The justification for the atomic bomb was it would defeat Hitler and end the Second World War faster, saving lives. The reality was different.
Fallout dismantles the conventional story of why the atom bomb was built. Peter Watson has found new documents showing that long before the Allied bomb was operational, it was clear that Germany had no atomic weapons of its own and was not likely to. The British knew this, but didn't share their knowledge with the Americans, who in turn deceived the British about the extent to which the Soviets had penetrated their plans to build and deploy the bomb.
The dark secret was that the bomb was dropped not to decisively end the war in the Pacific but to warn off Stalin's Russia, still in principle a military ally of the US and Britain. It did not bring a hot war to an abrupt end; instead it set up the terms for a Cold one to begin.
Moreover, none of the scientists recruited to build the bomb had any idea that the purpose of the bomb had been secretly changed and that Russian deterrence was its new objective.
Fallout vividly reveals the story of the unnecessary building of the atomic bomb, the most destructive weapon in the world, and the long-term consequences that are still playing out to this day.
Peter Watson was educated at the universities of Durham, London and Rome, and was awarded scholarships in Italy and the United States.
After a stint as Deputy Editor of New Society magazine, he was for four years part of the Sunday Times ‘Insight’ team of investigative journalists. He wrote the daily Diary column of the London Times before becoming that paper’s New York correspondent. He returned to London to write a column about the art world for the Observer and then at The Sunday Times.
He has published three exposes in the world of art and antiquities and from 1997 to 2007 was a Research Associate at the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research at the University of Cambridge. He has published twelve books of non-fiction and seven novels, some under the pen name of Mackenzie Ford. He lives in London where his interests include theatre, opera and fishing.
Awards, Etc.
Psychology Prize Durham University, 1961
Italian Government Music Scholarship Rome University, 1965
United States Government Bursary “for future world leaders” To study the psychiatric profession and its links to the administration of justice
Books of the Year
Psychology Today Magazine, 1978, for War on the Mind Daily Mail, 1990, for Wisdom and Strength Independent on Sunday, for A Terrible Beauty, 2000 Times Literary Supplement, for Ideas, 2005 Time Magazine, for The Medici Conspiracy, 2006 Queen’s Pardon Copy from Patrick Meehan after I had written a series of articles which brought about his release from prison after he had been wrongly convicted of murder, 1976.
Gold Dagger – Crime Writers’ Association of Great Britain For The Caravaggio Conspiracy, 1983
Beacon Award – SAFE Award – Saving Antiquities for Everyone For The Medici Conspiracy, 2006
US Library Association The Great Divide.
Emmy Nomination ‘The Caravaggio Conspiracy, 1984.
Best sellers
The Caravaggio Conspiracy Crusade Landscape of Lies Sotheby’s: The Inside Story Nureyev Lectures
Peter Watson has lectured at the following venues:
Universities
Cambridge Berkeley London UCLA Birmingham Georgia Georgia Chicago Birmingham Santiago de Chile York Madrid Harvard Tufts Military Bases
Fort Bragg Private Institutions in
Cleveland Berlin Chicago Belfast Los Angeles New York Washington Boston Palm Beach Other venues
Smithsonian Institution National Museum, Copenhagen Royal Society of Arts Rugby School Royal Library, Copenhagen Festivals
Vistos desde una cómoda distancia de casi 80 años, hay tres cosas que siempre me han sorprendido sobre el inicio de la era nuclear, el tema central de este libro: 1) que alguien haya hecho estallar una arma tan destructiva como una bomba atómica sobre una ciudad llena de civiles inocentes, 2) que lo haya hecho dos veces y 3) que nadie lo haya vuelto a hacer jamás.
Para las primeras dos preguntas creo haber encontrado una respuesta casi definitiva en esta pormenorizada relación de los hechos y personajes que condujeron, entre 1942 y 1945 al diseño, fabricación, construcción y lanzamiento de las únicas dos bombas que se han detonado con fines destructivos. Para la última pregunta todavía estoy buscando respuestas (y para ello estoy leyendo la trilogía del siglo xx de Ken Follet que recomiendo sin demoras).
