Triumfas ir tragedija

The Second World War #4

by Winston S. Churchill, Daina Valentinavičienė (Translator)

Seras Winstonas S. Churchillis buvo vienas svarbiausių XX a. politinių lyderių, Jungtinės Karalystės ministras pirmininkas (1940–1945, 1951–1955), iškalbingas laisvojo pasaulio balsas prieš nacių tironiją, aršus komunizmo kritikas bei talentingas rašytojas.

1953 m. jam buvo ypatingi. Už aktyvią politinę veiklą W. Churchilliui suteiktas sero titulas, o už memuarus „Antrasis pasaulinis karas", parašytus 1948–1953 m., – Nobelio literatūros premija.

Ketvirtasis, paskutinis, W. S. Churchillio atsiminimų tomas apima laikotarpį nuo Vakarų sąjungininkų išsilaipinimo Sicilijoje 1943 m. liepą, fašistinės Italijos dučės B. Mussolinio nušalinimą nuo valdžios iki Ašies valstybių sutriuškinimo.

Aprašoma, kokių milžiniškų pastangų reikėjo rengiantis 1944 m. birželio išsilaipinimui Normandijoje, kaip per svarbiausias to meto konferencijas (Teherano, Jaltos, Potsdamo ir kt.) britai ir amerikiečiai ginčijosi dėl ribotų išteklių paskirstymo kelioms operacijoms ir dėl karo strategijos; apie nuolat vykusias sunkias derybas su, anot autoriaus, ,,nelabai džentelmenišku'' Rytų sąjungininku.

W. Churchillis komentuoja įvykius kaip tiesioginis liudininkas, išmanantis karo dalykus. Jis vertina visus pagrindinius jų dalyvius, kartais labai diplomatiškai, kartais atvirai šaipydamasis. Čia autorius atsiskleidžia ir kaip pokario Europos architektas, ir kaip politikos analitikas, suvokiantis po karo Europą ištikusią tragediją ir aiškinantis jos priežastis. Ryškiausias būklės ,,diagnozės" akcentas – 1946 m. Fultone autoriaus pasakyta kalba apie Europą padalijusią geležinę uždangą.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Military History, Military Fiction, Biography

483 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1950

About the author

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, politician and writer, as prime minister from 1940 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1955 led Great Britain, published several works, including The Second World War from 1948 to 1953, and then won the Nobel Prize for literature.

William Maxwell Aitken, first baron Beaverbrook, held many cabinet positions during the 1940s as a confidant of Churchill.

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill, KG, OM, CH, TD, FRS, PC (Can), served the United Kingdom again. A noted statesman, orator and strategist, Churchill also served as an officer in the Army. This prolific author "for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values."

Out of respect for Winston_Churchill, the well-known American author, Winston S. Churchill offered to use his middle initial as an author.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston...

Reviews

[Manny · Rating 4 out of 5]

When you've done something almost supernaturally brilliant and far-sighted, and it works better than you could have dared hope, you really want to get the credit. Even Churchill is not immune. Back in 1940, when Britain was under siege and things looked almost desperate, he made a terrific strategic decision: not to go all-out on defence, but move tanks so as to be able to hold Egypt. That might give long-term chances of a counter-attack. Miraculously, it worked. We won the Battle of Britain; the USSR and the US entered the war on our side; and Egypt held.

Now a counter-attack in North Africa was indeed possible. It was still close, but Montgomery defeated Rommel at the Second Battle of El Alamein, and then the Allied forces had the initiative there. They advanced rapidly towards Tunis, and were suddenly threatening to cross the Mediterranean towards Sicily, Italy, and "the soft underbelly of Europe". Churchill's 1940 decision had turned out to be an incredible success, and he can't resist the temptation to present this as the turning point of the war.

Indeed, up to now almost everything had gone terribly, and afterwards almost everything went well; but the Battle of Stalingrad was going on more or less at the same time. (El Alamein: 23 October - 5 November 1942; Stalingrad: 23 August 1942 - 2 February 1943). Needless to say, Churchill doesn't ignore it, but it's also hard to feel he gives it the correct weight.

At least, those are my thoughts when looking back at the book. When I read it, I was so swept away by the narrative that I couldn't help accepting Churchill's version of events at face value. What a guy. Perhaps this was the zenith of our civilization, and we're now on the decline; it's hard to accept that anyone around today is in the same league. If you haven't read the series, put it on your list without delay. It won't disappoint.

[GoldGato · Rating 4 out of 5]

I ought to have known. My advisers ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked.

Winston Churchill's WWII series has turned out to be intriguing reading, albeit very long reading. This volume is the first one in the series where relief, not much but relief nevertheless, starts to show. After the first three volumes focused on one disaster after another, Churchill leads the reader to what he feels is the turning point of the war.

The British people can face peril or misfortune with fortitude and buoyancy, but they bitterly resent being deceived or finding that those responsible for their affairs are themselves dwelling in a fool's paradise.

The fall of Singapore deeply hurt Churchill, who tried to fathom why 80,000 Commonwealth troops could simply surrender. He also had to deal with the "sullen, sinister Bolshevik State" of Stalin's Soviet Union, which had originally partnered with Hitler with the objective of gleefully dividing the British Empire, only to run afoul of Hitler and Prussian pride. Then, there were the Yanks. Would they eventually join the fight? And if they did, would that single step portend their eventual rise to their own empire?

I was more attracted by the goldfish.
(Churchill on Moscow)

This is not a book for those simply wanting a quick review of World War II. This is Churchill. This is 1,000 pages of memos, personal thoughts, letters, telegrams, military notes, and a wonderful appendix filled with enough data to satisfy any modern-day chart fanatic. This is why it takes a long time to complete, as you think you're reading a straightforward account only to discover that Mr. Churchill wants you to really read each sentence, and oh how enjoyable it all becomes.

Stalin: "Why should we not go to my house and have some drinks?"
Churchill: I said that I was in principle always in favour of such a policy.

The Hinge, in Churchill's view, is the British victory in North Africa. But it's also the Soviets' stout infantry defence of Stalingrad and the Americans' naval rebound in the Pacific. If one had no idea of the eventual outcome of the war, it becomes clear that the tide had begun to turn in favour of the Allies.

In the night all cats are grey.

Churchill's ambivalence toward Darlan's Vichy French ("so much for Vichy") and the Free French (De Gaulle as the new Joan of Arc) makes for wonderful reading as his disgust at their infighting makes for glorious bon mots. His fractious relationship with Stalin ("in his heart...so far as he has one") and his between-the-lines read of the Americans are worth the slowing down and double takes, as in, did he actually just say that?

...it was the Americans, by their high tariff policy, who led the world astray, it is pretty good cheek of them now coming to school-marm us into proper behaviour.

Classic Churchill.

Book Season = Spring (you'll need as many seasons as possible)

[Mervyn Whyte · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this fourth volume somewhat less compelling than the earlier ones. It’s the longest in the series and tends to move slowly in places. Given that we’re four volumes in, I expected the story to have reached further than mid-1943—but most of this book stops around El Alamein in late 1942. That leaves two volumes to cover the final two and a half years of the war, which feels a little unbalanced. There's very little mention of Japan in this volume. So, that's something else that will have to be covered in depth in the final two volumes.

But the imbalance makes a certain sense. As Churchill himself says, before El Alamein, Britain had never won a major battle (apart from the Battle of Britain); after it, she never lost one. Explaining failure takes far more time—and, in Churchill’s case, justification—than chronicling success. A great deal of this series is Churchill making his case for why things unfolded the way they did, and why Britain acted as it did under his leadership.

What comes through clearly is that Britain was simply stretched too thin in the early years—trying to do too much, without the land forces or resources to make a decisive difference. Things only began to turn once American industry swung into full gear and the Eastern Front pinned down the bulk of the German army. New, more capable military leadership helped too.

The correspondence between Churchill and Stalin remains a highlight, especially when Stalin's tone sharpens and the usual diplomatic surface breaks. De Gaulle, as Churchill paints him, was incredibly difficult to work with—but of course, this is only one side of that story.

It may seem like this volume took me ages to get through, but I was reading three other books alongside it. I'm moving on to Volume V soon—but first, I’m starting The Sisterhood of Ravensbrück. Same era, but a much different context.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

The time frame of this book covers approximately one and a half years, from late 1941 until May 1943, during which a cascading series of events, some of them catastrophic, tried the resolve of the British peoples and their Prime Minister. There were several bright spots early-on, including the recent thumping that the British Commonwealth armies had given to German General Rommel in the North African desert, and the long-hoped-for entry of the United States into the war.

This latter development certainly gave Winston Churchill and the British military leaders cause for rejoicing, because Great Britain would no longer be standing alone against the Germans, who had spent the last two years gobbling up most of Europe. The reason for the United States' sudden abandonment of its former neutrality, however, brought a whole new set of huge problems. The U.S. was attacked by Japan, not Germany, and Churchill would spend a good part of the time covered in this volume using his utmost diplomatic persuasion skills trying to keep American military planners focused on looking at Europe as the main theater of war. This was no small matter since many in the American government were at odds over the assigning of precedence; America's highest ranking military leaders, Admiral E.J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General George Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, were evenly divided in this matter. In this effort Churchill cultivated and received the friendship of his increasingly good friend and ally Franklin Roosevelt, who sided with him on this issue.

Not that anyone could ignore what was going on in the Pacific. The British were certainly relieved when Hitler declared war on the U.S. in the wake of Pearl Harbor, forcing attention toward the European theater of war, but this also meant that Great Britain would now be fighting Japan. The consequences of this widening of the war were felt in the pressure exerted in the Pacific by a rampaging Japanese military, which very shortly began the action which would cause huge losses to America in the Philippines, and would take over other Allied bases in the Pacific. By March of 1942, the Japanese would conquer the Dutch East Indies, taking many allied soldiers prisoner. Prior to that, the Japanese had steamrolled down the Malayan Peninsula and had conquered the British island fortress of Singapore. They also overran Siam and invaded Burma, capturing Rangoon.

The beauty of Churchill's books comes from the combination of his command of English in writing historical narrative, and his liberal insertions of the voluminous correspondence carried out between himself and all manner of government agencies and foreign allies. The unfolding of the Singapore disaster, from the government's frantic steps to reinforce its defense at all cost, to the realization that nothing could be done to prevent the loss of the island, was both fascinating and sickening to read about..

This calamity was followed by the news that General Rommel had counterattacked in the African desert. Tobruk fell back into German hands and Britain faced a grave situation, despite earlier overconfident assurances Churchill had received from his commanding general there.

