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Pelican Books #24
National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy
Across the West, there is a rising tide of people who feel excluded, alienated from mainstream politics, and increasingly hostile towards minorities, immigrants and neo-liberal economics. Many of these voters are turning to national populist movements, which have begun to change the face of Western liberal democracy, from the United States to France, Austria to the UK.
This radical turn, we are told, is a last howl of rage from an aging electorate on the verge of extinction. Their leaders are fascistic and their politics anti-democratic; their existence a side-show to liberal democracy. But this version of events, as Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin show, could not be further from the truth.
Written by two of the foremost experts on fascism and the rise of national populism, this lucid and deeply-researched book is a vital guide to our transformed political landscape. Challenging conventional wisdoms, Eatwell and Goodwin make a compelling case for serious, respectful engagement with the supporters and ideas of national populism - not least because it is a tide that won't be stemmed anytime soon.
This radical turn, we are told, is a last howl of rage from an aging electorate on the verge of extinction. Their leaders are fascistic and their politics anti-democratic; their existence a side-show to liberal democracy. But this version of events, as Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin show, could not be further from the truth.
Written by two of the foremost experts on fascism and the rise of national populism, this lucid and deeply-researched book is a vital guide to our transformed political landscape. Challenging conventional wisdoms, Eatwell and Goodwin make a compelling case for serious, respectful engagement with the supporters and ideas of national populism - not least because it is a tide that won't be stemmed anytime soon.
374 pages, Paperback
First published October 25, 2018
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July 10, 2025
In the wake of Brexit, Trump, and the increasing popularity of national populist movements in Italy, France, Hungary and elsewhere, this book promises to answer three questions:
"What is behind the rise of national populism in the west?"
"Who supports these movements, and why?"
"And how will they change the face of politics in years to come?"
Of these three, only the second is dealt with adequately. The authors tackle many myths about the "who" - in particular the belief that national populists are mainly "old white men" who will soon be dead. Through extensive (and often tedious) use of statistics, they show us that most generalisations about the "who" are wrong, and that support comes from many sections of society including women, the young, and ethnic minorities. One generalisation that does hold true is that national populists tend to have spent less time in education (although many are still highly skilled) - the divide is more one of class than of age, gender or ethnicity.
As for what is behind this political sea change, they identify "four Ds": "Distrust" (of politicians and elites), "Destruction" (of a sense of national identity), "Deprivation" (caused by neoliberalism increasing inequalities) and "De-alignment" (increasing volatility as people sever life-long ties with traditional political parties).
Of these, "Destruction" is the most controversial (not least in their choice of word): Eatwell and Goodwin say that increasing rates of immigration cause real concerns for many voters, and that these concerns must be addressed head-on rather than dismissed as racism (they say that the addressing of these concerns is what distinguishes "national populists" from "left populists" such as Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders). They make an interesting point that "real" racism - discrimination based on racial characteristics, and the judgement that certain races are inferior - has largely died out (citing the example of inter-group marriage which, in 1958, 90% of Americans opposed, but today 90% approve of). A few hardcore racists remain (and are to be found within national populist movements), but what today passes for racism is actually mostly xenophobia: fear of cultural change, and in particular of Islam (some national populists claim that they are protecting Western values such as feminism and gay rights from Islamic prejudice, although this is rather undermined by the revelation that in the USA, Muslims are more accepting of homosexuality than evangelical Christians - 52% vs 34%). In a similar vein, the book tries to deny that national populism equates to facism, but that's at odds with its quoting Marine le Pen (whom it elsewhere paints as fairly moderate for a right-winger) comparing Muslims praying in the street to a "Nazi occupation".
The book raises some very pertinent points under the topics the "four Ds", particularly around the increasing division of society due to neoliberalism, but they don't go far enough in question how and why these forces are changing society. In particular, there is no mention of the media's role in amplifying people's xenophobia - which, given the persistence of myths around bendy bananas and queue-jumping immigrants, must surely take some responsibility.
Finally, "how will they change the face of politics" - there is really very little on this in the book, and it's perhaps best summed up as "more of the same, perhaps toned down a bit if we do something about immigration". The book points out that our liberal democracies are only around 100 years old, and there is no reason to expect them to return to what we have assumed is the status quo of relatively stable, centrist government by long-established political parties.
Overall, it's an interesting book, and one which has prompted me to think quite deeply, but it's a rather dry read, and incomplete in its analysis of national populism.
"What is behind the rise of national populism in the west?"
"Who supports these movements, and why?"
"And how will they change the face of politics in years to come?"
Of these three, only the second is dealt with adequately. The authors tackle many myths about the "who" - in particular the belief that national populists are mainly "old white men" who will soon be dead. Through extensive (and often tedious) use of statistics, they show us that most generalisations about the "who" are wrong, and that support comes from many sections of society including women, the young, and ethnic minorities. One generalisation that does hold true is that national populists tend to have spent less time in education (although many are still highly skilled) - the divide is more one of class than of age, gender or ethnicity.
As for what is behind this political sea change, they identify "four Ds": "Distrust" (of politicians and elites), "Destruction" (of a sense of national identity), "Deprivation" (caused by neoliberalism increasing inequalities) and "De-alignment" (increasing volatility as people sever life-long ties with traditional political parties).
Of these, "Destruction" is the most controversial (not least in their choice of word): Eatwell and Goodwin say that increasing rates of immigration cause real concerns for many voters, and that these concerns must be addressed head-on rather than dismissed as racism (they say that the addressing of these concerns is what distinguishes "national populists" from "left populists" such as Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders). They make an interesting point that "real" racism - discrimination based on racial characteristics, and the judgement that certain races are inferior - has largely died out (citing the example of inter-group marriage which, in 1958, 90% of Americans opposed, but today 90% approve of). A few hardcore racists remain (and are to be found within national populist movements), but what today passes for racism is actually mostly xenophobia: fear of cultural change, and in particular of Islam (some national populists claim that they are protecting Western values such as feminism and gay rights from Islamic prejudice, although this is rather undermined by the revelation that in the USA, Muslims are more accepting of homosexuality than evangelical Christians - 52% vs 34%). In a similar vein, the book tries to deny that national populism equates to facism, but that's at odds with its quoting Marine le Pen (whom it elsewhere paints as fairly moderate for a right-winger) comparing Muslims praying in the street to a "Nazi occupation".
The book raises some very pertinent points under the topics the "four Ds", particularly around the increasing division of society due to neoliberalism, but they don't go far enough in question how and why these forces are changing society. In particular, there is no mention of the media's role in amplifying people's xenophobia - which, given the persistence of myths around bendy bananas and queue-jumping immigrants, must surely take some responsibility.
Finally, "how will they change the face of politics" - there is really very little on this in the book, and it's perhaps best summed up as "more of the same, perhaps toned down a bit if we do something about immigration". The book points out that our liberal democracies are only around 100 years old, and there is no reason to expect them to return to what we have assumed is the status quo of relatively stable, centrist government by long-established political parties.
Overall, it's an interesting book, and one which has prompted me to think quite deeply, but it's a rather dry read, and incomplete in its analysis of national populism.
May 6, 2019
Published in 2018, I suspect that this popular social science book on the relatively recent phenomenon of national populism is going to need an updated second edition quite soon. Political change has not only not faltered since the events of 2016 but seems to be accelerating.
I have been recommending this book to anyone who will listen as a sound corrective to the idiotic rubbish that stands for political analysis and commentary by the lightweights who write in our national media, think politics ends when Parliament finishes its business and claim to be 'experts'.
It is not that Eatwell and Goodwin are by any means geniuses. They are simply extremely competent and knowledgeable analysts and observers of political phenomena and their causes. Eatwell brings a track record of analysis of fascism that helps correct many partisan assertions.
The base line of the book is quite simple. National populism is not in the least fascist, it owes its origins to changes that go back beyond the 2008 crash and its drivers are not simply to be explained in economic terms but represent often legitimate cultural concerns about liberalism.
The conclusion (this seems to be confirmed by recent events) is that national populism as an ideology is here to stay because of its role in relation to the failures and, it has to be said, arrogance of the urban liberal hegemony of the educated and the cosmopolitan.
No, this is not the path to fascism as the hysterics of the liberal-left proclaim (the hysteria and apocalypticism of the liberal left whose education is often confused with intelligence is very much part of the problem here) but a correction with good and bad aspects.
Eatwell and Goodwin do not tend to offer predictions but they do suggest that the ideology will transform into a less angry and more moderate version that (I believe) could be a permanent replacement for middle class-dominated liberal conservatism if perhaps with a wider class base.
The new Brexit Party captured 30% of the polling vote for the upcoming Euro Elections in a matter of weeks on the basis of it being more measured and moderate in tone than its rival, UKIP, and more honest and potentially less inept (which is not hard) than the liberal conservative Tory Party.
In Germany, the AfD's programme may imply the possibility of Dexit but it is challenging the Christian Democrats, who are already moving in their direction, with a programme of cultural and economic moderate nationalism within the liberal imperial model of the European Union.
In France, the 'gilets jaunes' are sustainedly confrontational against Macron, the 'great white hope' of the liberals, but Le Pen is not participating in the struggle, waiting to pick up the pieces against the most unpopular President in recent French history (and that is saying something!).
Where national populists are new to the game, they tend to be radical, aggressive, somewhat xenophobic but never antidemocratic. As they gain traction, they moderate tone and find they do not have to change core policies because these policies strike a chord with much of the public.
The other aspect of the case that intrigues is the hollowing out by the national populists of European socialist parties as the discontented working class start losing their tribal loyalty to parties led by middle class cultural liberals who make no effort to understand working class values.
This is not yet happening to the British Labour Party because Corbyn has introduced a form of left-populism and sat on the Brexit fence but the middle class liberals are constantly pressuring him to get off the fence and abandon the historic class base (or take it for granted).
In theory, assuming the liberal elite continues to blunder as it has done now for several years. this could mean the unification of large chunks of the working and lower middle classes against the liberal system as a whole with threats, ultimately, to its entire institutional structure.
But this would be mere theory since we are at the start of the process. Eatwell and Goodwin may be more right in thinking that the main forces in society (two middle class parties with different class bases) will adapt to populism by moving away from the centre towards their grassroots.
We cannot know yet which is more likely but elite elements may learn to adapt and recover power by giving people more of what they want (which will be very uncomfortable for ideological liberals) or liberals will be in one camp and populists in another, building competing coalitions.