La verdad no entiendo todavía por qué el libro ha recibido reseñas tan regulares aquí en goodreads (e imagino que en otras plataformas).
Es cierto que el nivel de detalle con el que llega a describir su autor, el reconocido periodista e historiador inglés Peter Watson (que es mejor conocido por su enciclopédico Ideas), todos los intríngulis que rodearon la invención y construcción de la bomba, pueden llegar a ser a veces desesperantes (en más de una ocasión me descubrí perdido en medio de una telaraña muy compleja de sitios, personas y eventos); pero la verdad es que la historia de la bomba atómica lo amerita sobradamente.
Y es que estamos hablando del artefacto tecnológico que partió la historia de la humanidad (y en particular la historia de los conflictos bélicos) en dos (como lo hicieron a menor escala y en su momento las armas de hierro, la pólvora o las ametralladoras): el tiempo en el que podrían morir miles de soldados y en el que podríamos morir todos nosotros. No es un secreto que desde 1945, la humanidad tiene en su poder una herramienta con la cual podría eliminarse a sí misma del acervo genético de la vida en la Tierra.
Entender como llegamos hasta ese punto, merece el nivel de detalle que necesite.
No le pongo 5 estrellas porque considero que el libro resultará entretenido y más digerible, tal vez para un nicho de lectores un poco más restringido que sus best sellers previos (en particular quienes aprecien la historia reciente de la física o de la política y las guerras en el siglo xx); pero desconocer, haciendo una reseña regular y con un puntaje muy bajo al libro en esta y otras plataformas, lo que consigue Watson con el texto al revelarnos las verdaderas causas de la construcción de la bomba, no es poca cosa.
Sin pretender arruinarles todas las sorpresas, resumiré aquí los puntos que considero más relevantes, y que hasta ahora eran en su mayor parte desconocidos de esta historia (el libro, que fue escrito en 2018, se basa en revelaciones hechas recientemente tras la desclasificación de documentos secretos de los servicios de inteligencia de los gobiernos implicados). Pero para no aburrirlos con una reseña muy extensa, déjenme presentarlos como una lista muy sencilla.
1. Los alemanes nunca estuvieron ni cerquita de construir una bomba atómica; esto sorprende porque fueron sus científicos los que descubrieron la fisión nuclear, y todo hay que decirlo, descubrieron e inventaron también la teoría cuántica (en la que se basa la descripción de los procesos más importantes detrás del fenómeno).
2. Los ingleses lo sabían y cuándo pudieron decirlo a los americanos para evitar que estos construyeran la bomba, no se lo dijeron. Con ello, condenaron a los japoneses y a la larga al mundo, a los efectos y peligros de las armas nucleares en manos de los militares.
3. Si bien Albert Einstein, empujado por Leo Szilard, fue el que a través de una famosa carta a Roosevelt, inicio la carrera atómica, Niels Bohr estuvo a punto de evitar el conflicto nuclear que siguió al final de la segunda guerra mundial. Así que si bien podemos culpar a los científicos de la bomba, también hay que culpar a los políticos (en particular Churchil) por no escuchar los inteligentes consejos de esos mismos científicos.
4. Si los desarrollos científicos que condujeron al descubrimiento de la fisión nuclear por Otto Hahn y Lise Meitner, hubieran ocurrido 4 o 5 años antes, Alemania habría tenido bombas nucleares cuando estallo la guerra. Fuimos increíblemente afortunados por el hecho de que estos desarrollos científicos se produjeran justo meses antes y después de estallar el conflicto, cuando los científicos y las comunidades técnicas de los países en guerra quedaron separadas.
