a "modern civic nation", and one that doesn't see itself exclusively as an imperial power. Well, they wouldn't be alone - the British are still dealing with that.
"The imperial construct of a big Russian nation is gone, and no restoration project can bring it back to life." That made my eyebrows shoot up. And Plokhy quotes Putin himself in the final chapters, talking about sharing the baptismal font of the Dniepr River. Certainly as there are elites who dream of a greater Russia- no doubt there are some Russian speakers that are a convenient reason to send the troops in.
The first six or so chapters follow a standard narrative - the "gathering of the lands of Rus'" in the 9th-11th centuries, then the conquests of Novgorod, Kazan, and Astrakhan, the Empire of Russia's acquisition of western territories through the partitions of Poland, and the Soviet Union's commitment to "internationalism" - I'm of course skipping a lot. This book isn't aiming to replace traditional summaries of Russian history, but instead approaches it from a history of the western frontier.
The question is that that the borders of successive Russian states - everything after the fall of the Mongol yoke, really - did not align with the people that, broadly defined, were considered at one time another to be 'part' of a Russian nationality. According to Plokhy, modern Russian identity took its more recognizable form in the 19th century, partly in rivalry to and in competition with the other nationalist project of Poland. Successive revolts led some Russian elites and intellectuals to state that there was a 'single Russian people', albeit with regional variants.
Chapters on the Soviet Union describe an ambivalent relationship on ethnic nationalism; on the one hand, official policies tended towards promotion of languages, cultures, and administrative figures as part of a policy of "indigenization" in the early years; but this was again subordinate to "Russification" by the Stalinist period, and each Soviet republic was still subordinate to the center in terms of economic policy and resource outputs.
Much of the book is analytical, although the last chapters are more explicitly opinionated on current events: Plokhy outlines the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass conflict starting in 2014, and he cautions about finding an alternate role for Russian nationhood, a "modern civic nation", and one that doesn't see itself exclusively as an imperial power. Well, they wouldn't be alone - the British are still dealing with that.
"The imperial construct of a big Russian nation is gone, and no restoration project can bring it back to life." That made my eyebrows shoot up. And Plokhy quotes Putin himself in the final chapters, talking about sharing the baptismal font of the Dniepr River. Certainly as there are elites who dream of a greater Russia- no doubt there are some Russian speakers that are a convenient reason to send the troops in.
September 12, 2023
Plokhy puts the current Russia–Ukraine war into a 600-year perspective. Over that whole period, he traces the almost constant tension between three major “tribes” of East Slavs, with the Moscow-based “Great Russians” constantly pushing to legitimate and impose their dominance over “Little Russians” (Ukrainians) and “White Russians” (Belarusians). The rulers of Muscovy claimed inherited lordship, concocting royal bloodlines back to Caesar Augustus. At one point they held the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople prisoner until he agreed to elevate the head of Moscow’s church to equal rank, with supremacy over the churches of other Slavic regions. The Tsars (Caesars) of the “Third Rome” insisted that Great, Little, and White Slavs were all one in blood, faith, and language, while repeatedly suppressing their subordinates’ actual differences in faith and language. Until the 20th century, the empire simply punished printing or teaching in Ukrainian or Belarusian, without providing a school system to teach the children Russian instead. Even Vladimir Lenin warned that Great Russian chauvinism was the main threat to comradeship among the republics of the Soviet Union.
This book explores an ongoing challenge—how to unite the people of a multi-ethnic state, if certain groups are deemed the “real” citizens. The Russian empire’s many expansions westward have been hailed as “recoveries” of kingdoms lost to their rightful lords (“torn away by force … reunited by love”). And now Putin insists that Ukraine must be restored to the fatherland by any means necessary. As Plokhy explains, “It is in pursuit of that vision that Russia has lost it’s way to modern nationhood, and in that sense has become a ‘lost kingdom’ in its own right.”
This book explores an ongoing challenge—how to unite the people of a multi-ethnic state, if certain groups are deemed the “real” citizens. The Russian empire’s many expansions westward have been hailed as “recoveries” of kingdoms lost to their rightful lords (“torn away by force … reunited by love”). And now Putin insists that Ukraine must be restored to the fatherland by any means necessary. As Plokhy explains, “It is in pursuit of that vision that Russia has lost it’s way to modern nationhood, and in that sense has become a ‘lost kingdom’ in its own right.”
February 21, 2021
I finished this fantastic book this morning and it was mind-blowinngly good. I couldn’t put it down - I guess most part of Russian and Soviet history reads like a political thriller.
•
It deals with the Russian question of national identity. It’s quite hard to pinpoint the start of the Russian nation/ empire but this book explains the whens and hows very well. I got lost in some of the details and I think you have to have a prior knowledge of some historical events to properly engage with it but it’s really worth it for the “plot”. Most of the book deals with the complex historical relation between Ukraine and Russia culminating with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
•
I learned so much and my fascination with Russian and Eastern European history has actually deepened after reading this book. To no one’s surprise Russia has always been a political and economic bully towards Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries and even Poland (which they tried to annex in its entirety many times).
•
Most of the book deals with the end of imperialism and the raise of communism in Russia and its territories. It’s absolutely crazy to read how their intentions towards the countries in the union fluctuated between - “you’re allowed to have a national and cultural identity” to “you must all learn Russian otherwise...” from from decade to decade. Lenin believed in cultural nationalism whereas Stalin killed everyone who even dared to think of Ukraine and Belarus as other nations. Krushchev relaxed this rule and allowed people to speak their language only for Brezhnev to come 10 years later and impose Russian again. It’s a continuous political and cultural see-saw that these countries had to live with for most of their existence. It’s honestly a fascinating book that taught me so much. For example I never knew that Soviet means council in Russian - that’s how Lenin’s communist party started - as a city council.
I’ll read a lot more by Serhii Plokhy for sure. I read Chernobyl: The History of a Tragedy last year and that was amazing too. He’s a very important historian and a wonderful writer.
•
It deals with the Russian question of national identity. It’s quite hard to pinpoint the start of the Russian nation/ empire but this book explains the whens and hows very well. I got lost in some of the details and I think you have to have a prior knowledge of some historical events to properly engage with it but it’s really worth it for the “plot”. Most of the book deals with the complex historical relation between Ukraine and Russia culminating with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
•
I learned so much and my fascination with Russian and Eastern European history has actually deepened after reading this book. To no one’s surprise Russia has always been a political and economic bully towards Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries and even Poland (which they tried to annex in its entirety many times).
•
Most of the book deals with the end of imperialism and the raise of communism in Russia and its territories. It’s absolutely crazy to read how their intentions towards the countries in the union fluctuated between - “you’re allowed to have a national and cultural identity” to “you must all learn Russian otherwise...” from from decade to decade. Lenin believed in cultural nationalism whereas Stalin killed everyone who even dared to think of Ukraine and Belarus as other nations. Krushchev relaxed this rule and allowed people to speak their language only for Brezhnev to come 10 years later and impose Russian again. It’s a continuous political and cultural see-saw that these countries had to live with for most of their existence. It’s honestly a fascinating book that taught me so much. For example I never knew that Soviet means council in Russian - that’s how Lenin’s communist party started - as a city council.
I’ll read a lot more by Serhii Plokhy for sure. I read Chernobyl: The History of a Tragedy last year and that was amazing too. He’s a very important historian and a wonderful writer.
July 27, 2022
Excellent overview of the history of Russia.
I came into this book with very little knowledge about Russian history. I was looking for something that gave me a good overview without too much excruciating detail and this book definitely met that goal.
We get a nice intro into the early Muscovites and Ivan III, who managed to gain sovereign independence from the Mongul horde at the time. Ivan III tripled the land mass of the people and made himself the first Tsar. By marrying the Byzantine niece of Constantine, he made a claim that Muscovy would be the Third Rome. The author covers the rise of Catherine the Great and how she basically usurped the empire from Peter and ushered a kind of elite renaissance while maintaining absolute monarchy rule. We get a little history about Napoleon briefly taking Moscow and then losing soon thereafter.
Throughout much of the book is the long and agonizing story of the Russian empire trying to govern a whole bunch of people that didn’t want to be part of the empire. From the Baltics to Poland, Belarus and then, oh my gosh, Ukraine, Russia is one big long history of trying to assert linguistic, cultural and military control and censorship over these states. Russia has forever been a nation trying to understand who it is and who exactly is a part of this nation. From the Polish revolts and the November Uprising of 1830 and Bloody Sunday, it’s just such a mess. Poland and Ukraine have forever been constant areas of conflict between Russia and also Germany. WWI was basically an imperial arms-race land grab that turned into a war.
With the labor and sovereign revolts bubbling up everywhere, it’s no surprise that Nicholas II of the Ramanov line tried to move to a constitutional monarchy. But this wasn’t enough and he finally had to abdicate the throne. He was exiled and eventually executed with his family. The monarchy was dead and Marxist influences finally started to come to a head with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Bolsheviks coming into power, led by Vladimir Lenin. There was quite a bit of conflict between Lenin and Stalin about how to run their fledgling socialist movement. Stalin won because Lenin died of like three strokes. Regardless of proposed communist ideology, Stalin just ran an authoritarian, one party regime with a “Republic” of soviet states that had no power aside from the Soviet party. What followed was mass economic stagnation, 4 million dead from famine and the institution of the Gulag concentration camps where forced labor and abject genocide occured for dissentors. Stalin presided over murder, genocide and ethnic cleansing. With the German-Russian non-aggression Molotov Pact, the two powers decided they had the right to go ahead and partition off parts of Poland. But then Germany broke the pact and invaded Russia, kind of starting WWII.
Fast forward to Krushchev and his obsession with a communist global order and you get the perfect ingredients for a Cold War with the two world powers and many, many proxy wars across the globe that slaughtered millions of people. It seemed like there was a second there where the Soviets had some things figured out like launching satellites in space and actually competing in the world economy but it didn’t last very long. By the time Gorbechav took over as the eight and final leader of the USSR, the economy was in total free fall. Gorbie tried to implement the perestroika, an economic reform, bringing in more liberal market reforms and maybe more economic independence of the soviet republics. Perestroika may have helped liberalize some of the political elite and something worked because elections actually started to be a thing with Boris Yeltsin becoming the first “elected” President. By the early 90s, after a failed coup attempt by conservative Soviet military leaders, the writing was on the wall as Ukraine declared independence with the rest of the states doing the same within that same week, bringing the end of the USSR. Enter Putin, the second “president” who presides over a rigid privatized economy at the behest of Russian Oligarchs in what is just a rebranded dictatorship.