The immediate case study is in the United Kingdom. It is now in the eye of this storm because of Brexit. Brexit smashed open a broken system. It acted as a major force for mass political education and created huge divisions between Euro-populists, the establishment and national populists.
Theresa May's Government, led by the most remarkably thick-skinned Prime Minister imaginable, whose limpet-like sticking to the rock of power has, in itself, showed the inherent lack of popular accountability within a liberal elite structure that now looks dubiously democratic.
This is something Remain and Leave populists can both agree on - the system is utterly broken. Both sides are abandoning traditional elite loyalties in a way that could be temporary or permanent, depending entirely on events in the next few weeks.
We saw (May 2019) Leavers abandoning the political process in local elections to Remainers who flocked to one minority party that had been rather discredited for other reasons only a short time before. The Tories were seriously damaged and Labour made no progress with a weak showing.
It is widely expected that the Euro Elections will be a quasi-referendum on Brexit in which Leavers will coalesce around a Party that did not exist only a few weeks ago while everyone else will have to decide on old loyalties or going for broke by backing the Remain Liberal Democrats and Greens.
The point (in the light of the book) is that, within weeks, we may have some idea whether Britain will follow the Goodwin/Eatwell model of having the Tory Party become national populist-lite overnight (on May's removal or resignation) or will be displaced or even collapse entirely.
But this is the point of national populism. It is not (unlike so much in preceding politics) a creation of the media or an adaptation within the liberal hegemony based on shifting interests, it is a slow burning and sustained revolution based on identifiable social forces.
This does not mean the destruction of liberalism or of liberal democracy (in terms of its forms) but it is a major challenge to neo-liberalism and globalisation in favour of the nation state and mass democracy. Opponents are going to have to stop confronting it head on and work around it.
Eventually things will settle down into a new order - one that may be rather uncomfortable for many liberal middle class people who assume that history was at an end for them. I suspect that not only a second edition of this book may be required but a third or fourth.
Getting back to the book, it is an easy read and not 'academic' in tone. It also has the great virtue of taking the long view on the different contributory factors to the rise of national populism. The well educated may find some of the story a repetition of what they knew already but bear with that.
It is certainly the best single volume readable book to take up if you want to understand what is happening. The authors cover the US (less successfully perhaps) as well as the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Faults? The popular social science nature of the book perhaps underestimates the complexity of the phenomenon at times. There is not much in-depth analysis of differences in national populism in different political markets and little mention of its emergence in the emerging world's democracies.
There are aspects of Putinism and the Hindu nationalism of Modi (and partial lessons from Chinese ways of managing certain issues) as well as Duterte and Bolsonaro to contend with. We might look on national populism as quite as global as communism and interwar militarism and imperialism.
Similarly, the trajectory of individual country national populisms is not covered and sometimes we can be deluded by the book into seeing all national populisms as much the same rather than as a complex phenomenon arising from similar pressures but emerging in national contexts.
The lumping together of national populisms suits liberal critics because it enables them to identify any or all of them with the worst aspects of post-fascist 'start-ups' or with that independent New York 'political gangster' who is still part of the elite structure he is tearing apart.
What the book does is show (without endorsing any movement or party) that national populism is a perfectly reasonable, indeed rational response, of its supporters to events in the world. How activists interpret that political need is based on the nation state and so diverse in content.
The book helps us to understand the 'stickiness' of national populism despite the undoubted flaws of its leaders and of the extremists who might attach themselves to it and the massive outpouring of bile, hysteria and ignorant or deliberate disinformation from left-liberals.
That 'stickiness' comes down to the fact that, for all its flaws, national populism still speaks for huge swathes of the population more than any alternative left-liberal or conservative liberal elite proposition. It is not perfect or even good but just better.
And the method of attack of liberals - that national populists are deplorables, racists, stupid and uneducated, 'untermenschen', unfit for democracy - simply strengthens the commitment of its supporters to it. Every attack strengthens it, something liberals have not yet understood.
Indeed, there is something definitely Nietzschean about the phenomenon ...
January 3, 2019
Total hate-read. I'm being generous in giving two stars. But there were some interesting ideas when the authors weren't being disgustingly partial.
Some thoughts:
• Starting theories with the words "outside of Eastern Europe" because populist countries like Hungary and Poland don't fit said theories, is not acceptable.
• What point are they trying to make in stating that the Nazis "oversaw the establishment of full employment, welfare schemes and benefits like cheap holidays". That Nazis weren't all bad? That's really a view you want to defend?? This fits into the overall issue of them bringing up "good" aspects of obviously terrible groups in an attempt to delegitimize liberal criticism.
• They critize Müllers ideas, which I have recently read in his "What is populism?", without any solid arguments to back up their criticisms. There are several instances of the authors critizing something they themselves do later in the book. The worst example of this is them lambasting Müller's "hostile model" of populism that is supposedly too narrow and then concocting some ludicrous theory of racism (see next point).
• The most infuriating part was the authors' thesis on racism. They totally dismiss obvious racism on the part of Trump and others like him by claiming they "do not fit the systematically racist mould" and they're really just xenophobic. The book also repeatedly claims "blatant racism" is nearly extinct, in a desparate attempt to clear populists of accusations of racism. A) it is not and b) racism that is less "blatant" is in no way less powerful.
• "The US First Amendment enshrines a commitment to free speech, but there has been a growing move towards banning controversial speakers on college campuses, which should be a haven of legal free speech". Dude, free speech doesn't mean that private institutions should give a platform to anyone and everyone.
• In the final chapter, the authors advize the traditional social democrat parties to change their positive stance on immigration if they want votes. Call me an idealist, but parties should not change their policies according to what "the people" supposedly want.
Some thoughts:
• Starting theories with the words "outside of Eastern Europe" because populist countries like Hungary and Poland don't fit said theories, is not acceptable.
• What point are they trying to make in stating that the Nazis "oversaw the establishment of full employment, welfare schemes and benefits like cheap holidays". That Nazis weren't all bad? That's really a view you want to defend?? This fits into the overall issue of them bringing up "good" aspects of obviously terrible groups in an attempt to delegitimize liberal criticism.
• They critize Müllers ideas, which I have recently read in his "What is populism?", without any solid arguments to back up their criticisms. There are several instances of the authors critizing something they themselves do later in the book. The worst example of this is them lambasting Müller's "hostile model" of populism that is supposedly too narrow and then concocting some ludicrous theory of racism (see next point).
• The most infuriating part was the authors' thesis on racism. They totally dismiss obvious racism on the part of Trump and others like him by claiming they "do not fit the systematically racist mould" and they're really just xenophobic. The book also repeatedly claims "blatant racism" is nearly extinct, in a desparate attempt to clear populists of accusations of racism. A) it is not and b) racism that is less "blatant" is in no way less powerful.
• "The US First Amendment enshrines a commitment to free speech, but there has been a growing move towards banning controversial speakers on college campuses, which should be a haven of legal free speech". Dude, free speech doesn't mean that private institutions should give a platform to anyone and everyone.
• In the final chapter, the authors advize the traditional social democrat parties to change their positive stance on immigration if they want votes. Call me an idealist, but parties should not change their policies according to what "the people" supposedly want.
May 27, 2019
A more cowardly and wrong-headed take on right wing populism would be hard to find outside of the annals of culture warrior YoutTube.
This is a book which sees fit to list every single grievance, real or imagined, that national populists claim while stammering out solutions to them, which are often vague, unhelpful or even hypocritical. For example, I laughed out loud when in the space of a single page they raised the unpopularity of diversity quotas, AND the possibility of making sure US universities hired a certain number of Republican professors to fight liberal hegemony in higher education. It became far less funny to me as I read on and realised that this utter lack of awareness wasn't an accident, but the thesis statement of the book: capitulate and surrender ground to national populists on every issue (even when at odds with one another) in the hope that they will be satisfied, and become reasonable again. The idea that people who are winning will de-escalate voluntarily is dangerously naive to me, as is Goodwin and Eatwell's stance on what qualifies as nativist rather than racist. See if you can spot the contradiction here:
"However, while we agree that Trump advocates discriminatory immigration policies and is deeply xenophobic... he does not fit the systematically racist mould". (pg76)
What DOES count as structural racism if not POLICY? If the authors don't believe the creation of new laws/reinterpretation of existing ones for the purpose of a discriminatory immigration policy fit in th mould of "systematically racist", then they ought to find other subjects to write about. Maybe a 200 page 'How To' on hand wringing?
I'm not really any good at scrutinising the electoral data used to show the rising support for national populist parties and movements in the US and Europe, but it all looked well collected and presented to me, which is the one saving grace of this book. That they are in service to such moral and political cowardice is a terrible waste.
This is a book which sees fit to list every single grievance, real or imagined, that national populists claim while stammering out solutions to them, which are often vague, unhelpful or even hypocritical. For example, I laughed out loud when in the space of a single page they raised the unpopularity of diversity quotas, AND the possibility of making sure US universities hired a certain number of Republican professors to fight liberal hegemony in higher education. It became far less funny to me as I read on and realised that this utter lack of awareness wasn't an accident, but the thesis statement of the book: capitulate and surrender ground to national populists on every issue (even when at odds with one another) in the hope that they will be satisfied, and become reasonable again. The idea that people who are winning will de-escalate voluntarily is dangerously naive to me, as is Goodwin and Eatwell's stance on what qualifies as nativist rather than racist. See if you can spot the contradiction here:
"However, while we agree that Trump advocates discriminatory immigration policies and is deeply xenophobic... he does not fit the systematically racist mould". (pg76)
What DOES count as structural racism if not POLICY? If the authors don't believe the creation of new laws/reinterpretation of existing ones for the purpose of a discriminatory immigration policy fit in th mould of "systematically racist", then they ought to find other subjects to write about. Maybe a 200 page 'How To' on hand wringing?
I'm not really any good at scrutinising the electoral data used to show the rising support for national populist parties and movements in the US and Europe, but it all looked well collected and presented to me, which is the one saving grace of this book. That they are in service to such moral and political cowardice is a terrible waste.
December 16, 2018
An international look at populist parties in different nations over the last 20 years. The authors situate Trump/Le Pen/Brexit as part of a broader trend.
There is an especially interesting graph at the end which shows that right-of-centre parties have moved to more solidly right wing, but at the same time left-of-centre parties have moved decisively rightwards leaving a vacuum of groups of under-represented people.