5. Los espías que comunicaron los secretos de la bomba a los rusos salvaron al mundo, en especial a Europa occidental, de una tercera guerra nuclear. Suena contraintutivo, saber que los rusos pudieron conseguir construir su propia bomba nuclear en 1949 no parece algo que nos haya salvado de la guerra, pero así fue. Si la USA hubiera mantenido (con Gran Bretaña) el monopolio nuclear, Rusia posiblemente habría invadido toda Europa (era superior en el terreno) y tal vez, después de Hiroshima y Nagasaki, la siguiente bomba nuclear habría estallado sobre Berlin o Paris y la historia habría sido muy diferente.
6. El general Leslie Groves, director militar del Proyecto Manhattan, es históricamente el responsable de que murieran decenas de miles de personas en Japón bajo la llama radioactiva de las primeras y únicas bombas atómicas que se han lanzado contra objetivos civiles en la historia. No queda muy bien parado Groves con este libro.
7. Aunque Heisenberg y otros científicos alemanes hayan insistido hasta su muerte que Hitler no tuvo una bomba atómica porque ellos no se lo permitieron, la madeja de hechos y personajes desenredada por Watson demuestra que en realidad y aunque hubieran querido, tampoco lo habrían logrado en el plazo necesario. La bomba es un invento terrible que necesitó de los americanos la más increíble combinación de cooperación científica internacional, recursos económicos, aislamiento geográfico, motivación de personas relativamente buenas y recursos minerales, de los que no disponía Alemania. Lo que nos salvo de ver un V2 con una cabeza nuclear aterrizando en Londrés fue que la fisión la descubrimos unos meses antes de que Hitler invadiera a Polonia en 1939.
Si todos detalles les parecen irrelevantes, entonces sí, puede que el libro de Watson merezca una mala reseña y una baja puntuación. Pero si como yo reconocen la importancia de que estas cosas se sepan, entonces no deben dejar de conocer esta historia de espionaje, ciencia de frontera, epifanías científicas, amistad y, lamentablemente, muerte que rodea la historia secreta de la bomba atómica.
I think it’s important to occasionally read books that challenge the conclusions I have, and it was with that in mind that I picked up this book. Peter Watson argues that atomic/nuclear weapons need never have been created, but because of distrust among the allies we ended up in the current “nerve-racking”situation.
His main arguments are that the British didn’t share their intelligence that the Germans had given up trying to develop nuclear weapons, that the US didn’t share information with the British about Soviet infiltration in the Manhattan Project, and that neither treated the Soviets as a true ally. He mostly discusses those who were involved - the scientists, some of whom would have refused to work if they had known such information, and military leaders such as Leslie Groves, who were driven by their own egos to pursue the project and use the weapon.
So, did it change my mind? Did it tell me anything I didn’t already know? Not really. The book is rather tedious reading for most of it, although there was some interesting information about Klaus Fuchs, the atomic scientist and spy who continually provided information on the project to the Soviets. Other than that, I think he fails to make many of his arguments mostly by what he fails to address. He is so wedded to the idea that the bomb was only meant as a demonstration for the USSR that he fails to consider reasons Japan was a legitimate target. His argument about Japan’s “peace feelers” never touches on what those were (because they were never truly serious or supported by the facts). He also bemoans the fact that Roosevelt and Churchill didn’t share their information with Stalin, saying they didn’t act like allies. Yet he ignores his details of extensive Soviet espionage - hardly the behavior of an ally!
Yes, Groves was egotistical and driven by personal ambition. Yes, some scientists had reservations afterwards regarding the work they had done. And it’s certainly conceivable that there was more than one audience in mind when the bombs were dropped (which I think is hardly a “dark secret”). But I feel Watson is at best overly optimistic - or at worst naive - in too many of his conclusions. He cites Richard Rhodes heavily, whereas there is no mention of many others who’ve argued the opposite point of view, and buried his arguments convincingly. And I was somewhat disturbed by his high praise for the spy, Fuchs, as well as his reliance on the goodwill of Joseph Stalin. There’s some interesting history here, and it’s told in a fairly readable manner. And while I can agree with some of his minor points, I wasn’t swayed because he fails to address too many issues.