There is no doubt that, in any other circumstances, heads should have rolled on the discovery that one of Britain's most valuable bases was lost in good measure because it was set up to be practically impregnable to a sea attack, but all of its defenses folded because no one thought far enough ahead to plan for a land-ward threat. Most of the blame for this fell upon Churchill, who was not in the government when the planning for Singapore's defense happened, but he had to face a Motion of Censure in Parliament. His political and oratorical skills met the challenge, and the result was a renewed vote of confidence in the National Government which he headed.

Fighting a two-ocean war was very difficult for the Allies. Churchill's job was not made easier by the fact that the Australian Prime Minister, fearing a Japanese invasion, made demands for the return of Australia's best army divisions, which were sorely needed in North Africa. They were especially panicked after the loss of Singapore, an installation which they believed to be critical to the defense of their island, and about the Japanese presence in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

There was no way that England could provide any significant defense to Australia. The United States solved this predicament by making Australia an important base for garrisoning growing numbers of forces that would be used in numerous Pacific island campaigns. Campaigns in Guadalcanal and New Guinea as well as significant American sea victories at the Coral Sea and Midway would eventually, but slowly, remove the immediate Japanese threat to Australia.

One of the greatest challenges to the Allies at this time was the danger of getting supplies shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. Naval convoys were coming under increasingly deadly German attack, from submarines and from the air. The Battle of the Atlantic was one of the most fearful campaigns of the war, because Britain could simply not survive without the food and material shipped from America, and Russia, now an Allied power, sorely needed everything that could be sent there. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of forward planning by American Naval authorities, causing severe shortages of escort vessels to guard the convoys. Churchill provides data showing the loss of three and a quarter millions of tons of British and other allied shipping lost between December 1941 and August 1942, and another almost three and three quarter million tons sent to the bottom of the ocean between August 1942 and late-May 1943, representing huge loss of lives as well as ships and their cargoes.

All of these losses and military reversals made it difficult to envision a pro-active strike against Germany. America would be able to provide the human and manufacturing resources needed to make this happen, but the country would take time to overcome years of pre-war isolationist military neglect. Churchill was especially feeling the sting of not-so subtle prodding from Joseph Stalin, whose country had felt severe punishment from German invasion. Churchill had made it a point to send as much assistance to Russia as possible from the beginning, but Stalin criticized him for having to suspend arctic ship convoys due to high losses from German submarine wolf packs and for not opening a second front against Hitler in western Europe.

Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt, and their top military staffs, would work very hard to come to some kind of consensus on when that European invasion would begin. As 1942 began, it became very apparent that no kind of invasion could possibly be mounted in 1942, much to Stalin's chagrin. The planners decided that an all-out attempt should be made to send an invasion force to France to begin pushing the German forces back into Germany, and ultimately defeat, in 1943. The 1942 campaign, code-named "Sledgehammer," formerly named "Bolero" and aimed at an attack on Brest or Cherbourg, morphed into "Roundup" for the liberation of France, based on the capture of Antwerp in 1943.

Much attention is mentioned in the book about planning for numerous Anglo-British military campaigns. There is an almost bewildering array of code-names, some of which evolved into other names. Thus, the projected 1943 "Roundup" eventually became the 1944 "Overlord" invasion. Likewise, the late-1942 "Gymnast" invasion of French North-Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), begat "Torch."

Before Torch happened, the British forces under General H.R. Alexander, the new Commander in Chief of the North African Theater of Operations, and his deputy, General B.L. Montgomery, Commanding the British 8th Army, bolstered Allied morale when they won back Tobruk and then defeated Rommel at Alamein (November 1942). This is where Churchill marked the turning of the "Hinge of Fate", when he declared that the British never had a victory before Alamein; after Alamein, they never had a defeat (p. 1065 of 1782).

If Alamein was the beginning of the end for the Germans in North Africa, it would need to be followed by months of hard slogging in the Western deserts. One of the compelling reasons for Torch was that it would give the Americans a chance to finally get a sizable force in battle against the Germans, since it was becoming obvious, as mentioned above, that an American-British invasion of France would not be feasible for some time. This is one reason why Churchill deferred to the naming of an American general, Dwight Eisenhower, as the operation's supreme commander. Churchill's description of this operation is, as always, detailed and orderly.

The Allies would not become, as General Alexander wired to Churchill, "masters of the North African shores" (pp 1375, 1376 of 1782) until May 13, 1943. This news followed the final encirclement and defeat of the Germans at Tunis, which compared, according to Churchill, to the Russian victory at Stalingrad. As Churchill sums up the situation at the middle of 1943, then, there was light at the end of the tunnel. Over two years of destruction, involving loss of countless numbers of civilians and military people, would have to transpire until this war ended. Much friendly collaboration would have to transpire among the Allies to make victory happen, and Churchill would be the most energetic leader in traveling whenever needed to consult on important matters. Already, within the pages of this book, he had made three trips to Washington D.C. to meet with Roosevelt, had broken the ice with Stalin with a trip to Moscow, and had participated in the first "Big Three" conference with the other two leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. This at a time when long-range air travel was both arduous and highly risky, even for a head of state.

However, if it was not immediately apparent at this time, Italy was almost out of the war as a military power, while Hitler's invasion of Russia was coming back to bite his ass, leaving Germany as an isolated combatant in Europe, and the Japanese juggernaut had peaked. If Alamein was Britain's hinge of fate, June 1943 was the turning point for the Allied cause.

[Leah · Rating 5 out of 5]

“ . . . the bells of all the churches should be rung”

This fourth volume in Churchill’s massive six-volume history of the Second World War covers the period from the beginning of 1942, just after Pearl Harbor, to the middle of 1943, with victory in North Africa secured and plans afoot for the invasion of Europe. It is the period which saw the darkest days of the war with defeat after defeat for the Allies, before the turn that would reverse all fortunes and make final victory a matter of when, not if. The Grand Alliance trembles as Stalin demands but does not get the opening of a second front in Europe to draw German fire away from Russia, but steadies and holds firm in face of the common enemy.

Theme of the Volume

HOW THE POWER OF THE
GRAND ALLIANCE
BECAME PREPONDERANT

This book is even longer than the preceding volumes, and there is no way I can adequately summarise it in a short review, so I’ll doubtless miss as much as I include. It is the usual mix of detailed military information – strategies, troop movements, battles, naval losses – and political analysis, including the relationships between the major players on the Allied side: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, along with the leaders of the British Dominions, the various military commanders from all nations, and in the latter stages, the leaders of Vichy France. During this period, Churchill travelled extensively, to Washington, Moscow and North Africa, and as always, when he becomes the “man on the spot”, as he himself calls it, his writing rises beyond the mere factual, giving some idea of why he was so successful in his earlier career as a war correspondent.

The first half of the book is deeply depressing and harrowing, as defeat follows defeat and losses mount. In the Pacific, Japan is driving all before her, seemingly unstoppable. The US is still underprepared and scrambling to build and train the forces she will need to beat Japan back. In Malaysia, Churchill admits that he believed Singapore was an impregnable fortress, so was stunned when she fell. In Europe, Russia is staggering under the German assault, being driven back closer to Moscow and calling desperately for aid the Allies cannot get through. In India, as fears grow of Japanese invasion, demands for independence are growing and some factions see Japan as preferable to Britain. In Australia, the Prime Minister, John Curtin, wants to pull back the Australian troops serving under Britain’s command to defend Australia from Japanese invasion – a decision that clearly angers and frustrates Churchill, who believes that the real enemy is Germany and that Japan will fall when Germany is defeated. In Britain, a few politicians are questioning Churchill’s tactics and abilities, and forcing him to repeatedly take time out to reassure them in debates or to deal with votes of no confidence, which he consistently wins by huge margins. Churchill too admits that at this point mistakes were made, some his, some his Allies’, some his commanders’, and is somewhat surprised that he has not been removed from power.

The strategic weighing of various options is brilliantly written, bringing clarity to what each proposed operation was hoped to gain, the difficulties of putting them into action, which nations favoured which action, and so on. Churchill discusses the operations that never happened as well as the ones that did, and is honest about the arguments he lost as well as those he won.

It is in North Africa that Churchill looks to change the trajectory of the war, and his main aim is to get Roosevelt to agree to this and concentrate American strength and manpower there, keeping just enough force in the Pacific to hold Japan from making further advances. Rommel has had success after success against the Allies in the desert, much to Churchill’s frustration given the massive concentration of precious Allied forces there. He is clearly unhappy with General Auchinleck’s performance in the field, feeling that he is overly cautious and that his delays are allowing Rommel to strengthen his grip and set up supply chains. We hear about the changes in the command structure that ended with General Montgomery taking charge of the Eighth Army – an appointment that would prove to be decisive. And finally the US and Britain agree the final shape of Operation “Torch”, planned for October 1942, designed to break German dominance and drive them from North Africa. In August, Churchill detours to Cairo to inspect the troops. It is here that he first makes mention of the “magnificent” 51st Highland Division – my father’s division – who have just arrived in Egypt and will play a leading role in the battle to come – Alamein. Churchill gives a thrilling blow-by-blow account of the battle, complete with several maps and diagrams. He includes contemporaneous first-hand reports from General Alexander, the man in overall charge. The 51st play a glorious role, alongside especially the Australians Churchill had fought so hard to keep, and New Zealand and Indian troops. Churchill’s sheer delight at victory after so many months of humiliation and defeat is palpable. And the “Torch” is lit.

From this point on, final victory is never in doubt. Russia has turned the tide on Germany with a magnificent victory at Stalingrad. Japan’s advance has ground to a halt. Vichy France is realising they may have picked the wrong side and some of their leaders are ready to work with the Allies in Africa. But there are still debates about where the Allies should concentrate their forces next. Churchill and Roosevelt meet in Casablanca with other Allied leaders, de Gaulle of the Free French and Giraud, the Vichy leader in North Africa, to plan for 1943. It is here that the demand for Germany’s ‘unconditional surrender’ is announced, that some felt led to the war going on longer than it might otherwise have done. Churchill explains the background to the decision – a decision that he clearly had some doubts about, though he justifies it.

Churchill visits Cairo again, and Tripoli, witnessing the Eighth Army formally entering the retaken city, led by the pipers of the 51st. Soon “Torch” has achieved all its aims and the Germans are driven out of North Africa. For the first time since the beginning of the war, Churchill orders that “the bells of all the churches should be rung” to mark this decisive victory.

He finishes the volume with a look ahead to next steps, and includes some correspondence between the three Grand Alliance leaders which show how the mood has lifted following the long-awaited victories.

Excellent as always, both in terms of historical fact and in understanding the strains and emotions of those who bore the weight of these momentous decisions that resulted in victory, but also in horrific losses. Churchill may concentrate more on the winning but he never fails to tells us of the ultimate price paid by so many, nor to give full recognition and praise to those who endured so much.