The fact that Putin annexed Crimea and is currently in a war to just steal the country makes soooo much sense. The ecstasy and agony of Moscow and Kyiv over the entire course of Russian history is what defines Russian nationalism. Russia believes itself to be a lost empire and Putin probably sees himself as the steward of that lost empire and salivating about retaking Kyiv to bring about a new Euroasia world order state as has been done with the EU. Meanwhile, the fallout of death, murder and war crimes continues.
This was an excellent and pretty objective book. Recommend.
I came into this book with very little knowledge about Russian history. I was looking for something that gave me a good overview without too much excruciating detail and this book definitely met that goal.
We get a nice intro into the early Muscovites and Ivan III, who managed to gain sovereign independence from the Mongul horde at the time. Ivan III tripled the land mass of the people and made himself the first Tsar. By marrying the Byzantine niece of Constantine, he made a claim that Muscovy would be the Third Rome. The author covers the rise of Catherine the Great and how she basically usurped the empire from Peter and ushered a kind of elite renaissance while maintaining absolute monarchy rule. We get a little history about Napoleon briefly taking Moscow and then losing soon thereafter.
Throughout much of the book is the long and agonizing story of the Russian empire trying to govern a whole bunch of people that didn’t want to be part of the empire. From the Baltics to Poland, Belarus and then, oh my gosh, Ukraine, Russia is one big long history of trying to assert linguistic, cultural and military control and censorship over these states. Russia has forever been a nation trying to understand who it is and who exactly is a part of this nation. From the Polish revolts and the November Uprising of 1830 and Bloody Sunday, it’s just such a mess. Poland and Ukraine have forever been constant areas of conflict between Russia and also Germany. WWI was basically an imperial arms-race land grab that turned into a war.
With the labor and sovereign revolts bubbling up everywhere, it’s no surprise that Nicholas II of the Ramanov line tried to move to a constitutional monarchy. But this wasn’t enough and he finally had to abdicate the throne. He was exiled and eventually executed with his family. The monarchy was dead and Marxist influences finally started to come to a head with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Bolsheviks coming into power, led by Vladimir Lenin. There was quite a bit of conflict between Lenin and Stalin about how to run their fledgling socialist movement. Stalin won because Lenin died of like three strokes. Regardless of proposed communist ideology, Stalin just ran an authoritarian, one party regime with a “Republic” of soviet states that had no power aside from the Soviet party. What followed was mass economic stagnation, 4 million dead from famine and the institution of the Gulag concentration camps where forced labor and abject genocide occured for dissentors. Stalin presided over murder, genocide and ethnic cleansing. With the German-Russian non-aggression Molotov Pact, the two powers decided they had the right to go ahead and partition off parts of Poland. But then Germany broke the pact and invaded Russia, kind of starting WWII.
Fast forward to Krushchev and his obsession with a communist global order and you get the perfect ingredients for a Cold War with the two world powers and many, many proxy wars across the globe that slaughtered millions of people. It seemed like there was a second there where the Soviets had some things figured out like launching satellites in space and actually competing in the world economy but it didn’t last very long. By the time Gorbechav took over as the eight and final leader of the USSR, the economy was in total free fall. Gorbie tried to implement the perestroika, an economic reform, bringing in more liberal market reforms and maybe more economic independence of the soviet republics. Perestroika may have helped liberalize some of the political elite and something worked because elections actually started to be a thing with Boris Yeltsin becoming the first “elected” President. By the early 90s, after a failed coup attempt by conservative Soviet military leaders, the writing was on the wall as Ukraine declared independence with the rest of the states doing the same within that same week, bringing the end of the USSR. Enter Putin, the second “president” who presides over a rigid privatized economy at the behest of Russian Oligarchs in what is just a rebranded dictatorship.
The fact that Putin annexed Crimea and is currently in a war to just steal the country makes soooo much sense. The ecstasy and agony of Moscow and Kyiv over the entire course of Russian history is what defines Russian nationalism. Russia believes itself to be a lost empire and Putin probably sees himself as the steward of that lost empire and salivating about retaking Kyiv to bring about a new Euroasia world order state as has been done with the EU. Meanwhile, the fallout of death, murder and war crimes continues.
This was an excellent and pretty objective book. Recommend.
October 6, 2025
In Search of Identity
The question you’re probably asking is ‘which kingdom is the Lost Kingdom?’ The answer is the Kievan Rus. Lost Kingdom by Serhii Plokhy centres around inheritance of this medieval state. From the release of the grip of the Mongols to present day Russia has struggled to build a nation and identity, competing with the Poles, Belorussians (so called White Russians) and Ukrainians (the Little Russians) in the east of Europe. All peoples who’s territory has an association with the Kievan Rus. The age old questions which Polkhy asks are ‘what is Russian Imperialism?’ And ‘what is Russian Nationalism?’ In Lost Kingdom we are in search of Russian in the east of Europe.
Lost Kingdom takes us on a journey from the 1450s to the 2014 invasion of Crimea to show how the focus of Russian nationalism changed through the each period to suit the objectives in of the state. The modern view of Russian Nationalism or Imperialism took its recognisable form in the 19th century following the final partition of Poland. As the Revolution rolled away the old, Soviet aims were to develop a new national identity of communism in a group of states collected together into the USSR. Nationalism was stirred up in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) to defeat the Germans and then it reverted to suppression of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Yiddish languages and identities in the reign of Nikita Khrushchev.
As Polkhy argues there is still a drive today to unite ethnically Russian peoples which has reached a climax with the invasion of Ukraine (the second, in 2022 would be unknown at the time of writing, but I imagine predicted) as Russia cannot separate from The Boarderlands. He states this will have a profound impact on world politics much like the Third Reichs desire to unite the German speaking peoples in the 1930s. As we know this true, but what we don’t know is: where will this end?
As with most historical sweeps, the earlier periods run through quicker than the modern areas. I have no issue with this personally as there are simple more sources as time marches on. Polkhy’s opinions are more prevalent as he talks about the rise of Putin and his national aims and the book ends in a political commentary of modern Russia. Again I have no issue with this. However, Lost Kingdom is easy to read, I did find it boring in places and at one stage thought about quitting. However, in soldering on I got to the end. Without feeling like much is learnt. Russia sees itself as the inheritor of Byzantium (Moscow is the third and final Rome) and then in later years the inheritor of the Kievan Rus who has a duty to unite all Russian speaking peoples into its empire. In whatever guise this forms. Something which, for example, the British abandoned long ago. Where does it stop?
The question you’re probably asking is ‘which kingdom is the Lost Kingdom?’ The answer is the Kievan Rus. Lost Kingdom by Serhii Plokhy centres around inheritance of this medieval state. From the release of the grip of the Mongols to present day Russia has struggled to build a nation and identity, competing with the Poles, Belorussians (so called White Russians) and Ukrainians (the Little Russians) in the east of Europe. All peoples who’s territory has an association with the Kievan Rus. The age old questions which Polkhy asks are ‘what is Russian Imperialism?’ And ‘what is Russian Nationalism?’ In Lost Kingdom we are in search of Russian in the east of Europe.
Lost Kingdom takes us on a journey from the 1450s to the 2014 invasion of Crimea to show how the focus of Russian nationalism changed through the each period to suit the objectives in of the state. The modern view of Russian Nationalism or Imperialism took its recognisable form in the 19th century following the final partition of Poland. As the Revolution rolled away the old, Soviet aims were to develop a new national identity of communism in a group of states collected together into the USSR. Nationalism was stirred up in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) to defeat the Germans and then it reverted to suppression of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Yiddish languages and identities in the reign of Nikita Khrushchev.
As Polkhy argues there is still a drive today to unite ethnically Russian peoples which has reached a climax with the invasion of Ukraine (the second, in 2022 would be unknown at the time of writing, but I imagine predicted) as Russia cannot separate from The Boarderlands. He states this will have a profound impact on world politics much like the Third Reichs desire to unite the German speaking peoples in the 1930s. As we know this true, but what we don’t know is: where will this end?
As with most historical sweeps, the earlier periods run through quicker than the modern areas. I have no issue with this personally as there are simple more sources as time marches on. Polkhy’s opinions are more prevalent as he talks about the rise of Putin and his national aims and the book ends in a political commentary of modern Russia. Again I have no issue with this. However, Lost Kingdom is easy to read, I did find it boring in places and at one stage thought about quitting. However, in soldering on I got to the end. Without feeling like much is learnt. Russia sees itself as the inheritor of Byzantium (Moscow is the third and final Rome) and then in later years the inheritor of the Kievan Rus who has a duty to unite all Russian speaking peoples into its empire. In whatever guise this forms. Something which, for example, the British abandoned long ago. Where does it stop?
July 14, 2023
The "Lost Kingdom" is a timely book, though a wee bit late to the party (it was written in 2017). With the disasterous Russian invasion of 2022, this is a book that helps to explain Russian mania over not only "Ukraine" but also the other "satellitle" countries of the former Soviet Bloc.
Very well researched and extremely detailed, this may strike the casual reader as a wee bit dry. But, if your interest is in learning the historical basis for the current Russian debacle then look no further.
The story starts in 1472, with the birth of the Tsardom. Grand Prince Ivan III marries Sophia, Daughter of the Greek Thomas Palaeologus and cements his blood tie with the former, fallen Byzantine Empire. Ivan III also fought off the Mongols and established Muscovy as the central power of the Rus city states. In time this would develop the idea of Russia as a "Second Byzantium".
As the Tsar's power and lands expanded, so to did his titles and the concept of a Russian "Empire" took root in the psyche. Under Catherine the Great, the Russian enchantment with Ukraine took root, as well as incursions into Belarus.
The historical basis for Russian agression established, we then shift into the modern era of the murderous Communist era when mass genocide (Ukraine) became the norm. As well as culutral dominance in the realms of religion, history, and language.
During all of these periods, the dominance of Russia in this multi-ethnic empire was a given. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the other nations wanted to be free and clear, but Russia needed and wanted its buffer satillitle states.
Finally, into the modern Putin era where this mania and created "history" led to the occupations of Crimea and the Donbass and now the ongoing Ukraine War.
A good book for anyone interested in the REAL history (not Russian propoganda) of the Russian Imperialistic drive and their desire to control their neightbors, all under a false "hisotry" in which Russia is the basis for existence for these varied cultures.
Very well researched and extremely detailed, this may strike the casual reader as a wee bit dry. But, if your interest is in learning the historical basis for the current Russian debacle then look no further.
The story starts in 1472, with the birth of the Tsardom. Grand Prince Ivan III marries Sophia, Daughter of the Greek Thomas Palaeologus and cements his blood tie with the former, fallen Byzantine Empire. Ivan III also fought off the Mongols and established Muscovy as the central power of the Rus city states. In time this would develop the idea of Russia as a "Second Byzantium".