The book is rather too statistics heavy with an awful lot of opinion polls quoted, but overall it paints a persuasive picture that the trends are more enduring and more nuanced than the media political commentators present them.
There is an especially interesting graph at the end which shows that right-of-centre parties have moved to more solidly right wing, but at the same time left-of-centre parties have moved decisively rightwards leaving a vacuum of groups of under-represented people.
The book is rather too statistics heavy with an awful lot of opinion polls quoted, but overall it paints a persuasive picture that the trends are more enduring and more nuanced than the media political commentators present them.
February 23, 2019
The book is useful for the secondary literature that it draws on, but there is little in the book that's original or insightful. By defining racism narrowly, it comes to the convenient conclusion that racism is in decline while straining to find all reasons, except racism, for the rise in xenophobia, of which it tries to present a sympathetic portrait.
It seems like the same book keeps appearing periodically, under different titles and by different authors, at whose core is the same tired anti-immigrant argument. There's little here that you won't have already read in books by Christopher Caldwell, David Goodhart, Douglas Murray et al.
If you want to read about populism, you are better off reading Cas Mudde, Kaltwasser, Müller.
It seems like the same book keeps appearing periodically, under different titles and by different authors, at whose core is the same tired anti-immigrant argument. There's little here that you won't have already read in books by Christopher Caldwell, David Goodhart, Douglas Murray et al.
If you want to read about populism, you are better off reading Cas Mudde, Kaltwasser, Müller.
May 17, 2019
I can write a thesis on how much I didn't like this book. But I won't because it will feel like a waste of time. However, a few points:
- This is a book that pretends to be objective and academic. It isn't. It uses plenty of statistics but almost all of them are about the perceptions of white working men on how they feel alienated and unprivileged. This is not evidence, especially when it is not balanced with counter statistics about how others perceive their circumstances or whether the perceptions of the white men are factually true.
- The authors insist many times, too many times, that the national populists are not fascists. I will give them that not all national populists are fascists but they fail to mention that most of the current fascists reside in national populists movements.
- They go further to insist that national populists are by and large not racist. I find this a stretch. They use word play to say they are xenophobes but not racists. I say this comes too close to splitting hairs.
- The authors also insist that the fears and anger of white mostly working class me about migration and their supposed unprivileged situation is legitimate. That is simply not true, they are not unprivileged even if they felt like it and the fact that they feel like this doesn't make their consequent actions justifiable.
I write this and think of the shouts of the white men in the protests in the US: "Jews will not replace us" and "blood and earth" which both carry distinctly Nazi tones and the "Heil Trump" shouted by Spenser with his extended arm. To say that those, and Farage and Orban and LePen and Wilders, are neither fascists nor racists is dangerously complacent and outright dangerous.
This is an apologist book for bigoted white men written by other white men to tell us that we should pamper their fears or risk taking the consequences.
If you want to read something significant, and less tedious, about the subject, read What Is Populism? by Jan-Werner Muller. That one is worth the time.
- This is a book that pretends to be objective and academic. It isn't. It uses plenty of statistics but almost all of them are about the perceptions of white working men on how they feel alienated and unprivileged. This is not evidence, especially when it is not balanced with counter statistics about how others perceive their circumstances or whether the perceptions of the white men are factually true.
- The authors insist many times, too many times, that the national populists are not fascists. I will give them that not all national populists are fascists but they fail to mention that most of the current fascists reside in national populists movements.
- They go further to insist that national populists are by and large not racist. I find this a stretch. They use word play to say they are xenophobes but not racists. I say this comes too close to splitting hairs.
- The authors also insist that the fears and anger of white mostly working class me about migration and their supposed unprivileged situation is legitimate. That is simply not true, they are not unprivileged even if they felt like it and the fact that they feel like this doesn't make their consequent actions justifiable.
I write this and think of the shouts of the white men in the protests in the US: "Jews will not replace us" and "blood and earth" which both carry distinctly Nazi tones and the "Heil Trump" shouted by Spenser with his extended arm. To say that those, and Farage and Orban and LePen and Wilders, are neither fascists nor racists is dangerously complacent and outright dangerous.
This is an apologist book for bigoted white men written by other white men to tell us that we should pamper their fears or risk taking the consequences.
If you want to read something significant, and less tedious, about the subject, read What Is Populism? by Jan-Werner Muller. That one is worth the time.
October 6, 2019
I had expectations for this book but it turned out to be an apologetic s**t. I understand that all the books about populism published in the last few years always offer the same analysis, I understand that they wanted to offer a "new" point of view on the topic... but you can do it without saying that "Lega Nord is NOT racist"? That "Front National has not a fascist background" (really buddy? In the '80 they used to march with their heads shaved, but ok)? Because, you know that sounds utterly stupid and blind to me.
November 20, 2020
The astonishing "Brexit" of the UK from the EU and elections of Donald Trump in the USA (2016), Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2018), and (re-election of) Boris Johnson in the UK has shocked pundits and the public in the West. Alongside these, support for "national populists" has grown in countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe. Many in the West are perturbed that millions have thrown their support behind national populist strongmen but Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin provide an accessible and empathetic account of why national populism has ascended, why we should have seen it coming, and why it will likely remain on the political scene for years to come.
National populist support derives largely from the uneducated and working classes who also tend to live in rural areas and places where industry has been exported to cheaper countries of production including China. These voters have not been able to financially thrive in the neoliberal economy that has left them behind (while the cosmopolitan political elite sniff that they can "learn to code"). Recently, some Democratic politicians in the USA have proposed forgiving post-secondary debt; yet this is still a benefit for the educated rather than the working class as this helps the sociology major from Berkerley, not the Walgreen's cashier in Kansas or the waitress at Applebee's. Additionally, these voters tend to be more traditional in their values and oppose the identity politics that social liberals have catapulted to the top of political agendas rather than putting forth economic reforms to help the working class.
National populist voters also have pride in their country's heritage but can view immigration and multiculturalism as a threat; they question why they should be expected to pay to support low-skill immigrants and those who do not meaningful participate in their economy and fear that these immigrants (particularly from Muslim countries) will undermine their country's values (though I think that Muslims and social conservatives and Christians might actually find in each other allies on certain issues like religious liberty). Europeans in particular have witnessed streams of refugees pouring into Europe and Islamic terrorism in the twenty-first century. Even in Canada, our multicultural "mosaic" differs sharply from the USA's "melting pot"; the former encourages ethnic minorities to maintain cultural traditions whereas the melting pot boils off elements of ethnic diversity in favour of a generalized American monoculture. Yet I've also witnessed the ways in which some larger ethnic minorities are able to create alternative ethnic communities removed from mainstream Canadian culture, where they do not even need to bother learning one of our country's official languages. This leads to questions of what is civic duty and can help fuel the populist attitude among Canadians.
All in all, this has been one of the best reads of 2020 and I will be heartily recommending this to those who flippantly point to Trump and his braggadocio and sneer that national populists are bigots and fascists; rather, Eatwell and Goodwin effectively demonstrate how the snide accusation that national populists are fascist is entirely nonsensical if one is paying attention to history. The book also showcases national populism on a global scale, relating how Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, Viktor Orban, and others have been able to gather political support; indeed, the authors contemplate that a "national populism-lite" practiced by centre-right parties in the way of restrictions on immigration and big government programs for the working classes (e.g. government-sponsored health care) might be the future of Western conservatism.
National populist support derives largely from the uneducated and working classes who also tend to live in rural areas and places where industry has been exported to cheaper countries of production including China. These voters have not been able to financially thrive in the neoliberal economy that has left them behind (while the cosmopolitan political elite sniff that they can "learn to code"). Recently, some Democratic politicians in the USA have proposed forgiving post-secondary debt; yet this is still a benefit for the educated rather than the working class as this helps the sociology major from Berkerley, not the Walgreen's cashier in Kansas or the waitress at Applebee's. Additionally, these voters tend to be more traditional in their values and oppose the identity politics that social liberals have catapulted to the top of political agendas rather than putting forth economic reforms to help the working class.
National populist voters also have pride in their country's heritage but can view immigration and multiculturalism as a threat; they question why they should be expected to pay to support low-skill immigrants and those who do not meaningful participate in their economy and fear that these immigrants (particularly from Muslim countries) will undermine their country's values (though I think that Muslims and social conservatives and Christians might actually find in each other allies on certain issues like religious liberty). Europeans in particular have witnessed streams of refugees pouring into Europe and Islamic terrorism in the twenty-first century. Even in Canada, our multicultural "mosaic" differs sharply from the USA's "melting pot"; the former encourages ethnic minorities to maintain cultural traditions whereas the melting pot boils off elements of ethnic diversity in favour of a generalized American monoculture. Yet I've also witnessed the ways in which some larger ethnic minorities are able to create alternative ethnic communities removed from mainstream Canadian culture, where they do not even need to bother learning one of our country's official languages. This leads to questions of what is civic duty and can help fuel the populist attitude among Canadians.
All in all, this has been one of the best reads of 2020 and I will be heartily recommending this to those who flippantly point to Trump and his braggadocio and sneer that national populists are bigots and fascists; rather, Eatwell and Goodwin effectively demonstrate how the snide accusation that national populists are fascist is entirely nonsensical if one is paying attention to history. The book also showcases national populism on a global scale, relating how Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, Viktor Orban, and others have been able to gather political support; indeed, the authors contemplate that a "national populism-lite" practiced by centre-right parties in the way of restrictions on immigration and big government programs for the working classes (e.g. government-sponsored health care) might be the future of Western conservatism.
March 25, 2019
Sombering book on the state of the new wave of nationalistic populism taking over many western democracies. Instead of brushing aside the huge and unpredictable populist decisions taken by the people (Brexit & Trump) as last-ditch efforts, or momentary passionate decisions which will wither way automatically with time, its high time that we accept the reality in the shift of people's attitude to immigrants, inequality and job security. All of these issues are genuine feelings among the electorate which the main parties will have to address otherwise these populist parties will continue to dominate the political scene for a long long time.
March 22, 2021
Nebloga studija apie nacionalpopulizmą, daug statistinių duomenų, kaip keitėsi tam tikrų grupių balsavimas už vieną ar kitą populistą bėgant metams.
Pasigedau daugiau pavyzdžių. Suprantu, kad rimtam kokybiniam tyrimui imtis negali būti pernelyg plati, tačiau užsiciklinimas tik ties Trumpu, Brexitu ir Le Pen truputį erzino (labai epizodiškai paliečiami Fidesz, Salvini, Alt-Right ir kitų valstybių radikalų klausimai).