[Kathy · Rating 4 out of 5]

So, everyone out there, pop quiz. Who knew before now that just after the United States entered WWII our shipping was attacked constantly by the German Navy, even just off shore of New Orleans and in the Chesapeake Bay and all around Florida? We didn't have very effective anti-submarine defense at the time and they picked off ships at will. Even to the point of picking and choosing which ships to sink. Two-thirds of the ships that went down were tankers, since they were the most important. 70 ships were lost in 6 months. Most of the American.

Hello, I had never heard this before. All I have heard is we were never attacked on American soil except for Pearl Harbor (which almost doesn't count) and 9-11. OK, so this isn't soil but right offshore should count for something. I have asked various people and no one had heard this before. We tend to edit out losing things from our histories I suppose.
I knew that the desert war turned around at El Alamein, but I never knew just how close to Cairo and all the important stuff in Egypt it was. Had Rommel won there things would have turned out much different. But he didn't and this was the battle Churchill calls the Hinge of Fate, because it was the beginning of the Allied victories. After this they didn't lose any major battles.

[K A · Rating 5 out of 5]

1942-43 Britain having survived Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain to hold off invasion is fighting back and forth across North Africa and at sea against air and U-boat attack with large losses. Russia has joined the war and been driven back to Moscow and the Caucuses. The US has joined after Pearl harbour but Japan is sweeping through the Far East conquering Singapore, Burma and threatening Australia and India. This book charts the turn of fate as the Allies finally conquer Rommel in Africa, the Russians win at Stalingrad and the US destroy Japanese carriers at Midway and start the fight back in the Pacific. Fascinating first hand letters and telegrams between Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Generals and Politicians of the day.

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This fourth volume takes us from January 1942 to May 1943. During this period, as the title indicates, the fulcrum of the war shifted from one of constant defeats to one of victory. The tide had changed, but as Churchill continued to warn, the road to triumph was still to be long, costly and arduous.

Page 493 (my book) June, 1942

We had survived the collapse of France and the attack on Britain. We had not been invaded. We still held Egypt. We were alive and at bay; but that was all. On the other hand, what a cataract of disasters had fallen upon us. The fiasco of Dakar, the loss of all our Desert conquests from the Italians, the tragedy of Greece, the loss of Crete, the unrelieved reverses of the Japanese war, the loss of Hong Kong, ... the catastrophe of Singapore, the Japanese conquest of Burma, Auchinleck’s defeat in the Desert, the surrender of Tobruk, the failure, as it was judged, at Dieppe – all these galling links in a chain of misfortune and frustration to which no parallel could be found in our history.

Churchill was much on the road visiting Washington, going to Casablanca and from there to Cairo, and a long journey to Moscow (with a stopover in Teheran) to visit Stalin. In many ways this was Churchill’s top ascendancy in the war – he was the elder statesman and leader who had been the very first to join the battle against Hitler. But he must have felt his voice and status beginning to diminish. From henceforth he would be listened to less – and his allies would assert their dominance. Stalin’s armies were killing and engaging far more Germans than the British. U.S. production was just beginning to have a growing role – and their navy and air force was starting the onslaught in the Pacific where the British had been so humiliated, particularly at Singapore. Britain’s role was receding.

There were a few tiresome chapters about India of which I had little interest. Britain and Churchill’s attempts at empire preservation hold little appeal to me. Also there were too many military details on Tobruk.

But Churchill’s accounts of personal interactions with Roosevelt, Stalin, de Gaulle, and the Darlan episode in Algeria were eloquently depicted.

Page 611 (on de Gaulle)

I knew he was no friend of England. But I always recognised in him the spirit and conception which, across the pages of history, the word “France” would ever proclaim. I understood and admired, while I resented, his arrogant demeanour. Here he was, a refugee, an exile from his country under sentence of death, in a position entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the British Government, and also now of the United States. The Germans had conquered his country. He had no real foothold anywhere. Never mind; he defied all. Always, even when he was behaving worst, he seemed to express the personality of France – a great nation, with all its pride, authority, and ambition.

And once more the drilling down of Churchill to minute details continues to startle and amaze me – here is one letter.

Page 833

Prime Minister to Lord President 6 Mar 43

Transport of Flowers
I am distressed that your Committee should not have seen their way to agree to any relaxation of the ban on the transport of flowers by train. I recognize that in present circumstances the provision of special trains for flowers cannot be justified; but surely some half-way house can be found between the provision of special facilities and the complete abolition of the traffic.

I should be glad if your Committee would give immediate consideration to an arrangement whereby such transport capacity as can properly be made available for flowers, without damage to essential war purposes...can be fairly distributed between the growers.

And one of my favourite quotes of Churchill from a letter

Page 808

The maxim “Nothing avails but perfection” may be spelt shorter: “Paralysis”.

[Michael Reilly · Rating 4 out of 5]

(2nd half)

This covers the last half of 1942 and the beginning of 1943.

1942 was the hinge in all three fronts of the war.

In the Pacific, the American victory in June at the Battle of Midway stopped the Japanese advances. The rest of the war was the slow, brutal fight pushing the Japanese back to their home island.

On the Russian front, the Russians stopped the German army at Stalingrad. By December the Russians had turned the tables and trapped the German Sixth Army. The rest of the war was the slow, brutal fight pushing the Germans back to their homeland.

On the Western front, the unbroken string of German victories was stopped in Egypt at El Alamein. Churchill says, "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat."

This section of Churchill's history focuses on the campaigns in North Africa and Egypt. Churchill had great respect for Rommel. He felt that his generals were not up to Rommel's level. He eventually flew to Egypt and meet with all of the generals. He transferred the generals who had been losing battles and territory to Rommel. He appointed General Alexander to be Commander in Chief in the Near East and General Montgomery to head the Sixth Army, which was opposing Rommel.

Montgomery was the victor at El Alamein and Alexander was a success as commander. In April of 1943, the Americans landed in North Africa. The Americans and English pushed the Germans out of North Africa and Egypt. This set the stage for the invasion of Italy and the beginning of the battle in Europe.

Churchill visited America twice and Russia once during these ten months. In 1942 he was 68. Travel in war time conditions was dangerous and exhausting. He tells of unheated planes and close calls on his flight to Russia.

He also tells a tragic story. The Germans knew he was planning to fly from Gibraltar to England. They were hoping to shoot down his flight. They saw a guy who looked like him get on a commercial flight. They thought he was pulling a fast one. They ordered an air strike. The plane was shot down and thirteen passengers were killed. Leslie Howard, the well known English actor, was one of those killed.

Each of these volumes has an appendix of memos written by Churchill during the relevant period. He was a magisterial writer with a awe inspiring ability to clearly and succinctly summarize a complicated problem and forcefully advocate for his solution.

He also loved to tinker with every little thing. He constantly peppered his subordinates with questions about things he saw in the newspaper. In this volume he challenges the decision to ban the transport of cut flowers by train. He asked whether the savings in space on trains was worth the loss of flowers to beleaguered citizens?

This memo is from July 16, 1942.

"Complaints reach me about your new plans for poultry rationing as they effect country-folk. The hen has been part and parcel of country life since history began. Townsfolk can eke out their rations by a bought meal. What is the need for this tremendous reduction to one hen per person? Anyhow, the Cabinet ought too have been informed."

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the fourth volume of Winston Churchill’s six-volume account of the Second World War, and it covers a long stretch – from January, 1942 all the way up to June 1943. I started reading the first volume sometime in the 1990s, and I likely will read the fifth volume in ten years or so. Call it a lifelong project.

I’ve gotten to know Churchill’s approach, and his perspective on the war, fairly well as I’ve gone ahead. He’s looking at it from the point of view of policy and foreign relations, far more than military tactics and battles won or lost. Still, from an overall strategic perspective, he sees the period under discussion as the point at which the Allies went from losing one battle after another to winning them. The beginning of the book accordingly covers the loss of Singapore, Malaya, and Burma, as well as Rommel’s advances in Libya and the fall of Tobruk, and the second volume covers the counter-attack from the Egyptian frontier and the invasion of North Africa from the Atlantic, which ultimately pushed the Italian and German forces out altogether. All of that makes it sound, again, like what this book covers is mostly military activities, but that really is not the case. Churchill sees the whole picture from the point of view of the many Cabinet meetings he attended, from minutes and memos sent to various departments and foreign ministers, and from his momentous meetings with Roosevelt and Stalin to discuss the war situation in the long term.

Stalin, he makes plain, was insistent upon a Western invasion of France at the earliest opportunity, and was deeply disappointed to have to wait for years for this action, and even more annoyed that lend-lease shipments were frequently suspended due to U-boot activity. Churchill defends the decision of the Western allies to wait until they could build up a force capable of holding its ground, and not being pushed immediately back into the sea for the sake of pulling a few units away from the Eastern Front for a short period. He also talks about plans of his that never came to fruition, including an invasion of Norway (code named “Jupiter”) that might have alleviated the pressure on Northern shipping to the USSR, and the top-level decisions he made about staffing and command which resulted, for example, in Alexander replacing Wavell in Egypt and in combined Allied control under Eisenhower.

The most fascinating parts of the book are often brief flashes of insight from the official documents reproduced, for example about orders to remove regional insignia from uniforms to save on material and Churchill’s insistence that eggs not be too strictly rationed. One of the final appendices is a report by Churchill projecting post-war conditions and cautioning leaders not to make promises that could bind a future administration to impossible attainments. Throughout, his sense of perspective and humor comes across, sometimes in small incidents that took place during dangerous flights across warzones or in details about his personal activities or conversations.

Probably most people don’t ever get this far into the series, as I imagine most people find the level of detail and lack of action to be pretty dull, but I’m pleased I’ve been able to live long enough to read it.

[Steve Hemmeke · Rating 4 out of 5]

I picked this up after a 10 year hiatus (!). It makes for great change-of-pace reading.

Dear Winston includes every detail he has, every main policy paper and telegram, leading Britain through the war.
This volume starts with America entering the war, and ends with the Allies routing Rommel from North Africa. “We turn from almost uninterrupted disaster to almost unbroken success” (vi).

“We were no longer alone. At our side stood two mighty Allies. Russia and the United States were, though for different reasons, irrevocably engaged to fight to the death in the closest concert with the British Empire” (3).

I found Stalin’s telegrams to Churchill, and Churchill’s visits to FDR, to be the most entrancing. Stalin was generally grumping and compmlaining about how the West wasn’t doing anything to draw Hitler off from him. It’s Russia taking all the casualties, not you! He had a point. We took our sweet time getting D-Day going, but it takes time to produce weapons, train men, and move it all into position. Here is Churchill to FDR, March 5, 1942:

“When I reflect how I have longed and prayed for the entry of the United States into the war, I find it difficult to realise how gravely our British affairs have deteriorated by what has happened since December 7. We have suffered the greatest disaster in our history at Singapore, and other misfortunes will come thick and fast upon us. Your great power will only become effective gradually because of the vast distances and the shortage of ships.”