As the Tsar's power and lands expanded, so to did his titles and the concept of a Russian "Empire" took root in the psyche. Under Catherine the Great, the Russian enchantment with Ukraine took root, as well as incursions into Belarus.
The historical basis for Russian agression established, we then shift into the modern era of the murderous Communist era when mass genocide (Ukraine) became the norm. As well as culutral dominance in the realms of religion, history, and language.
During all of these periods, the dominance of Russia in this multi-ethnic empire was a given. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the other nations wanted to be free and clear, but Russia needed and wanted its buffer satillitle states.
Finally, into the modern Putin era where this mania and created "history" led to the occupations of Crimea and the Donbass and now the ongoing Ukraine War.
A good book for anyone interested in the REAL history (not Russian propoganda) of the Russian Imperialistic drive and their desire to control their neightbors, all under a false "hisotry" in which Russia is the basis for existence for these varied cultures.
March 1, 2019
I really enjoyed reading Plohky's Lost Kingdom. As a history buff with very limited knowledge of Russian imperial history, this book was both insightful and a pleasure to read. Capturing five centuries in such a short book obviously means cutting corners here and there, but the red thread of both Russian imperialism (orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality) and the 'all-Russian nation' (Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian) sets the stage for an engaging and insightful understanding of Russia's historical development. The second half of the book covers the USSR's shifting approach to its 'independent' republics and, after its demise, the book briefly covers Russia's orientation to its near-abroad. For people looking for a place to start on Russian history, Plohky does a nice job.
February 28, 2022
In the past week I have seen several news broadcasts from Ukraine. The one I remember best featured a Ukrainian journalist in Kyiv who stated that Vladimir Putin did not recognize Ukrainians as a separate nationality, but rather thought of them as "bad Russians". He did not mean that Putin thought they were evil, but merely that they were incompetent at being Russians. Many of them insisted on speaking a language other than Russian, going to a church other than Russian Orthodox, and not celebrating their cultural affinities with other Russians.
Professor Plokhy would probably agree that this is in indeed the way Putin looks at Ukrainians. In this book, which he wrote nearly five years ago, Plokhy provides 1000 years of background on the similarities and differences of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. As it turns out, there has been a great deal of controversy, going back at least two centuries, concerning who is and who is not a Russian, and what characteristics make one a Russian, or non-Russian. Plokhy, who is a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard and can hopefully view the current war from the safety of Cambridge, provides quotes from many of the individuals who had given the concept of Russianness serious thought over the past 200 years, and a few of them have more than a passing similarity with the statements given by Putin recently while trying to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin may have been ranting, and he may have been cynically using ethnic controversies for his own purposes, but this book strongly suggests he wasn't making this stuff up. It's been argued about for centuries.
The author makes a game attempt to differentiate the cast of characters, but to my parochial American eyes way too many of the names were way too similar for me to keep them straight. This book was very enlightening in providing background for current events, but unless you find this subject interesting, it might not do much for you.
Professor Plokhy would probably agree that this is in indeed the way Putin looks at Ukrainians. In this book, which he wrote nearly five years ago, Plokhy provides 1000 years of background on the similarities and differences of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. As it turns out, there has been a great deal of controversy, going back at least two centuries, concerning who is and who is not a Russian, and what characteristics make one a Russian, or non-Russian. Plokhy, who is a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard and can hopefully view the current war from the safety of Cambridge, provides quotes from many of the individuals who had given the concept of Russianness serious thought over the past 200 years, and a few of them have more than a passing similarity with the statements given by Putin recently while trying to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin may have been ranting, and he may have been cynically using ethnic controversies for his own purposes, but this book strongly suggests he wasn't making this stuff up. It's been argued about for centuries.
The author makes a game attempt to differentiate the cast of characters, but to my parochial American eyes way too many of the names were way too similar for me to keep them straight. This book was very enlightening in providing background for current events, but unless you find this subject interesting, it might not do much for you.
April 24, 2022
Lost Kingdom is a history of the ambiguous, and ultimately irresolvable, interplay between Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism. Like many modern states, including the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and France, Russia acquired an empire before it acquired a nation. But as the British historian Geoffrey Hosking has pointed out, whereas Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire, and has never fully been able to conceive of itself as anything else. Furthermore, to the extent that Russians have attempted to identify themselves in “national” terms—whether tied to ethnicity, religion, language, dynastic inheritance, or any combination thereof—the frontiers of these imagined realms have rarely cohered with Russia’s political borders. Even more uniquely, Russia has, for almost all of its history, shared its mythology of national origins in the civilization of Kyivan Rus’ with neighbors that remained stubbornly outside of its political control.
From the 1470s, when Ivan III of the Grand Duchy of Moscow threw off the “Tartar yoke”, crushed the Republic of Novgorod, and began styling himself “Grand Prince of All Rus’”; to its interminable conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over the “liberation” of the Orthodox Christians (most of whom were Uniates, or Eastern Catholics) of its Ruthenian (modern-day Ukraine and Belarus) lands; to its invention of a tripartite Russian nationality comprised of the “Great Rus’” (Russia), “White Rus’” (Belarus), and “Little Rus’” (Ukraine) tribal denominations in the nineteenth century; to its dramatic oscillations in the Soviet Era between Lenin’s policy of national “indigenization” and Stalin’s brutal regime of “Russification”; to Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war on Ukraine and the ideological self-deception behind it; Russia has always been an empire in search of a nation.
Yet if it fails to subdue Ukraine, as we must hope it does, it may have proven itself, finally and definitively, unable to be either. What happens then is anyone’s guess.
From the 1470s, when Ivan III of the Grand Duchy of Moscow threw off the “Tartar yoke”, crushed the Republic of Novgorod, and began styling himself “Grand Prince of All Rus’”; to its interminable conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over the “liberation” of the Orthodox Christians (most of whom were Uniates, or Eastern Catholics) of its Ruthenian (modern-day Ukraine and Belarus) lands; to its invention of a tripartite Russian nationality comprised of the “Great Rus’” (Russia), “White Rus’” (Belarus), and “Little Rus’” (Ukraine) tribal denominations in the nineteenth century; to its dramatic oscillations in the Soviet Era between Lenin’s policy of national “indigenization” and Stalin’s brutal regime of “Russification”; to Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war on Ukraine and the ideological self-deception behind it; Russia has always been an empire in search of a nation.
Yet if it fails to subdue Ukraine, as we must hope it does, it may have proven itself, finally and definitively, unable to be either. What happens then is anyone’s guess.
April 19, 2022
Serhii Plokhy's 'Lost Kingdom' has a solid prose that easily flows. The narrative hardly loses pace, and you easily hop from Kyiv to Moscow, from tsarist to nationalist to soviet intellectuals on a clear chronological path. Do read it if you want to understand the evolution of an idea and how it is applied to high politics. Analytically however the book has some problems. I found three of 'm.
1. Without strictly defining 'national', 'ethnic' or 'cultural', Plokhy can be a bit too vague at times. Perhaps that is the curse of trying to write a readable book for a wider audience.
2. Also, while intellectual and high political debate on the Russian nation (and the Ukrainian, and the Polish, and the Belarusian) is given a lot of attention, we're left to guess a bit at how these ideas found their way to the masses. Was it through the advent of print media? Along trade routes and knowledge networks as a byproduct of capitalism? Was it through industrialisation, where the labouring class formed and imagined an identity beyond their villages and towns? Was it through conscription? Or as an evolution of monarchist or religious identity? Was it through democratization and some sense of equality shared by all? But perhaps that is one of the problems of Russian nationalism. Nationalism developed in Western countries along such lines. In Russia however it was botched, in part by autocratic tendencies to very violently enforce the sense of nation.
3. And finally, how has Russian sense of nation been affected by early modern imperialist expansion to the east? Surely coming into contact with different cultures causes one to reassess the self. Perhaps this point stems from my own national identity as I'm from the Netherlands, a country that has identity issues as a result of overseas imperialism and its legacy.
Anyways, the book does help to understand the cultural basis of the way the Kremlin thinks today, so I would recommend it.
1. Without strictly defining 'national', 'ethnic' or 'cultural', Plokhy can be a bit too vague at times. Perhaps that is the curse of trying to write a readable book for a wider audience.
2. Also, while intellectual and high political debate on the Russian nation (and the Ukrainian, and the Polish, and the Belarusian) is given a lot of attention, we're left to guess a bit at how these ideas found their way to the masses. Was it through the advent of print media? Along trade routes and knowledge networks as a byproduct of capitalism? Was it through industrialisation, where the labouring class formed and imagined an identity beyond their villages and towns? Was it through conscription? Or as an evolution of monarchist or religious identity? Was it through democratization and some sense of equality shared by all? But perhaps that is one of the problems of Russian nationalism. Nationalism developed in Western countries along such lines. In Russia however it was botched, in part by autocratic tendencies to very violently enforce the sense of nation.
3. And finally, how has Russian sense of nation been affected by early modern imperialist expansion to the east? Surely coming into contact with different cultures causes one to reassess the self. Perhaps this point stems from my own national identity as I'm from the Netherlands, a country that has identity issues as a result of overseas imperialism and its legacy.
Anyways, the book does help to understand the cultural basis of the way the Kremlin thinks today, so I would recommend it.
September 20, 2018
"Lost Kingdom" was interesting and frustrating.
It is a very knowledgeable look at the relationship between the three East Slavic nationalities from the time of Ivan III (around 1480) to the present.
However, as I read, I kept thinking that something was missing, or the story was not being told from the best perspective.
Perhaps the book should have been organized along thematic lines, with chapters defining specific terms and how they have worked out over time, instead of a chronological progression.
There is a lot of interesting information here. In particular, I found the account of Nicholas II's visit to the Ukrainian territory Russia captured from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early months of the First World War very interesting. Also, the discussion of how Putin's relationship with the "near abroad" changed over the course of the early 2000s was very clear and well presented.
Worth a read if you have an interest in Russian or Ukrainian history, but this should NOT be the first book you read on the subject.
It is a very knowledgeable look at the relationship between the three East Slavic nationalities from the time of Ivan III (around 1480) to the present.
However, as I read, I kept thinking that something was missing, or the story was not being told from the best perspective.
Perhaps the book should have been organized along thematic lines, with chapters defining specific terms and how they have worked out over time, instead of a chronological progression.
There is a lot of interesting information here. In particular, I found the account of Nicholas II's visit to the Ukrainian territory Russia captured from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early months of the First World War very interesting. Also, the discussion of how Putin's relationship with the "near abroad" changed over the course of the early 2000s was very clear and well presented.
Worth a read if you have an interest in Russian or Ukrainian history, but this should NOT be the first book you read on the subject.