Dar tas nuolatinis liberalizmo kalimas prie kryžiaus ir sistemiškai kartojamas nacionalpopulizmo sekėjų nusivylimo esama socioekonomine padėtimi naratyvas. Kartais toks vaizdas, jog patys autoriai stipriai prijaučia nacionalpopulizmui.
Šiaip toks vidutinio lygio mokslinis skaitalas.
Pasigedau daugiau pavyzdžių. Suprantu, kad rimtam kokybiniam tyrimui imtis negali būti pernelyg plati, tačiau užsiciklinimas tik ties Trumpu, Brexitu ir Le Pen truputį erzino (labai epizodiškai paliečiami Fidesz, Salvini, Alt-Right ir kitų valstybių radikalų klausimai).
Dar tas nuolatinis liberalizmo kalimas prie kryžiaus ir sistemiškai kartojamas nacionalpopulizmo sekėjų nusivylimo esama socioekonomine padėtimi naratyvas. Kartais toks vaizdas, jog patys autoriai stipriai prijaučia nacionalpopulizmui.
Šiaip toks vidutinio lygio mokslinis skaitalas.
February 5, 2021
Well researched, full of statistical data. A bit dry and some comments (especially on populists' anti-immigration rhetoric and racist rhetoric) were quite problematic.
Also what is missing, it feels like the authors were saying that it's not only the worsening economic condition of the uneducated whites that is fueling the rise of populism but legitimate concerns of protection of social values of some communities and their culture... I mean should the mainstream parties listen to bigotry, or educate and improve the social conditions of those in trouble? I would say the latter, while it didn't come quite clearly through in the book.
Also what is missing, it feels like the authors were saying that it's not only the worsening economic condition of the uneducated whites that is fueling the rise of populism but legitimate concerns of protection of social values of some communities and their culture... I mean should the mainstream parties listen to bigotry, or educate and improve the social conditions of those in trouble? I would say the latter, while it didn't come quite clearly through in the book.
December 30, 2018
This is far more honest and daring than one might expect. It's not just another 'populists are racist and bad' tirade. It's open-minded, empathetic and realistic. Some of the stats about future demographic trends are quite an eye-opener.
February 20, 2022
Da leitura do livro “Populismo: A revolva contra a democracia liberal” de Roger Eatwell e Matthew Goodwin ficamos um pouco com a ideia dos autores entenderem, tal como o título sugere, que o populismo surgiu essencialmente em resposta à democracia liberal e em especial à sua vertente neoliberal. Ora, não é bem assim. Populistas sempre existiram desde que há registo escrito da história. E o que os define é essencialmente os afetos e empatia (afectação) tal como foi caracterizada por Espinosa. Sem afetos, sem empatia, não há reconhecimento de um líder que tenha a sua legitimação vinda das bases, do povo, e não alicerçada nas elites. Como é óbvio, todos os líderes eleitos por sufrágio directo têm de ter algo de populistas. Era este tipo de análise que estava à espera dos autores. A minha dúvida e que este livro não esclareceu é onde está o limite entre um regime populista saudável e um patológico? Será que a distinção depende exclusivamente do líder? Fica a questão.
Um outro ponto que teria sido útil ser abordado é a relação ambivalente, umas vezes de agonismo, outras de antagonismo entre liberdade e democracia. Esta dualidade em que assenta o nosso sistema político parece-me muito importante para a compreensão do fenómeno populista, e este confronto (de agonismo ou antagonismo) entre nós e os outros é muito bem explicado por Chantal Moufe e Ernesto Laclau.
Da análise que os autores fazem dos movimentos populistas de finais fo Séc XX e início do Séc XXI gostei particularmente da análise e síntese que fazem sobre as suas causas. A descrição destas nos quatro “D”: Desconfiança; Destruição; Despojamento; Desalinhamento, parecem-me bastante didáticas e refletem uma análise bastante oportuna sobre o que poderá estar no origem de muitos movimentos populistas dos nossos dias.
Por último não posso deixar de referir a forma como os autores fundamentaram muitas das suas premissas e conclusões. Apontar estudos de opinião, sem uma detalhada análise da sua ficha técnica, e utilizar os resultados para sugerir significado à variação de alguns pontos percentuais entre os que antes tinham uma opinião ou apoiavam uma dada ideia para os que agora assumem outras posições não é boa ciência. Utilizar análises descritivas para se retirar conclusões e enunciar princípios ou regras gerais é uma armadilha a que se deve sempre fugir.
Um outro ponto que teria sido útil ser abordado é a relação ambivalente, umas vezes de agonismo, outras de antagonismo entre liberdade e democracia. Esta dualidade em que assenta o nosso sistema político parece-me muito importante para a compreensão do fenómeno populista, e este confronto (de agonismo ou antagonismo) entre nós e os outros é muito bem explicado por Chantal Moufe e Ernesto Laclau.
Da análise que os autores fazem dos movimentos populistas de finais fo Séc XX e início do Séc XXI gostei particularmente da análise e síntese que fazem sobre as suas causas. A descrição destas nos quatro “D”: Desconfiança; Destruição; Despojamento; Desalinhamento, parecem-me bastante didáticas e refletem uma análise bastante oportuna sobre o que poderá estar no origem de muitos movimentos populistas dos nossos dias.
Por último não posso deixar de referir a forma como os autores fundamentaram muitas das suas premissas e conclusões. Apontar estudos de opinião, sem uma detalhada análise da sua ficha técnica, e utilizar os resultados para sugerir significado à variação de alguns pontos percentuais entre os que antes tinham uma opinião ou apoiavam uma dada ideia para os que agora assumem outras posições não é boa ciência. Utilizar análises descritivas para se retirar conclusões e enunciar princípios ou regras gerais é uma armadilha a que se deve sempre fugir.
August 1, 2025
The book itself is well-written, and rich in second literature sources. I agree with the authors when they criticise the idea that national populism is just a temporary phase, or that it only appeals to old white men which are soon to die off. These points are the reason behind my two stars.
Beyond this, however, the book is filled with flaws which make its argument insufficient in defending its key thesis.
The book presents itself as an academic reference but is in fact nothing short of a compilation of statistics with no deep interpretation of the acquired results. The author more so use the results to defend a conclusion that they already had, fail to contrast it with contradictory findings, and when stumbling upon cases that contradict their hypothesis, sweep it away.
In 1895, Durkheim laid out three core principles of sociological method in his "The Rules of Sociological Method":
1) Social facts are things, meaning social facts (such as beliefs, customs, culture) exist outside of the individual and constrain the individual's behavior.
In order to study a social phenomena, one cannot only rely on an individual's perception of it. Instead, one must look for causes that exist outside of the perspectives of individuals. Sometimes, the reasons we give are incomplete compared to reality, sometimes they are exaggerated, sometimes they are contradictory. It is the role of sociologists to investigate the gaps between the reasons people give for their actions and the measurable correlating factors, as well as to interpret said gaps.
This book does none of this work. When investigating why people vote for national populists, the authors cite statistics such as "white people feel that immigration is detrimental to them", or "white people feel voiceless", and so on.
The word "voiceless" appears many times in this book yet not a single time do the authors explain what it is supposed to mean, and how exactly are white people voiceless compared to ethnic minorities. But more importantly, they never seek for objective factors behind those subjective feelings. The authors acknowledge that these feelings may or may not be coherent with objective reality, but never attempt to make a parallel with what objective reality is like. If white people feel increasingly voiceless despite objective findings showing that it is not the case, then surely we cannot limit our analysis to what feelings do they have, but expand it to "why do they feel that way".
There has also been no questioning on the role played by national populists' narratives in shaping people's beliefs towards immigration. Did one cause the other, or do the two mutually reinforce each other? The authors do not ask the question, making the reader believe that a seizable part of the population in Western countries spontaneously conceived a political agenda that no major political party was able to offer, and that, seeing this demand, the nationalist populist parties materialised afterwards in response to it.
2) Nothing is innate, everything is social
The authors do not study stances towards immigration as social constructs. The profound hostility that is found in populist bases against migrants is labeled as being "normal", caused by people's natural desire to live within their national community. The authors also reject economic inequality as being the main driver of anti-immigration stances (or populism in general), claiming that it is before all caused by "political and cultural" reasons.
Even in a book defending anti-immigration, one is allowed to acknowledge that such a stance is not "natural", that it has historical, political and socioeconomic causes, and refusing to study these causes out of fear of being unfairly labeled "racist" is not a proper scholarly attitude. For example, the authors repeatedly claim, without delving into deeper details, that the complete rejection of immigration by nationalist populists is due to the principled incompatibility of Western civilisation with Islam. According to the authors, populists are worried that their national identity will be destroyed through waves of migration flux, and seek to protect their "traditional values" and "ways of life".
What is very surprising to me, however, is that this book mentions several times that the national populist voter base often holds conservative views, from the preference of said traditional values (those are not detailed), to their rejection of gay marriage (referred to as a "choice of sexual lifestyle") or their attitudes towards women. The authors spend quite a lot of time defending that there is an original divide between populists and liberals, the latter seeking to "play the race card" and impose "political correctness" on everyone. In the authors' own words:
The authors repeatedly emphasize the failures of the liberal left by focusing on issues that are not of the concern whatsoever of the white working class, such as women's rights, LGBT rights, and so on, only to later chastise migrants for doing the same. The authors even cite a statistic showing that migrants who grow up in the West are far more supportive of gay marriage than evangelical Christians are, yet dismiss such findings by claiming that "young Muslims are just as religious as their elders are". Is the issue Islam's values or just... Islam?
The authors then mention the "fear of Sharia law" as one of the greatest concerns of the populist base, but fail to mention whether this fear is real or imagined. Where are the statistics asking Muslim migrants whether they are in favor of Sharia Law? Where are the statistics looking for the change in attitudes and social values between first-generation and second-generation migrants? There is quite the irony behind claiming that the rise of national populism is explained by how "voiceless" the white working class is, despite migrants being a mute demographic within this entire book.
The authors sweep away anti-immigration attitudes as unmovable, as they are supposedly caused by incompatible features between the migrating cultures and the hosting culture. As a consequence, they suggest that the only way to dismantle national populism is for left-wing parties to also adopt anti-immigration policies(?). However, they completely skip over what makes the compatibility hard: such as the ghettoization of migrants which fail to integrate socioeconomic life, not out of self-exclusion but out being unable to do so; the systemic racism which hinders integration and facilitates an "us versus them" approach, the foreign interferences of hosting countries in migrating people's countries which are at the root of religious radicalisation, and so on.
