"...I confess to a very strong sense of the dreadfulness of the step of removal, of the deep wounding such a step must inflict on the country, and thus approach it as one would approach high-risk major surgery, to be resorted to only when the rightness of diagnosis and treatment is sure" (Charles L. Black, Jr., "Impeachment: A Handbook, New Edition").
Like the delicate scent of flowers in springtime, talk of impeachment is in the air. Whether such talk is mindful or mental, partisan or patriotic, there's no question that the question of the "Big I" hasn't consumed this much bandwidth since the dial-up days of 1998.
Charles L. Black, Jr. of Yale Law School published his brief handbook on presidential impeachment in 1974, near the height of the Nixon debacle. He intended, like a modern-day legal Prometheus, to capture the incandescent legalese of impeachment practice and theory, and bring it down to the level of common humanity. He succeeded.
The first 61 pages of Black's reissued handbook is his original work, a masterful parsing of the issues in terms the thoughtful layman can understand. What does "high Crimes and misdemeanors" really mean? Should the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review a Senate vote for conviction under articles of impeachment? Does a president need to commit an explicitly criminal action to be liable for impeachment, or can impeachment proceed for something that isn't in the criminal code? If so, what actions are severe enough to trigger impeachment proceedings, and what aren't?
I found most helpful Black's discussion of why the Constitutional Framers chose not to include "maladministration" as a grounds for presidential impeachment, a charge which many original state constitutions did include as an impeachable offense for state-level officials. The Framers thus avoided the British system of parliamentary governance, in which the executive serves at the pleasure of the legislative. Impeachment is not a no-confidence vote. It is not a means to remove an unpopular president, or a president whose policies are disliked by any given Congress. Rather, to suffer impeachment, a president must engage in treason (very narrowly defined), bribery, or "high Crimes and misdemeanors" — whatever that means.
The remainder of the book, written by Philip Bobbitt of Columbia Law School, provides important additional discussions arising from the unsuccessful impeachment of President Bill Clinton, as well as from impeachment investigations or talk which took place under the terms of Reagan, George W. Bush, and Obama. Along with rebuttals of common fallacies in thinking about impeachment, he also includes a brief discussion of what the 25th Amendment was actually meant to do (spoiler: it wasn't forged to support a palace coup).
While not to the level of Black's treatise (in my opinion, anyway), Bobbitt's discussion of impeachment theory and practice that has blossomed from recent history is quite helpful. If his addition fall shy of Black's masterpiece, it is perhaps because he writes while caught in the gears of the endless controversy machine that is the Trump presidency. His deep misgivings about the Trump administration are obvious, though he strives mightily (and I would say with overall success) to reach conclusions that transcend the current moment.
I opened this book already in agreement with Black, that impeachment should be the unthinkable final weapon in a war for democracy, not a crowbar to pry out an unlovable president. Removal of a chief executive by Congress directly overturns the electoral will of the people, and must be approached with sacred horror in a system that holds sacrosanct that will. And yet, like any other weapon, we must be ready to wield it, if necessary, to defend the hard-won Constitutional order gifted to us by the Framers.
Black and Bobbitt provide an invaluable and thoughtful aid toward determining when we must leave that sword of impeachment firmly in its sheath — and when, with regret but with determination, we must draw it out and let it do what it was meant to do.