February 6, 2018
It’s a great introduction to Russia’s relationships with national groups within the body of the state, as well as the Soviet Union. Because it’s primarily an intellectual history, it delves deeply into matters of historiography and their relationship to political power. It has shortcomings: it leaves out Russo-Finnish relationships as well as those involving Central Asian and Siberian national groups, although these could receive their own books. Overall, the book is highly recommended.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 27, 2020
The term 'Russian' is not some kind of abstract average of the three terms (great, little, and white) but a living cultural strength, a grand, developing, and growing national force.", wrote Petr Struve in 1912. A century later, just when Crimea was about to be annexed by Putin, he quoted Struve in one of his speech justifying the annexation of Crimean land claiming it to be a part of Russia. Since the days of Rurik dynasty in the 11th Century, the rulers of all Rus' have seen great, little and white Russia (namely Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) as one land. To preserve it, they have consistently employed various linguistic, ethnic, and cultural policies to keep at bay the voices of the separatists or those who demanded autonomy of the regions. Either during the Tsars imperial period (recognised in 1558) or Lenin's Rveloultion of 1917, the history of Rus' has often been accommodated to justify the nationalistic policies of the various rulers.
Serhii Plokhy's Lost Kingdom is a history of the same period starting from the days of Ivan the Great when, gradually, Tsar was recognised by the West and an Orthodox Patriarchate was established in the Muscovy land. Russian nationalism had been kept intact as one until the dissolution of USSR in 1991; nevertheless, it was through the great efforts and ever-shifting narratives of all Rus' history that they maintained to do so. This book, though laden with too many details in just 350 pages, helps you understand how one Russian identity had been preserved throughout these vast lands until its dissolution on the civic and political basis instead of linguistic and cultural justifications.
Serhii Plokhy's Lost Kingdom is a history of the same period starting from the days of Ivan the Great when, gradually, Tsar was recognised by the West and an Orthodox Patriarchate was established in the Muscovy land. Russian nationalism had been kept intact as one until the dissolution of USSR in 1991; nevertheless, it was through the great efforts and ever-shifting narratives of all Rus' history that they maintained to do so. This book, though laden with too many details in just 350 pages, helps you understand how one Russian identity had been preserved throughout these vast lands until its dissolution on the civic and political basis instead of linguistic and cultural justifications.
April 3, 2018
Russian history viewed through the prism of Nationalism. Slight Leftist bent but still quite good.
Rating: 4 out of 5 Stars
Rating: 4 out of 5 Stars
January 14, 2023
Neapšaubāmi vērtīga un noderīga grāmata visiem, kas interesējas ne vien par krievu impēriskās domāšanas veidošanos un tās saikni ar priekšstatu par nacionālo identitāti, bet arī par tā vai cita perioda krievu, ukraiņu un baltkrievu intelektuāļu diskusijām par identitāti, nāciju, nacionālo pašapziņu un valstiskumu. Tomēr - kā jau vienmēr - ir dažas problēmas. minēšu tikai divas. kas man šķita īpaši būtiskas. Pirmkārt, varbūt ir loģiski uzsākt šo apcerējumu ar vēstījumu par Maskavas kņazistes (Maskavijas) veidošanos, ja jau uzmanības centrā ir tieši Krievija un krievu nācijas veidošanās, taču vismaz neliels atskats Kijevas Krievzemes vēsturē būtu ļoti noderējis, lai labāk izprastu, kas tieši vēlāk kļuva par vienu no krievu nacionālā mīta svarīgākajām sastāvdaļām. Otrkārt un galvenokārt: nav īsti saprotams, kāpēc, runājot par Krievijas impērijas veidošanos un tātad daudziem un dažādiem kariem un teritoriju aneksiju, autors gandrīz vispār nepiemin t. s. krievu-turku karus, tik daudzskaitlīgus un brutālus, kuriem bija īpaša nozīme impērijas dienvidaustrumu robežu paplašināšanā un nostiprināšanā. It sevišķi interesanta šī problēma kļūst, ņemot vērā to nenoliedzamo apstākli, ka lielākā daļa no šīm savulaik iekarotajām un anektētajām teritorijām ietilpst mūsdienu Ukrainas sastāvā un to pievienošana impērijai joprojām ir kā imperiālā, tā arī antikoloniālā naratīva sastāvdaļa - pietiek atcerēties kaut vai Potjomkina mirstīgo atlieku ekshumāciju pirms krievu okupācijas armijas atkāpšanās no Hersonas vai Katrīnas Lielās pieminekļa demontāžu Odesā.
July 20, 2025
Imperiul pierdut. O istorie a naționalismului rus de la Ivan cel Groaznic la Vladimir Putin de Serhii Plokhy (2017)
Iată o carte de istorie scrisă de un distins profesor de origine ucraineană de la Universitatea Harvard, după anexarea Crimeei și înainte de invazia Rusiei în Ucraina în 2022. Descriu poziționarea în timp pentru a sublinia tensiunea din fragmentele finale ale cărții, într-un context în care zarurile nu fuseseră încă aruncate, dar nori se vedeau adunându-se la orizont. Câteva spicuiri :
„Așa cum au demonstrat evenimentele recente, chestiunea rusă nerezolvată amenință pacea și stabilitatea în Europa și în lumea întreagă. ... Conflictul ruso-ucrainean este deja cea mai gravă criză internațională a relațiilor dintre Est și Vest de la sfârșitul Războiului Rece. Rămâne de văzut dacă anexarea Crimeei și războiul din Donbas vor fi ultimele etape ale procesului de destrămare a URSS sau începutul unui nou și terifiant proces de reconstituire a granițelor și populațiilor europene. ... Răspunsul va depinde de abilitatea și ușurința cu care elitele ruse vor accepta realitățile politice postsovietice și vor adapta identitatea Rusiei la cerințele lumii postimperiale. ... Alternativa poate fi un nou Război Rece sau ceva mai rău.”
Plokhy realizează două mari analize în acest volum: pe de o parte ne prezintă istoria Rusiei, un stat organizat ca entitate politică distinctă începând cu aproximativ 600 de ani în urmă, și alături de aceasta oferă, desigur, prezentarea unor momente cheie legate de istoria Poloniei, Ucrainei, Belarusului și altor state din regiune; pe de altă parte, sunt prezentate elementele de cultură care au dus la cristalizarea naționalismului rus și a caracteristicilor identitare panruse. Acesta din urmă cred că este cel mai interesant concept pe care îl prezintă istoricul: națiunea panrusă nu există ca entitate, ci este un concept care s-a transformat de-a lungul secolelor. Cu argumente istoriografice extrem de bine documentate, cartea ne demonstrează că panrusismul este o construcție politică și ideologică care își are originea în secolul al XVIII-lea, fiind consolidată în secolul al XIX-lea, și care pretindea că rușii, ucrainenii și belarușii sunt trei ramuri ale unui singur popor rus. Această teorie a fost promovată de Imperiul Țarist și mai târziu reluată de regimul sovietic într-o formă diferită și a presupus rusificări forțate și interzicerea limbilor etnicilor ucraineni și belaruși, iar mai târziu aceste presiuni s-au aplicat și în republicile sovietice.
Ajungând la istoria recentă, Serhii Plokhy analizează felul în care această ideologie este folosită pentru a justifica acțiunile imperialiste directe și indirecte ale Rusiei – fie sub forma intervenției în politica fostelor state sovietice, fie prin radicalizarea etnicilor ruși din anumite teritorii, prin crearea campaniilor ideologice de tipul „Lumea Rusă” sau prin acțiuni internaționale de destabilizare.
Mi s-a părut fascinant felul în care cartea transmite complexitatea gândirii acestui profesor, dar și spiritul de organizare al atât de multor informații, multe dintre ele fiind probabil rezultatul unei munci de cercetare originale. Un volum excelent, dens și panoramic.
Iată o carte de istorie scrisă de un distins profesor de origine ucraineană de la Universitatea Harvard, după anexarea Crimeei și înainte de invazia Rusiei în Ucraina în 2022. Descriu poziționarea în timp pentru a sublinia tensiunea din fragmentele finale ale cărții, într-un context în care zarurile nu fuseseră încă aruncate, dar nori se vedeau adunându-se la orizont. Câteva spicuiri :
„Așa cum au demonstrat evenimentele recente, chestiunea rusă nerezolvată amenință pacea și stabilitatea în Europa și în lumea întreagă. ... Conflictul ruso-ucrainean este deja cea mai gravă criză internațională a relațiilor dintre Est și Vest de la sfârșitul Războiului Rece. Rămâne de văzut dacă anexarea Crimeei și războiul din Donbas vor fi ultimele etape ale procesului de destrămare a URSS sau începutul unui nou și terifiant proces de reconstituire a granițelor și populațiilor europene. ... Răspunsul va depinde de abilitatea și ușurința cu care elitele ruse vor accepta realitățile politice postsovietice și vor adapta identitatea Rusiei la cerințele lumii postimperiale. ... Alternativa poate fi un nou Război Rece sau ceva mai rău.”
Plokhy realizează două mari analize în acest volum: pe de o parte ne prezintă istoria Rusiei, un stat organizat ca entitate politică distinctă începând cu aproximativ 600 de ani în urmă, și alături de aceasta oferă, desigur, prezentarea unor momente cheie legate de istoria Poloniei, Ucrainei, Belarusului și altor state din regiune; pe de altă parte, sunt prezentate elementele de cultură care au dus la cristalizarea naționalismului rus și a caracteristicilor identitare panruse. Acesta din urmă cred că este cel mai interesant concept pe care îl prezintă istoricul: națiunea panrusă nu există ca entitate, ci este un concept care s-a transformat de-a lungul secolelor. Cu argumente istoriografice extrem de bine documentate, cartea ne demonstrează că panrusismul este o construcție politică și ideologică care își are originea în secolul al XVIII-lea, fiind consolidată în secolul al XIX-lea, și care pretindea că rușii, ucrainenii și belarușii sunt trei ramuri ale unui singur popor rus. Această teorie a fost promovată de Imperiul Țarist și mai târziu reluată de regimul sovietic într-o formă diferită și a presupus rusificări forțate și interzicerea limbilor etnicilor ucraineni și belaruși, iar mai târziu aceste presiuni s-au aplicat și în republicile sovietice.
Ajungând la istoria recentă, Serhii Plokhy analizează felul în care această ideologie este folosită pentru a justifica acțiunile imperialiste directe și indirecte ale Rusiei – fie sub forma intervenției în politica fostelor state sovietice, fie prin radicalizarea etnicilor ruși din anumite teritorii, prin crearea campaniilor ideologice de tipul „Lumea Rusă” sau prin acțiuni internaționale de destabilizare.