Without such sociological investigation, the chapter of this book on immigration can be skipped and replaced by reading a twitter thread written by 14EuroLord88 on the need to defend the innocent white race from the brown barbarians.
3.) The cause of a social fact must be found in other social facts
One of the authors' main point is that national populism is on the rise because uncaring elites refuse to listen to the people. Who are the uncaring elites, why do they not care, and who is the "people" (can we equate "people" to "white working class")? Those facts are quite unclear, despite how often this argument is repeated throughout the book.
Despite the authors mentioning that left-leaning liberal elites are the cause behind the change in alignment of white people's political allegiances, they do not explain why the fact that populist parties are themselves also spearheaded by billionaires and millionaires not also considered repulsive by their voters. It seems that the domination of political parties by "elites" cannot itself be the cause of voter apathy, as Trump, Berlusconi and Le Pen themselves come from elitist circles and families. The authors claimed that left-wing parties support immigration due to elites being out of touch with the regular people, but it is clear that what we refer to as "elites" is not one homogeneous crowd, but a divided group with various conflicting interests. What are those conflicting interests, where do they come from and what role do they play in national populism? The book does not seem to care.
In the chapter studying the economic factors behind national populism, it is mentioned that automation is the cause of half of last labour in Europe. If that is the case, then why is the fear or migrants taking over the jobs of hard-working nationals at the forefront rather than the fear of automation? What role do the speeches and discourses held by populists responsible for this perception?
The authors take the speeches and narratives of nationalist populists as factual information and do not study it as a social factor, failing to grasp the reactiveness with which it engages in politics. In this entire book, "populism" is never truly defined as anything but "a political ideology which centers the people's interests", which is an egregious gap in scholarly work. Populism's negative connotation comes from the belief that it is a political tool used by certain elites to ignite pre-existing concerns within the population, mobilizing their support by selling them an all-encompassing but eventually incoherent ideology.
Hence, a "populist" candidate might despise Islam and oppose immigration yet simultaneously support the invasion and destruction of a Muslim country, creating a massive Muslim migration flux, like Berlusconi did in 2011 with the invasion of Libya.
Populism is appealing because it can make endless promises to its voter base without any political accountability, and uses its externality to the mainstream political circuits to gain legitimacy in its anti-institutional, pro-people movement. It remains that after being voted into power, the 1% heavily benefits from the arrival of the populists while the working class who voted for them suffers.
The link between populism and fascism, which the authors dismiss early on as "hysterical", lies in the fact that rises in populist figures occur when a desperate population existing amongst growing socioeconomic inequalities is faced with the unsolvable contradictions of the liberal system it toils under, which they as individuals cannot undo. By providing simple and comforting narratives (once we get rid of immigration, everything will be better), populists gain support at the expense of their opponents who cannot promise the same. However, populists omit that such solutions cannot defeat the inherent contradictions of the existing economic model, and only pave the way for increased radicalisation once the realization that "banning immigration" is more easily said than done, occurs.
Fascists do not start as fascists, they start as populists, concerned with the inevitable consequences of liberal democracy within a capitalist economic model.
Beyond this, however, the book is filled with flaws which make its argument insufficient in defending its key thesis.
The book presents itself as an academic reference but is in fact nothing short of a compilation of statistics with no deep interpretation of the acquired results. The author more so use the results to defend a conclusion that they already had, fail to contrast it with contradictory findings, and when stumbling upon cases that contradict their hypothesis, sweep it away.
In 1895, Durkheim laid out three core principles of sociological method in his "The Rules of Sociological Method":
1) Social facts are things, meaning social facts (such as beliefs, customs, culture) exist outside of the individual and constrain the individual's behavior.
In order to study a social phenomena, one cannot only rely on an individual's perception of it. Instead, one must look for causes that exist outside of the perspectives of individuals. Sometimes, the reasons we give are incomplete compared to reality, sometimes they are exaggerated, sometimes they are contradictory. It is the role of sociologists to investigate the gaps between the reasons people give for their actions and the measurable correlating factors, as well as to interpret said gaps.
This book does none of this work. When investigating why people vote for national populists, the authors cite statistics such as "white people feel that immigration is detrimental to them", or "white people feel voiceless", and so on.
The word "voiceless" appears many times in this book yet not a single time do the authors explain what it is supposed to mean, and how exactly are white people voiceless compared to ethnic minorities. But more importantly, they never seek for objective factors behind those subjective feelings. The authors acknowledge that these feelings may or may not be coherent with objective reality, but never attempt to make a parallel with what objective reality is like. If white people feel increasingly voiceless despite objective findings showing that it is not the case, then surely we cannot limit our analysis to what feelings do they have, but expand it to "why do they feel that way".
There has also been no questioning on the role played by national populists' narratives in shaping people's beliefs towards immigration. Did one cause the other, or do the two mutually reinforce each other? The authors do not ask the question, making the reader believe that a seizable part of the population in Western countries spontaneously conceived a political agenda that no major political party was able to offer, and that, seeing this demand, the nationalist populist parties materialised afterwards in response to it.
2) Nothing is innate, everything is social
The authors do not study stances towards immigration as social constructs. The profound hostility that is found in populist bases against migrants is labeled as being "normal", caused by people's natural desire to live within their national community. The authors also reject economic inequality as being the main driver of anti-immigration stances (or populism in general), claiming that it is before all caused by "political and cultural" reasons.
Even in a book defending anti-immigration, one is allowed to acknowledge that such a stance is not "natural", that it has historical, political and socioeconomic causes, and refusing to study these causes out of fear of being unfairly labeled "racist" is not a proper scholarly attitude. For example, the authors repeatedly claim, without delving into deeper details, that the complete rejection of immigration by nationalist populists is due to the principled incompatibility of Western civilisation with Islam. According to the authors, populists are worried that their national identity will be destroyed through waves of migration flux, and seek to protect their "traditional values" and "ways of life".
What is very surprising to me, however, is that this book mentions several times that the national populist voter base often holds conservative views, from the preference of said traditional values (those are not detailed), to their rejection of gay marriage (referred to as a "choice of sexual lifestyle") or their attitudes towards women. The authors spend quite a lot of time defending that there is an original divide between populists and liberals, the latter seeking to "play the race card" and impose "political correctness" on everyone. In the authors' own words:
"(In America there is) an increasing fixation or near total obsession among democrats and the liberal left with race, gender and 'diversity' rather than traditional left wing concerns like how to improve conditions for all workers and tackle inequality."
The authors repeatedly emphasize the failures of the liberal left by focusing on issues that are not of the concern whatsoever of the white working class, such as women's rights, LGBT rights, and so on, only to later chastise migrants for doing the same. The authors even cite a statistic showing that migrants who grow up in the West are far more supportive of gay marriage than evangelical Christians are, yet dismiss such findings by claiming that "young Muslims are just as religious as their elders are". Is the issue Islam's values or just... Islam?
The authors then mention the "fear of Sharia law" as one of the greatest concerns of the populist base, but fail to mention whether this fear is real or imagined. Where are the statistics asking Muslim migrants whether they are in favor of Sharia Law? Where are the statistics looking for the change in attitudes and social values between first-generation and second-generation migrants? There is quite the irony behind claiming that the rise of national populism is explained by how "voiceless" the white working class is, despite migrants being a mute demographic within this entire book.
The authors sweep away anti-immigration attitudes as unmovable, as they are supposedly caused by incompatible features between the migrating cultures and the hosting culture. As a consequence, they suggest that the only way to dismantle national populism is for left-wing parties to also adopt anti-immigration policies(?). However, they completely skip over what makes the compatibility hard: such as the ghettoization of migrants which fail to integrate socioeconomic life, not out of self-exclusion but out being unable to do so; the systemic racism which hinders integration and facilitates an "us versus them" approach, the foreign interferences of hosting countries in migrating people's countries which are at the root of religious radicalisation, and so on.
Without such sociological investigation, the chapter of this book on immigration can be skipped and replaced by reading a twitter thread written by 14EuroLord88 on the need to defend the innocent white race from the brown barbarians.
3.) The cause of a social fact must be found in other social facts
One of the authors' main point is that national populism is on the rise because uncaring elites refuse to listen to the people. Who are the uncaring elites, why do they not care, and who is the "people" (can we equate "people" to "white working class")? Those facts are quite unclear, despite how often this argument is repeated throughout the book.
Despite the authors mentioning that left-leaning liberal elites are the cause behind the change in alignment of white people's political allegiances, they do not explain why the fact that populist parties are themselves also spearheaded by billionaires and millionaires not also considered repulsive by their voters. It seems that the domination of political parties by "elites" cannot itself be the cause of voter apathy, as Trump, Berlusconi and Le Pen themselves come from elitist circles and families. The authors claimed that left-wing parties support immigration due to elites being out of touch with the regular people, but it is clear that what we refer to as "elites" is not one homogeneous crowd, but a divided group with various conflicting interests. What are those conflicting interests, where do they come from and what role do they play in national populism? The book does not seem to care.
In the chapter studying the economic factors behind national populism, it is mentioned that automation is the cause of half of last labour in Europe. If that is the case, then why is the fear or migrants taking over the jobs of hard-working nationals at the forefront rather than the fear of automation? What role do the speeches and discourses held by populists responsible for this perception?
The authors take the speeches and narratives of nationalist populists as factual information and do not study it as a social factor, failing to grasp the reactiveness with which it engages in politics. In this entire book, "populism" is never truly defined as anything but "a political ideology which centers the people's interests", which is an egregious gap in scholarly work. Populism's negative connotation comes from the belief that it is a political tool used by certain elites to ignite pre-existing concerns within the population, mobilizing their support by selling them an all-encompassing but eventually incoherent ideology.
Hence, a "populist" candidate might despise Islam and oppose immigration yet simultaneously support the invasion and destruction of a Muslim country, creating a massive Muslim migration flux, like Berlusconi did in 2011 with the invasion of Libya.
Populism is appealing because it can make endless promises to its voter base without any political accountability, and uses its externality to the mainstream political circuits to gain legitimacy in its anti-institutional, pro-people movement. It remains that after being voted into power, the 1% heavily benefits from the arrival of the populists while the working class who voted for them suffers.
