ADLER ANALYZES SIX OF THE 102 “GREAT IDEAS” HE HAS HELPED IDENTIFY
Mortimer Jerome Adler (1902-2001) was an American philosopher, educator, and popular author, who worked at various times for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and his own Institute for Philosophical Research.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1981 book, “Working for the Encyclopedia Britannica company and … editing and publishing ‘Great Books of the Western World,’ I produced two volumes on the great ideas, entitled the ‘Syntopicon.’ These were intended to guide readers to the important passages in which the discussion of the great ideas can be found in the great books. In the course of that work I wrote essays on each of the 102 great ideas, which comprise the chapters of the Syntopicon…”
He begins the first chapter, “It cannot be too often repeated that philosophy is everybody’s business. To be a human being is to be endowed with the proclivity to philosophize… It is also necessary to understand why this is so and what philosophy’s business is. The answer, in a word, is ideas. In two words, it is great ideas---the ideas basic and indispensable to understanding ourselves, our society, and the world in which we live… But everyone … [has not] pondered sufficiently the questions raised by each of the great ideas. To do that and to think one’s way through to some resolution of the conflicting answers to these questions is to philosophize. This book aims to do no more than to provide some guidance in this process… for six of them… of obvious importance to all of us: truth, goodness, and beauty on the one hand; liberty, equality, and justice on the other.” (Pg. 3-4) Later, he notes that these particular ideas (except for beauty) are found in the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and the Gettysburg Address.” (Pg. 20-21)
He observes, “Ideas, as objects of thought, do exist. The idea of truth or of justice does not cease to exist when I cease to think about it, for others can be thinking about it when I am not. However… objects of thought do cease to exist as intelligible objects when no one at all is thinking about them. There would be stars and atoms in the physical cosmos when no human beings or other living organisms to perceive them. But there would be no ideas as objects of thought without minds to think about them. Ideas exist objectively, but not with the reality that belongs to physical things.” (Pg. 12)
He notes, “The commonsense view is the one that all of us embrace when we reject the self-contradictory and self-refuting position of the extreme skeptic as being not only unreasonable, but also impracticable. There is hardly an aspect of our daily lives that would be the same if we were to embrace instead of rejecting the position of the extreme skeptic. We are firmly committed to the view that truth and falsity are ascertainable by us and that, with varying degrees of assurance, we can somehow discriminate between what is true and what is false. Almost everything we do or rely upon is grounded in that commitment.” (Pg. 35)
He acknowledges, “subjectivism and relativism … are much more prevalent in regard to goodness and beauty than they are with regard to truth. One reason for this may be that it is easier to correct the errors involved in the case of truth… We will find that more difficult to do when we come to the discussion of goodness and beauty… with regard to goodness and beauty as well as with regard to truth, it is necessary to distinguish between the objective and subjective aspects in order to prevent the relapse into extreme skepticism... if truth were entirely subjective we would have no basis for trying to resolve by rational means our differences of opinion about what is true…” (Pg. 44)
He suggests, “Self-evident truths are not tautologies… such as the statement ‘All triangles have three sides.’ … Sometimes, the self-evidence of the truth derives from our understanding of definitions. Sometimes, it derives from our understanding of terms that are not only undefined but are also indefinable, such as ‘part’ and ‘whole.’ Since we cannot understand what a part is without reference to a whole… we cannot define parts and wholes… How about the prime example of self-evident truth proposed in the Declaration of Independence?... Clearly, it is not self-evident … is the word ‘created’ is understood to mean CREATED BY GOD, for the existence of God and God’s act of creation… can be challenged.” (Pg. 52-53)
He explains, “In matters of truth, objective considerations play the major role… in the sphere of taste---temperamental inclinations, emotional predilections, cultural attachments predominate… because differences in matters of taste do not yield to reason, to argument, to the weight of the evidence… One further polarity characterizes the two spheres. The sphere of truth is transcultural… In the sphere of taste, mankind is divided into a multitude of factions and is always likely to remain so.” (Pg. 60-61)
He states, “I hope I shall be able to persuade readers that the mistakes of subjectivism and relativism can also be corrected with regard to goodness. The importance of doing so should be obvious. If all our judgments about good and evil, right and wrong… are purely subjective… there is no point in resorting to rational argument when we find ourselves in conflict with others about such matters.” (Pg. 65)
He then (borrowing from Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’) argues, “we can ask the following critical question: Do we regard something as good simply because we in fact desire it, or ought we to desire something because it is in fact good?... in one case the goodness is attributed to the object only because it is desired, while in the other the object ought to be desired only because it is good… Against the skeptic, are we able to defend the … view that, while some objects appear good to an individual simply because he or she in fact desires them, there are other objects that he or she ought to desire because they are … really good, not just apparently good?... To refute the skeptical view… we must be able to show how prescriptive statements can be objectively true.” (Pg. 69, 71)
He says, “If… we put aside our basic distinction between real and apparent goods, there will be as many different conceptions of happiness as there are differences with respect to the apparent goods that individuals want… The miser who wants only money… should accordingly count himself happy when he gets what he wants… [But] Once we come back to the distinction between real and apparent goods… Far from achieving happiness, the miser, the playboy, and the power-hungry individual have achieved only a counterfeit of it. They have got what they wanted, but not what they ought to want.” (Pg. 93)
He asserts, “The judgment about the beauty of an object … is the judgment of an expert, with special knowledge and skill in judging specimens of a certain kind… This is not to say that the experts cannot disagree. They often do… But there is a difference between the disagreement of the experts with one another and the disagreement between the laymen and the experts… The layman cannot argue with the judges in a way that might persuade them to change their minds. If he could, he would be an expert himself, not a layman.” (Pg. 115)
He contends, “The truth of the proposition that all human beings are by nature equal is confined to the one respect in which that equality can be truly affirmed; namely, their all being equally human… There is no other respect in which ALL human beings are equal… The contrary is true… though all human beings have the same generic and specifically distinctive properties and powers, some will have them to a higher, some to a lower, degree than others.” (Pg. 166-167)
Of economics, he comments, “The middle position between … erroneous extremes… calls for a moderate, not an extreme, form of circumstantial equality. With regard to the possession of political or economic goods… it calls for no more than everyone is entitled to by natural right… A moderate or justly limited equality of conditions is an equality in kind… Justice requires only that all shall be haves. It does not require that all shall be haves IN THE SAME DEGREE.” (Pg. 170-171)
He outlines, “The natural moral law puts us under three obligations. Its first precept commands us to … seek everything that is really good for us… The second precept … means acting justly toward others… The third precept commands us to act for the common good or general welfare of the community of which we are members.” (Pg. 192-193)
He summarizes, “a sound and adequate theory of equality is one that includes all the dimensions of equality---personal and circumstantial equality and inequality, equality and inequality in kind as well as equality and inequality in degree… To insist that equality of opportunity is the only circumstantial equality to which individuals are entitled is to deny that all persons are entitled by right to an equality of conditions that makes them all equal in kind as political and economic haves.” (Pg. 236)
This book will be of keen interest to students of philosophy.