Churchill, in typical egocentric fashion, shows that he was the main force urging everyone to get off their duffs and get moving. He saw too much holding back, waiting to attack until everything was perfect. He wanted every Ally force employed in attacking the enemy as much as possible, to wear them down.

But with Germany’s massive defeats in Russia and Africa, the tide turned:
“Henceforward the danger was not Destruction but Stalemate…. Soon the German nation was to be alone in Europe, surrounded by an infuriated world in arms.”


For some video and visuals, try these.
We shall fight…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdAD0...

Churchill funeral: When will we ever again see a nation so sincerely grateful for a great statesman like Churchill? The lowering of the cranes over the Thames gets me every time…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87Xkr...

Speech: Their Finest Hour
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jjhx...

[Dale · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a completely fascinating study of determination and leadership. I do not know how he accomplished all that he did in the fifteen months ending in June 1943. Great Britain's first foray into the far East, setbacks and then victories in North Africa, two trips to Washington, one each to Moscow, Cairo, and Casablanca, obtaining strategy concurrence among the Allies - what did he not do? And all of this published in his official correspondence exactly the way he produced it at the time, as he wanted history to judge his actions. Churchill obtained consensus with openness, skill and savvy with quite a disparate group of characters - including one Joseph Stalin. Early in this period, when things were looking dim, he had to address a "No Confidence" Vote of Censure in the House of Commons. He did so by embracing the issue head-on, not by blaming others, but by skillfully addressing concerns that the House had raised. Result: 25 voting for censure, 475 voting against censure. That was great news for the Allied countries, and probably all the free world today.

[John Boyne · Rating 5 out of 5]

Churchill's fourth volume in his masterpiece work on WWII covers the period from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to the final victory in North Africa. The title, "The Hinge of Fate" is very appropriate for this volume as the book begins with England alone and on the retreat and ends with Russia and the United States joined with England and rapidly perusing the destruction of Germany. Always a great read from Churchill has he provides an amazing amount of first hand accounts surrounded by his personal thoughts and opinions on many matters. What set this volume aside from the others was the intense increase in political conversations with world leaders and negotiations between the great powers on how to conduct the war. It's a marathon to get through the whole series but well worth it as I look forward to beginning volume five soon.

[Michael Bafford · Rating 3 out of 5]

I haven’t read all of this; I have read all of Mr Churchill’s narrative and a good many telegrams and reports and even “Personal Minutes” to various and sundry high-ranking officials. Our library has the full set of these memoirs and I have considered giving them a try for many years but it was not until I saw one of the codgers in the movie The Bucket List reading just this, the fourth volume, that I finally got down to it. The preface is intriguing:

I have called this volume The Hinge of Fate because in it we turn from almost uninterrupted disaster to almost unbroken success. For the first six months of this story all went ill; for the last six months everything went well. (p. vi)

And then come:

Moral of the Work
In War: Resolution
In Defeat: Defiance
In Victory: Magnanimity
In Peace: Good Will

Theme of the Volume
How the power of the Grand Alliance become preponderant

The “Grand Alliance” is that between the U.S. (particularly) but also the Soviet Union.

This new year of the Second World War, 1942, opened upon us in an entirely different shape for Britain. We were no longer alone. At our side stood two mighty Allies, Russia and the United States were, though for different reasons irrevocably engaged to fight to the death in the closest concert with the British Empire. This combination made final victory certain . . . (p. 3)

The mention of the British Empire is a recurring theme. Soldiers from Australia, New Zeeland, South Africa and India form a large part of the Eighth Army in North Africa and there is considerable politics involved in keeping them up to the mark. Early on Australia feels threatened by Japan, reasonably so, and wants their troops back. Mr Churchill is pressed to explain why they can’t have them.

This whole North Africa campaign is something I have never really understood. The French, the Vichy French, had large colonies in the west and Britain had control of Egypt – and the Suez in the east. Nazi Germany needed oil, but surely the Middle East would have been a better target? Another question which I found increasingly confusing was why the Germans did not invade Malta. They had already taken Crete yet Malta remained in British possession from which air strikes on shipping from Italy to North Africa could be launched and convoys and war ships could find a relatively well-protected harbour. That the British had great trouble supplying Malta caused Mr Churchill considerable deliberation. Yet it was supplied and remained a threat.

Mr Churchill had a pet project called “Jupiter” an invasion of northern Norway. The purpose was to capture a couple of airfields which could be used as bases for bombers and fighters protecting the convoys running from the U.S. to Murmansk. This sounds like a good idea to me, but despite his efforts in pushing it forward the project never came off. Mr Churchill’s callousness is apparent in planning this:
“[during the invasion]…it seems unlikely that more than one-fifth or one-sixth of the transports and covering craft would be sunk. A military attack is not ruled out simply because a fifth of the soldiers my be shot on the way, provided the others get there and do the job.” (p. 352)

The story, though, begins in the far east as the Japanese march through Malaya and then take Singapore – the major British fortress. It is not until later, when he is informed of the fall of Tobruk that he truly expresses his feelings. This was the fortress that had resisted a siege by Rommel’s German and Italian forces for 241 days only a year earlier. At the time of this disaster Mr Churchill was in the U.S. with Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins:

...In a few minutes he [general Ismay] brought the following message, which had just arrived from Admiral Harwood at Alexandria.
“Tobruk has fallen, and situation deteriorated so much that there is a possibility of
heavy air attack on Alexandria in near future…”
This was one of the heaviest blows I can recall during the war. Not only were its military effects grievous, but it had affected the reputation of the British armies. At Singapore 85,000 men had surrendered to inferior numbers of Japanese. Now in Tobruk a garrison of 25,000 (actually 33,000) seasoned soldiers had laid down their arms to perhaps one-half of their number. If this was typical of the morale of the Desert Army, no measure could be put upon the disasters which impended in Northeast Africa. I did not attempt to hide from the President the shock I had received. It was a bitter moment. Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another. Nothing could exceed the sympathy and chivalry of my two friends. There were no reproaches; not an unkind word was spoken. “What can we do to help?” said Roosevelt. (p. 382-3)

The answer, of course, was “Give us as many Sherman tanks as you can spare and ship them to the Middle East as quickly as possible.”

Well, we know how it went, but considerable of the charm of this book is that at the time no one knew. After the Japanese had also taken Burma Mr Churchill feared for both India and Ceylon. He also feared that the Axis would sweep on through Egypt as he expressed in a message to General Auchinleck on 25 June 42:

I hope the crisis will lead to all uniformed personnel in the Delta and all available loyal man-power being raised to the highest fighting condition. You have over seven hundred thousand men on your ration strength in the Middle East. Every fit male should be made to fight and die for victory. There is no reason why units defending the Mersa Matruh position should not be reinforced by several thousands of officers and administrative personnel ordered to swell the battalions or working parties. You are in the same kind of situation as we should be if England were invaded, and the same intense, drastic spirit should reign. (p. 389)

After being driven from Mersa Matruh there is a change of command and on 30 June 42 Prime Minister to Minister of State:

… you should insist upon the mobilisation for battle of all the rearward services. Everybody in uniform must fight exactly like they would if Kent or Sussex were invaded. Tank hunting-parties with sticky bombs and bombards, defence to the death of every fortified area or strong building, making every post a winning-post and every ditch a last ditch. This is the spirit you have got to inculcate. No general evacuation, no playing for safety. Egypt must be held at all costs. (p. 425-6)

The man does have a way with words. “Every post a winning-post and every ditch a last ditch…”

Meanwhile over in Russia the Soviet resistance was stiffening. Mr Churchill is clearly ambivalent here: “I feel we at least deserve credit for our patience in the face of ceaseless affront from a Government which had been hoping to work with Hitler, until it was assaulted and almost destroyed by him.” …
“This is however the point at which to tell, all too briefly, the tale of the magnificent struggle and decisive victory of the Russian Armies…” (p. 582)

Mr Churchill regrets frequently that the western allies have not been able to relieve the pressure of the Axis armies on the Soviet Union by an invasion of France in 1942, or even in 1943. Not even obliquely does he admit that Commies and Nazis killing each other could be a good thing.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. [Chiefs of Staff] Committee 4 Mar. 43
I feel so very conscious of the poor contribution the British and American Armies are making in only engaging perhaps a dozen German divisions during the greater part of this year while Stalin is facing 185, that I should not be prepared myself to court the certain rebuff which would attend a request for information as to his plans. (p. 935)

Throughout the struggle there is still class-consciousness as revealed in a message from General Alexander to Prime Minister and C.I.G.S. (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) 1 Nov. 42 during the battle of Alamein: “Best estimate of casualties up to 6 A.M., October 31: killed wounded, and missing – officers, 695; other ranks, 9,435…” (p. 597)

That this was a an all-out struggle is made evident in, for example the Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes: Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War, C.I.G.S., and Minister of Production 8 May 42:

…3. 1,700,000 is the figure given for men in the Home Guard. My latest figure is 1,450,000, of which only 840,000 have rifles. Of course those with rifles are relieved by those without, and they all ought to be trained, but surely the emphasis should be on getting a number trained in shooting equal to the rifles issued. Let me know what is the plan about this.
4. I still think that, in view of the immense quantities of .30 ammunition now being produced in America – 319,000,000 rounds in March, for instance – we ought to try to get another 100,000,000 over to improve holdings of the Home Guard and for practice. I should be willing to make an effort for this… (p. 859)

These “Personal Minutes” are often interesting as Mr Churchill gets after his various Ministers, Secretary’s, Sea Lords, and Generals. As for example: Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production 13 May 42

Your latest returns shows that you have 1797 [aircraft] “in preparation.” These are presumably in addition to the 649 ready, and ready within four days. The shortage of aircraft at the present moment is acute. Now is the time for you to bring forward this reserve of 1797, which are presumably defective in this or that spare part.
Lord Beaverbrook in 1940 gained great advantages for us by a searching analysis and scrutiny of the machines in the Air Supply Units. What we want now is more aircraft in the front line. Get at it and bite at it. (p. 860)

He can also offer praise. Prime Minister to Minister of Labour 24 Sept. 42

I have read with great interest your note describing what has been achieved in the man-power field during the year ended last June.
I see that you drafted nearly a million men and women into the Services, thereby fulfilling the great bulk of their requirements, and at the same time added 800,00 to the labour force on munitions.
I congratulate you on this great performance. (p. 901)

The view is, of course von oben as for example in the Battle of the Atlantic when he reports “gross tons of shipping lost” and also “the number of ships lost” but nothing about the number of lives lost. Still I found this interesting, especially when the narrator is as dedicated and involved as Mr Churchill. From worrying – and writing to those in charge – about the distribution of flowers to the larger cities, providing a ration of sugar for bee-keepers, reviewing a “typical standard infantry battalion” or ordering increased air attacks on transport convoys, or defending himself in Parliament, or planning an invasion of West Africa or Sicily, or sweetening the Free French and the Russians and the Americans, while travelling to Africa and America no job is too large or too small.