I decided to give this book a chance, as it seemed like an interesting premise. However, once I got to the thesis about how the whole development of the Atomic Bomb was based on some significant lies and cover-ups, and that if the world had known the truth and acted on it, so many problems that nuclear weapons caused would be solved, this turned into a hate-read. Right off the bat, the US stopping the Manhattan Project would not have solved the problems. Yes, the weapon started out as countering the Germans, and eventually the primary target became the Soviets. Watson holds that the weapons were used in Japan to halt the Soviets. At the beginning of the book, he alludes to various surveys that held that the Japanese would eventually have surrendered without the bomb, but Watson never goes back to that.
This work just focuses on the American/British/Soviet nuclear triangle and how the development of the Bomb evolved during the war. Maybe America might have stopped, but Watson does not make the case that the Soviets would not have taken the weapon design and run with it on its own accord. Also, he says nothing about the situation in post-War Europe, when the US had to rely on the threat of the bomb to counter the superior Soviet conventional threat. He could have strengthened his argument by noting that the Soviet forces were not as strong as they appeared, but Watson either didn't find that information or didn't care.
His writing was decent, and I did admit that I wanted to see where this premise went, especially since it is one I disagree with...but Watson never got there. The bomb was flawed, and several who worked on the project and advocated for the weapon did have second thoughts, but I don't think the alternatives would have been any better. Assuming Japan didn't surrender before winter 1945-1946, an amphibious landing would have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives, and millions of Japanese, to say nothing of possible Soviet lives if/when US forces encountered them...and if people found out that the US had a weapon that could have stopped that (given all the work and leaks, I am sure that it might have happened), then it is just as bad for all concerned. Plus, the standoffs in Europe and the conflict in Korea might have escalated to an even greater degree without the threat of nuclear deterrence. It was there for the discussion in the conclusion, but instead, Watson only focused on the development, and did not make any real attempt to tie his assertions at the start into the overall analysis of his work.
Gave it a chance (trying to broaden my horizons and be a little more open to opposing viewpoints in this day and age), but Watson straight up whiffed on this work. There are other books about the development of the bomb that are better quality and actually back up all assertions. Not worth the read (at any price), and not one to cite for any future work (if it comes to that).
I'm a big fan of atomic history, and so I looked forward to what seemed like new information on this topic. However, I found myself disappointed within a few chapters. Watson's narrative dryly wanders back and forth around his supposition that there was no need for the atomic bomb, centering on his premise that the Nazis would never have completed theirs in time to affect the war. I did not find his logic compelling, especially since he goes to great lengths to state over and over that every physicist in the world was aware of the process and possibilities of fission. Had the United States not completed the bomb first, it seems a foregone conclusion that some nation, likely Russia or Germany, would have soon afterwards. And that nation would've held a weapon which could have been used to completely alter the post-war world. Watson's overall premise, that had the United States not created the atomic bomb, we would not have been "saddled with the Cold War", seems especially fallacious to me. SOMEONE would have created it. There was no keeping that genie in its bottle. And in spite of all the stereotypical "warhead" stories about the paranoid way the United States approached the Cold War, I think it's very likely that had Russia or Germany created the atomic bomb first, the early 1950's would have been a time of atomic terror.
My disagreement with Watson's premise aside, I often found his writing to be repetitive and his narrative padded with information that seemed designed only to create pages. Like so many nonfiction books I read today, this book could have been cut by 2/3rds, if not more. So many authors today write their entire book in their liner notes and the foreword, and then spend the rest of the book repetitively pounding their point home. In this book's case, the few interesting moments aren't worth plowing through the entire narrative. At about the 1/3rd point, I casually skipped 50 pages ahead and started reading, then skipped another 50 pages and then another. At each point, I couldn't even tell I'd skipped ahead. Nothing had changed.
