In Prejudicial Appearances noted legal scholar Robert C. Post argues modern American antidiscrimination law should not be conceived as protecting the transcendental dignity of individual persons but instead as transforming social practices that define and sustain potentially oppressive categories like race or gender. Arguing that the prevailing logic of American antidiscrimination law is misleading, Post lobbies for deploying sociological understandings to reevaluate the antidiscrimination project in ways that would render the law more effective and just. Four distinguished commentators respond to Post’s provocative essay. Each adopts a distinctive perspective. K. Anthony Appiah investigates the philosophical logic of stereotyping and of equality. Questioning whether the law ought to endorse any social practices that define persons, Judith Butler explores the tension between sociological and postmodern approaches to antidiscrimination law. Thomas C. Grey examines whether Post’s proposal can be reconciled with the values of the rule of law. And Reva B. Siegel applies critical race theory to query whether antidiscrimination law’s reshaping of race and gender should best be understood in terms of practices of subordination and stratification. By illuminating the consequential rhetorical maneuvers at the heart of contemporary U.S. antidiscrimination law, Prejudical Appearances forces readers to reappraise the relationship between courts of law and social behavior. As such, it will enrich scholars interested in the relationships between law, rhetoric, postmodernism, race, and gender.
Robert Post is Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School. He served as the School's 16th dean from 2009 until 2017. Before coming to Yale, he taught at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law.
The first text reproduces a paper written by Post. Four academics then present their own views on the Post paper.
Post argues that there are two importante principles that can be applied to make sense of US employment antidiscrimination laws. The first and most dominant principle up to now, is an instrumentalist principle that argues that in order to choose between candidates for a job, the choice must be made as if behind a veil of ignorance about the candidates' race, gender, age or looks, simply picking the candidate who can best execute the job. The second principle is sociological and argues that the courts should decide on the basis of how to change discriminatory social norms in order to suggest social norms that lead to a fairer society.
In my opinion, the arguments are well marshalled and applied to key court cases about lookism and gender discrimination. These cases also serve the purpose of showing how complicated the terrain is -should antidiscrimination laws be applied to business dress codes, and if so, when? I admit I occasionally lost track of Post's more abstract arguments.
The four views on the Post paper essentially look more closely at the terms and arguments Post uses and provide important analysis of key terms.
For example, K. Antony Appiah takes issues= with the term "stereotype" and unravels four different and important meanings, which have to be separately considered.
Reva B. Siegel considers that Post omits important conceptual arguments that require analyzing discrimination arguments implicitly based on social stratification. Both Appiah and Siegel consider that Post's arguments need to clear up different semantics for what constitutes race.
I found Grey's account to be more of a helpful review of Post's paper.
I confess I did not undertand Judith Butler's points or arguments.
In order to thoroughly understand the four views on Post's paper, I believe the reader needs to be knowledgeable about legal principles and philosophy. For readers without such knowledge I would recommend reading Post's paper and Appiah's addendum, skipping Siegel, Grey, and Butler