[Tim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just to clarify, I started this book two months ago and have just finished it. I read fast, but not that fast.

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Hinge of Fate is the fourth installment of Winston Churchill's World War Two volumes.

His theme for this book is described as "How the power of the Grand Alliance became preponderant." Accordingly, he spends the book's 800 plus pages detailing how the tide turned (particularly against Germany and the Axis powers) during 1943.

The first two hundred pages deal largely with the fight against Japan. Fear over losing Singapore and Australia to the Japanese invaders looms large in Churchill's mind, and the loss of the former is a cause of particular anxiety to him. (Australia would remain safe due partly to the defeat of the Japanes navy in the Coral Sea).

Subsequent to Singapore's fall, President Roosevelt writes to the Prime Minister"I reali(z)e how the fall of Singapore has affected you and the British people. It gives the well-known back-seat driver a field day, but no matter how serious our setbacks have been-and I do not for a moment underrate them-we must constantly look forward to the next moves that need to be made to hit the enemy." This February 1942 letter underscored the strength of the growing bond between the U.S. and U.K., but it also alluded to political troubles at home for Churchill.

It is incredible to see read about just how much domestic criticism Churchill's government was willing to put up with in such a time of crisis. A Vote of Confidence on his leadership was called by the opposition in the House of Commons in early 1942 at a time when the war in Pacific and in the Middle East was not faring well.

This resulted in a two hours long speech to that chamber by a Prime Minister worried about his government being toppled.

During the course of his speech Churchill would inform the members that any one of them "will be free to say anything he think sift about or against the Administration or against the composition of personalities of the Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the House is always so careful to observe about military secrets." He would go on to say that he owes it "to the House (of Commons) to explain to the them what has led me to ask for their exceptional support at this time."

Churchill avoided a vote of no confidence, allowing a stronger hand to be exercised in execution of his wartime responsibilities. He would also survive a vote of censure later on in 1942 when the situation in North Africa appeared not to be going Britain's way.

Ensuring India does not fall to Japan is of critical importance to Churchill as well. Interestingly, he expresses distaste for Gandhi and his peace movement, citing its potential success as a guarantee that the country would fall to the invaders. Later in the book Gandhi is temporarily jailed over British concern that he would frustrate their desire to keep India on a war footing. It is from his confinement that the world-renown promoter of peace would go on a hunger strike.

After the first few hundred pages the book transitions to the fight against the Axis Powers.

The Middle Eastern theater becomes the area of focus, and Churchill utilizes ample detail to lay out fights in this region. The struggle against Erwin Rommel and the Africa Corps take up numerous pages, and Generals Bernard Montgomery and Claude Auchinlek prove invaluable to Churchill during the campaign to gain a foothold in the Middle East.

The Eighth Army and its relentless battling against German Panzer divisions make for suspenseful reading. The surrender of the Tobruk fortress to Rommel by General Hendrik Klopper marked a low point in the campaign, and it was not until the fighting at the Alamein position that the tide began to turn against Rommel. The help of New Zealand and Australian divisions in the victory there showed just how much Great Britain's empire contributed in manpower during the war. The failure of Rommel to take Egypt or to successfully follow up on victories at Tobruk doomed Axis efforts to maintain a base of operations in the desert.

The book then turns to north and western Africa after things settle down in the desert. "Operation Torch" is the new objective for the Allies, and by this juncture the American military is finally ready to spearhead a major operation against the Germans and Italians. General Dwight Eisenhower plays a key role for the first time in this operation, and Churchill's admiration for the American general is apparent.

While the motivations for the invasion of north and West Africa is apparent, the political gamesmanship with the French leaders-in-exile in north Africa makes for confusing reading. Trying to discern if leaders like Philippe Petain and Francois Darlan would actively/passive oppose or actively/passively support the American-led landing in north Africa made for guesswork among the American and British military staff. Britain distrust of Darlan, whom they viewed with disdain, did not eliminate the necessity of working to prevent him from stirring up opposition among the locals against the attempt to gain an Allied stronghold in the Tunisia/Algiers area.

Charles de Gaulle's stance as part hero, part enigma also makes the relationship between the Anglo-American partners and France complicated. Franklin Roosevelt is shown to have particular difficulties accepting de Gaulle as a genuine partner in the fight against Hitlerism. The concern that a cabal of Frenchmen would use the crisis and disorder precipitated by the German invasion for their own nefarious purposes was always at the back of American and British minds.

The Americans end up being appointed to take the lead in the initial landings in Operation Torch. This is done to prevent a potential backlash if Royal Navy ships and British troops are seen as spearheading the operation in the opinion of the local French population.

The success in establishing Allied control over north and west Africa causes The Hinge of Fate to end on a very encouraging note for the cause of worldwide freedom. The finishing off of Axis control in northeastern Africa allows full Allied control of the northern portion of that continent, eliminating Italian and German control of a crucial region.

Once in command in this area, the debate over what to do next takes center stage. A cross-English Channel invasion of German positions in France held appeal for Allied some war planners. Still others felt a bold campaign against southern Italy and a working up into the interior of Axis-controlled Europe (undertaken most likely after surrounding areas like Sicily were subdued) from there was a better, bolder next move.

Men like Generals George Marshall and Eisenhower take on an increasingly pivotal role in the direction of the war as the Hinge of Fate advances toward its ending, and their advice is taken seriously by Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The link between America and England becomes so strong that the Prime Minister even mentions the idea of a postwar joint citizenship between the two nations. He also expounds on his desire for a postwar United Nations, envisioning a sort of Security Council as well as regional governmental bodies and international troops which would underpin a peaceful world order.

Against the backdrop of war planning looms the fighting on the Russian front, where many German divisions are held up in brutal combat. Stalin's longing for the Allies to open up a major second front in Europe are a source of frequent frustration, as he hopes this would force Hitler to pull ground and air forces from the fight in Russia to stave off an invasion of the Reich from the west. The contribution made by the expelling of the German invasion from Russia is impossible to miss: the amount of German machinery and troops absorbed by that theater left the Allies in the west with a much weaker enemy to do battle against.

The Allies ultimately decide a cross-Channel invasion must be put off for another year (until 1944), opting instead to invade through the Mediterranean as a followup to victories in northern Africa. This is where the book leaves off.

Throughout its entirety The Hinge of Fate is a comprehensive, thorough account of the second World War through the firsthand accounts of Britain's Prime Minister. This spectacular work is an important contribution to the world's collective understanding of the key players, battles, and forces which shaped the battle to save mankind from fascism.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Winston Churchill was remarkable, as much as for any other reason, for the sheer volume of words he produced. In a long life, during which he was often preoccupied by both family matters (he had four children) and matters of state, he nevertheless found the time to compose an inordinate number of books. I say compose, because he perfected a system during the first war, which revealed its efficacy more than ever in the second, of working through secretaries. There are many odd anecdotes told about Churchill, not the least of which is that his secretaries, sometimes working in rotation throughout much of the night, were obliged to attend to him and take down what he said, even in the bath. This way of getting the material down in print proved to be very effective, as the tens of thousands of published pages of his work amply demonstrates.

His long history of the Second World War continues with "The Hinge of Fate." Although he was personally assured that the American entry into the war meant the ultimate defeat of Germany, he still had to see to the day to day running of the war machine, and counter the perverse effects of both German victories and British pessimism. Now began, as well, the long battle with Stalin about opening up a second front in France, to take some of the heat off the Russian armies in the East. In fact, his relationship with the Russian leader is one of the most interesting sources of anecdotal references throughout this series.

This is history being well told by a man who was, while perhaps not a trained historian as such, so steeped in the history of his family and his country, that he an utterly unique point of view. The fact that he was also a central figure in the war itself, means that we have, if you like, a one in a million chance victory on our hands, as though we had just won a lottery of sorts, by being able to read him.

[David Rubin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the fourth volume in Winston Churchill's monumental work on the Second World War. This is not history of a grand scope, but rather, Churchill's personal memoir of the war. Of course, being a key player on the allied side, Churchill brings a wealth of information and insight to the decision making process.

We Americans are so inculcated with the American roles and perspectives of the war, that Churchill's quintessential British version of events is a refreshing view. The book is composed of two interwoven parts: His personal recollections and opinions and verbatim copies of telegrams, letters, and radio transmissions. Source material not in the primary text is included in appendices taking up one third of the book (Kindle version).

Another major allure of this book is the wonderful command of the language which the author has demonstrated throughout his lifetime. I highly recommend the four volume "History of the English Speaking People," for example. Churchill was not just a great public speaker; at heart he is a reporter. In fact, Winston Churchill was the first major British politician to have made his living as a reporter and writer. Use a dictionary or an electronic reader with a built in dictionary; some of his language is a bit archaic.

One downside: Amazon has apparently scanned the physical volume to make its Kindle edition and sometimes errors occurred. Shame on Amazon for not doing a better job with the editing.

Well, for me, its off to the next volume, "Closing the Ring."

[Jeff Elliott · Rating 3 out of 5]

Being 1,000 pages it took me a while to get through. There were a few good chapters on leadership (4 and 5). Having been a fan of Churchill this became a must read. During the time I have been reading this book I have learned some other things about him from another perspective. It's hard to read someone's work objectively until you have outside sources. Churchill's tendency to meddle in areas outside of his domain was what cost him his job before the war but also led to his success during it. As I read his thoughts about himself and the war it is now easy to see how this accusation rings true. In one of the appendix notes he is writing to someone about re-releasing a German propaganda film as an edited English film highlighting German atrocities. He even goes so far as to suggest a title for the film.

I'm still a big fan of Churchill and admire his courage and moxy but I can also see how that could be taken as arrogance and meddling.

It will probably be a while before I begin the fifth book in this series. I have some other books I want to get through first...perhaps this fall.

[Keith · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lots of details about the negotiations between the powers on how to proceed with the war. I am struck with the immense difference in complexity between board games that people plan and a real war spread across several continents.

Chapter 12: India
In the midst of Japanese powerful attacks and victories, India was charging Great Britain exorbitant fees for the defense of India, and also factions were agitating for independence.

It is striking how much more difficult a real war is than even the most complex simulation games.
- Uncertainty of the situation
- Shifting alliances - Uncertainty about the reliability of others
- The need to manage public opinion at home including opposition to one’s best efforts

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have read almost every one of Churchill's books. Reading any of them is like going to a technicolor movie.