He dejado este libro sobre la página 140 de las 460 que tiene. No es un libro de divulgación científica, sino un libro de historia, excesivamente técnico en los detalles para mi gusto. Yo lo calificaría más como un trabajo o tesis sobre la historia de la bomba atómica que no un libro de divulgación para el gran público. El escritor es periodista, no científico, y eso le da un aspecto más bien periodístico, que si este dijo eso, que si el otro dijo lo otro, que si dijo esto pero mintió, etc. Al final, muchas cosas de las que dice acaban resultando más bien irrelevantes. Lo dicho, lo recomendaría más que a aquellos que quieran hacer un estudio histórico en profundidad, pero no para aquellos que quieran simplemente leer por el placer de enterarse de cosas.
The atomic bomb and the consequences of its detonation over Japan has been one of the most debated and controversial topics of the last several decades. Peter Watson’s new book Fallout has added another log onto the fire of conspiracy and intrigue by stating directly in the title that the making of the atomic bomb involved a conspiracy and cover up. But yet, there’s also more than enough here to suggest that Fallout may just keep the debate on simmer.
I think there is definitely something to the idea that secrecy was involved and rationales may have not been the truth. When he outright calls the bomb unnecessary and unneeded and indicates that it never would’ve happened without the deception, conspiracy, and cover up. I think it’s a plausible and solid case that the focus of the weapon changed from Germany, Japan, to Cold War matters, and that scientists were not told lest they stop work, think about what that might mean.
Furthermore, I’m not so sure that the atomic bomb doesn’t happen anyway at some point considering the need for military evolution. Just because it didn’t happen then doesn’t mean that it would never happen. And whether Japan was the right target or not is a useful debate, it’s not like we’re shooting atomic bombs off every Friday. This is a weapon that has been used only a handful of times in human history, so maybe the demonstration effect as horrible as it was for the people of Japan had some greater point of illustrating why weapons so great and powerful should be given more thoughtful consideration, thus proving that Watson is somewhat justified.
Un libro bastante interesante por la premisa. Pero no tanto por la forma de contarse. Hay demasiadas idas y vueltas en la historia y aunque consigue hacer pasar la idea, puede ser duro de leer cuando es la tercera vez que cuenta lo mismo. Un detalle importante es la cantidad de referencias que se citan a menudo y que le dan más credibilidad a la versión que cuenta (que por otra parte parece la más probable).
El autor nos cuenta sobre las investigaciones que hizo a documentos que no son de fácil acceso para el público, los informes que emitieron los científicos, presidentes, embajadores, etc. el libro no tiene tantos datos estadísticos, muy poco, mas habla sobre las conversaciones de los participes de la bomba atómica, decisiones, traiciones, conversaciones de los espías, etc. Por citar Knute Rockne, Klaus Fuchs, Niels Bohr, Rudolf Peierls, Enrico Fermi, Leslie Groves el general, James Chadwick el que descubrió el neutron en 1932, Leo Szilard, Lise Meitner, Paul Rosbaud influyó en las publicaciones y tenía grandes contactos, Victor Weisskopf, Walther Bothe, Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, Ernest Lawrence, Hans Suess, Karl Wirtz, Jomar Brun, Edward Teller el Hungaro, Egene Wigner, Albert Speer Ministro de Armamento y Producción Bélica de Alemania Nazi, Fritz Houtermans, Arthur Compton, Los científicos rusos Wilhelm Röntgen, Nikolay Semyonov, Pyotr Kapitsa, Dimitri Mendeleev, Igor Kurchatov. No hay mucho que subrayar o marcar, por eso le quito una estrella. Algunas partes interesantes a la vez desconcertante el dialogo entre Bohr y Churchill y para reírse el diálogo entre Borh y Roosevelt. Y por momentos se vuelve pesado la lectura, pero luego de volver atrás y recordar de quien esta hablando se vuelve de nuevo interesante. Notas subrayadas: "Todo empezó en 1898 con la identificación del electrón, a la que no tardó en seguir, en 1907, el conocimiento de la estructura del átomo. Más tarde, en 1932, los científicos descubrieron el neutrón y de inmediato comprendieron que su existencia sugería la posibilidad de activar una reacción en cadena en el seno mismo del átomo." "La fisión nuclear se hizo realidad las Navidades de 1938" "Victor Weisskopf aprendió de Bohr, (Toda dificultad, por grande y profunda que sea, encierra su solución ... Eso lo aprendimos de él.)" 04/11/2021 al 31/12/2021 leí 13:08. 01/01/2022 al 20/03/2022 leí 17:49 Total de 30:57 (30 horas con 57 minutos). Inicié a leer el 4 noviembre del 2021 y terminé de leer el 20 de marzo del 2022. (4 meses y medio).