The link between populism and fascism, which the authors dismiss early on as "hysterical", lies in the fact that rises in populist figures occur when a desperate population existing amongst growing socioeconomic inequalities is faced with the unsolvable contradictions of the liberal system it toils under, which they as individuals cannot undo. By providing simple and comforting narratives (once we get rid of immigration, everything will be better), populists gain support at the expense of their opponents who cannot promise the same. However, populists omit that such solutions cannot defeat the inherent contradictions of the existing economic model, and only pave the way for increased radicalisation once the realization that "banning immigration" is more easily said than done, occurs.
Fascists do not start as fascists, they start as populists, concerned with the inevitable consequences of liberal democracy within a capitalist economic model.
December 31, 2023
Reading this book reminded me of another book I read not long ago about the crisis of poor executive and middle management in corporate America. Hundreds of pages of outlandish behaviour and systematic breakdowns that objectively make corporations much less efficient, safe and well-paid for workers, and less profitable than they could be. The final conclusion of the book? It is the immigrants’ fault. Immigration hadn’t even been mentioned in the book until that point. All the examples given were of clearly native-born Americans managing companies into the ground. I was stunned.
This book has helped me understand that previous book’s bizarre conclusion. Case in point: national populists blaming most things they don’t like on immigrants, even when they at some level acknowledge the fundamental problems of modern capitalism and how it negatively affects democracy and government. Are there things that politicians and political parties do that alienate working-class and less educated voters? Yes. Focusing policies and speaking to just the middle class rather than the broad working class is one annoyance. Pandering to neoconservative economics and never turning down a corporate lobbyist calling is another. Standing back and allowing globalization to take away blue-collar jobs and drive income inequality is yet another.
So we understand that most problems are economic, but yet most national populists are concerned more with ethnic and cultural makeup of society. They want a “fair” system that means inequality such that white people are given preferential treatment in all spheres (although they will argue that it’s the immigrants who get preferential treatment now, which if having human rights and access to housing, education, and medical treatment is preferential, then we are merely witnessing white fragility at play when actual attempts at equality is seen as white oppression). So far, so good for this book’s analysis. Oh, and these folks generally don’t like LGTBQ or women to have rights either. Your standard bigotry buffet.
So why only three stars? This book fails to adequately address how to deal with national populism and bring people back into the pluralistic fold. We learn that economic solutions won’t help because these folks are happy with economic pain if it means the smelly foreigners are in more pain. Think of Southern US public swimming pools being filled in to keep Black kids out at the expense of all kids. So what to do? This book limply suggests to cave into the demands of the national populists and limit immigration going forward. However, that’s not the only demand. The populists want to set up some version of an apartheid system where one’s country of origin limits access to many services. How do we deal with that? This book has no answers. It suggests dialogue. I would caution that dialogue can easily be seen as acknowledging the validity of such extreme views. Human rights should absolutely never be put on the table for discussion or traded away for political gain. The authors don’t say to actually do this, but when they are telling us that the populists have “legitimate” grievances, and to me the only way to address these grievances to the populists’ liking seems to be to create a purposefully unequal society rigged for white people (because let’s be honest, it’s really about skin colour here - no one is fooling anyone), this tactic to me is a non starter. It is a real slippery slope full of more wedge issues to come, like we see with the push to limit trans rights to pander to populist bigots.
The book fails to address any aspect of climate change, which even by 2018 was painfully obvious. The book cannot have seen COVID coming, but the incredible anti-science and conspiracism that was clearly below the surface went undetected by the authors as well. They also say that national populists still believe in democracy, but by 2023 we now know that there is a growing anti-democratic movement afoot if it means wrenching power away from non-whites, Muslims, women, LGTBQ, or other minorities (not all populists share the same hatreds). The means justify the ends.
In sum, pretty good diagnosis but poor prescription for change. How about we start with dismantling neoconservative capitalism and its grave inequalities and insisting that any proposal that limits human rights is off the table for discussion? We should also get involved in political parties and push for much better engagement with the general population. Yes, this is a long road ahead, but throwing immigrants to the wolves is not the answer. As we have seen with the far right, they just move on to a new enemy. If we lived now in an all-white country and still had neoconservative capitalism and its economic inequality, the same people would merely focus on another boogeyman and ignore the actual corporate beast in the room. It’s the economy, stupid.
This book has helped me understand that previous book’s bizarre conclusion. Case in point: national populists blaming most things they don’t like on immigrants, even when they at some level acknowledge the fundamental problems of modern capitalism and how it negatively affects democracy and government. Are there things that politicians and political parties do that alienate working-class and less educated voters? Yes. Focusing policies and speaking to just the middle class rather than the broad working class is one annoyance. Pandering to neoconservative economics and never turning down a corporate lobbyist calling is another. Standing back and allowing globalization to take away blue-collar jobs and drive income inequality is yet another.
So we understand that most problems are economic, but yet most national populists are concerned more with ethnic and cultural makeup of society. They want a “fair” system that means inequality such that white people are given preferential treatment in all spheres (although they will argue that it’s the immigrants who get preferential treatment now, which if having human rights and access to housing, education, and medical treatment is preferential, then we are merely witnessing white fragility at play when actual attempts at equality is seen as white oppression). So far, so good for this book’s analysis. Oh, and these folks generally don’t like LGTBQ or women to have rights either. Your standard bigotry buffet.
So why only three stars? This book fails to adequately address how to deal with national populism and bring people back into the pluralistic fold. We learn that economic solutions won’t help because these folks are happy with economic pain if it means the smelly foreigners are in more pain. Think of Southern US public swimming pools being filled in to keep Black kids out at the expense of all kids. So what to do? This book limply suggests to cave into the demands of the national populists and limit immigration going forward. However, that’s not the only demand. The populists want to set up some version of an apartheid system where one’s country of origin limits access to many services. How do we deal with that? This book has no answers. It suggests dialogue. I would caution that dialogue can easily be seen as acknowledging the validity of such extreme views. Human rights should absolutely never be put on the table for discussion or traded away for political gain. The authors don’t say to actually do this, but when they are telling us that the populists have “legitimate” grievances, and to me the only way to address these grievances to the populists’ liking seems to be to create a purposefully unequal society rigged for white people (because let’s be honest, it’s really about skin colour here - no one is fooling anyone), this tactic to me is a non starter. It is a real slippery slope full of more wedge issues to come, like we see with the push to limit trans rights to pander to populist bigots.
The book fails to address any aspect of climate change, which even by 2018 was painfully obvious. The book cannot have seen COVID coming, but the incredible anti-science and conspiracism that was clearly below the surface went undetected by the authors as well. They also say that national populists still believe in democracy, but by 2023 we now know that there is a growing anti-democratic movement afoot if it means wrenching power away from non-whites, Muslims, women, LGTBQ, or other minorities (not all populists share the same hatreds). The means justify the ends.
In sum, pretty good diagnosis but poor prescription for change. How about we start with dismantling neoconservative capitalism and its grave inequalities and insisting that any proposal that limits human rights is off the table for discussion? We should also get involved in political parties and push for much better engagement with the general population. Yes, this is a long road ahead, but throwing immigrants to the wolves is not the answer. As we have seen with the far right, they just move on to a new enemy. If we lived now in an all-white country and still had neoconservative capitalism and its economic inequality, the same people would merely focus on another boogeyman and ignore the actual corporate beast in the room. It’s the economy, stupid.
January 7, 2020
The book offers nothing really new if you religiously follow opinions, literature, or research articles about national populism especially after the rise of Marine LePen, Brexit, and Trump. The writers presented readers with historical and socioeconomic backgrounds, showing that national-populism is not a new trend but it has been there for quite long, waiting to erupt.
It also dissects the material and non-material factors that draw people to support national populist party and its candidates. They sum up four factors that play a huge part in boosting nat-pop: destruct, destruction, deprivation, and de-alignment. When pundits tend to point out economical hardship as the primary reason of the nat-pop waves. They feel like the immigrants However, for those who live economically comfortable, non-material factors such as nationalism and xenophobia contribute more.
What makes me a bit uncomfortable here is the writers' approach towards non-material factors such as nationalism, conservatism, and immigration. The writers tend to be a bit apologetic towards the racism and xenophobia that lure (usually) the upper and middle class along with older (35-65 or let’sjust say, the Boomers) to nat-pop. They said:
Many voters do not think in transactional terms about costs and benefits, gross domestic product, jobs or growth. […]. Instead, they attach as much value, if not more, to community, belonging, group identity and the nation –and it is these deeper concerns that will need to be addressed.
They continued by saying that the liberal left, the enemy of nat-pop, will dismiss theses values as racist or xenophobic. How to talk about national identity without “othering” the immigrants which are usually seen as “the Others” who threaten the national value? I understand the writers’ point that by dismissing these concerns, we might risk pushing them further to the warm embrace of nat-pop. Thus, it is important to find a cure for the relative deprivation plaguing the nation and ensure that social integration works effectively.
Until then, and this time I agree with the writers, we will see national populism live long and prosper; besieging the fragile reign of liberal democracy.
It also dissects the material and non-material factors that draw people to support national populist party and its candidates. They sum up four factors that play a huge part in boosting nat-pop: destruct, destruction, deprivation, and de-alignment. When pundits tend to point out economical hardship as the primary reason of the nat-pop waves. They feel like the immigrants However, for those who live economically comfortable, non-material factors such as nationalism and xenophobia contribute more.
What makes me a bit uncomfortable here is the writers' approach towards non-material factors such as nationalism, conservatism, and immigration. The writers tend to be a bit apologetic towards the racism and xenophobia that lure (usually) the upper and middle class along with older (35-65 or let’sjust say, the Boomers) to nat-pop. They said:
Many voters do not think in transactional terms about costs and benefits, gross domestic product, jobs or growth. […]. Instead, they attach as much value, if not more, to community, belonging, group identity and the nation –and it is these deeper concerns that will need to be addressed.
They continued by saying that the liberal left, the enemy of nat-pop, will dismiss theses values as racist or xenophobic. How to talk about national identity without “othering” the immigrants which are usually seen as “the Others” who threaten the national value? I understand the writers’ point that by dismissing these concerns, we might risk pushing them further to the warm embrace of nat-pop. Thus, it is important to find a cure for the relative deprivation plaguing the nation and ensure that social integration works effectively.
Until then, and this time I agree with the writers, we will see national populism live long and prosper; besieging the fragile reign of liberal democracy.
October 28, 2020
Numa palavra: EDUCAÇÃO.