[Michael Scott · Rating 2 out of 5]

[TODO]


--- Considering ElAlamein as "the hinge of fate" is, to put it mildly, British-centered. It was a battle of great tactical importance, which opened up the campaign in Italy, but "the" hinge? How about Stalingrad (Russia)? How about Midway and Guadalcanal (US)? Admittedly, Churchill does say "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat." (Emphasis mine.)

--- The terse treatment of Stalingrad and, in general, of the Russian plight. Although Churchill does complain that it was not fair of the Russians to keep asking (in no polite terms) for help from the Allies (which the Russians considered a duty of the Allies) after having aided Nazi Germany for more than a year, at the start of the war and until the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty was unilaterally broken by Hitler, the material in this book seems to suggest that Churchill aided Stalin's Russia reluctantly and as little as possible while not appearing to break their treaties.

--- It also seems that Churchill did everything in his power to prevent spill of British and, to some extent, British Empire and American lives, using the Russians as a human shield. A poorly equipped human shield led by a criminal leader who could not get along politically with the other two major Allies, but a human shield nevertheless.

--- Churchill spends a disproportionate amount of material arguing his case, which he feels is in need of this. He defends his management of the Eastern war (which ended in total collapse at the hits of the Japanese army); the disastrous campaigns in North Africa (where Rommel plays the non-commitment of the British generals and re-gains, while using few troops but novel tactics with armored troops, all the territory the British have conquered from the hapless Italians); the non-intervention in Europe; the disaster at Dieppe (good learning experience, in the opinion of Churchill); etc. He blames everyone but the British and, when the British cannot be defended, everyone but himself. Among others, he blames the Australians; the impossibility to predict the precarious status of the US troops in the Pacific; the US reluctance to enter the war; the previous administration's building of adequate defenses in Singapore, where the inland part of the fortress was not built (?!); etc. This reviewer would have preferred an admission of guilt. At some point, Churchill is close to admitting the mistakes, but, even then, defers to higher ground: " The Australians’ claim that they had understood and foreseen the dangers in the Far East and from Japan better than I had done in London can only be judged in relation to the war as a whole. It was their duty to study their own position with concentrated attention. We had to try to think for all." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 403-405). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.
In another place, he does admit some part of guilt, about the complete collapse of the British situation in the Pacific, and the tragic falls of Singapore and of Burma (both major strongholds of the British and considered unconquerable for a long period of time): "I do not write this in any way to excuse myself. I ought to have known. My advisers ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 885-886). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.


-- The political treatment of India, which seems to contradict the general position against tyranny that Churchill insists the British were taking. Among others, the political games to keep India a British protectorate: "The document on which we have agreed represents our united policy. If that is rejected by the Indian parties, for whose benefit it has been devised, our sincerity will be proved to the world, and we shall stand together and fight on it here, should that ever be necessary." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 3558-3560). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.


-- The little attention given to the plight of Jews.


-- The little attention and somewhat malicious statements regarding the bombing of German cities, which Churchill considers due retaliation for similar aggression acts started by the Germans: "Only the weather is holding us back from continuous, heavy bombing attack on Germany. Our new methods are most successful. Essen, Cologne, and above all Lübeck, were all on the Coventry scale." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 3361-3363). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.


++ Churchill was able to correctly predict the impact of the China on the war. On the losing side of prediction, the US President Roosevelt estimated a quick growth, similar to what he saw in Japan. In hindsight correct, Churchill deplores the overall capabilities of China: "I would of course always be helpful and polite to the Chinese, whom I admired and liked as a race and pitied for their endless misgovernment, but that he must not expect me to adopt what I felt was a wholly unreal standard of values." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 2230-2231). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition. He also recounts an episode of Chinese misinformation, from the official reply of General Wavell (Commander in Chief of the Pacific front):  << “I did not refuse Chinese help,” replied Wavell. “You say I have ‘now’ accepted 49th and 93rd Divisions. I accepted both these divisions when I was at Chungking on December 23rd, and any delay in moving them down has been purely Chinese. These two divisions constitute Fifth Chinese Army, I understand, except for one other division of very doubtful quality. >> Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 2246-2248). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition. (The Chinese claim has been of the British General refusing their aid and of aid being comprised of much larger armies.)



+ The exploit at Saint Nazaire, where a courageous group of British commandos stormed the port and destroyed the only place along the Atlantic coast where the supreme yet damaged battleship Tirpitz could have been repaired. This cost the Germans many months of repairs and helped the Allies survive in the Battle of the Atlantic, where attacks from German U-boats were already more than the Allies could manage.


+ Identifying some of the weaknesses in German war strategy, such as the inability to continue their most successful plans (Goering's aerial attacks of British war factories, now Raeder's submarine attacks on the Allied fleets in the Atlantic).


+ The very interesting defensive war carried out in the Pacific after the fall of Burma, with establishment of bases at Fort T (Addu Atoll, in the Maldives); the defense of Ceylon (Sri Lanka); etc.


+/- Small piece mentioning Doolittle's aerial attack and subsequent bombing of Tokyo, on April 18, 1942, the first during this war on Japanese soil, which likely helped in the Japanese setting policy of defense-first.


+++ Churchill assesses the cost of feeding the Russian front, for both Britain and Allies: lack of ammunition for other military action, a heavy price in lives and shipping tonnage in the Atlantic, weak defenses left in Britain, etc. For years during and after the war, and especially in their satellite countries, the Russians have built the myth that they, by themselves and alone, fought and conquered Hitler's Germany. In reality, the murderous policy of Stalin of throwing human lives at the enemy was a contrast to the British policy of preserving as much as possible their soldiers, and of compensating with equipment aids to the Russians, and of putting lives at stake only when necessary or when winning chances were very favorable.


+ The interesting piece on the exploit at Bruneval, Cap d'Antifer, near Havre. There, the Germans have installed a new type of Radar, which was causing many British planes to be detected and lost. To study it, "a detachment of paratroops dropped at midnight behind the German station on the cliff summit, and held the defenders at bay. With them went a carefully briefed party of sappers and an R.A.F. radio mechanic, with instructions to remove as much of the equipment as they could, sketch and photograph the rest, and if possible capture one of the German operators." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 4561-4564). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition. The action was successful and British Intelligence and war research were able to use the results to good effect.


-- The endless stream of letters cannot compensate the overall feeling that the British were simply stalling. Roosevelt writes to Churchill: "the Russians are to-day killing more Germans and destroying more equipment than you and I put together." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Location 5164). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.

-- The feeling that the Her Majesty's Government was covering it all up in bureaucratic lettering, while human lives were lost on a gigantic scale on the Russian front: "When subsequent reproaches were made by the Soviet Government, and when Stalin himself raised the point personally with me, we always produced the aide-memoire and pointed to the words “We can therefore give no promise”." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 5636-5637). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition. And "Nearly all my work has been done in writing, and a complete record exists of all the directions I have given, the inquiries I have made, and the telegrams I have drafted. I shall be perfectly content to be judged by them." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 6683-6684). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.


++ Interesting mention of the class prejudice existing inside the British army, which prevented people such as Michael Dunbar, a sergeant in the armored brigade with relevant experience in the Spanish war, from being used to their capacity.


++ The episode when Churchill is criticized and censored publicly, in the middle of the war!



+++ An interesting thought regarding an European Union: "I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council consisting of perhaps ten units, including the former Great Powers, with several confederations—Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc.-which would possess an international police" Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 9170-9173). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.


++ Churchill makes an interesting speculation about the general reason for which the French accepted so readily to collaborate with the German invaders: the unquestionable trust the French public officer puts in the chain of command (droit administratif). It was sufficient for a trusted group of people to man the Vichy Government, for the general French public officer to find acceptable an unbroken link with the Germans.


+++ The mention of flying fortresses, an American invention much derided at first, but useful later in the bombing of Axis cities.


+++ The very interesting debate about the term unconditional surrender, which many detractors of Churchill claim has prolonged the war. In Churchill's view, it was needed to appease the public and prevent that the Axis, once defeated, are burdened with similar terms as those of 1918 (which he blames in The Gathering Storm as important in the rise to power of Hitler), has helped pushing Italy into submission to the Allies, and has also helped prevent that Germans and other defeated nations start a new World War.


+++ The interesting story of the battle for North Africa, including the brilliant maneuvering of Generals Alexander and Montgomery, and the political encounters with the French.


+ Desert Victory, a propaganda film that inspired the Russians.


+++ An example of the poor ability of the British to wage war, even in 1943: "General Marshall somewhat hesitatingly observed, “I admired your gallery, but we had one like it [the tunnels inside the Rock of Gibraltar] at Corregidor. The Japanese fired their artillery at the rock several hundred feet above it, and in two or three days blocked it off with an immense bank of rubble.” I was grateful to him for his warning, but the Governor seemed thunderstruck. All the smiles vanished from his face." Churchill, Winston (2010-07-01). The Hinge of Fate (Winston Churchill World War II Collection) (Kindle Locations 13239-13242). RosettaBooks. Kindle Edition.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE FOURTH VOLUME (OF SIX) OF CHURCHILL’S FASCINATING HISTORY OF THE WAR

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (1874-1965) was a British statesman who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1945, and then again from 1951 to 1955. He won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953 for his historical works. In 1963, he was made an honorary citizen of the United States (one of only eight people so honored). [NOTE: page numbers below refer to the 873-page paperback edition.]

He wrote in the Preface to this 1950 book, “We had now to face the onslaught of Japan… this volume … is told from the standpoint of the British Prime Minister… Again, I rely upon the series of my directives, telegrams, and minutes… As they are my own composition, written at the time, it is by these that I prefer to be judged. It would be easier to produce a series of afterthoughts when the answers to all the riddles were known, but I must leave this to the historians who will in due course be able to pronounce their considered judgments. I have called this volume ‘The Hinge of History’ because in it we turn from almost uninterrupted disaster to almost unbroken success… And this agreeable change continued to the end of the struggle.”