Fascinating look at the politics and secrecy in the development of the atomic bomb
I loved this book. Author Peter Watson is a wonderful writer. The pages just flew by and the book was hard to put down. It is as exciting as any thriller. Watson presents a side of atom bomb development about which I was only peripherally aware. The case of the Rosenbergs is very well known, but this book isn’t about that. In fact the Rosenbergs never really come up. It is instead about all the secrecy and the political will to have the bomb. It was about what the Allies knew or didn’t know about atom bomb development in Germany and Russia, and how Russia obtained secret information. This book complements The Making of the Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes which is an excellent look at the Manhattan project. I strongly recommend Fallout for anyone interested in history. Disclosure: I received a complimentary copy of this book via Netgalley for review purposes.
En este libro el autor nos narra todos los secretos de la construcción de la bomba atómica en Los Álamos, Fermi, Bhor como escaparon de la Europa ocupada
Los entresijos de la bomba, las disputas políticas están plasmadas en este libro.
Such a powerful book! We’ve only learned about a single snowflake on the tip of the iceberg In regard to the creation and geopolitical consequences of the atom bomb. A clash between Klaus Fuchs and Niels Bohr, one behaving as an honest, upright, open-minded, and farsighted member of the international community, while the other scammed in the shadows, betrayed his colleagues who provided him sanctuary with his duplicitous deceits.. but Fuchs, not Bohr may have prevented an atomic war from happening during the early stages of the Korean War. Such a mind-boggling and uncomfortable observation to make with foresight.
Espionage and intrigue of all types occurring just before and during WWII isn't a surprise, but Watson assembles a tense timeline filled with a myriad of notable names, each playing their respective role in driving progress toward their side's ability to produce atomic weaponry (or delaying it, for that matter). That many of these names belong to reputable, even household-name level, scientists makes the story all the more intriguing.
*NOTE*: Don't open this book and expect to see tons of all-but-masterbatory material on the destructive elements of the atomic bomb with a batch of colorized pages of mushroom clouds in the middle---a bunch of 'Merica high-fiving pressed neatly between a nice book cover---nope, this is something else entirely. This covers the minutiae of the host of moves made by global powers and individuals that brought us across the line of demarcation we know as the age of atomic warfare. Much of this appears to have been shoved to the sidelines of history, likely because it's not as overtly sensational as your commonly-encountered WWII fare. I speak for myself and the everyman/woman, of course. History buffs might find some of this as old hat.
You're treated to a multi-layered narrative (as one would expect given the dynamic movements in a world headed back to war): There are scientists locking horns with the great leaders of the era and attempting to reason and coerce; some are fleeing to other countries with their very lives; some are stealing secrets and piping them over to the Soviets---that, and much, much more.
Watson has a few thesis statements to present and re-present over the course of the book, and, while you might mutter "I know, I know..." in the middle of your read, it truly does help to re-calibrate your head, as the book is quite dense, and can be hard to continually organize for the casual reader (more on that below). You'll know them when you see them, because you'll see them a lot. Having said that, you'll be pretty surprised at the simple human errors committed by the world leaders we've done so much to portray as near-perfect, errors that cost both sides (Allied/Axis) dearly. In hindsight, Watson is asking us to take a second and wonder what our world would look like had those choices turned out differently.
