This is the first biography of Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, a key figure in the early development of airpower, whose significant and varied achievements have been overlooked because of his subsequent involvement in the Fall of Singapore. It highlights Brooke-Popham's role in developing the first modern military logistic system, the creation of the Royal Air Force Staff College and the organisational arrangements that underpinned Fighter Command's success in the Battle of Britain. It challenges longstanding views about his performance as CinC Far East and, based on new evidence, offers a more nuanced narrative that throws light on British and Allied preparations for the Pacific War, inter-Service relations and the reasons for the disastrous loss of air and naval superiority that followed the Japanese attack. It highlights the misguided attempts at deterrence, in the absence of a coordinated information campaign, and the unprecedented security lapse that betrayed the parlous state of the Allied defences.
A graduate of Imperial College and Birmingham University, Peter John Dye served in the Royal Air Force for more than thirty-five years and was awarded the OBE for his work during the First Gulf War, retiring as an air vice-marshal. He was Director General of the Royal Air Force Museum from 2008 to 2014. He has been an Honorary Research Fellow at Birmingham University, a visiting lecturer at Wolverhampton University, and a Verville Fellow at the National Air & Space Museum, Washington, D.C.
This book is a biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, and essentially splits into two parts: 1) his life before World War II, and 2) his service as Command-in-Chief Far East in Malaya and Singapore in 1941 (and subsequent aftermath). The first half offers a detailed perspective into the founding of the RAF. The second half takes a very detailed look into the conditions in East Asia in World War II, especially prior to the Japanese attacks on Malaya, the Philippines, and Hawaii in December 1941.
The book is on-the-whole well written, and I think Dye makes a compelling case that Brooke-Popham was not entirely responsible for the fall of Malaya and Singapore in 1941-42. That said, Dye does seem to assume an existing base of knowledge on the part of the reader, and as a result frequently (and frustratingly) addresses topics only obliquely. For instance, the planned defense of Malaya, Operation Matador, is discussed at great length, but the actual plan executed on December 8th, Operation Krohcol, is only introduced when executed and is never explained.
I would like to point out a few excellent design elements which I think all non-fiction books should consider: - A concise list of acronyms and abbreviations at the front of the book, just before the introduction. This was easy to consult while reading, compared to a list tucked next to the index at the end of the book (or worse, no list at all). - Page headers identify the chapter and chapter title (e.g., Chapter Two // Army Staff College and Air Battalion), rather than the author and book title. I might not always remember what chapter I’m in, but I’ll generally remember which book I’m reading, so I appreciated this approach. - Extensive notes at the end of the book, identified by chapter number and title (books often will list either chapter number or title, but not both), and with a header saying which pages are covered (“Notes to Pages 57-60”). This made it extremely easy to look up any note in question. Additionally, the notes were also included in the index, which you don’t often see.
Overall, I think this book is worth a read if you’re very interested in the Far East Asia theater of World War II, the early history of the RAF, or Brooke-Popham himself.