Hubert Dreyfus is one of the more celebrated, as well as controversial, commentators on Heidegger. He was a legendary lecturer at UC Berkeley, particularly for his class on Heidegger, and his ground-breaking philosophical ruminations on artificial intelligence would alone give him a high place in late-twentieth century American philosophy. But as attractive as Dreyfus’s Heidegger has been it has also been divisive, with many finding it so detached from the Heidegger that they have read as to label the subject of this work “Dreydegger”.
I think this is a great book, beautifully presented and written. For Dreyfus, Dasein (Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world”) is not a solitary, psychologizable consciousness making individual decisions, as most older readers of Heidegger had interpreted. Rather, Dasein is the condition for universal, generic human being. This being is, obviously, social and linguistic. It is determined by the meanings given to certain practices in different societies. Heideggerean “chat” is that speech that simply takes social norms as given, as “common sense”. Authentic speech, and being, is that which consciously acknowledges and embraces this social determination that is, ultimately, arbitrary and groundless.
To me, this sounds very much like an articulation of what Heidegger set out to accomplish when writing “Being and Time”. The German thinker claimed at the time to be writing a wholly original work that split with all philosophy that had come before it. He would, he proclaimed, reject all psychologization and valuation so as to come to an understanding of the broadest sense of what made the world possible for the particularly human category of being. I have arrived at the understanding, however, that while Heidegger set out to achieve something like Dreyfus’s interpretation of “Being and Time”, the actual text is something less unique for its time.
Heidegger, understandably, fell short of his preposterous ambitions for his magnum opus. Not only does he psychologize and promote values in his famous book, he does so quite blatantly and, at times, tritely. The notion of anxiety (the original name for “existential angst”), conveniently marginalized by Dreyfus, is too central to the text of “Being and Time” to not read the work in proto-existential terms. In trying to identify the most generic and universal conditions for being, Heidegger falls back on ruminating on the death-obsessed musings of bourgeoisie European intellectuals and their attempts to “live authentically”. (It was these most reactionary impulses in “Being and Time” that most influenced Sartre and, to a lesser extend, Merleau-Ponty.)
Again, I do not think one should be too harsh on Heidegger for this. It was through the influence of Heidegger’s writings, including those written after “Being and Time”, that later thinkers began a critique and rejection of the “subject”. Heidegger prepared the ground for, but did not himself complete the leap away from a transcendental subject, even if he sought to do so.
Dreyfus’s work, “Dreydegger” if you will, has come to seem to me not so much an interpretation, as a correction and updating of “Being and Time” in relation to its authors ambitions. Dreyfus is, from the standpoint of someone writing several decades after Heidegger and having read Heidegger’s more radical disciples, such as Derrida and Foucault, presenting what Heidegger strove but fell short of achieving in “Being and Time”.