Yeah, I struggled with this, but I was rewarded for it. The information contained therein can be hard to digest, especially when we're asked to revisit a time period. Many readers might lose track and glaze over a bit. Just keep trucking. Within these pages are harrowing stories of courageous souls, so-called "leaders" that only served as stumbling blocks to common sense, and those doing their part for their country. You may very well find yourself realizing that you're sympathizing with Soviet spies, or booing uber-patriotic US officials. It's a sinewy story that's worthy of your consideration, as it is a most unique angle on one of the most important scientific moments in history.
Many thanks to NetGalley, Perseus Books, and PublicAffairs for the advance copy.
I received an ARC of this book via NetGalley in exchange for my honest opinion.
Dense, but fascinating exploration of the not so glamorous truths revolving around the production of the atomic bomb. Deceit, hubris, and political aggression is weaved throughout, portraying the leaders in charge in a less than flattering light. This book gives more detail than what the majority of us are taught in school about the impact of the atomic bomb, and gives a much greater, and grimmer, outlook on this impact.
This 15-hour audiobook mysteriously disappeared from my "Currently Reading" list and also from Goodreads. So I found a paperback edition with a warped title to repost. Not sure what's going on with the file. But I decided to quit listening at 55%.
The premise of the book was intriguing -- that the atom bomb was not needed to end the war as Germany had given up on the bomb, a fact that was kept secret by the Allies. And that the bomb was dropped, not to end the war, but to scare the Soviets. There are a lot of angles to this premise and I didn't get far enough to comment on that. But I quit because I couldn't keep up with the million details and names, way more names than the famous scientists like Niels Bohr.
One of those scientists, Dr. John Wheeler, I actually met in ~1984 when he was teaching at U.T. Austin, when I was invited by a physics grad student to a social gathering at the professor's house. I didn't know Dr. Wheeler's background at that time, or at all, till I read this book. But I still remember him and found his photos online.
The book is worth reading for anyone with an interest in the topic and the patience for details.
The first part is very tedious, jumping from one place to another, its a maze of events, places and people; the last part is more structured, focused on less characters and more to the point. Its a well written book with a lot of information, but stating that the bomb wasn’t needed; yeah, tell that to the tend of thousands of marines that were going to invade Japan, as well to the brainwashed Japanese ready to die for their Emperor. Also, book agrees with Bohr, that the bomb should’ve been disclosed to USSR to provide a balance. Would the USSR had shared info of the bomb if they had it first? Its just wishful thinking and very naive of the author; and although atomic threat has indeed provided a balance, I cannot think of a single example in world history of a country sharing potential advantages to enemies (yes, they were allies, but just because they had a common enemy, remember USSR first sided with nazi Germany)
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Lots of detail, lots of names of scientists across many countries. The thesis I diagree with which is why I challenged myself to read this book. I have read other books by Mr Watson and enjoy his style. I am half way through and I just cannot get on board. We made the atom bomb it ended WW II. Were the Japanese defeated - sure but why drag a world war out one more deadly day if you can end it sooner. We can all second guess the Truman administration. But we were not there in the room in real time making the best tactical and strategic decisions after year of blood shed across the globe. Full disclosre my dad was on a US destroyer in the pacific in 1944-45 so I may have a bias. We live with the threat of total atomic annihilation since Augsut 1945. May our current and future leaders act with wisdom and restraint.
It is a poorly written book with little organisation. Watson attempted to detail the intelligence report the British had about Hitler's lack of progress in building the bomb. The chronology was extremely confusing with events dating forward n backward. Characters were introduced suddenly. There was also little reference of the enrichment processes. I read elsewhere that one consideration was that japan may fight to the death to resist an invasion. The book had little material to make it interesting.
Interesante recordatorio de que la historia no es inevitable y en cada punto de inflexión hay oportunidades para no inflexionar. Es un buen libro para sembrar dudas acerca de la probidad de un proyecto no necesario y que ha colocado al mundo en un lugar más sombrío, cerca de la medianoche. Creo que exculpa de forma inconsistente a los científicos que colaboraron en los proyectos atómicos (un puñado de negativas y no hubiera sido posible) y algunas especulaciones son sugestivas pero no muy convincentes. En suma, un trabajo ameno, rotundo y muy bien escrito. Recomendable.