Mi s-a părut fascinant felul în care cartea transmite complexitatea gândirii acestui profesor, dar și spiritul de organizare al atât de multor informații, multe dintre ele fiind probabil rezultatul unei munci de cercetare originale. Un volum excelent, dens și panoramic.
March 24, 2020
One of the best histories--of any topic--I have encountered. Despite the considerable span of time covered in his text, Plokhy never strays from the question of how Russian nationalism has emerged, morphed and disappeared countless times over the centuries and writes with admirable clarity.
December 6, 2024
В цій книжці Плохія дуже детально описано, що таке росія, звідки вона взялася в нашому світі, розвиток російського народу та його ідей (загалом вони шовіністичні, ну це ж росія і її русский мир, як інакше) та відносини цієї держави з Україною.
А відносини були складні, криваві, такі, що пригнічували мову/культуру/націю, і можна назвати їх токсичними, якщо вжити сучасну лексику.
Як тільки росіяни не бачили українців: і єдиним народом з росіянами, і окремим народом в складі імперії, і совєтським народом також, але ніколи вони не бачили Україну та українців незалежними та й навіть реально автономними (і совєтський союз - це узурпаторська держава, яка на практиці взагалі мало давала автономії щось вирішувати та й ще пригнічувала нації, їх мову та культуру). З такими ідеями та думками, росія ніколи не побачить в Україні самостійну державу, який би правитель/цар/президент/імператор росією не керував, тому війна буде завжди, поки українці не стануть сильними і не дадуть відсіч росіянам так, щоб вони усвідомили в своїх головах, що Україна їм не належить і ніколи не належала.
Так, вони можуть вкрасти нашу історію, називати себе другим Києвом, шукати своїх предків серед київських князів, вигадувати, що росіяни жили на наших територіях з давніх віків, але вони ніколи не вкрадуть наше бажання свободи та прагнення жити у своїй країні, а не із великорусским народом, який не є ні братнім, ні близьким, ні дружнім, а є вбивцею, тираном та насильником.
І так, русский мир базується на мові та культурі, тому для всіх, хто до сих пір говорить російською, слухає їх музику і каже яка різниця, є погані новини: ви продовжуєте створювати ілюзію для росіян, що їх тут чекають, бо ж кордони росіян для них закінчуються там, де лунає російська мова/існує російська культура.
Можете казати, скільки завгодно, що російська мова не спричинила війну, але це зовсім не так, якби в Україні було менше засилля російського, то путін би може ще раз подумав, чи варто нападати на країну, яка розвиває свою культуру, мову та національність, та зневажає все російське, бо зрозумів би, що тут йому не раді.
Тому хто ще вірить, що це війна путіна/простий народ невинуватий/мова не має значення/треба заморожувати конфлікт, росія далі не полізе, читайте цю книжку і розумійте, що росія ще й як може нашкодити українцям, нашій державності та й сусідам, бо знайде причину влізти на територію. Поляків теж колись росіяни контролювали і вважали їх своїми, бо мови ж схожі, чого б і цю територію собі не взяти.
росія - це зло, яке має бути знищене повністю, а не лише частково, бо ця нечисть повернеться як не зараз, то через декілька років.
А відносини були складні, криваві, такі, що пригнічували мову/культуру/націю, і можна назвати їх токсичними, якщо вжити сучасну лексику.
Як тільки росіяни не бачили українців: і єдиним народом з росіянами, і окремим народом в складі імперії, і совєтським народом також, але ніколи вони не бачили Україну та українців незалежними та й навіть реально автономними (і совєтський союз - це узурпаторська держава, яка на практиці взагалі мало давала автономії щось вирішувати та й ще пригнічувала нації, їх мову та культуру). З такими ідеями та думками, росія ніколи не побачить в Україні самостійну державу, який би правитель/цар/президент/імператор росією не керував, тому війна буде завжди, поки українці не стануть сильними і не дадуть відсіч росіянам так, щоб вони усвідомили в своїх головах, що Україна їм не належить і ніколи не належала.
Так, вони можуть вкрасти нашу історію, називати себе другим Києвом, шукати своїх предків серед київських князів, вигадувати, що росіяни жили на наших територіях з давніх віків, але вони ніколи не вкрадуть наше бажання свободи та прагнення жити у своїй країні, а не із великорусским народом, який не є ні братнім, ні близьким, ні дружнім, а є вбивцею, тираном та насильником.
І так, русский мир базується на мові та культурі, тому для всіх, хто до сих пір говорить російською, слухає їх музику і каже яка різниця, є погані новини: ви продовжуєте створювати ілюзію для росіян, що їх тут чекають, бо ж кордони росіян для них закінчуються там, де лунає російська мова/існує російська культура.
Можете казати, скільки завгодно, що російська мова не спричинила війну, але це зовсім не так, якби в Україні було менше засилля російського, то путін би може ще раз подумав, чи варто нападати на країну, яка розвиває свою культуру, мову та національність, та зневажає все російське, бо зрозумів би, що тут йому не раді.
Тому хто ще вірить, що це війна путіна/простий народ невинуватий/мова не має значення/треба заморожувати конфлікт, росія далі не полізе, читайте цю книжку і розумійте, що росія ще й як може нашкодити українцям, нашій державності та й сусідам, бо знайде причину влізти на територію. Поляків теж колись росіяни контролювали і вважали їх своїми, бо мови ж схожі, чого б і цю територію собі не взяти.
росія - це зло, яке має бути знищене повністю, а не лише частково, бо ця нечисть повернеться як не зараз, то через декілька років.
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July 8, 2025An excellent book for anyone interested in geopolitics, Eastern Europe, and it is essential to understand the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Plokhy argues, quite convincingly, that the aspiration for a great pan-Russian nation is a fundamental factor in the very idea of Russian nationality and Russia as a political entity. In this sense, imperialism is intrinsically associated with what it means to be Russian.
The difficulty of establishing a political unity detached from this self-perception is a decisive factor in Russia's political history.
Plokhy develops his analysis with care, but never boring or excessively focused on historical details.
He brings in political and cultural elements to demonstrate how national identity and the Russian imperialist project developed hand in hand.
Against this backdrop, the second largest East Slavic nation, Ukraine, became the focal point of Russian international politics, even today.
Thus, it became an obsession to prevent the advance of Ukrainian liberalism and nationalism, as Plokhy demonstrates.
Russia became independent without wanting or planning to. Its identity, stripped bare after 1991, never found any content other than imperialism.
The tragedy of this, however, is not only Russian...
Plokhy argues, quite convincingly, that the aspiration for a great pan-Russian nation is a fundamental factor in the very idea of Russian nationality and Russia as a political entity. In this sense, imperialism is intrinsically associated with what it means to be Russian.
The difficulty of establishing a political unity detached from this self-perception is a decisive factor in Russia's political history.
Plokhy develops his analysis with care, but never boring or excessively focused on historical details.
He brings in political and cultural elements to demonstrate how national identity and the Russian imperialist project developed hand in hand.
Against this backdrop, the second largest East Slavic nation, Ukraine, became the focal point of Russian international politics, even today.
Thus, it became an obsession to prevent the advance of Ukrainian liberalism and nationalism, as Plokhy demonstrates.
Russia became independent without wanting or planning to. Its identity, stripped bare after 1991, never found any content other than imperialism.
The tragedy of this, however, is not only Russian...
March 27, 2022
很多人相信，最根本來說，第二次世界大戰源於未能以和平方法解決「德意志問題」，也有些人把希特勒和普丁打民族牌來動搖和兼併鄰國領土的做法相提並論。在東西方關係上，俄-烏衝突業已成了冷戰結束後最嚴重的國際危機。到底兼併克里米亞和頓巴斯戰爭是蘇聯解體的最後一幕，還是標誌著歐洲進入了一個恐怖的新階段，一個人口和土地被重塑的階段，仍有待觀察。
克里米亞已在2014年被俄羅斯兼併，而頓巴斯戰爭則在2015年明斯克協議後趨緩，而本書則是在2017年時出版。當時烏東尚不穩定，但對於衝突的發展則是未知的，不過很遺憾的在2022年2/24俄軍全面入侵烏克蘭後，很顯然的是往對歐洲不利的方向發展了……也不只是歐洲如此，全世界都陷入了對能源和軍備的雙重恐慌吧。
本書幾乎是完全著重於民族、語言、血統、宗教等的角度，來解釋斯拉夫人綿延幾百年的歷史糾結。論述思想的部分居多，歷史場景重現的部分較少，老實說讀起來有點累。而且個人對斯拉夫和蘇聯都沒有甚麼基礎的知識，有時候會比較難跟上腳步。不過到後來1990年前後的部分就比較熟悉了，尤其是到了普丁的年代，搭配上時事來看簡直是細思極恐，尤其是下面這段:
普丁有一次這樣問出生烏克蘭的<共青團真理報>記者卡夫坦:「你讀過鄧尼金的日記嗎？」這裡的日記是指內戰期間白軍將領鄧尼金的回憶錄。「沒有。」卡夫坦回答說，但答應回家之後會去讀。「記得要讀。」普丁叮囑他，然後補充說: 「鄧尼金討論了大俄羅斯和小俄羅斯。小俄羅斯就是烏克蘭。他指出，沒有人被容許在我們的關係之間攪和，那總是俄羅斯的家務事。」
普丁對於烏克蘭有如恐怖情人一般的執著，最大一部分是防禦的迫切需求，另一部分也許真的是源於蘇聯歷史的緬懷吧。不過個人感覺所有檯面上的理由，在檯面下應該還是有現實面(錢啦)上的考量，但因為本書並沒有著重這個部分，烏克蘭也不是經濟大國，也許入侵的真正原因要好幾年以後才會被研究出來了。
April 1, 2022
3.5, rounded up to 4 for Goodreads.
I read this book because an academic I respect said it was a good overview of the development of Russian nationalism, which is incredibly relevant post the Feb. 24th Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, I found this book glossed over some important points in the historical development was ultimately not that informative for me. This book doesn't mention the Jewish Bund, the conflicts in the Pale of the Settlement, the Insurrectionary Black Army of Nestor Makno, or the present day works of Alexander Dugin. All of these matter, but none of these were mentioned. While useful for someone with little to no knowledge of the region, it's not nearly as helpful as I had hoped.
I read this book because an academic I respect said it was a good overview of the development of Russian nationalism, which is incredibly relevant post the Feb. 24th Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, I found this book glossed over some important points in the historical development was ultimately not that informative for me. This book doesn't mention the Jewish Bund, the conflicts in the Pale of the Settlement, the Insurrectionary Black Army of Nestor Makno, or the present day works of Alexander Dugin. All of these matter, but none of these were mentioned. While useful for someone with little to no knowledge of the region, it's not nearly as helpful as I had hoped.