He begins, “The New Year of the Second World War, 1942, opened upon us in an entirely different shape for Britain. We were no longer alone. At our side stood two mighty allies. Russia and the United States were, though for different reasons, irrevocably engaged to fight to the death in the closest concert with the British Empire. This combination made final victory certain unless it broke to pieces under the strain, or unless some entirely new instrument of war appeared in German hands. There was indeed a new instrument of war for which both sides were avidly groping. As it turned out it was into our already stronger hands that the secret of the atomic bomb was destined to fall. A fearful and bloody struggle lay before us and we could not foresee its course, but the end was sure.” (Bk. 1, Ch. 1, pg. 3)

He admits of Singapore, “I ought to have known. My advisers ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked. The reason I had not asked about this matter… was that the possibility of Singapore having no landward defenses no more entered into my mind than that of a battleship being launched without a bottom. I am aware of the various reasons that have been given for this failure… I do not consider these reasons valid. Defenses should have been built.” (Ch. 3, pg. 44)

He paid tribute to Nazi General Rommel on January 27 in the House of Commons: “ We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.” He acknowledges, “My reference to Rommel passed off quite well at the moment. Later on I heard that some people had been offended. They could not feel that any virtue should be recognized in an enemy leader. This churlishness is a well-known streak in human nature, but contrary to the spirit in which a war is won or a lasting peace established.” (Ch. 4, pg. 59)

He states, “The U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been wise for the Germans to stake all upon it… Just as Goering repeatedly shifted his air targets in the Battle of Britain in 1940, so now the U-boat warfare was to some extent weakened for the sake of competing attractions. Nevertheless, it constituted a terrible event in a very bad time.” (Ch. 7, pg. 109)

He recounts, “I told the President how much I felt American opinion overestimated the contribution which China could make to the general war. He differed strongly. There were five hundred million people in China. What would happen in this enormous population developed in the same way as Japan had done in the last century and got hold of modern weapons? I replied I was speaking of the present war, which was quite enough to go on with for the time being. I said I would of course always be helpful and polite to the Chinese, whom I admired and liked as a race and pitied for their endless misgovernment, but that he must not expect me to adopt what I felt was a wholly unreal standard of values.” (Ch. 8, pg. 116)

He explains, “I always followed… the principle that military commanders should not be judged by results, but by the quality of their effort… I admired the composure and firmness of mind with which [General A.P.] Wavell had faced the cataract of disaster which had been assigned to him with so much formality and precision. Some men would have found reasons for declining, or asked for impossible conditions before accepting a task so baffling and hopeless, failure in which could not but damage their reputation with the public. Wavell’s conduct had conformed to the best traditions of the Army.” (Ch. 8, pg. 125-126)

He summarizes, “From this moment all our thoughts turned with sober confidence to the offensive. No longer did we think in terms of where the enemy might strike the next blow, but where we could best strike at him to win back the vast territories that he had overrun in his headlong rush. The road would be long and hard, and massive preparations were still needed to win victory in the East, but the issue was not in doubt; nor need the demands from the Pacific bear too heavily on the great effort the United States was preparing to exert in Europe.” (Ch. 14, pg. 222)

He spoke with Roosevelt about north Africa: “‘What can I do to help?’ said Roosevelt. I replied at once, ‘Give us as many Sherman tanks as you can spare…’ … the Americans were better than their word. Three hundred Sherman tanks… and a hundred self-propelled guns were put into six of their fastest ships and sent off to the Suez Canal. The ship containing the engines for all the tanks was sunk by a submarine off Bermuda. Without a single word from us the President and Marshall put a further supply of engines into another fast ship and dispatched it to overtake the convoy. ‘A friend in need is a friend indeed.’” (Ch. 22, pg. 333)

He records, “A story---alas, not authenticated---[said] Montgomery spoke of the trials and hazards of a soldier’s career. He gave his whole life to his profession, and lived long years of study and self-restraint. Presently fortune smiled, there came a gleam of success, he gained advancement, opportunity presented itself, he had a great command. He won a victory, he became world-famous, his name was on every lip. Then the luck changed. At one stroke all his life’s work flashed away, perhaps through no fault of his own, and he was flung into the endless catalogue of military failures. ‘But,’ expostulated [General Hastings] Ismay, ‘You ought not to take it so badly… It may well be that you are not going to disaster.’ ‘What?’ cried Montgomery, sitting up in the car. ‘What do you mean? I was talking about Rommel!’” (Bk. 2, Ch. 3, pg. 404-405)

He acknowledges, “I had now been twenty-eight months at the head of affairs, during which we had sustained an almost unbroken series of military defeats… We were alive and at bay; but that was all. On the other hand, what a cataract of disasters had fallen upon us!... The fact that we were no longer alone but instead had the two most mighty nations in the world in alliance, fighting desperately at our side, gave indeed assurances of ultimate victory. But this, by removing the sense of mortal peril, only made criticism more free. Was it strange that the whole character and system of the war direction, for which I was responsible, should have been brought into question and challenge?” (Ch. 8, pg. 477-478)

He reports with satisfaction, “We had nothing like this superiority at Alamein… For these reasons the Battle of Almein will ever make a glorious page in British military annals. There is another reason why it will survive. It marked in fact the turning of ‘the Hinge of Fate.’ It may almost be said, ‘Before Almein we never had a victory. After Almein we never had a defeat.’” (Ch. 10, pg. 524)

He admits, “Memories of the war may be vivid and true, but should never be trusted without verification, especially where the sequence of events is concerned. I certainly made several erroneous statements about the ‘unconditional surrender’ incident, because I said what I thought and believed at the moment without looking up the records. Mine was not the only memory at fault….” (Ch. 15, pg. 597)

He observes, “We must now revert to the tremendous drama unfolding around Stalingrad… This crushing disaster to the Germans ended Hitler’s prodigious effort to conquer Russia by force of arms, and destroy Communism by an equally odious form of totalitarian tyranny.” (Ch. 16, pg. 619-620)

He comments on the Russian interpretation of the massacre at Katyn: “Their report… [was] that the Polish prisoners fell into German hands and were later slaughtered by them… When we remember the confusion caused by the German advance, that the guards of the camps must have fled as the invaders came nearer, and all the contacts afterwards during the period of Russo-Polish cooperation, belief seems an act of faith.” (Ch. 18, pg. 661)

He suggests, “The American chiefs do not like to be outdone in generosity. No people respond more spontaneously to fair play. If you treat Americans well they always want to treat you better. Nevertheless I consider that the argument which convinced the Americans was on its merits overwhelming.” (Ch. 22, pg. 710)

Whether one reads it as history, or literature, this series will be absolute “must reading” for anyone even marginally interested in the Second World War. (At the very least, one should read an abridgement, such as Memoirs of the Second World War.

[Rob Markley · Rating 5 out of 5]

As the balance shifts towards inevitable victory for the allies there is not just the story to follow but also many veiled lessons to be learned. Also much in evidence are Churchill's own, although a fairly old man - prodigious powers. This latter point comes through in his writing, in the vast array of topics he concerns himself with, in the diplomacy inherent in the hints without explicitly judging the living or memory of still recent events; but most of all in his ability to manage two immense allies in USA and USSR. Eisenhower to whom much is handed is a political sub manager not a combat soldier. This management takes a fair portion of Churchill's energy during the war and of this book, but what is apparent is the conviction that USA must take the lead and is handed such, while at the same time carefully managed to pursue Churchill's strategy and agenda in every way except with the inability to re invade Norway.

Where there is general weakness both in Churchill, and in Roosevelt and Americans is naivety about the look of the post war situation. The Americans are naive and fanciful in their regard of the real situations of China and India (we see Gandhi for what he really was in Churchill's work!) and hence indirectly contribute to the disasters to follow. Churchill himself assumes a 19th century redrawing of European borders - breaking away Prussia from Germany and creating regional power blocs. Neither have any concept of the sharp polarisation and divide postwar communism will bring. Neither have regard for the terrible world wide evil they are toying with.

Churchill certainly covers the Katyn forest atrocity leaving little doubt as to responsibility, but nevertheless refusing to outright condemn the Soviet's, all for the sake of defeating Nazism. Not only is there the disregard for the future of Poland (the reason for the war in the first place) but also a sad lack regard for their sensibilities, simply using them as pawns in the game. Then there is the committed huge cost in material and lives expended supporting those Soviets! Has Churchill remembered nothing from the the treachery of communism so apparent in volume one, 'The Gathering Storm' - had he become too single minded in seeking to defeat one evil, in that he more than supped with the devil - he gave the keys to the restaurant?!

The other great learning theme is to reflect not to the future and without, but within and to the internal sickness. Churchill is constantly harping on as to why British units require so many more (compared to the Germans) non combatants and such a long tail dragging behind every combat unit. He overly loyal to dithering and excuse making administrators like Wavell and Auckinleck, while astutely contrasting them with true Generals like Alexander and Montgomery. The incompetence and inaction that delivers what everyone imaged as the the fortress of Singapore is castigated and Churchill hints at postwar cover up. While Churchill out of patriotism cannot say as much, Britain was infected by bureaucracy and inertia, by class prejudice and self interested privilege, by narrow minded self protectionist sentiment, by blindness, incompetence and laziness. Churchill himself is the great force attempting and in a large part succeeding in reanimating the British bulldog.

[Roy Lotz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I find that I am liking each one of these volumes more than the last. The pleasure of this series is that, through the eyes of Winston Churchill, the war takes the shape of an enormous board game, played over months and years. Far removed from the gore of the front lines, Churchill sees the conflict as symbols on a map, which he needs to arrange in the most advantageous possible way—a game he plays brilliantly. This is not to say that he is frivolous or superficial. But warfare is far more palatable when experienced from the command chair than from the trenches.

Added to purely military decisions is the messier business of courting allies. Indeed, the best parts of this book describe Churchill’s cultivation of his relationships with Roosevelt and Stalin. Dealing with the Americans was relatively easy, as Roosevelt and Churchill seemed to have gotten along very well. Nevertheless, working so closely together required constant coordination of plans, both short-term and long-term; and Churchill sometimes struggled to get the American command to accept his military vision.

With Stalin, relations were far more tense. The Soviet leader is constantly demanding from Churchill fresh supplies and for a second front in France. Churchill, meanwhile, does his best to placate Stalin while firmly refusing to do what he feels is unwise. This culminates in his 1942 visit to Moscow, narrated in the two best chapters of the book. Churchill, certain that the Allies will not be able to invade France in 1942, decides he must deliver this message personally if he is to maintain his working relationship with the Soviets. Stalin, at first, doesn’t take the news well, but by the end they are up all night, drinking vodka. In virtually any other circumstances, the two men would have been sworn enemies, and it is fascinating to see them try to cooperate.

The title of the book is quite apt, as it contains the battles that marked the beginning of the end for both Germany and Japan: Midway, Stalingrad, and Tunisia. These books, it should be remembered, are public memoirs rather than objective history; and so Stalingrad and Midway, being battles Churchill had nothing to do with, get only a cursory treatment. Northern Africa, on the other hand, occupies much of the book, as British and then American forces beat Rommel, invaded the Vichy territories, and finally won a decisive victory in Tunisia.