Fundamental para combater movimentos mais ou menos inorgânicos - com franca tendência para se institucionalizarem- que exploram os receios mais profundos, ainda que não inteiramente fundados mas também não totalmente desfasados da realidade objectiva (independentemente da avaliação que possamos fazer das perspectivas subjectivas vulneráveis ao populismo).
Quanto mais educadas, mais imunes ficam as pessoas ao discurso nacional populista.
Portanto, educação precisa-se... para ontem.
Fundamental para combater movimentos mais ou menos inorgânicos - com franca tendência para se institucionalizarem- que exploram os receios mais profundos, ainda que não inteiramente fundados mas também não totalmente desfasados da realidade objectiva (independentemente da avaliação que possamos fazer das perspectivas subjectivas vulneráveis ao populismo).
Quanto mais educadas, mais imunes ficam as pessoas ao discurso nacional populista.
Portanto, educação precisa-se... para ontem.
March 12, 2019
The book brings to light some interesting facts about the statistics behind the rise of national populism in the West, but in a rather dry way though. I sometimes got the feeling that I was reading some report. Although I understand that the book tries to offer a more realistic look at this phenomenon it does in my opinion suffer from the authors quite narrow definition of racism as the they rather downplay its factor, along with racial stereotypes, in the rise of national populism.
April 29, 2021
Very depressing but interesting, the liberal left is pretty fucked
March 29, 2025
Politika...tema, galinti sukelti ginčus tarp artimiausių žmonių.
Knyga nebloga, rašyta prieš aštuonis metus, tad galima patikrinti ar pildosi autorių pranašystės. Pildosi ir su kaupu. Vien šis faktas parodo, kad autoriai suprato apie ką rašė, jų įžvalgos nuovokios, taikyti tyrimai teisingi. Puikiai nuspėta politinė padėtis Europoje - radikalių partijų iškilimas. Autoriai taip pat tvirtino, kad Trumpas turi šansų sugrįžti į valdžią, o kaip visi žinome, Baltuosiuose rūmuose šiuo metu vėl šeimininkauja jis.
Smagu, kad beveik tobulai išlaikytas politinis neutralumas nesirenkant stovyklos būti už ar prieš nacionalpopulistus, nors esu beveik tikras, kad autoriai yra prieš. Brandus požiūris nesistengiant manipuliuoti žmonėmis, nuteikinėti ar gąsdinti nacionalpopulizmu. Kalbama faktais, keliant hipotezes ir prognozes, neigiami mitai ar klaidingas požiūris.
Itin žavėjo dar vienas dalykas: puikiai aprašoma kodėl žmonės renkasi nacionalpopulistus, radikalus ir nusigręžia nuo tradicinių didžiųjų partijų. Puikiai griaunamas mitas, kad radikalai nebūtinai yra rasistai ir seksistai, priešingai negu propagandinė žiniasklaida bando tokią nuomonę įteikti.
Ko pritrūko iki labai gero vertinimo? Knyga su ryškiu amerikonišku prieskoniu, labiau skirta būtent JAV auditorijai, nors netrūksta europietiškų pavyzdžių. Kartais informacija sausoka, norėjosi informacijos pateikimo žaismingumo.
Knyga nebloga, rašyta prieš aštuonis metus, tad galima patikrinti ar pildosi autorių pranašystės. Pildosi ir su kaupu. Vien šis faktas parodo, kad autoriai suprato apie ką rašė, jų įžvalgos nuovokios, taikyti tyrimai teisingi. Puikiai nuspėta politinė padėtis Europoje - radikalių partijų iškilimas. Autoriai taip pat tvirtino, kad Trumpas turi šansų sugrįžti į valdžią, o kaip visi žinome, Baltuosiuose rūmuose šiuo metu vėl šeimininkauja jis.
Smagu, kad beveik tobulai išlaikytas politinis neutralumas nesirenkant stovyklos būti už ar prieš nacionalpopulistus, nors esu beveik tikras, kad autoriai yra prieš. Brandus požiūris nesistengiant manipuliuoti žmonėmis, nuteikinėti ar gąsdinti nacionalpopulizmu. Kalbama faktais, keliant hipotezes ir prognozes, neigiami mitai ar klaidingas požiūris.
Itin žavėjo dar vienas dalykas: puikiai aprašoma kodėl žmonės renkasi nacionalpopulistus, radikalus ir nusigręžia nuo tradicinių didžiųjų partijų. Puikiai griaunamas mitas, kad radikalai nebūtinai yra rasistai ir seksistai, priešingai negu propagandinė žiniasklaida bando tokią nuomonę įteikti.
Ko pritrūko iki labai gero vertinimo? Knyga su ryškiu amerikonišku prieskoniu, labiau skirta būtent JAV auditorijai, nors netrūksta europietiškų pavyzdžių. Kartais informacija sausoka, norėjosi informacijos pateikimo žaismingumo.
August 5, 2020
3-4 [somewhere in that range, I am not sure]
This book is confusing. It makes a impassioned argument that the roots of national populism can be found in primarily subjective feelings about relative deprivation compared to those outside of the "national group" (i.e. immigrants), a strong feeling of detachment from the political process, and economic inequality. In many areas, Eatwell and Goodwin's arguments are lucid, especially in the economic and political involvement sphere. Yet, the authors take the time to dismiss national populism as simply an economic phenomenon. Indeed, using stats, polls, and research studies they demonstrate that many, many people in Europe and the US feel deeply uncomfortable about immigration, often attributing their economic plight to that immigration.
Yet, and as other reviews here on Goodreads point out, Eatwell and Goodwin also take the time to, partially by implication and partially directly, that the views of national populist parties are neither racist nor explicitly bad. They seem to make the argument that suspicion of, specially Muslim, immigrants has a good basis in liberal democratic thought, and that national populist parties have no interest in tearing apart the democratic system (indeed, they claim that national populists would see the state become 'more democratic' referencing referendums). Such a conclusion ignores the situations occurring in Hungary, in Poland, and the way in which nation populists receive funding and support from nations such as Russia to undermine the system of domestic democracy so important to the modern state. Further, Eatwell and Goodwin suggest that voters who support national populists are right to advocate for a reduction in protections for minority groups if it furthers some idea of "democracy" (i.e. they seem to say that national populists, and the "lite" versions thereof who build policies to prevent their mainstream parties from sliding into irrelevance, reflect a feeling from the populous that the current democratic system does not represent them). That view may indeed have a basis in reality, and few would argue that the current democratic settlement is truly representative, but the book risks legitimising the degradation of minority rights in favour of preventing a broader backlash, without exploring alternative ways of fixing the system so opposed by national populists.
On the flip side, however, the authors also spend chapters focusing on the economic causes of national populism, from inequality of wealth and development to a lack of sociol-economic representation among certain groups (especially non-degree holding white workers). There is little doubt in my person opinion that this plays a huge role, however the authors are careful to reject the idea that economics are the sole causes. Instead, as mentioned, a subjective feeling of being 'left behind' economically, socially, and politically in certain groups has led to a rapid rise in national populist thought.
Overall, I have problems with this book. They overly-excuse and apologise for national populist parties who have been involved with disgusting, often explicit racism and xenophobia. At the same time, exploring and properly outlining why such groups have support in such large parts of the electorate is vital in any attempt by mainstream parties to fight back against that tide, and in that the authors are accomplished in focus.
Recommended to political nerds, and anyone with an interest in gaining an alternative view on the rise of national populism.
This book is confusing. It makes a impassioned argument that the roots of national populism can be found in primarily subjective feelings about relative deprivation compared to those outside of the "national group" (i.e. immigrants), a strong feeling of detachment from the political process, and economic inequality. In many areas, Eatwell and Goodwin's arguments are lucid, especially in the economic and political involvement sphere. Yet, the authors take the time to dismiss national populism as simply an economic phenomenon. Indeed, using stats, polls, and research studies they demonstrate that many, many people in Europe and the US feel deeply uncomfortable about immigration, often attributing their economic plight to that immigration.
Yet, and as other reviews here on Goodreads point out, Eatwell and Goodwin also take the time to, partially by implication and partially directly, that the views of national populist parties are neither racist nor explicitly bad. They seem to make the argument that suspicion of, specially Muslim, immigrants has a good basis in liberal democratic thought, and that national populist parties have no interest in tearing apart the democratic system (indeed, they claim that national populists would see the state become 'more democratic' referencing referendums). Such a conclusion ignores the situations occurring in Hungary, in Poland, and the way in which nation populists receive funding and support from nations such as Russia to undermine the system of domestic democracy so important to the modern state. Further, Eatwell and Goodwin suggest that voters who support national populists are right to advocate for a reduction in protections for minority groups if it furthers some idea of "democracy" (i.e. they seem to say that national populists, and the "lite" versions thereof who build policies to prevent their mainstream parties from sliding into irrelevance, reflect a feeling from the populous that the current democratic system does not represent them). That view may indeed have a basis in reality, and few would argue that the current democratic settlement is truly representative, but the book risks legitimising the degradation of minority rights in favour of preventing a broader backlash, without exploring alternative ways of fixing the system so opposed by national populists.
On the flip side, however, the authors also spend chapters focusing on the economic causes of national populism, from inequality of wealth and development to a lack of sociol-economic representation among certain groups (especially non-degree holding white workers). There is little doubt in my person opinion that this plays a huge role, however the authors are careful to reject the idea that economics are the sole causes. Instead, as mentioned, a subjective feeling of being 'left behind' economically, socially, and politically in certain groups has led to a rapid rise in national populist thought.
Overall, I have problems with this book. They overly-excuse and apologise for national populist parties who have been involved with disgusting, often explicit racism and xenophobia. At the same time, exploring and properly outlining why such groups have support in such large parts of the electorate is vital in any attempt by mainstream parties to fight back against that tide, and in that the authors are accomplished in focus.
Recommended to political nerds, and anyone with an interest in gaining an alternative view on the rise of national populism.
January 19, 2019
Eatwell and Goodwin have carefully constructed a fresh view on our contemporary political climate, supported by an incredible amount of data. The main takeaway is already stated on one of the first pages of the book: nationalist and populist sentiments are here to stay. Many liberal parties, along with their voters, discredit their opposition by labeling them as racists, morons, or angry elders. That is not a sustainable strategy for advancing the political agenda and trying to create a more united electorate. The authors argue that populists do have some legitimate points which liberal parties fail to recognise. They deliver a well-crafted analysis of the main drivers of populist and nationalist sentiment, while simultaneously exposing the failures of established political parties.