January 8, 2025
Probably one of Plokhy’s weaker entries but still a decent read - especially the sections up until WW1 and then it just kinda drifts off. It’s like he’s got a page limit - the sections post Stalin especially seem just to be a précis of a wikipedia page 😂
July 12, 2023
3,5 ster
November 20, 2024
Illuminating, as always from Ploghy, though not quite as forceful as “gates of europe” as I’d expected. Ploghy details the exact historical moments that have led to the convoluted amalgamation of empire, nation, and state that is Russia today, and the mess that’s created. Enough distinction is paid towards the Byelorussian co-development with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to somewhat enlighten the reader on why Belarus remains an illiberal Russian addendum though Ukraine has chosen a different post Soviet path.
I would strongly support an up to date addendum to this work, as this was published after the war started but before the 2022 full scale invasion - Ploghy describes the ~10k Russians lost in that stage of the war in dramatic terms, suggesting this loss may be enough to deter Russia in the future. How would he contextualize the 800,000 in the last three years?
I would strongly support an up to date addendum to this work, as this was published after the war started but before the 2022 full scale invasion - Ploghy describes the ~10k Russians lost in that stage of the war in dramatic terms, suggesting this loss may be enough to deter Russia in the future. How would he contextualize the 800,000 in the last three years?
February 27, 2025
何謂俄羅斯？邊界何在？又是什麼人構成？這些巨大的俄羅斯問題，如果只有俄羅斯菁英在思考，那麼，強權，離人民的安居樂業想法很遠。烏克蘭，如果被稱爲出走，甚而回歸，這樣的民族觀，被視爲單一的民族認同問題，就過度簡化人民的需求了。
書中清楚說明近幾百年的政權交替史，大俄羅斯、小俄羅斯、白羅斯。為什麼要基輔來轉譯與歐洲古典羅馬等帝國血緣的關係，說穿了，也就是統治者世界觀的矮化。烏俄戰爭，可謂冷戰後最嚴重的國際危機，到底人口、土地、國境會不會再重塑，就不再是單純烏俄的民族問題。這是作者未能觸及的政治現實議題了。
書中清楚說明近幾百年的政權交替史，大俄羅斯、小俄羅斯、白羅斯。為什麼要基輔來轉譯與歐洲古典羅馬等帝國血緣的關係，說穿了，也就是統治者世界觀的矮化。烏俄戰爭，可謂冷戰後最嚴重的國際危機，到底人口、土地、國境會不會再重塑，就不再是單純烏俄的民族問題。這是作者未能觸及的政治現實議題了。
May 20, 2022
This book provides a lot of historical background to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
March 22, 2022
Reading this during Russia's latest invasion of Ukraine has been like watching a car crash in slow motion. The book itself is terrific, but got increasingly difficult on an emotional level, as well as.increasingly complicated. I will definitely be reading it again soon.
February 26, 2018
This book looks at a particular aspect of Russian history - one with plenty of relevance for the present day. It looks at how Russia interacts with neighboring lands and/or internal minorities. Russia often pushes itself toward empire, an empire usually justified on a sense of ethnic identity - but gaining any empire typically results in adding non-Russians to the mix. The key tricky spot is the Ukraine, with a long tradition of association with Russia, but still distinct from Russians.
The book also argues that there has always been some backwards-looking justifications for Russia's expansion. That explains the title - Russia is forever looking to gain what it sees itself as once having. As a result, Russia feels further justified in any expansion.
Early on, expansion wasn't much based on ethnicity. Who the hell was nationalist in the 1470s? But there was a past to harken back to: the days of the Rus before the Mongols came. The rise of Moscow could harken back to those days. The borderlands to the west made things grayer for expansion on this justification. Russia also saw itself as leader of the Slavs and as the Orthodox center.
By the 19th century, Russia needed to contend with rising nationalism. Some Russian thinkers categorized people into Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians. But there was still rising nationalistic identities, with that of the Poles causing the most problems. By the late 19th century, Russia adopted the policy of Russification, which failed. A language press for not only Poles but also Ukrainians and Belarussians emerged.
The Bolsheviks came to power. They initially had little use for the old Russian nationalism, or any nationalism. Stalin was supposed to be their expert on minority relations, but Lenin didn't realize how poorly suited Stalin was at this until just before his stroke. Anyhow, they wanted to spread communism and so their initial solution was to create a federated model - a union of republics -a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But this soon turned into some rather more centralized, especially under Stalin. People whose power came from being ethnic minority leaders weren't trusted. The Nazi invasion marked a further intensification of Russian nationalism, as that's how Stalin sold the war to the Russian people. Khrushchev, as part of his de-Stalinization, moved away from Russian nationalism. But then Brezhnev brought it back when he came to power. The issue of how the USSR helped deal with its non-Russian populations helped bring down the USSR.
Since then, Russian nationalism has revived under Putin. At times the last chapter and epilogue seemed strangely optimistic. Oh, Putin invades the Ukraine, annexes Crimea and all of that is really bad. But he also ran into trouble in the Ukraine. Russia never did annex anything else, and the remaining Ukrainian state is more antagonistic to Russia. The war, while skyrocketing Putin's popularity, also left a bad taste in the mouths of many in Russia. Plokhy argues it's a milestone in the formation of a post-communist Russia, and it doesn't sound like a very successful one.
Aye, but then the epilogue seems downright pessimistic. Sorta. It's language is straightforward, as Plokhy notes there is an easy path forward for Russia to accept that their Russia World project isn't going as planned and adapt. Well, that would be rather optimistic ....... if there was any sign that the Kremlin was going to adapt in this manner. Will the Ukraine incursion be the final stage of the USSR dismemberment or will it signal a new stage of conflict in Europe? Sigh. He never says that latter is more likely and he leaves it open-ended. But that sounds like bad news to me.
It's an informative and interesting book. The one annoyance for me is I had to step away from it for a bit midway through, so my knowledge of the first half is sketchier than I'd like it to be.
The book also argues that there has always been some backwards-looking justifications for Russia's expansion. That explains the title - Russia is forever looking to gain what it sees itself as once having. As a result, Russia feels further justified in any expansion.
Early on, expansion wasn't much based on ethnicity. Who the hell was nationalist in the 1470s? But there was a past to harken back to: the days of the Rus before the Mongols came. The rise of Moscow could harken back to those days. The borderlands to the west made things grayer for expansion on this justification. Russia also saw itself as leader of the Slavs and as the Orthodox center.
By the 19th century, Russia needed to contend with rising nationalism. Some Russian thinkers categorized people into Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians. But there was still rising nationalistic identities, with that of the Poles causing the most problems. By the late 19th century, Russia adopted the policy of Russification, which failed. A language press for not only Poles but also Ukrainians and Belarussians emerged.
The Bolsheviks came to power. They initially had little use for the old Russian nationalism, or any nationalism. Stalin was supposed to be their expert on minority relations, but Lenin didn't realize how poorly suited Stalin was at this until just before his stroke. Anyhow, they wanted to spread communism and so their initial solution was to create a federated model - a union of republics -a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But this soon turned into some rather more centralized, especially under Stalin. People whose power came from being ethnic minority leaders weren't trusted. The Nazi invasion marked a further intensification of Russian nationalism, as that's how Stalin sold the war to the Russian people. Khrushchev, as part of his de-Stalinization, moved away from Russian nationalism. But then Brezhnev brought it back when he came to power. The issue of how the USSR helped deal with its non-Russian populations helped bring down the USSR.
Since then, Russian nationalism has revived under Putin. At times the last chapter and epilogue seemed strangely optimistic. Oh, Putin invades the Ukraine, annexes Crimea and all of that is really bad. But he also ran into trouble in the Ukraine. Russia never did annex anything else, and the remaining Ukrainian state is more antagonistic to Russia. The war, while skyrocketing Putin's popularity, also left a bad taste in the mouths of many in Russia. Plokhy argues it's a milestone in the formation of a post-communist Russia, and it doesn't sound like a very successful one.
Aye, but then the epilogue seems downright pessimistic. Sorta. It's language is straightforward, as Plokhy notes there is an easy path forward for Russia to accept that their Russia World project isn't going as planned and adapt. Well, that would be rather optimistic ....... if there was any sign that the Kremlin was going to adapt in this manner. Will the Ukraine incursion be the final stage of the USSR dismemberment or will it signal a new stage of conflict in Europe? Sigh. He never says that latter is more likely and he leaves it open-ended. But that sounds like bad news to me.
It's an informative and interesting book. The one annoyance for me is I had to step away from it for a bit midway through, so my knowledge of the first half is sketchier than I'd like it to be.
December 3, 2025
Comprehensive. Detailed. Easy to follow even with so much information. I WISH it had a second epilogue post 2022.
annotations:
-promoted the cultural Russification of non-Russians, and in doing that created conditions for the development of post-Soviet Russian imperialism after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
-The traditional view holds that Russia’s problem with self-identification derives from the fact that it acquired an empire before it acquired a nation. This is probably true for a number of empires…but what makes the Russian situation unique is that none of those empires shared common historical roots and myths of origin with their foreign subjects, as had been the case with Russian throughout a good part of its imperial history.
-With Novgorod defeated and Tartar dominance thrown off, the foundations of Muscovite sovereignty had been laid.
-By 1490, Ivan’s chancellery had begun to use the Kyivan descent of the Muscovite princes as grounds to extend his claim from those two principalities to Kyiv itself.
-By God’s grace, this is our patrimony form antiquity, from our forefathers.
-The Muscovite wars with Lithuania, triggered by the conflict over the fate of the Novgorod and continued under the banner of gathering the patrimony of the Kyivan princes, made Muscovy a major actor on the East European scene. It was no longer just a country fighting for its independence, but one expanding beyond its “natural” Mongol borders.
-The Mongol gift was now a reimagined as a symbol of imperial power.
-Featuring Central Asian gold and jewels and Muscovite furs, the cap was swathed in invisible layers of historical mythology, first Kyivan, then Byzantine, and finally Roman. Whether the Muscovites sought a Roman connection…all ways led through Kyiv, the seat of the first Rurikid princes, without whom there could be no claim to anything but the Mongol tradition.
-It was the Kyivan myth of origins that became the cornerstone of Muscovy’s ideology as the polity evolved from a Mongol dependency to a sovereign state and then an empire. The ruling dynasty, which relied on Kyivan roots to legitimize its rule, would subsequently find it difficult, if not impossible, to divorce itself from that founding myth.