As a final thought, I am constantly surprised at how much I am learning from these books. Somehow, after a lifetime of World War II media, I knew close to nothing about operation “Torch,” and had no real idea of the significance of the Northern African campaigns. I was also unfamiliar with the Katyn massacres—Russia’s mass executions of Polish prisoners, an issue which Churchill felt he could not raise with the Soviets, for fear of hurting their relationship. Indeed, having been in Dresden just two weeks ago, I’ve had occasion to reflect that it was not only the axis who committed war crimes.

[Colonel Sir Cedric Wycliffe-Hawthorne · Rating 5 out of 5]

Review of The Hinge of Fate by Winston S. Churchill

The Hinge of Fate is the fourth volume in Winston Churchill’s six-volume history of the Second World War, offering a sweeping narrative of the period between 1942 and 1943. As with the earlier volumes, Churchill’s meticulous recounting of events is enriched by his direct involvement in the shaping of the war’s strategies and decisions, as well as his exceptional insights into the pivotal moments that shifted the course of the conflict.

Key Themes and Events:
• Turning of the Tide: This volume delves into the crucial turning point of the war, when the momentum shifted from the Axis powers to the Allies. It examines how Britain and its allies gradually began to achieve success after months of challenges and constant defeat.
• The Battle of El Alamein: A major focus is placed on the Allied victory at El Alamein in 1942, where British forces under General Montgomery decisively defeated Rommel’s Afrika Korps, preventing the Axis powers from securing North Africa.
• The Pacific Theater: Another critical element of this volume is the examination of the war in the Pacific, particularly Japan’s persistent attempts to destabilize the Allies by attacking Russia, as well as the gradual Allied pushback against Japanese forces. The volume charts how these developments impacted the global strategy.
• The Russian Front: Churchill also provides key insights into Germany’s engagement with Russia, where Hitler’s failure to defeat the Soviet Union led to a prolonged conflict on the Eastern Front, significantly impacting Germany’s overall war effort.

Churchill’s Role and Leadership:
• Churchill’s personal leadership is crucial in this volume, as it tracks his actions during these defining moments of the war. His ability to unify the Allies, make key decisions under pressure, and maintain his leadership in the face of mounting adversity is evident throughout.

Notable Quotes:
• “The hinge of fate has turned. The war is now at a critical juncture. Our enemies will not yield easily, and our resolve must be as firm as ever.”
• “Victory, when it comes, will be the product of countless decisions, acts of bravery, and the immense efforts of all who fought.”

Final Verdict:

The Hinge of Fate is a landmark volume in the historical recounting of the Second World War. Churchill’s unique perspective as a statesman, his personal insight into the events, and the narrative’s dramatic sweep make this book essential for

[Nathan Casebolt · Rating 4 out of 5]

With the violent entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into World War II, the fate of the Axis powers was sealed. However, history only appears inevitable in retrospect. Both Germany and Japan expanded to their greatest extents in 1942. Nazi panzers bit deeply into Russia and threatened Egypt, Britain's lifeline to to the East. Japan tore through thin colonial defenses around the Pacific rim and tightened its decade-long stranglehold on China. By 1943, however, Axis power was strained to the breaking point in a war never intended to last this long. American industry armed the Allies with breathtaking speed while the vastness of Russian space and population bled Germany dry. The hinge of fate had turned; and from this point to the end of the war, the door would inexorably close on Axis dreams of empire.

Churchill's memoirs of this time are largely dedicated to the campaigns to clear North Africa of German and Italian forces. The pivotal naval Battle of Midway is rolled into a single chapter along with the Battle of the Coral Sea. The titanic struggle on the Russian front is only occasionally mentioned, including such monumental turning points as the Battle of Stalingrad. That's not to say Churchill downplays Russian sacrifice and contribution; to the contrary, he frequently expresses his comprehension of how much final victory was owed to the Russians. However, he also never forgot Stalin's intentions to join Germany in carving up the British Empire before Hitler unleashed the Wehrmacht on him, and Churchill never (with good reason) trusted the Stalinist regime.

Beyond this, though, it must be remembered that these are the memoirs of the British Prime Minister, not a comprehensive history of the war. For the British, the war in this period consisted of working with the Americans to contain Japan as best they could, supply Russia as best they could, and strike the Axis on the only feasible large-scale front available to the western allies: North Africa. What most stands out to me about this volume is Churchill's palpable sense of relief over the ultimate outcome of the war. This is illustrated by a memo in the appendices in which he writes to one of his ministers that he hasn't reviewed the ammunition returns in months because the supply from America is so large. The entry of the United States into the war transformed a struggle for survival into a crusade to victory, and this comes through clearly in the brightening tone of this volume.

[Steven Wheeler · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've been fascinated by World War II for at least five decades, and have spent many pleasant hours reading about Winston Churchill, but mainly his own writing. His series The Second World War is eminently readable and is a rich resource on the strategic level of the war as told by a key participant.

I picked the fourth volume to comment on here because it covers America's entry into the war and his correspondence with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It's fun to see how these two world leaders got along so famously with mutual esteem, respect, and admiration. Churchill would sign many of his cables to FDR as "Former Naval Person" due to his past service as First Lord of the Admiralty 1911-1914. He and the president usually saw eye-to-eye on issues large and small, but if they did differ to some degree, they would talk it through and arrive at mutual understanding and agreement.

At least as fascinating is Churchill's correspondence and above all meeting with Josef Stalin in Moscow in August, 1942. Remember that Churchill's Second World War books came out after FDR had passed, but while Stalin was will alive. So he had to tread a bit carefully in reporting and commenting upon the Soviet Premier. Still, he remarked more than once on the fact that prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Russians were indifferent to Britain's fate and would have gleefully divvied up the British Empire with the Nazis had England been beaten. Still, his account of meeting Stalin and working to establish a personal relationship is profoundly enlightening on many levels.

It's a treat to spend time with Mr. Churchill in the form of his writing, especially because he adds amusing anecdotes here and there. One such is when he and Stalin were in a rather tense discussion of Arctic supply convoys and Churchill was trying to convey the difficulties of the route in the face of sea and weather conditions and German air power. Stalin seemed apt to discredit these factors, and at one point asked if Churchill was implying that he knew little about naval operations. Churchill replied: "Russia is a land animal. The British are sea animals."

In any case, the quality of Churchill's writing, the product of a brilliant mind, is worth the price. So, too is the example of an eminently worthy national and international leader. Would that we had another of his calibre among us today. It's refreshing to remember this in our present era.

[Edvinas Palujanskas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Tikėjausi, kad ši knyga bus daug geresnė nei buvo iš tikrųjų. Žinoma, iš anksto buvo galima nuspėti, kokius ideologinius teiginius sakys Čerčilis, tačiau šioje knygoje atrodė, kad propaganda pamažu vis didėjo ir didėjo, kol galiausiai paskutiniuose knygos puslapiuose Indijos subkontinento okupacija buvo pavadinta "civilizuojančiu valdymu", o Izraelis buvo visapusiškai šlovinamas(P.480. "Nuo 1917m. Balfouro deklaracijos ištikimai rėmiau sionistų bylą").
Įdomiausi knygoje aptariami dalykai buvo pasiruošimas išsilaipinimui Normandijoje ir išsilaipinimas Rivjeroje bei apmąstymai, ką reikėjo daryti, kad Italija būtų buvusi užimta greičiau ir tuo pačiu kaip būtų buvę galima per ją veržtis į Austriją. Kita vertus, knygoje Čerčilis pernelyg šlovina kiekvieną savo mintį ir veiksmą. Jam atrodo, kad dėl Lenkijos jis padarė viską ir kad jeigu būtų buvęs perrinktas 1945m., jis būtų galėjęs kone išgelbėti šalį. Kai Čerčilis knygoje pateikia Stalino telegramas apie Lenkiją, kone jaučiu kaip Stalinas juokiasi iš Čerčilio. Stalino kariuomenė kontroliavo Lenkiją ir buvo tiesiog tragikomiška skaityti, kai Čerčilis prašo Stalino, kad į Lenkijos rinkimus būtų galima atsiųsti nepriklausomus stebėtojus.
JAV ir Didžioji Britanija pagal Čerčilį yra neklystančios pasaulio laisvosios valstybės ir jam visiškai neatrodo veidmainiška viename puslapyje kalbėti apie demokratinius rinkimus Graikijoje, o kitoje vietoje jau šlovinti Britanijos imperiją.
Kadangi ši knyga yra memuarai, o ne Antrojo pasaulinio karo istorija, ją galima vertinti gan neblogai. Po nuolatiniais pasikartojančiais propagandiniais teiginiais, galima rasti gan neblogų dialogų su įvairiais žymiais žmonėmis ir situacijų aprašymų, kurie yra itin komiški, pvz:
P. 340(Jaltoje). "Mūsų šeimininkai labai stengėsi, kad mums būtų patogu, ir į kiekvieną atsitiktinę pastabą dėmesingiausiai reaguodavo. Kartą Portalas, gėrėdamasis dideliu stikliniu akvariumu su viduje augančiais augalais, pastebėjo, kad jame nėra žuvų. Po dviejų dienų akvariume jau plaukiojo auksinės žuvelės. Kitą kartą kažkas tarp kitko tarstelėjo, kad kokteiliuose nėra citrinos žievelės. Kitą dieną vilos vestibiulyje jau stovėjo vaisiais apkibęs citrinmedis. Matyt, visa tai buvo atskraidinta lėktuvu ir iš toli".

[David Campton · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reading this as part of my endeavour, after owning them for 30 years, of reading this 6 volume account of WW2 from Churchill's perspective, completing each one 80 years after the year it refers to. After 3 years of describing defeat after defeat (with the exception of the brief glory of the Battle of Britain) this volume, as the title suggests, marks the turning point. However it is also the epitome of the statement attributed to Churchill that history would be kind to him as he intended to write it. Covering the period from the US's effective entry into the war in January 1942, through to the eve of the assault on Sicily in mid 1943, this account largely overlooks events on the Eastern Front (with brief references to Stalingrad) and the Pacific (although the early 1942 reverses at Singapore and in the Indian Ocean continues the litany of defeats from previous volumes). The first half is largely focused on the desert war and the ultimate victory at Alamein. I had to go and seek out other accounts to counterbalance Churchill's clearly partial record, which particularly casts Auchinleck in a poor light (making one wonder why Churchill then recommended him for a significant role in the Burma theatre), and paints Montgomery in glowing terms, suggesting that Churchill saw something of himself in the self-promoting commander of the 8th Army. The second half is a largely repetitive account of the discussions in various places about "what next?" Unsurprisingly Churchill's broad objective is painted as the one that wins out, as previously with the American invasion of French North Africa, although he does note his championing of the invasion of Northern Norway (without suggesting that this might be because of his regrets about the Narvik campaign earlier in the war when he was in the admiralty). Also in this volume we see the emergence of the US Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, who arguably have a greater influence on the subsequent trajectory of the war and the post-war world.