Only if they recognise these failures they can move on from their increasing political losses. Many liberals nowadays think the populist waves are political backlashes from the ‘angry white elders’. This myth, however, is debunked throughout the book. Liberal parties should not sit idle and wait until new generations come up while the old slowly disappear: nationalist and populist sentiments originate from reasonable concerns, shared by both new and old generations.
‘National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy’ delivers an extraordinary analysis of the forces shaping populism today, and is definitely a must-read for everyone left bewildered by the (recent) success of populist politicians.
Only if they recognise these failures they can move on from their increasing political losses. Many liberals nowadays think the populist waves are political backlashes from the ‘angry white elders’. This myth, however, is debunked throughout the book. Liberal parties should not sit idle and wait until new generations come up while the old slowly disappear: nationalist and populist sentiments originate from reasonable concerns, shared by both new and old generations.
‘National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy’ delivers an extraordinary analysis of the forces shaping populism today, and is definitely a must-read for everyone left bewildered by the (recent) success of populist politicians.
September 13, 2019
First off, this book is pretty laden with bias. It reminded me of a right wing retort to Jason Stanley’s “How Fascism Works”, with the former being an apologetic text on what the author calls “national populism” and the latter being a left wing mischaracterization of right wing populists as fascists. Either way, this book does a good job at explaining the ideology of the “national populist” movement although, if I have one critique about the content itself, the authors place way too much assumption in the idea of that national populism is democratic.
The authors argue that, because national populism attempts to be in tune with the common man and because of pro-democracy attitudes in the West and the success of national populist outcomes (like Brexit or the Trump victory), that national populism is inherently a democratic movement. The authors also note the rise of fascist and anti-democratic movements via democracy and a populist appeal throughout history but fail to draw the connection. The national character of national populism draws into question how committed these voters will be to democracy when they perceive that their nation is changing into something they don’t like. Ethnic decline is inevitable for whites, mostly due to their low birth rates. Can we assume that a group which places national identity and culture as their salient issue will continue to support democracy when their demographic weight is weakened? I can’t see the values put forth in this book being synonymous with democracy if this trend of ethnic change counties. The authors even cite sources that claim that multi ethnic democracies with a historic majority turning into a minority are not successful. This makes me fundamentally disagree with the authors premise of what national populism is. While I don’t think it’s fascist-lite, or a bunch of angry old white men, I see it as a return to the conservative norms of a previous century. Except, demography has changed since the early 1900s, giving this group a powerful incentive to damage democracy and liberal rights when given the chance
The authors argue that, because national populism attempts to be in tune with the common man and because of pro-democracy attitudes in the West and the success of national populist outcomes (like Brexit or the Trump victory), that national populism is inherently a democratic movement. The authors also note the rise of fascist and anti-democratic movements via democracy and a populist appeal throughout history but fail to draw the connection. The national character of national populism draws into question how committed these voters will be to democracy when they perceive that their nation is changing into something they don’t like. Ethnic decline is inevitable for whites, mostly due to their low birth rates. Can we assume that a group which places national identity and culture as their salient issue will continue to support democracy when their demographic weight is weakened? I can’t see the values put forth in this book being synonymous with democracy if this trend of ethnic change counties. The authors even cite sources that claim that multi ethnic democracies with a historic majority turning into a minority are not successful. This makes me fundamentally disagree with the authors premise of what national populism is. While I don’t think it’s fascist-lite, or a bunch of angry old white men, I see it as a return to the conservative norms of a previous century. Except, demography has changed since the early 1900s, giving this group a powerful incentive to damage democracy and liberal rights when given the chance
December 4, 2019
While the book offers a different perspective on supporters of populist movements, trying to explain their motives and worries, it has strong weaknesses. First, it fails to account for why those disillusioned working class voters that are just afraid of immigrants (which, as the authors seem to agree, are quite scary) have no problems voting for openly fascist and racist politicians. It denies those voters’ agency, their free choice to deny the tempting offers of the national populists. Second, it offers no solution on the problem, apart from conservative parties adapting a “populism lite”, mentioning Sarkozy, May and Kurz as good examples for making offers to more nationalist voters that contained right parties in following elections (for years to come as we can see in all three countries today).
While those arguments may be debated, their scientific working ethos is highly questionable. Claims (even quantitative ones) are made widely without any empirical backing and results from studies are very selectively presented. As an example, they say that “only one in four felt that immigration had a positive impact on their nation” in a survey that was conducted “around the world”. This number is worthless without stating the exact question that was asked and, more importantly, how many people said that immigration had a negative impact on their life, and how many people were undecided in this question. Unfortunately, this kind of examples can be found on every other page of the book. For an unscientific book like that, you would at least expect that it is interesting to read, but it was in fact a constant struggle through bad statistics, changing the country of analysis in every paragraph and constant subtle remarks that the others had seen the development for quite a long time already.
While those arguments may be debated, their scientific working ethos is highly questionable. Claims (even quantitative ones) are made widely without any empirical backing and results from studies are very selectively presented. As an example, they say that “only one in four felt that immigration had a positive impact on their nation” in a survey that was conducted “around the world”. This number is worthless without stating the exact question that was asked and, more importantly, how many people said that immigration had a negative impact on their life, and how many people were undecided in this question. Unfortunately, this kind of examples can be found on every other page of the book. For an unscientific book like that, you would at least expect that it is interesting to read, but it was in fact a constant struggle through bad statistics, changing the country of analysis in every paragraph and constant subtle remarks that the others had seen the development for quite a long time already.
January 22, 2019
Interesting book that should be required reading for every Corbynista because it explains in very clear terms how much of an error it is every time they accuse someone of racism or sexism or some other ism how much harm they are doing to their own cause. I felt relieved that I am not turning into some kind of 1930's black shirt if I take the view that Raheem Sterling should not play up front for England. And I am right to be annoyed to be a called a racist for that view? I also feel emboldened in my view that Dianne Abbot is a dreadful shadow home secretary. That is not because she is black , a woman or working class, but because she is a hopeless speaker unable to string anything that makes sense. And when taking these views (and you can disagree) it is absurd to suggest its my white privilege spewing out. No its the view that everyone should be held to the same standards and when people do that but get told they are racist, they desert those political parties that take that view and move to ones that don't. Populism is not good but boy are the Corbynista's and the PC branches of the Labour Party testing people in the UK. Back to the book. A terrible title for something that should be very widely read. At least the terrible Owen Jones got a catchy title for his book. It's not academic but it does use academia to make some very good points. Those fighting populism should take note of it all.
January 24, 2020
Clearly written, well-organized, and mostly well-argued; other reviewers have allowed their heads to explode over the idea that people who vote for nationalists and populists might actually have reasons for doing what they do, and I will confess that I was a bit put off by the authors' unwillingness to supplement their factual claim (people like national populists because they don't like immigration, and arguing that immigration is great won't change that) with a moral claim (something like, "insofar as this is motivated by racism, this is not something that anyone should try to capitalize on"). And yes, I'm as amazed as you are that people take Jonathan Haidt seriously, and the book does engage in far too much dubious "well actually"ing (e.g., they like the research that suggests the Nazis took power because people really like Nazis; they ignore basic facts like the violence, intimidation, right-wing capitulation, straight out deception etc that were involved in Hitler's becoming chancellor).
But the second one starts thinking that national populist voters are a basket of deplorables, well, we know what happens. For that reason alone this is well worth a read, because it lays out, systematically and straightforwardly, a sociological explanation for the rejection of liberalism and the embrace of nationalism and xenophobia.
But the second one starts thinking that national populist voters are a basket of deplorables, well, we know what happens. For that reason alone this is well worth a read, because it lays out, systematically and straightforwardly, a sociological explanation for the rejection of liberalism and the embrace of nationalism and xenophobia.
June 9, 2020
Popular Nationalism has been misunderstood.
Myths:
1. They are poor unemployed whites. Actually the median income of Trump voters was higher than that of Clinton voters. They do have lower education but most are not unemployed.
2. They are racists. Actually most are not but they are worried about uncontrolled or undocumented low-skilled immigration which depresses wages of less skilled residents. They are also worried about the rapid change of the racial composition of their country. That was clearly expressed by the Dutch national party which was inclusive; and even some Mexican Americans voted for Trump despite what he called them.
3. They are angry. They just feel they are not listened to by mainstream parties. Even the traditional Democrats in America and British Labour Party had been seen to have embraced neoliberal capitalism. The less educated less skilled rural people have been all but forgotten.
4. Populism is a phase. It is actually going to stay and had already shifted European central parties to the right, with much more restricted immigration, and even Brexit. Unfortunately the Populists are probably unable to deliver
So if the left continues to turn a dead ear, they are going to go extinct.
Myths:
1. They are poor unemployed whites. Actually the median income of Trump voters was higher than that of Clinton voters. They do have lower education but most are not unemployed.
2. They are racists. Actually most are not but they are worried about uncontrolled or undocumented low-skilled immigration which depresses wages of less skilled residents. They are also worried about the rapid change of the racial composition of their country. That was clearly expressed by the Dutch national party which was inclusive; and even some Mexican Americans voted for Trump despite what he called them.
3. They are angry. They just feel they are not listened to by mainstream parties. Even the traditional Democrats in America and British Labour Party had been seen to have embraced neoliberal capitalism. The less educated less skilled rural people have been all but forgotten.
4. Populism is a phase. It is actually going to stay and had already shifted European central parties to the right, with much more restricted immigration, and even Brexit. Unfortunately the Populists are probably unable to deliver
So if the left continues to turn a dead ear, they are going to go extinct.
March 28, 2021
A brilliant work to understand National Populism and its’ roots. Although it majorly focuses on the challenge at the western democracies, those who follow developing democracies, easily grasp the similarities. After left-wing politics have shifted to the middle and adopted Globalization and capitalism, uneducated working-class, culturally conservatives, and elders but not only these parts of the societies but also some from every segment have found themselves speechless in the Parliament of their countries. This makes them apolitical till an important economic crisis hits them like the one in 2008. Afterward, those speechless people diverted themselves to marginal parties that have a populist discourse. Now it is a sociological reality, a very important challenge for Liberal Democracies. Traditional left and right parties need to find ways to win back these masses otherwise populism-driven unstable and irrational political arena can be drifting societies into chaos.
To win back these people, first of all, their needs have to be understood and this book can be a guide.
To win back these people, first of all, their needs have to be understood and this book can be a guide.
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