-The vision of Muscovy as successor to Byzantium and the only remaining Orthodox empire on the face of the earth was first developed in the early sixteenth century. That vision, centered on the figure of the Muscovite tsar, was incomplete as long as the country remained without a patriarch of its own
-It is no accident that the rise of Muscovy as an independent state coincided with the declaration of independence of its church from Constantinople, which had been an ally of the Mongol Horde for decades, if not centuries.
-But for a Muscovite ruler to marry a Uniate with the support of Rome was a sign of recognition of his new independent status by the political and ecclesiastical elite of Western and Central Europe.
-In a country without a ruling dynasty or a legitimate secular institution to run the state, the church took on particular importance.
-Hermogen’s insistence that a Muscovite patriot and a true Christian must be loyal to the tsar became a stable of Muscovite literature in the first decades of the 17th century.
-The conflict between the Kyivan vision of church reform and the traditionalist Muscovite view would bring about a profound schism (Raskol) in the Muscovite church and society.
-At its core was the notion of the tsar’s status as the only remaining Orthodox emperor after the fall of Byzantium.
-The Kyivan monks were now insisting on their city’s importance, stressing its centrality to Rus’ and Muscovite history.
Kyiv emerges from the pages of the Synopsis as the birthplace of the Russian dynasty, state, and church.
-As the numerous editions and reprints of the Synopsis educated the Muscovite public in the basics of its history, they prompted the Muscovites to think about themselves as a nation. That nation, however, was anything but purely Muscovite, as the history and nation of Muscovy described in the book were unimaginable without Kyiv and the lands then known as Little and White Rus’.
-The author(s) of the Synopsis encouraged reads to consider extending the tsar’s possessions not primarily as a dynastic realm or an Orthodox state but as a nation. This was a revolutionary idea.
-Peter’s letters and decrees show an interesting transformation of his understanding of the term “fatherland”, which changed its meaning in the course of the first decades of the eighteenth century form the tsar’s patrimony to a patria common to all Muscovites.
-Resentment and distrust of foreigners in government were accompanied by an unprecedented growth of Russian national assertiveness. It was during Elizabeth’s rule that key discussions took place about the empire’s history and literary language-two major elements of all nation-building projects in early modern Europe.
-In accepting its historical explanation of the origins of the Rus’ people. Lomonosov embraced a historical myth that stressed the unity of the Great and Little Russian heirs to the medieval Kyiv state, separating them from the European West.
-The new All-Russian nation needed not only a common past but also a common language.
-As one would expect under the rule of a foreign-born princess, the civic elements of the new Russian identity became more important than the ethnic ones.
-The ideas of the Enlightenment, of which Catherine was a student and admirer, transformed the understanding of empire from a patchwork of territories that maintained particular rights and privileges acquired over the centuries to a centralized state that relied on administrative uniformity even as it celebrated its ethnic and religious diversity.
-The hodgepodge of long-established customs and special privileges accumulated in the course of history was to yield to well-ordered and homogeneous bureaucratic norms.
-The abolition of the Hetmanate and the gradual elimination of its institutions and military structure ended the notion of partnership and equality between Great and Little Russia…
-The Little Russians maintained their attachment to their traditional homeland…but for most of them there was no longer a contradiction between loyalty to their historical patria and to the Russian Empire.
-Thus, she was not only claiming what had belonged to her predecessors on the Russian throne, but also saving coreligionists and people of the same ethnic background from persecution and from the temptation to rebel.
-As increasing centralism broken down regional loyalties and autonomous enclaves such as the Hetmanate, an all-Russian identity emerged.
-The advent of nationalist ideology, with its emphasis on linguistic and ethnic particularism, created another obstacle to the successful integration of the annexed territories.
-“What rule should we use in dealing with the European Enlightenment, with European ideas that we can no longer do without, but that threaten us with inevitable demise unless we adapt them skillfully?”
-According to Uvarov, nationality was the traditional way of life that was supposed to ensure the continuity of the other two key elements of Russian identity-religions and autocracy-in an age shaped by new European ideas…He ignored Schlegel’s emphasis on national language and culture, stressing attachment to traditional institutions.
-Like his father, Paul, and his rother and predecessor, Alexander, Nicholas did not believe that partitions served the interest of Russia, but, like then, he felt that he could not afford to turn those lands over to the Poles.
-Apart from history, Russian language and culture emerged as the principal tools of the government’s new policy in the borderlands.
-By the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles’ belief in the unity of Great and Little Russia and their treatment of the latter as the fountainhead of Russian culture was being challenged by the Little Russians’ search for a nationality of their own.
-If the government were to take an indulgent attitude to the currently developing feeble impulse to separate the Ukrainian dialect by elevating it to the status of a literary language, then it would have no basis not to allow the same separation for the dialect of the Belarusians, who constitute a tribe as significant as that of the Little Russians.
-Ukrainian dialect by elevating it to the status of a literary language, then it would have no basis not to allow the same separation for the dialect of the Belarusians, who constitute a tribe as significant as that of the Little Russians.
-The Russian Empire was launched on a new era of mass politics that saw workers’ rebellions, peasant revolts, military mutinies, and the birth of parliamentarism, which challenged the absolute power of the tsars.
-On both sides of the freshly drawn front lines, nationalism was on the rise, and nothing fed it better than war.
-The war was presented not as a struggle of one European empire against another but as a contest of the Russian people and the Slavic world they led with the Germanic race.
-The war on the southern sector of the Russian front was supposed to solve the Russian question once and for all, uniting all Russians under the emperor’s rule. It also offered a unique opportunity to crush rising Ukrainian and Belarusian movements within the empire, ensuring the complete unity of the reconstituted Russian nation.
-In the summer of 1915…a Progressive Bloc that demanded a government responsible to the people, meaning one composed of Duma deputies. The tsar refused to create such a government.
-February 1917 brough ta food shortage in the capital…The socialists created a soviet (council) that became the real power in the city, making the tsarist government all but irrelevant.
-Lenin and his cohort were internationalist in composition and outlook and in their conception of the forthcoming revolution. Russian imperial nationalism was anathema to them
-For Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who insisted on the political primary of social classes, the nationality question was of secondary importance
-The Russian nationalists were outraged by what they interpreted as a surrender of Russian national interests by the socialist ministers of the Provisional Government.
-Since Russia had been taken over by the Bolsheviks, they saw the Ukrainian state led by a former Russian aristocrat as a base from which the traditional Russia might be restored.
-Lenin, never a strong believer in the all-Russian nation…According to him, the Great Russians were dominant, while the Ukrainians and Belarusians, former members of the privileged big Russian nation, were among the oppressed.
-For Lenin, the main threat to the unity of his state was coming not from the location nationalists, whom he hoped to accommodate by creating a federal framework for the future Union, but from the Great Russian nationalism that threated to derail his plans. He referred to it as great-power chauvinism, arguing that Russified non-Russians such as Ordzhonikidze (this was a dig at Stalin) could be much more ardent promoters of such chauvinism than the Russians themselves.
-Lenin attacked the government apparatus, which was largely controlled by Stalin, claiming that it was mainly inherited from the old regime and permeated with Russian great-power chauvinism. The way to keep it in check was to take powers from the center and transfer them to the republics.
-Lenin’s victory created a separate republic within the Union for the Russians, endowing them with a territory, institutions, population, and identity distinct from those of the Union as a whole.
-Whereas Lenin had formulated his policies on the nationality question with an eye to world revolution and the possibility of future European and Asian membership in an international Soviet Union, Stalin had no such illusions by the late 1920s. The conventional wisdom of the day, fully embraced by Stalin, was that the Soviet Union, surrounded by hostile bourgeois powers, could rely only on itself to guarantee its survival.
-The Soviet propaganda machine was sending a message to society, and that message was loud and clear: non-Russian nationalism constituted the main danger to the regime.
-The Bolshevik regime, which had come to power in opposition to the empire of the tsars and built its reputation by attacking the imperial Russian past, now began to regard itself as a continuator of the cultural and state-building traditions of the tsars.
-Hitler’s rabid nationalism, which helped him unite Germany around his leadership, made an impression on the communist leadership of the Soviet Union.
-Imperial Russian glory was revived for the sole purpose of mobilizing Russian nationalism in preparation for what Stalin and his circle regarded as an inevitable war with the capitalist West.
-The transformation of the Russians from a people guilty of imperial domination to the leading Soviet nation coincided with and was fueled by Stalin’s defeat of his opponents in the late 1920s and his rise to supreme power in the course of the 1930s.
-But as the government’s foreign policy switched from one of defense to offense, those nationalities suddenly became an asset, allowing the regime to destabilize neighboring countries and legitimize its forthcoming aggression.
-Russian nationalism was now at the core of the new Soviet identity, and the mobilization of other East Slavic nationalisms was conditioned by that new reality.
-With the regime’s back to the wall, Stalin was invoking symbols and gods previously discarded and desecrated.
-The global spread of communism, not the nationality question in the Soviet Union, was the top agenda item for Stalin’s successors.
-The introduction of free elections transformed Soviet society, putting the structure and even the integrity of the multiethnic USSR into question.
-Authoritarian regimes were preferred, since their leaders could be counted on to follow a steady policy course as they became dependent on Russian in economic or security terms. Democracies were hard to handle, because the outcomes of elections could be unpredictable.
-Putin had lost to pro-democratic forces in Ukraine and Georgia in a contest of ballots but won in a war of bullets, stopping the rebellious republics form evading his embrace in the ranks of NATO.
-The games had been staged to demonstrate that Russia was strong enough to reenter the internation scene not as a partner of the West but on its own terms.
-the idea of exploiting divisions in Western societies, including those between their liberal cores and far left and far right fringes, in order to position Russia ass the beacon of conservative values throughout the world-a country a d civilization that would defend traditional European values against their alleged distortion by the decadent liberalism of the postmodern era.
annotations:
-promoted the cultural Russification of non-Russians, and in doing that created conditions for the development of post-Soviet Russian imperialism after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
-The traditional view holds that Russia’s problem with self-identification derives from the fact that it acquired an empire before it acquired a nation. This is probably true for a number of empires…but what makes the Russian situation unique is that none of those empires shared common historical roots and myths of origin with their foreign subjects, as had been the case with Russian throughout a good part of its imperial history.
-With Novgorod defeated and Tartar dominance thrown off, the foundations of Muscovite sovereignty had been laid.
-By 1490, Ivan’s chancellery had begun to use the Kyivan descent of the Muscovite princes as grounds to extend his claim from those two principalities to Kyiv itself.
-By God’s grace, this is our patrimony form antiquity, from our forefathers.
-The Muscovite wars with Lithuania, triggered by the conflict over the fate of the Novgorod and continued under the banner of gathering the patrimony of the Kyivan princes, made Muscovy a major actor on the East European scene. It was no longer just a country fighting for its independence, but one expanding beyond its “natural” Mongol borders.