Cómo y por qué se decidió construir la bomba atómica: el estado del arte, lo que sabían ingleses y americanos de lo que estaban construyendo los nazis, lo que iban espiando los soviéticos del proyecto Manhattan y la decisión de asesinar unos cuantos miles de japoneses cuando ya tenían ganada la guerra. Un tratado muy completo y bien documentado pero árido de cojones, prolijo y reiterativo hasta decir basta.
Con abundantes archivos que se desclasificaron recientemente, Watson cuenta aspectos del desarrollo de la bomba atómica que no se conocían en su momento. Historias muy interesantes que incluso podrían ser dignas de una película de espías. Todo contado de forma amena.
Like every book I’ve ever read by Peter Watson, my mind is completely blown. What a well written look at recent history, extremely well thought out. And devastating.
El libro definitivo para conocer la historia de la construcción de la primera bomba atómica. Con las últimas desclaficaciones (2018) toda la trama d espionaje junto a la influencia de destacados físicos en la construcción y ocultación - revelación del proyecto Manhattan. Adictivo.
Fue necesaria la bomba atómica desde el punto de vista militar en el contexto de la segunda guerra mundial? En este libro Peter Watson plantea que más allá de las consideraciones y cuestionamientos morales, la bomba no fue tampoco necesaria en el contexto de la guerra. Grupos de interés, manipulación de la información de los reales avances alemanes y consideraciones más allá de la segunda guerra mundial habrían sido a su juicio las motivaciones. Más allá de la tesis del autor, el libro es muy interesante. Nos muestra la génesis de la bomba en sus aspectos científicos, políticos, militares y a nivel de lo que fue el desafío de inteligencia y espionaje asociado. Llamativo es como Japón termina siendo el destino de las bombas en 1945, cuando nunca estuvo en el objetivo del proyecto inicial. Interesante además resultan las visiones del equilibrio atómico de la postguerra, como consecuencia de la obtención de la bomba soviética en 1949 facilitado por la información obtenida de los americanos. También sorprende lo cerca que estuvo de usarse armamento atómico en la guerra de Corea. Finalmente el libro nos muestra la personalidad y motivaciones de los científicos claves en el proceso, en que destaca el pensamiento de Bohr.
I was certainly intrigued by the premise of how the development of the atom bomb affected international politics during the conclusion of WWII. Be prepared to slog through the technicalities of the physics behind the bomb (fission, uranium enrichment, etc) before getting to the juicy stuff. Also, there are a LOT of people to keep track of, specifically physicists from many different countries, some of who narrowly escaped Nazi persecution. I thought the overall book might have been more cohesive had the narrative been presented in a linear chronology and there was some redundancy in how often the author reiterates the same points throughout (specifically part two – who know what and when [that Germany did not have a bomb program]).
This is not an in-depth look at how the bomb was built, but how the idea of the bomb affected relations between the Allies and how ultimately the bomb affected future conflicts like the Korean War. Basically the triumvirate of the US, Britain, and Russia both cooperated then backstabbed each other, withholding certain information from one another and throwing shade (looking at you Churchill and General Groves). I’m sharing the following quote that basically sums up the whole book: “Simply put, in the summer of 1942 there was no need for Allies to embark on building a nuclear weapon – not if the main reason for building a bomb was to counter a Nazi threat, because there was no Nazi threat… By not acting as Allies, the Allies Kick-started the nuclear arms race we inherit today.”
I received a complimentary copy of this book via the Amazon Vine program.
Interesante historia que narra la obtención de la Bomba A, el papel de los científicos, los espías y los políticos, así como lo cerca que estuvimos de su empleo, en el periodo de tiempo en el que sólo los USA la poseían y como luego dio lugar a un equilibio del terror.