-The Mongol gift was now a reimagined as a symbol of imperial power.
-Featuring Central Asian gold and jewels and Muscovite furs, the cap was swathed in invisible layers of historical mythology, first Kyivan, then Byzantine, and finally Roman. Whether the Muscovites sought a Roman connection…all ways led through Kyiv, the seat of the first Rurikid princes, without whom there could be no claim to anything but the Mongol tradition.
-It was the Kyivan myth of origins that became the cornerstone of Muscovy’s ideology as the polity evolved from a Mongol dependency to a sovereign state and then an empire. The ruling dynasty, which relied on Kyivan roots to legitimize its rule, would subsequently find it difficult, if not impossible, to divorce itself from that founding myth.
-The vision of Muscovy as successor to Byzantium and the only remaining Orthodox empire on the face of the earth was first developed in the early sixteenth century. That vision, centered on the figure of the Muscovite tsar, was incomplete as long as the country remained without a patriarch of its own
-It is no accident that the rise of Muscovy as an independent state coincided with the declaration of independence of its church from Constantinople, which had been an ally of the Mongol Horde for decades, if not centuries.
-But for a Muscovite ruler to marry a Uniate with the support of Rome was a sign of recognition of his new independent status by the political and ecclesiastical elite of Western and Central Europe.
-In a country without a ruling dynasty or a legitimate secular institution to run the state, the church took on particular importance.
-Hermogen’s insistence that a Muscovite patriot and a true Christian must be loyal to the tsar became a stable of Muscovite literature in the first decades of the 17th century.
-The conflict between the Kyivan vision of church reform and the traditionalist Muscovite view would bring about a profound schism (Raskol) in the Muscovite church and society.
-At its core was the notion of the tsar’s status as the only remaining Orthodox emperor after the fall of Byzantium.
-The Kyivan monks were now insisting on their city’s importance, stressing its centrality to Rus’ and Muscovite history.
Kyiv emerges from the pages of the Synopsis as the birthplace of the Russian dynasty, state, and church.
-As the numerous editions and reprints of the Synopsis educated the Muscovite public in the basics of its history, they prompted the Muscovites to think about themselves as a nation. That nation, however, was anything but purely Muscovite, as the history and nation of Muscovy described in the book were unimaginable without Kyiv and the lands then known as Little and White Rus’.
-The author(s) of the Synopsis encouraged reads to consider extending the tsar’s possessions not primarily as a dynastic realm or an Orthodox state but as a nation. This was a revolutionary idea.
-Peter’s letters and decrees show an interesting transformation of his understanding of the term “fatherland”, which changed its meaning in the course of the first decades of the eighteenth century form the tsar’s patrimony to a patria common to all Muscovites.
-Resentment and distrust of foreigners in government were accompanied by an unprecedented growth of Russian national assertiveness. It was during Elizabeth’s rule that key discussions took place about the empire’s history and literary language-two major elements of all nation-building projects in early modern Europe.
-In accepting its historical explanation of the origins of the Rus’ people. Lomonosov embraced a historical myth that stressed the unity of the Great and Little Russian heirs to the medieval Kyiv state, separating them from the European West.
-The new All-Russian nation needed not only a common past but also a common language.
-As one would expect under the rule of a foreign-born princess, the civic elements of the new Russian identity became more important than the ethnic ones.
-The ideas of the Enlightenment, of which Catherine was a student and admirer, transformed the understanding of empire from a patchwork of territories that maintained particular rights and privileges acquired over the centuries to a centralized state that relied on administrative uniformity even as it celebrated its ethnic and religious diversity.
-The hodgepodge of long-established customs and special privileges accumulated in the course of history was to yield to well-ordered and homogeneous bureaucratic norms.
-The abolition of the Hetmanate and the gradual elimination of its institutions and military structure ended the notion of partnership and equality between Great and Little Russia…
-The Little Russians maintained their attachment to their traditional homeland…but for most of them there was no longer a contradiction between loyalty to their historical patria and to the Russian Empire.
-Thus, she was not only claiming what had belonged to her predecessors on the Russian throne, but also saving coreligionists and people of the same ethnic background from persecution and from the temptation to rebel.
-As increasing centralism broken down regional loyalties and autonomous enclaves such as the Hetmanate, an all-Russian identity emerged.
-The advent of nationalist ideology, with its emphasis on linguistic and ethnic particularism, created another obstacle to the successful integration of the annexed territories.
-“What rule should we use in dealing with the European Enlightenment, with European ideas that we can no longer do without, but that threaten us with inevitable demise unless we adapt them skillfully?”
-According to Uvarov, nationality was the traditional way of life that was supposed to ensure the continuity of the other two key elements of Russian identity-religions and autocracy-in an age shaped by new European ideas…He ignored Schlegel’s emphasis on national language and culture, stressing attachment to traditional institutions.
-Like his father, Paul, and his rother and predecessor, Alexander, Nicholas did not believe that partitions served the interest of Russia, but, like then, he felt that he could not afford to turn those lands over to the Poles.
-Apart from history, Russian language and culture emerged as the principal tools of the government’s new policy in the borderlands.
-By the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles’ belief in the unity of Great and Little Russia and their treatment of the latter as the fountainhead of Russian culture was being challenged by the Little Russians’ search for a nationality of their own.
-If the government were to take an indulgent attitude to the currently developing feeble impulse to separate the Ukrainian dialect by elevating it to the status of a literary language, then it would have no basis not to allow the same separation for the dialect of the Belarusians, who constitute a tribe as significant as that of the Little Russians.
-Ukrainian dialect by elevating it to the status of a literary language, then it would have no basis not to allow the same separation for the dialect of the Belarusians, who constitute a tribe as significant as that of the Little Russians.
-The Russian Empire was launched on a new era of mass politics that saw workers’ rebellions, peasant revolts, military mutinies, and the birth of parliamentarism, which challenged the absolute power of the tsars.
-On both sides of the freshly drawn front lines, nationalism was on the rise, and nothing fed it better than war.
-The war was presented not as a struggle of one European empire against another but as a contest of the Russian people and the Slavic world they led with the Germanic race.
-The war on the southern sector of the Russian front was supposed to solve the Russian question once and for all, uniting all Russians under the emperor’s rule. It also offered a unique opportunity to crush rising Ukrainian and Belarusian movements within the empire, ensuring the complete unity of the reconstituted Russian nation.
-In the summer of 1915…a Progressive Bloc that demanded a government responsible to the people, meaning one composed of Duma deputies. The tsar refused to create such a government.
-February 1917 brough ta food shortage in the capital…The socialists created a soviet (council) that became the real power in the city, making the tsarist government all but irrelevant.
-Lenin and his cohort were internationalist in composition and outlook and in their conception of the forthcoming revolution. Russian imperial nationalism was anathema to them
-For Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who insisted on the political primary of social classes, the nationality question was of secondary importance
-The Russian nationalists were outraged by what they interpreted as a surrender of Russian national interests by the socialist ministers of the Provisional Government.
-Since Russia had been taken over by the Bolsheviks, they saw the Ukrainian state led by a former Russian aristocrat as a base from which the traditional Russia might be restored.
-Lenin, never a strong believer in the all-Russian nation…According to him, the Great Russians were dominant, while the Ukrainians and Belarusians, former members of the privileged big Russian nation, were among the oppressed.
-For Lenin, the main threat to the unity of his state was coming not from the location nationalists, whom he hoped to accommodate by creating a federal framework for the future Union, but from the Great Russian nationalism that threated to derail his plans. He referred to it as great-power chauvinism, arguing that Russified non-Russians such as Ordzhonikidze (this was a dig at Stalin) could be much more ardent promoters of such chauvinism than the Russians themselves.
-Lenin attacked the government apparatus, which was largely controlled by Stalin, claiming that it was mainly inherited from the old regime and permeated with Russian great-power chauvinism. The way to keep it in check was to take powers from the center and transfer them to the republics.
-Lenin’s victory created a separate republic within the Union for the Russians, endowing them with a territory, institutions, population, and identity distinct from those of the Union as a whole.
-Whereas Lenin had formulated his policies on the nationality question with an eye to world revolution and the possibility of future European and Asian membership in an international Soviet Union, Stalin had no such illusions by the late 1920s. The conventional wisdom of the day, fully embraced by Stalin, was that the Soviet Union, surrounded by hostile bourgeois powers, could rely only on itself to guarantee its survival.
-The Soviet propaganda machine was sending a message to society, and that message was loud and clear: non-Russian nationalism constituted the main danger to the regime.
-The Bolshevik regime, which had come to power in opposition to the empire of the tsars and built its reputation by attacking the imperial Russian past, now began to regard itself as a continuator of the cultural and state-building traditions of the tsars.
-Hitler’s rabid nationalism, which helped him unite Germany around his leadership, made an impression on the communist leadership of the Soviet Union.
-Imperial Russian glory was revived for the sole purpose of mobilizing Russian nationalism in preparation for what Stalin and his circle regarded as an inevitable war with the capitalist West.
-The transformation of the Russians from a people guilty of imperial domination to the leading Soviet nation coincided with and was fueled by Stalin’s defeat of his opponents in the late 1920s and his rise to supreme power in the course of the 1930s.
-But as the government’s foreign policy switched from one of defense to offense, those nationalities suddenly became an asset, allowing the regime to destabilize neighboring countries and legitimize its forthcoming aggression.
-Russian nationalism was now at the core of the new Soviet identity, and the mobilization of other East Slavic nationalisms was conditioned by that new reality.
-With the regime’s back to the wall, Stalin was invoking symbols and gods previously discarded and desecrated.
-The global spread of communism, not the nationality question in the Soviet Union, was the top agenda item for Stalin’s successors.
-The introduction of free elections transformed Soviet society, putting the structure and even the integrity of the multiethnic USSR into question.
-Authoritarian regimes were preferred, since their leaders could be counted on to follow a steady policy course as they became dependent on Russian in economic or security terms. Democracies were hard to handle, because the outcomes of elections could be unpredictable.
-Putin had lost to pro-democratic forces in Ukraine and Georgia in a contest of ballots but won in a war of bullets, stopping the rebellious republics form evading his embrace in the ranks of NATO.
-The games had been staged to demonstrate that Russia was strong enough to reenter the internation scene not as a partner of the West but on its own terms.
-the idea of exploiting divisions in Western societies, including those between their liberal cores and far left and far right fringes, in order to position Russia ass the beacon of conservative values throughout the world-a country a d civilization that would defend traditional European values against their alleged distortion by the decadent liberalism of the postmodern era.
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